INTRODUCTION

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Yamuna's Life:

Yamunacharya,[1] more popularly known as Alavandar, was the son of Isvara Bhatta and the grandson of the celebrated Nathamuni, the reputed thinker and sage who set Visishtadvaita Vedanta on a fresh phase of its career. He was born in 916 A. D.[2] at Viranarayanapuram (now called Kattu Mannargudi) in South Arcot District in Taminad. He was named Yamuna, presumably because he was born soon after his parents went on a pilgrimage to holy places on the banks of the Yamuna, hallowed by association with the lilas of Sri Krishna. He studied under Maha Bhashya Bhatta. It is said that, like Ramanuja, he had an uncommonly handsome figure and lovable personality and dignified carriage and deportment[3] Beauty of form was matched by the high quality of his mind. Venkatanatha refers to this *avaditamatih* (*Stotra Bhashya*). A precocious child, Yamuna mastered several branches of learning in a short time. Tradition records that he defeated in a debate arranged by the chola potentate of the time, a conceited and presumptuous court-poet, Vidvajjanakolahala (Akkialvan), who was a terror to all learned men far and near, as he exacted a heavy capitation fee from all learned folk. In recognition of this victory, Yamuna was hailed Alavandar (the man come to save or rule) by the queen, and was granted the gift of a territory by the king. Venkatanatha refers to this in his *Rahasyatrayasara*, *Guruparampara-sarah*.

நீளவந்தின்று விதிவகையால் நினைவொன்றிய நாம்
மீளவந்தின்னும் வினையுடம் பொன்றி விழுந்து உழலா
தாளவந்தாரெனவென்று அருள் தந்து விளங்கிய சீர்
ஆளவந்தார் அடியோம் படியோமினி அல்வழக்கே.

"We who were caught up in samsara from beginningless time have now, by good fortune, acquired a true knowledge of our nature as a spiritual being distinct from the body, consider that Alavandar (Sri Yamuna) came into the world to protect us from the danger of falling again in the mire of transmigratory cycle and we will ever be attached to the feet of the sage, Alavandar, who triumphed over his opponents and blessed us with his writings. Never more shall we read the works of heretics".

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1. Some of his other names are Yamuna Muni, Peria Mudaliar, Yamunaituraivan, and Vadimatsimhendra.
2. Dhatu year, ashada month under the asterism uttarashada.
3. Tiruvaimozhi, IV. VIII—Idu. Commentary.

To this day a locality in Gangaikondapuram goes by the name 'Alavandarmedu' vouching for the substantial correctness of the episode. The distractions of princely life kept him away from spiritual association for some years, till he was won over to the higher life, thanks to the tireless efforts of Rama Misra (Manakkalnambi), the chosen disciple of Pundarikaksha (Aravindaksha, Uyyakkondar), who was himself the foremost among the numerous disciples of Nathamuni, charged with the duty of instructing his grandson in the sacred lore. When Rama-misra initiated Yamuna into the ultimate truths and passed on to him the spiritual treasures bequeathed to him by Nathamuni, the awakening came and Yamuna realised the futility, of the life he had been leading, felt the spiritual call and became a sannyasin and settled at the holy spot of Srirangam, leading an exemplary life of saintliness and rectitude.[1] He became the accredited leader of the Visishtadvaita Vedantins and devoted all his time to the dissemination of the truths handed to him by his master and to the composing of philosophical and religious works for the benefit of posterity and in unremitting service to Bhagavan. Except for a trip to Kanchipuram to see the young Ramanuja on whose worthy shoulders he wanted the mantle of leadership to fall, and a pilgrimage to Tiruvanantapuram (Trivandrum) to worship at the famous shrine of Sri Padmanabha, Yamuna stayed at Srirangam which was in those days a great centre of Vaishnava thought and faith.

Some interest attaches to these two visits. It is said that during his visit to Kanchipuram, he saw at the temple the young Ramanuja near his teacher, Yādavaprakasa, and in the company of fellow students. Yamuna was deeply impressed with the bright, young man who was head and shoulders above the rest of the company, and he fervently prayed to the Lord that he may be pleased to make Ramanuja the worthy leader of the faith. Saying that Ramanuja may be allowed to complete his preparatory studies under Yadava, Yamuna had to hurry back on an urgent call from Srirangam. But before returning, he took care to send a copy of his *Stotra-Ratna* to Ramanuja for his edification and spiritual nourishment. Ramanuja was so captivated by the beauty and grandeur of the work that he longed to become Yamuna's pupil. This ambition was not actually fulfilled; but like Ekalavya, he became his pupil in mind.

About Yamuna's pilgrimage to Tiruvanantapuram, tradition has it that during one of the important annual temple festivals called Adhyayana

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1. Tiruvarangattamudanar in his *Ramanuja Nurrandadi*, st. 21 speaks of him with the greatest veneration as "the foremost among the saints wedded to the holy life"

(...தூய் நெறிசேர் எதிகட் கிறைவன் யமுனைத் துறைவன்...)

Utsavam, when the Alvars' Divya Prabandams are sung, the Araiyar (the Chief Chorister) while chanting the following stanza of *Tiruvoimozhi* repeated it thrice, gesticulating and, as it were, pointing to Yamuna.

கடுவினை களையலாகும்; காமனைப் பயந்த காளை
இடவகை கொண்டது என்பர், எழில் அணி அனந்தபுரம்;
படம்உடை அரவில் பள்ளி பயின்றவன் பாதம் காண
நடமினோ, நமர்கள் உள்ளீர்! நாம் உமக்கு
அறியச் சொன்னோம். X ii 8

" Good souls ! you could have all your sins, including the most deadly ones, rooted out, if you would only follow my suggesion. Wise men have declared that the ever-youthful Lord, the very embodiment of beauty, and the creator of Manmata, has specially taken His abode in the beautiful city of Tiruvanantapuram to make Himself easily accessible to all. Speed to this holy spot to worship the blessed feet of Sri Padmanabha who reclines on Adisesha with his resplendent hood. Having tasted of this delectable experience myself, *I commend this to you,* lest you should miss.it. *Speed, good soul, speed* ". Yamuna took it as a divine command that he should offer worship at a shrine so dear to Saint Satakopa. He rose at once, put Teyvavari Andan in charge of his ashram (monastery) and hurried to Tiruvanantapuram and had darsan at the sacred shrine of Sri Padmanabha.

While at Tiruvanantapuram, enjoying the unsurpassed experience of the Divine, Yamuna suddenly remembered that that was the precise date on which he had been instructed to meet Kurukaikkaval Appan from whom he had previously sought initiation into the mysteries of Yoga. What could he do, except to accuse himself for his forgetfulness? If wishes were aeroplanes, he could have rushed to that great adept in Yoga on time. His sorrow at the loss of the only opportunity was inconsolable. We are told that with this lapse, the Visishtadvaitins lost for ever the secret of Yoga.

In the last days of his life, Yamuna was keen that the mantle of spiritual leadership should fall on worthy shoulders. He could think of none but Ramanuja. As he was thinking of Ramanuja, Yamuna got, from two devotees who had come from Kanchipuram to pay their respects to the ailing master, the welcome news that Ramanuja had broken away from Yadavaprakasa and was rendering service to Lord Varadaraja. Yamuna took the news as a god-send and as an answer to his prayers that he may be allowed to have young Ramanuja as his successor; and immediately he sent his disciple, Mahapurna, to Kanchipuram, to get Ramanuja to his presence. On the side of Ramanuja, for some years past he had been anxious to become a disciple of Yamuna, whose *Stotra-Ratna* had made a tremendous impression on him. Now that he was free from any obligation to Yadavaprakasa, he got

permission from Lord Varadaraja and set out for Srirangam. He met Mahapurna on the way at Madurantakam and was delighted to learn that the master had sent for him. Both hurried to Srirangam. But when they arrived, it was too late. Yamuna had left off his mortal coils (1040 A. D.) and Ramanuja could only see the body of Yamuna lying in state. His sorrow was inconsolable. Tradition has it that Ramanuja noticed three of the five fingers of the right hand of Yamuna closed and he interpreted this phenomenon as betokening three unfulfilled wishes of the Master. After due inquiries, he learnt that the master had often referred to the need (i) to express our gratitude to Vyasa and Parasara in an appropriate form (ii) to pay a tribute of devotion to Saint Satakopa and (iii) for writing a commentary on *Vedanta Sutras* of Badarayana from the Visishtadvaita stand-point for which Yamuna and earlier acharyas had laboured so hard. When Ramanuja expressed his resolve to carry out the wishes of the master, lo ! the fingers opened !

That the period assigned to Yamuna is fairly accurate and reliable is shown by internal evidence. While refuting the doctrine of absolute identity based on the upanishadic text *ekamevadvityam Brahma*—Yamuna says in his *Samvit Siddhi* "The statement, the paramount ruler of the Chola country *now reigning* is without a second in this world" is intended to deny the existence of a ruler equal to him; it does not deny the existence of his servants, sons, consort and so on.

Yatha cola nrpassamrad advitiyo S dyabhutale
iti tat tulya nrpati nivaranaparam vacah |
na tu tad bhrtya tat putra kalatradi nishedakam ||

Samvit Siddhi p. 101

This passage while revealing Yamuna's penetrating intellect and knack of explaining even the most abstruse in terms of the most familiar, throws light incidentally on his age. The paramount ruler is Rajaraja, the Great, (985-1012 A.D.) the most powerful of the Chola monarchs, who was undoubtedly the paramount ruler at the time and who rightly claimed for himself the title of emperor (samrat), having conquered the Vengi Kingdom, Orissa and Ceylon and vanquished the Rashtrakutas.

It is also interesting to note that Yamuna refers in one place to Sureswara, the pupil of Sankara, and also the commentator of Sankara Bhashya, by name as "Sauresam vacah",[1] and in another place speaks of him as, *Vartikakara*[2] and quotes two verses from his *Brhadaranyakopanishad-*

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1. *Atma-Siddhi*; Page 35; vide foot note 76
2. *Atmasiddhi*, p. 27; vide footnotes 57; and 58

Bhashya-Vartika. From the references he makes to Sureswara (800 A.D.), Srivatsanka Misra and Bhaskara, it is clear that Yamuna must have flourished long after these thinkers.

Yamuna's works.—

From authoritative sources, it is learnt that Yamuna composed eight works; and they are.—*Agamapramanya, Maha Purusha Nirnaya, Atma-Siddhi, Isvara Siddhi, Samvit-Siddhi, Gitarthasamgraha, Chatussloki* and *Stotra-Ratna.* Venkatanatha's *Rahasyatrayasara* vouches for this; at the commencement of his commentary on *Gitarthasamgraha,* he says:—

Manatvam bhagavan matasya mahatah pumsastatha nirnayah
Tisrah siddhaya atma samvid akhiladisana tattvasrayah |
Gitarthasya ca samgrah: stutiyugam Srisrisa yorityamun
Yadgranthan anusandathe yatipatistam Yamuneyam numa: ll

Agamapramanya is devoted to vindicating the authoritativeness of the Pancharatra agamas. *Mahapurusha nirnaya* is designed to show that the ultimately Real is the Supreme Purusha, Sriman Narayana. The three siddhis-*Atmasiddhi, Iswarasiddhi* and *Samvit Siddhi* - establish the visishtadvaitic conception of soul, God and samvit (knowledge) after a critical examination of rival views. *Gitarthasamgraha* is a marvellous epitome of the teaching of the *Bhagavadgita* which is one of the cardinal texts for the vedantin. *Chatussloki* and *Stotra-ratna* are hymns in praise of Goddess Lakshmi and *Lakshmipati*,

Another work, *Kashmiragama pramanya*, is sometimes attributed to him. Perhaps the only evidence for this is the following statement occurring towards the close of *Agamapramanya* (page 89)

Yatha ca ekayanasakhaya apaurusheyatvam-tatha Kashmiragama pramanyeva prapancitamitineha prastuyate (....that the *ekayanasakha* is apaurusheya (not the work of any person, but self-existent) has been discussed at length in *Kashmiragama pramanya*; therefore, it is not here dilated upon). A close look at this passage will reveal that it is non-committal with regard to the author-ship of this work. All that it states is since the self-existence of ekayanasakha has been elaborately dealt with in that work it is not discussed here (i.e. in *Agamapramanya*). A comparison of this passage with a few parallel references would be interesting. i) In one place, Yamuna says "How knowledge never fails to be manifest has already been

1. *A History of Indian Philosophy* by S. N. Dasgupta Vol. III p.16 and 139; *Contribution of Yamuna* to *Visishtadvaita by* Dr. N. Narasimhachari. p. 2 and Yamuna's *Agamapramanya* Ed, and translated by Dr. A.B. Buitenan p. 4.

elaborately dealt with in the *Prathamadhikarana;* hence it is needless to refer to that view here...(Yatha cha samvitah prakasavyabhicharastatha prapanchitam prathamadhikarna iti natropakshipya pratiksheptavyam)[1] (ii) In another place, Yamuna states: "And this has clearly been proved in the *Adhikarana* and later it would be conclusively established" (sa cha adhikarana siddhah sadhayishyate cho parishtat)[2] (iii) In yet another place, Yamuna writes, "This (the impossibility of such an analysis) may be ascertained from the commencement of the siddhanta part of *bhrantyadhikarana* and from *Samvit-Siddhi* (anirupanancha bhrantyadhikarana siddhantarambe *samvit-siddau* cha anusandhatavyam)[3]. (iv) To cite one other instance "As the Yatharthakhyati has been established in the *Sastra*, it is not dealt with here" (Yatharthakhyati samarthanena cha Sastra iti na varnyate)[4]. From these analogous statements where references are not confined to his own works, it would be clear that there is no sufficient warrant for including *Kashmiragama pramanya* among his works in the face of the strong tradition that he composed only the eight works detailed above. There are reasons to believe that it was composed by one of the disciples of Nathamuni who contributed a great deal towards making the *Agamas* a live force in thought and conduct.

The chronological order of Yamuna's works.—Although the chronological position of the works of Yamuna cannot be definitely fixed, yet it could be stated with a fair measure of certainty that (i) of the three *siddhis*, *Samvit Siddhi* was composed first, then *Atma Siddhi* and next *Isvara Siddhi* (ii) *Agama pramanya* was composed after *Purusha nirnaya* and that (iii) *Chatussloki* preceded *Stotra Ratna.* There is internal evidence in support of the first two statements and well recognised procedure to vouch for the correctness of the third. The evidence may now be indicated. That *Samvit Siddhi* was composed before Atma Siddhi is clear from the following references it contains to *Samvit Siddhi* (a) "Already established in *Samvit Siddhi* (Samvit Siddha veva sadhitam)[5] (b) "may be ascertained from...and from 'Samvit-Siddhi' (samvitsiddhau cha anusandhatavyam). As there is the following reference to *Atma- Siddhi* in *Ishvara Siddhi* the latter must have been composed later than the former. "When discussing the nature of the soul, it has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former body..." (purva deha parityagena dehantara prapaka karma prerita prana sahaya eva dehantaram pravisati ityupapaditam atmacintayam).[6] In *Agama pramanya,* Yamuna says: iti sarvan chaitat Purushanirnaye nipunataramupapaditam iti neha prapanchyate (All this has been well explained in great detail in Purushanirnaya and is therefore not further dilated

1. *Atma Siddhi* pp. 59. 2. *Atma Siddhi* p. 73. 3. *Atma Siddhi* p. 75.
4. *Atma Siddhi* p. 25. 5. *Atma Siddhi,* p. 31. 6. *Iswara Siddhi,* p. 95.

upon here). This supports the view that *Purushanirnaya* preceded *Agama-pramanya*. The accepted procedure that one is to perform purushakara prapatti to Sri (Lakshmi) before prapatti to the Divine Couple favours the inference that *Catussloki* must have been composed before *Stotra-ratna*. The reason for approaching Goddess Lakshmi prior to offering oneself to Sriman Narayana is, in the words of Venkatanatha, to secure the intercession of Lakshmi, the very embodiment of mercy, on our behalf so that the Lord may not take too serious a view of our sins and shortcomings and that his anger and dissatisfaction with us may be mitigated and He may be pleased to accept our surrender (tadupa sadana trasa samanim).

If chronologically *Samvit Siddhi* is the first among the *Siddhis*, it may be asked: Why is it that *Atma Siddhi* figures first and *Samvit Siddhi* comes last in all available editions of *Siddhi traya?* A plausible reason is that although all the three have suffered from the ravages of time and vandalism, and are, in consequence, incomplete, *Atma-Siddhi* alone is a little fuller and its beginning along with the *mangala sloka* has escaped destruction, while *Samvit-Siddhi* has not only lost, like *Isvara Siddhi*, much valuable material both at the beginning and end, but also in the intervening parts.

THE SHAPING FORCES OF YAMUNA'S THOUGHT

The shaping forces of Yamuna's thought include the writings of such illustrious purvacharyas as Tanka, Dramida and Srivatsanka Misra, the *Nyaya-tattva* of his grandfather and pracharya, Nathamuni, and the compositions of the Alwars, particularly those of Nammalwar (Saint Satakopa). He has profound admiration for the ancient preceptors. Tanka's (Bhashyakara's) work he characterises as concise and pregnant with meaning (parimita gambhira bhashina)[1], and Srivatsanka Misra, he describes as the venerable Srivatsanka who set forth an ocean of rules of interpretation, elegant and thoughtful (gambhira nyayasagara bhashina Srivatsanka Misra).[2] Nathamuni's *Nyaya tattva*, a veritable treasure-house of philosophic wisdom, has furnished the guide lines for Yamuna's own epoch-making writings.[3] This is evident from his references to this work and to its *padas* (chapters) and *adhikarnas* (sections). He seems to have followed this work so closely that Venkatanatha says that '*Atma-Siddhi* is verily a condensed version of *Nyaya-tattva*' (Nyayatattva prakaranam hi *Atma Siddhi'h*:[4] It is a matter of poignant interest that this master-piece has been

1. and 2. *Atma Siddhi* p. 9

3 Uktam khalu Nathamunibhih Vedantanukulam Nyayatattivabhidhanea ! tacchi parigrhitam Yamunacharyadibhih:-Venkatanatha's *Tattvamukta Kalapa* p. 491

4, *Nyaya-siddhanjana*, Buddhipariccheda

lost. Yamuna's feelings of gratitude to Nathamuni is too deep for words. He starts and winds up his *Stotra Ratna* with fervent praise of his spiritual guru; and at the close of *Agamapramanya,* he grows ecstatic in his praise of the great supernormal spiritual gifts of Nathamuni which enabled him to have Sakshatkara (direct, immediate apprehension) of the three reals-cit, acit and Iswara. (Jiyan Nathamuni sva Yoga-mahima pratyaksha tattva trayah)[1],

Yamuna's indebtedness in Nammalvar is immeasurable and is expressed in an inimitable way in the following stanza of *Srotra-Ratna.* •

Mata pita yuvatayas tanaya vibhutis
sarvam yadeva niyamena madan vayanam I
adhyasya nah kulapater vakulabhiramam
Srimat tadangri yugalam pranamami murdhna II

Stotra-Ratna St. 5.

"I bow my head reverently before the blessed feet of Parankusa[2], the first and foremost leader of our race, adorned with *vakula* flowers : those holy feet alone have been and ever will be to me and to everyone of my race, mother, father, wives, sons and cherished wealth".[3] How Yamuna has been steeped in *Divya Prabandas,* particularly in *Tiruvoimozhi* could be seen from a study of his *Stotra Ratna.* Elsewhere it has been shown how this hymn echoes the sentiments expresed in *Tiruvoimozhi.*

It is learnt that Yamuna used to expound to his disciples the inner significance of Divya Prabandas and more especially, *Tiruvoimozhi;* and many of his original interpretations of some of the stanzas of Tiruvoimozhi have been recorded as 'Alavandar's *nirvahamkal*' in *Idu,* the most elaborate and fascinating commentary on Tiruvoimozhi.

Accounts of the life of Ramanuja record that as directed by Mahapurna, Ramanuja was studying the inner significance of Divya Prabandas from Maladhara, who had himself learnt them from Yamuna. Maladhara took great offence at Ramanuja now and then pointing out that what he

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1. *Agamapramanya,* Ed by Buitenan p. 80
2. Nammalvar, Saṭokopa and Maran are some of the other names of Parankusa.
3. Compare Venkatanatha's obeisance to Nammalvar in the third stanza of Prasthavapaddatih, *Padukasahasra.* Nammalvar saw the very root of the veda and hence could give us their equivalent in Tamil in his *Tiruvoimozhi.*

was saying could not have been Yamuna's own views; and in consequence he suspended instruction. When Mahapurna heard about this, he advised Maladhara to resume the discourses, stating that Ramanuja was no ordinary pupil and that his discipleship was just as formal as that of Krshna under Sandipini; and that, in any case, they were but channels, conduit pipes as it were, to pass on Yamuna's teaching to Ramanuja. The discourses were resumed, and later, when differences of opinion arose again, Maladhara realised that Ramanuja was on surer ground and that he had a clearer insight into Yamuna's mind than he himself could claim; for like Ekalavya of old, Ramanuja had uncommon guru-bhakti and was attuned to the master's mind. This episode bears testimony to the great esteem in which the visishtadvaitie acharya held the Divya Prabandas, considered as the Tamil veda, and acquired complete mastery over them.

Siddhitraya at a glance:—

SIDDHITRAYA

Atma-Siddhi, Isvara-Siddhitrayam and *Samvit-Siddhi,* usually referred to by the collective name of *Siddhitrayam* are not parts of a single work but pendent treatises designed to establish respectively the visishtadvatic conception of *atman (jiva or soul),* Isvara (God) and *Samvit* (consciousness; knowledge), after a critical consideration of rival views. These polemical works are conceived on the model of the great *Siddhis* of the advaitic school, such as *Brahma Siddhi, Ishta-Siddhi* and *Naishkarmya Siddhi.* Some of the views set forth in these *Siddhis* of the advaita school come in for critical examination in *Siddhitraya.* In *Atmasiddhi,* some statements from *Ishtasiddhi* are cited and criticised[1].

Atma Siddhi and *Isvarasiddhi* are written in elegant prose interspersed with verse in the manner of early philosophical works like *Tantra-vartika;* and *Samvit Siddhi* is wholly in verse.

Unfortunately all these have suffered from the ravages of time and neglect and possibly from vandalism. All of them end abruptly; *Isvara Siddhi* and *Samvit Siddhi* have no beginning either, and *Samvit Siddhi* is the worst hit, because even in the body of this work there are many gaps. What we now have of *Siddhitraya* is only a fragment of the original work. Even in this truncated form, *Siddhitraya* impresses upon its reader that the author was a master-mind who expounded all the cardinal principles of visishtadvaita in a clear and distinct manner and that he set himself the highest standards of logical thinking. These three *siddhis* are of the greatest value to the student

1 *Atma Siddhi,* p. 32

of vedantic thought not only because they are the earliest available visishtavaita classics but also because they present an authentic account of this system of thought and belief, having been inspired and shaped by the rich contributions of previous acharyas including Nathamuni, transmitted to him through an unbroken tradition. They have furnished the basis and inspiration for Ramanuja's brilliant systematisation of Visishtadvaitic thought and also for post-Ramanuja dialectics.

ATMA SIDDHI

The *mangala* sloka (invocatory verse) with which *Atma Siddhi* commences is a prayer for the highest form of bhakti[1] to the Supreme Purusha; and it states in a nut-shell the visishtadvaitic conception of the Deity. Yamuna explains why he undertakes this work. All systems of thought agree that Atma-jnana is the means to transcendental felicity (*nisreyas*). Numerous sruti passages assert that knowledge of the *jivatma* and *Paramatma* is the means of liberation. But conflicting views have been held by thinkers on almost every aspect of the self, its essential nature, attributes, the means by which it is known, its duration, number, the way to the attainment of moksha and so on. Likewise, divergent views are entertained about the infinite self. In the maze of arguments and counter-arguments presented by inquirers seeking to justify their respective views of man and God, one is confused and is unable to come to the right conclusion. Hence the need of this inquiry.

At the very outset, Yamuna states in unmistakable words the *Pratijna*— the thesis which he proposes to establish,—in a superb stanza remarkable for its brevity and clarity.

Dehendriyamanah prana dhibhyo Snyo S nanyasadhanah:
nityo S vyapi pratikshetramatma bhinnah atma swatah sukhi ll

"The individual soul is a spiritual principle different from the body, senses, mind (*manas*) vital breath, (*prana*) and consciousness (*dhih*); it does not depend on anything else for its manifestation (i.e. it is self-luminous); it is eternal, subtle (*anumatra, atisukshma*), distinct in each body and is, in its essential nature, blissful"

Then Yamuna plunges into the subject, seeking serially to establish, after a reasoned consideration, every one of the items mentioned in the *pratijna*. First materialism in its different forms identifying the soul with

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1. The *bhakti* prayed for is semushi bhaktirupa (knowledge that has blossomed into bhakti) as will be evident from Ramanuja's prayer at the commencement of his Sri Bhashya.

either the body or senses or *manas* or vital breath is examined and shown to be unacceptable. Incidentally the Nyaya-Vaiseshika theory that *manas* is one of the nine ultimate *dravyas*, which with their properties and relations constitute the whole universe, is assailed. Then follows a critical review of the theory that *samvit* (consciousness) is the soul, for the reason that it is *ajada* (other than insentient). The Buddhists *(prakatah)* and the disguised Buddhists (pracchanah) sponsor the view that self-luminous consciousness alone is the soul and that it is the only reality; but that on account of *vasanas* (impressions of previous experience) or on account of beginningless ignorance *(avidya)*, it has for its object the erroneously imagined and unreal distinctions of knower and known. The Buddhist doctrine, whether it identifies the same with momentary consciousness *(kshanika vijnana)* or with a stream of consciousness, has to face insuperable difficulties. Nor docs the Advaitic theory of pure consciousness devoid of subject and object, eternal and self-luminous, fare any better. Yamuna shows that what is termed consciousness is well-known to possess the character of manifesting by its very existence some object to its substrate, namely the soul; and that terms such as *samvit*, *anubhuti*, *jnana*, *prakasa* and *avagati* are synonyms and are relative terms, always pointing to an agent and an object. The atman is a knower *(jnatr)* and not mere knowledge *(jnana)*. Perception, reasoning and scriptural testimony support the visishtadvaitic view of the soul; and on this view alone the possibility of ignorance afflicting the soul could be explained. The self which is knower presents itself as 'I' *(aham)*.

The *pramanas* by which the self is known are next considered. The Nyaya and the Sankhya doctrines that the soul is known through inference come in for scrutiny. The fallacies lurking in their proofs for the existence of the soul are relentlessly exposed. The Nyaya arguments could, at best, prove the existence of 'some entity' as the substrate of qualities such as effort and desire; but it would be difficult to call it the 'self'. Likewise, the arguments advanced by the Sankhya are shown to fail of their purpose. Yamuna also exposes the deficiencies of the Nyaya and the Sankhya conceptions of the soul.

Then, he demonstrates the untenability of the view that the self is directly perceived. The Bhatta maintains that the self becomes aware of itself and this must only be through *manasa-pratyaksha*, since the external senses cannot cognise the self, which is subtle and formless. The Bhatta understands *aham-pratyaya*(self-consciousness) literally. The 'I' it is said, can be perceived directly. So the self, according to him, is both subject and object of knowledge. The Prabhakara objects to this and contends that the self is always subject and that it is revealed as such *(grahaka eva)*, as subject only in all knowledge. In other words, it is revealed simultaneously with the

object. Whenever an object, say a pot, is known, there is, in addition, self-awareness. But the self so known is cognised as knower, not as object of knowledge. Either school of Mimamsa criticises the other; and Yamuna shows that neither position stands logical scrutiny. He says the self cannot be revealed by that for which he stands witness, any more than he who witnesses the pot can be revealed by the pot. Yamuna states that persons well versed in the vedas, having no faith in the power of reason to prove the existence of the atman, assert that this proof is furnished by the vedas alone.

Anumaniki mapyatmasiddhim asradd adhanah srautimeva tam srortriyah sankiranti. Thus it is concluded that the self is known only through *sruti* and *srutyarthapatti*. What the scriptures teach has to be properly understood; and for this unclouded reasoning is a pre-requisite.

Then Yamuna establishes that the soul is self-luminous consciousness in itself and possesses knowledge as its attribute. In its very essence (*svarupa*) the soul is consciousness; and it has consciousness as its attribute, (dharma). To distinguish consciousness which is of the nature of *dharma* or attribute from that which is the *svarupa* of the soul, it has come to be called *dharma-bhutajnana* (attributive consciousness). Attributive consciousness is eternal and natural to the soul as luminosity is to the sun. This doctrine, special to visishtadvaita vedanta, offers a satisfactory solution for many a knotty problem,

The objections, mostly from the Nyaya-Vaiseshika and Mimamsa darsanas, to the view that consciousness is eternal and natural to the self are next considered. Among other things, it is said, if knowledge were eternal there would be no distinction between one item of knowledge and another. Moreover, knowledge is known to be caused only when there is sense organ contact. Further, there must be knowledge even in deep sleep. These and other objections are suitably met. It is pointed out that if, as the opponent says, knowledge is an occasional property of the soul, it would amount to despiritualising it. After an elaborate discussion into the nature of prakasa (manifestation) Yamuna concludes that it is *anubhava duratvam* (*not* remote from experience). In this he is adopting the definition offered by Nathamuni. This conception offers an easy explanation for all facts of knowledge and shows how the past and the future could come under the purview of knowledge.

From the foregoing discussion, Yamuna concludes that the soul has consciousness for its essential nature and is aware of itself at all times; and it knows objects besides itself, with the aid of *dharma-bhuta-jnana* working through the medium of *manas* and senses. Since the perception of external objects depends on various causal conditions, it is said 'He knows', He does not know'.

Though the soul shines forth as having consciousness for its essential nature, yet, like the fish which moves about in the deep lake or the milk mingled with water, the soul does not shine forth clearly and directly. That is why the arguments advanced by teachers of old consistently with the nature of the soul and with scriptural teachings are held in esteem. But these don't satisfy fully; for they could after all provide only indirect, mediate knowledge (*paroksha jnana*). To secure immediate knowledge (*aparoksha jnana*), persons seek to get rid of the veiling obscurities and evils by the practice of yoga and to purify themselves through fire (*puta paka*) as it were by mental control allowing the *sattva* quality to predominate. Immediate knowledge arises only at the culmination of the highest stage of concentration. Thus, with the aid of scriptural testimony, inference and perception resulting from the practice of yoga, such a disciplined person cognises the soul, which is in itself self-luminuous, most clearly and explicity (*bhavana prakarsha paryante cha paroksha jnanamudayata iti sarva vadi nirvadam iti*).

Next the inquiry into the duration of the soul (*kalavaccheda pariksha*) it taken up. The Buddhist view that the soul is momentary (*kshanika*) is taken up for consideration. The rest of *Atma-siddhi* has been lost.

Yamuna refers to certain sections of *Atma-Siddhi* which are not available. i) The section called *sambandhavimarsa* where the nature of the relation of the finite soul to the infinite Self is determined is lost. ii) Again, the section where he establishes that the soul is *svatssukhi* (*blissful* in its pristine purity) is also lost. This being the last item in the pratijna (what he set out to establish) it is clear Yamuna completed the work; but a good part has been irretrievably lost.

ISVARA SIDDHI

Isvara Siddhi is devoted to a discussion of the existence and nature of the Supreme God. As stated already it is incomplete. The available text contains only a part of the *purvapaksha* relating to proofs for the existence of Isvara. Starting abruptly, it ends with equal abruptness. The prefatory statement runs as follows: "In establing that the (activities of the world process) is under the governance of a single supreme person, the prima facie view may be stated first" This is followed by the presentation of the Mimamsa objections to a belief in an ommiscient God. The Mimamsaka recognises no creation or dissolution and thinks that the world is self-evolving, getting the impetus for change from the past karmas of souls who play their part in life's journey at the time; and therefore, he dispenses with the God-idea. The Mimamsaka argues that perception, whether of the normal (*laukika*) or of the super-normal (*alaukika* or yogic) kind, fails to furnish any evidence for

a belief in God. Nor is inference capable of establishing God's existence. Next comes the Naiyayika reply to these arguments and his proofs for God's existence. This is followed by the Mimamsaka rejoinder; which again invokes the counter-arguments of the Naiyayika and he adduces further proofs of God's existence. At this stage, the work breaks off. The portions lost include entire *siddhanta* and also part of the *purvapaksha*, at least what the Mimamsaka would possibly have said about *agama* not vouching for the existence of God. It is obvious that the Nyaya stand-point with which the available text ends does not represent Yamuna's own view, though Dr. S. N. Dasgupta is disposed to think otherwise, for reasons best known to himself. He says "Yamuna follows the method of the Nyaya and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who has a direct knowledge of the materials. He has also a direct knowledge of *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) of men in accordance with which he creates......."[1] Having definitely stated in *Atma Siddhi* that the fimite self is known only through scripture, Yamuna would never countenance the view that the existence of the Supreme Self is matter for *anumana.*

ânumaniki mapyatma siddhim asradda
dhanah srautimevatam srotryah sangirante.

Moreover, in *Agamapramanya*, Yamuna states categorically "that might be only if the proof of the existence of God is sought on the flimsy ground of inference; but, as a matter of fact, it is not so; the great Lord is indeed known only on the authority of the upanishads"

nanu ca kevala tarkabaladayam
yadi sishadhayisha-padam isvarah: |
bhavetu nama tatha sati dushanam
srutisirah pramito hi Mahesvarah || *Agamapramanya* p. 17

Further, the substance of the entire *Isvara siddhi* now extant, including the views of the Naiyayika, figures in the purvapaksha in Ramanuja's comments on the *Brahma Sutra* I. i. 3—*sastrayonitvat.* Taking the discussion beyond the *purvapaksha,* Ramanuja points out that belief in a God as the author of the universe is primarily based upon sruti or revelation. Reason, designated *yukti* or *anukulatarka* may indicate the probability of a conclusion already reached by other means, and is thus ancillary to scriptural authority. In this matter, the function of reason is purely negative, the removal of any antecedent improbability that may be felt to exist about the truth of God. By itself reasoning is powerless to prove God's existence. At best it can make

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1. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, by S. N. Das Gupta Vol. III p. 153.

out a case for an intelligent being who is to be the creator of the world; it cannot establish that the creator is a single omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, all-wise and merciful God. Much less can it establish that God is at once the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

SAMVIT SIDDHI

As noticed already, *Samvit Siddhi* has suffered the greatest damage having lost large tracts at the beginning, the end and also in the intervening parts. What remains of *Samvit Siddhi*, though fragmentary, is still of considerable value to the student of vedantic thought as it discusses many a fundamental philosophical issue. In the main, the work is devoted to a critical review of the advaitic doctrines and the establishment of the visishtadvaitic theory. Incidentally some of the Sankhya, Jaina and Bauddha concepts of the Real come in for scrutiny. The topics discussed include the advaitic interpretation of certain upanishadic texts for which a privileged position is claimed by the absolutists, texts such as *sad eva saumya idam agra asit, ekame vadvitiyam Brahman, tat satyam* sa atma *tat tvam asi* Ṣvetaketo'', the ontological status of the world; the conception of Brahman as pure, distinctionless (*nirvisesha*) quality-less (*nirdharmaka*) thought (*samvit*), the concepts of *Maya* and *avidya*; *ekajivavada*; the critique *bheda*; and so on.

Taking their stand on certain crucial upanishadic texts, the *abheda* srutis, the advaitins contend that Brahman is the only reality (*satya*) and that the *prapancha* (the world of men and things) is *mithya*. It was easy for Yamuna to establish his own thesis that Brahman is all-comprehensive and does not exclude the cosmos by showing that as against the few *abheda srutis* the bulk of the upanishadic texts (i.e. the *abheda srutis*) support belief in the *saprapancha* ideal, namely that *cidacit prapancha* is real and is rooted in Brahman. But that amounts to committing the error of concentrating on convenient sections of the upanisads and explaining away the rest. It could at best show that this is also a plausible alternative interpretation, but not vindicate its claim to greater credence. Therefore, Yamuna takes up for consideration the very *abheda srutis* which are claimed to be the bedrock of unflinching monism, and establishes with great logical acumen that they do not bear out the interpretation put on them by the Advaitins. Far from expounding alternative theories of the Real and its relation to the world, the three types of upanishadic texts-the *abheda* srutis, the *bheda srutis*, and the *ghataka srutis*-stress different aspects of the comprehensive and consistent view of the real, namely the transcendence, the unity and the immanence of God. Interpreted in the light of the context in which the statement; "Sat existed, one only, without a second "aditya'', the expression '*advitiya*', it would be been, does not deny the existence of everything other than *Sat* or Brahman. Whether taken as a *bahurihi* or *tat purusha* compound, it does

not convey such a negative meaning. All *pramanas,* perception, inference and sruti, vouch for the reality of the world. "Sat existed, one only, without a second' really intends to assert, says Yamuna, that the Supreme Spirit is one without a peer. He neither has nor had nor will have an equal or a superior (*samanadhika rahita*) fit to be reckoned as a second. He cites an illustration to support this interpretation. "The paramount monarch of the chola country now reigning is without a second in the world" emphasises that he is unrivalled, there is no monarch equal to him. Surely, it does not deny the existence of his retinue, sons, consort and so on. The whole host of devas, asuras and men, the fourfaced Brahma and the cosmic egg form but an infinitesimal part of a drop from the ocean of the greatness (*mahima)* of the Supreme Purusha, the Lord of all who is untainted by *klesas* (sorrows) or *karma,* and who is the seat of the six-fold qualitiss of omniscience and the the like, and whose glories cannot even be conceived by the mind. "There is but a single sun in the sky and not two", does not deny the existence of the rays of the sun. The world which is but an infinitesimal fraction of the entire collection of entities which constitute His possessions *(vibhuti)* and which are under His sway could scarely be called a second entity. Yamuna asks: Does anyone counting with his fingers the ocean as seven, count the waves, foam, bubbless and drops of water found therein ?

The truth of the world is not its unreality, but its having Brahman for its soul-*aita tatmyam idam sarvam tat satyam.* The world constituted of spiritual and non-spiritual entities derives its very being from the fact of its having Brahman for its soul; and it is the body (sarira) of God. It is a mode (*prakara*) of the Lord. Its unchanging and ultimate cause is *Sat* alone. Just as sparks are not different from the fire where from they take their rise, even so the effect is non-different from their cause. That the effect is substantially the same as the cause is shown by the very examples cited, namely, clay, steel, gold and so forth. The cause that brought them into actuality is also the sustaining principle. Without being nourished by Brahman's power, fire would be incapable of burning; water of wetting, and wind would be powerless to move.

The concise formula, *Tat tv m asi,* is claimed by the advaitin to be an unequivocal statement of the identity of *jiva* and Brahman. Does this text teach the absolute identity of jiva and Brahman? Of the two terms here equated *Tat* refers to the omniscienct Lord whose will is ever-realised, who is the creator of the world and who is the sea of illimitable bliss; and *tvam* to the finite soul characterised by helplessness and affected by sorrow and misery. Their qualities are wholly opposed to each other as light to darkness; they must be distinct and to equate them would amount to attributing contradictory qualities to the self-same entity. It is unhelpful to

suggest that contradictory features could be attributed to the same object on the basis of limiting conditions; for there could be no limiting conditions in the case of pure consciousness.

It won't do merely to say that the world is an appearance *(mithya)*. How the appearance appears has to be explained. The advaitin seeks to explain it thus: Brahman which is under the influence of *maya* appears as Iswara who is characterised by *satya samkalpatva* and who is the cause of the world; and the self-same Brahman under the influence of avidya, appears as the finite soul steeped in sorrow and delusion and that consequently the identity of the basic reality, *suddha caitanya,* is what is asserted in the *Tat tvam asi* text.

According to Yamuna such a doctrine bristles with difficulties. For one thing, there would be confusion between Iswara and jiva. Further the contention that Brahman is, in itself, devoid of these distinctions, but that, in association with *maya* and *avidya,* it deludes itself into believing that it is manifold and possessed of qualities is like asserting that Devadatta who is beheaded for an alleged crime remains unhurt. Besides, this interpretation of *Tat tvam asi* amounts either to saying 'A' is 'A' which is a tautology or attempting to equate what could not be identified, namely the real and the unreal.

The equation *(sama nadhikananya* is to be interpreted as *prakara* prakari identity or *sarira sariri bhava.*

Yamuna points out that the scriptures teach that Brahman and the finite self are not identical and that, in moksha, the jiva retains its ditinctness as seen in the description that "dwelling in the depths of Brahmanubhava the liberated soul experiences illimitable bliss, "If the jiva were to perish at the time the fruits of its labours are realised, Yamuna asks: For whm is this moksha? Who would endeavour to reach such a state of self-annihilation?

After exposing the weakness of the theory of a single, distinctionless, qualityless and pure consciousness, Yamuna seeks to establish that *samvit* is manifold.

Next he takes up for examination the conception of *avidya* which is a vital, and at the same time, the most vulnerable part of Advaitic philosophy. The notion of *avidya* is, according to Yamuna, a waxen doll that cannot stand before the fire of reasoning. He exposes the manifold defects of the doctrine of *avidya.* These have been succinctly expressed by Ramanuja in what has become known as sevenfold objections *(sapta vidanupapatti)* to

maya, and these have been elaborated by Venkatanatha in his great polemical work, '*Satadushani*. *Avidya* must be either a negative or a positive principle; and either alternative leads to unwelcome results. It is spoken of as *sadadvilaksana*. The reasons advanced to support this could be shown to prove quite the opposite description. *Avidya* is either consciousness or the knower or the known; and in any case, it cannot be dispelled; either *avidya* is the contradictory or the contrary of *vidya*. If the former, it cannot possibly exist any where, as the real is consciousness witht out a second; if the latter, the theory that *samvit* is without a second would have to be abandoned. *Avidya* as conceived by the advaitin can have no *asraya* (support). It can have no place in the jiva; to say so is to commit the fallacy of mutual dependence (*any on yasraya*); it could have no place in Brahman, which is omniscient. And if it were to exist in the omniscient and the eternally free Being, it can never be removed.

It is argued that the texts referring to ommiscience and other perfections have only relative validity (*vyava harika pramanya*) while those speaking of non-dualism alone have absolute validity (*tattvika pramanya*); but this is untenable, because there is no basis except dogmatic assertion for distinguishing between two sets of scriptural texts. *Avidya* should not only have an *asraya*, a basis from which to operate, but also something which it negates (*pratiyogin*). On the advaitic theory, Brahman must be both the *asraya* and the *pratiyogin*, a manifestly impossible position. To suggest that in different aspects Brahman is *asraya* and *pratiyogin* is to accept distinctions in Brahman.

Next Yamuna shows that *avidya* cannot be single. The view that *moksha* is not a state to be newly attained is then shown to be indefensible. The contention that *avidya* is an obstacle to *Brahma-jnana* does not stand the test of reason. Then *eka jiva veda* is shown to be illogical. Next, it is pointed out that the Advaitin cannot give an intelligible account of social life on the basis of the theory of phenomenal selves, each of which creates with the aid of its individual *avidyas*, objects perceptible only to itself. Then it is shown that the advaitic view that self-luminosity, unity, all-pervasivences and eternity characterise consciousness contradicts their view that *samvit* is *nirdharmaka*. To make them the very essence of Brahman is no escape. *Satyam, jnanam* and *anantam* cannot be interpreted negatively as is sought to be done.

The advaitic theory that all *pramanas* establish non-difference is to be rejected; because, everyone of them reveals its object as something specific. There is no support for the conclusion that the world is *sadasad-vilaksana*.

The advaitic argument that things are only thought, since they always go together is next shown to be faulty. It is a double-edged weapon; for,

on the same ground, one might as well draw the inference that thoughts are things. Moreover, the very assertion that thoughts and things go together implies difference. If there were no two things, there could be no talk of their going together.

A few passages from *Samvit Siddhi* not found in the available text but quoted in *Srutaprakasika* (Sudarsana suri's commentary on *Sri Bhasya*) may be cited. These have also been reproduced by Venkatanatha.

1. Yadya prakasa mana dhih kadacidavatisthate
   ....
   ghatadaviva tatrapi kalpaniyam prakasakam |

2. ghato' yamiti vijnane ghatamatram, prakasate
   na vittiriti yushmakam goshthishu nanu ghushyate

3. atita' nagate carthe katham prakatya sambhavah
   na hi dharminyasatyeva dharmah sambhavamrcchate

4. tadevapasyatam sarvasunyatvat bhibyatam satam
   gatissvayam prakasatvadrte nanyopalabhyate.

The first states the advaitic argument that *samvit* must be regarded as self-luminous; for, if it depended on 'something else' for its manifestation, that something else would require some other entity for its manifestation and so on endlessly. The second is the Advaitic criticism of the Bhatta view that when objects are cognised, objects alone are presented first and not *samvit* also; *samvit* is presented later, as when it is said 'I know this jar'. The third is the Advaitic refutation of the Bhatta view of prakatya. In the last, the Advaitin criticises the Bhatta theory of *samvit* and shows that unless it is admitted to be self-luminous, the very existence of *samvit* would be threatened.

Criticisms Answered

This summary of the discussions on the available text of *Siddhitrayam*, brief as it is, suffices to show that almost all the fundamental issues of philosophy have been considered from the stand-point of visishtadvaita vedanta and conclusions drawn after a critical review of rival doctrines. These conclusions are reinforced, and topics not discussed here dealt with in the other works of Yamuna. Together they present a comprehensive account of visishtadvaita darsana in all its aspects.— *tattva, hita and purushartha.* On the foundation thus well and truly laid Ramanuja erected a stable and splendid superstructure satisfying fully the demands of philosophy and religion.

Before indicating the extent of Yamuna's influence on Ramanuja, it is quite necessary to show that the comments made by Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta on the contributions of Yamuna are unwarranted. Otherwise the criticisms may be taken to be justified especially since Dr. S. N. Dasgupta enjoys great prestige among the exponents of Indian thought. The criticisms and the replies thereto may be prefaced by the general observation that Dr. Dasgupta seems not only to have overlooked the fact that large portions of the *Siddhis* have been lost, but also to have skipped over the available text. Besides, he has practically ignored the other works of Yamuna which corroborate, amplify and supplement what is established in Siddhitrayam. The most effective way of meeting the adverse comments is by quoting extracts from Yamuna's writings thereby revealing that Dasgupta's reading of the texts has been perfunctory.

Now for the comments.—1. "Yamuna follows the method of the Nyaya and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who had a direct knowledge of the materials. . . ."[1] The reply to this has already been furnished. It has been shown that Yamuna does not accept the Nyaya view that the existence of God is proved by arguments and that in *Agamapramanya* he has categorically stated that scriptural testimony is our only guide in this regard. (vide p. 16 ante)

2. " . . . Iswara is spoken of as fashioner of the world system in accordance with the Nyaya doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the relation of Isvara to the world, both in the *Siddhitraya* and in the

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1. A History of Indian Philosophy by Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta, vol. iii, pp. 153-4 all the criticisms on the subject are found in pages 153-4.

Agamapramanya, it is almost certain that his own attitude does not differ much from the Nyaya attitude which left the duality of the world and Isvara unresolved......" Reply.—Mistaking the view mentioned last in *Isvara-siddhi* for the *Siddhanta*, Dasgupta draws this palpably erroneous conclusion. That Yamuna does not countenance the view that God is an almighty clock-maker setting to work on material existing independently of Him has already been indicated. Again, far from accepting the dualism of Iswara and the cosmos, Yamuna maintains that the Real is a unity. The ultimately Real is the Supreme Purusha who owns the multitudinous objects and persons comprising the *prapancha* as His *vibhutis*, (property, glory) *prakaras*, (modes). The modes are real, distinct from one another and from God; they have their distinctive characteristics and there is no mixing up of their nature; and yet they are inseparably related to the Supreme and have an adjectival existence. They are related to the Supreme as body is related to the soul; they owe their very existence to, are controlled in their activities by, and exist to subserve the purposes of the Supreme. Yamuna's solution of the problem of the 'One and the many' is unique. Rejecting at once the notion of a blank unity and unrelieved pluralism he believes in a unity in diversity. The prakaras are many; the prakarin is one.

The very opening stanza of *Atma-siddhi* declares that prakrti, kala and souls (*baddhas*, *muktas* and *nityas*) always conform to the will of Sriman for whom creation, sustenance and dissolution are sport, in the interest of soul-making,

Prakrti purusha kala vyakta mukta yadiccha
manuvidadhati nityam nitya-siddhairanekaih |

Again, he says.—

"Svadhina trvidha chetanachetana
Svarupa sthitipravrtti bhedam purushaviseshamisvara......"

"The Supreme Person has under His control the diverse forms of essence, existence and activities of the threefold jivas and non-intelligent objects.......". In fact, the special contribution of visishtadvaita vedanta to the solution of the problem of the relation of God to the cosmos is the conception of *sarira-sariri-bhava*.

The section termed *sambandavimarsa* devoted to a discussion of this question is among the portions of *Atma-Siddhi* lost; but at the very outset, Yamuna has clearly expressed what is unmistakably his view,

atma paramatmano sambandhepi..........nanatve satyeva
abhedo namanvayah amsamsi bhava lakshanah samavayah;
ses a seshitva rupah, paratantra lakshanah, svasvami bhavah.
bhrtya svami lakshana iti....... *Atma Siddhi*, p. 8

"In regard to the relation of the individual soul to the Supreme Self, while accepting multiplicity of souls, the relation between God and the soul is one of non-difference; it is conceived in different ways, as an inherent relation like that between whole and part, or as the relation between the principal and the subordinate, or as the relation between owner and owned, or as that between master and servant". The last mentioned—bhrtya-svami relationship—is what Yamuna accepts. This would imply the partial truths conveyed by others; but they do not bring out, quite as well as this does, the unique features of the relation of souls to God, namely that they are eternally, inherently and inseparably related as servants to the master. Being the most natural relationship, it accounts for bliss arising from service to God. In all other cases, servitude to others is a cause of suffering. Inseparability (aprthak siddha) characterises this relationship.

In *Samvit siddhi* (p. 104). Yamuna says.—

tadda taadaatmya sambandhe sruti pratyaksha mulake |
nirdosha S paurusheya ca srutiratyartham aadaraat ll

"Scripture and perception assert that the relation of identity (*tadatmya)* of *tat* and *tvam* is in the sense of soul-body or prakari-prakara aikya, not as *bhedaabheda)*......The scripture, self-existent (not the work of any person) and free from all defects, earnestly and repeatedly declares that the finite self and the Supreme Self are identical, non-different, in this sense."

Thus the most essential feature in the relation of the jiva to God is its being inherently and for all time a bhrtya or dasa. This idea is elaborated in *Stotra-Ratna*.

Pita tvam mata tvam dayitatanayastvam priya suhrtvamana
tvam mitram gururasi gatiscasi jagatam |
tvadiyastvadbhrtyastva parijanastvad gatirahm
prapannascaivam satyahamapi tavaivasmi hi bharah ll St. 60

"Thou (alone) art my father, Thou art my mother; Thou art my beloved son; Thou art my true well-wisher; Thou art my dear friend ; Thou art my preceptor; Thou art the refuge of all the worlds; I am Thine, Thy servant, Thy attendant; Thou art my only support; I have taken refuge in Thee; under this circumstance, I am indeed a burden on Thee."

3. " Yamuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about Isvara and this relation to the souls and the world. He does not make inquiry into the nature of the reality of the world and rests content with proving that the world appearance is not false, as the Sankarites supposed......"

This criticism has no meaning, because Yamuna (and for that matter this would apply equally to any of the exponents of vedantic thought) claims no originality for his views. He is not weaving out a system of his own, but is seeking to expound the profound truths imbedded in the upanishads. He does not claim any originality for his interpretation either; for he strictly follows the lead given by the ancient masters like Tanka, Dramida and Sri Vatsankamisra and conforms closely to well-established rules of interpretation (*nyayas*). Notwithstanding all this, none can deny the unique and original contribution that Yamuna has made to vedantic thought. A mastermind, he has assimilated the vast array of traditional views, laid bare the unerring logic that supports them, and synthesised the apparently diverse and contradictory disclosures of the real found in the Vedanta, the Pancharatra agamas and Divya Prabandams and presented them in a remarkably cogent, logical, lucid and convincing manner.

One is heartened to find that Dasgupta concedes at least that Yamuna proved the untenability of the advaitic theory of the phenomenality of the world. As for the nature of the world, it has been shown that it is a *vibhuti* (possession) of the Lord, and that it undergoes real modifications (parinama) under the guidance of the Supreme and provides the body, mind, senses and the like, (i.e. the instruments of enjoyment) the objects of enjoyment and the field whereon the jivas are to play their part.

yadanda mandantara gocharam ca yaddasottaraanyaavaranaani Yani chal
gunah pradhaanam purusham param padam
paraatparam brahma cha te vibhutayah ll *Stotra-Ratnam*, St. 17

The cosmic sphere, all that lies therein, its sheaths numbering over ten, the threefold gunas, primordial matter, the finite self, the transcendental domain of Brahman, released souls and the ever-free souls, Thy divine forms of transcendental beauty—all these constitute Thy limitless and glorious possessions over which Thy sway is absolute"

Ityadi vedavach ana tanmulaptagamairapi |
Brahmatmanatmalabho Syam prapanchaschidachinmayah ll

Samvit-Siddhi, p. 102.

"With the aid of scriptural texts such as the foregoing and smrti texts based thereon, it is learnt that the world constituted of senient and nonsentient objects derives its very being from the fact of its having Brahman for its soul"

Mama natha! yadasti yo S smyaham
Sakalam taddhi tavaiva Madhava l
... ... *Stotra Ratna,* St. 53.

"Oh Madhava! whatever I have and also whatever I am-all these are indeed thine own..." Echoing the sentiments expressed by Nammalvar in Tiruvoimozhi iv. viii-10, Yamuna says "Oh Lord! I can't endure even for a moment my body, my vital energies, the joys coveted by all, my very self and what-ever else that belongs to me, if they do not subserve Thy purposes and glorify Thee. This is the truth. Let them break into thousand pieces, if they don't serve Thee. Oh slayer of Madhu! This is my earnest prayer."

Na deham na pranan na cha sukha maseshabhi lashtam
na chatmanam nanyatkimapi tava seshatva vibhavat l
bahirbhutam natha! kshanamapi sahe ya tu satatha
vinasam tatsatyam Madhu mathana vijnapanamidam ll

Stotra Ratna, St. 57.

4. "He is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring his salvation and the nature and characteristics of that state". The following citations from Yamuna's works would suffice to show that he has not been silent about either the means to moksha or about its nature, but has specially mentioned *bhakti* and *prapatti* as the *sadhanas,* and has described moks*ha* as *brahma-prapti* betokening not only freedom from the travails of samsara but also the positive experience of the bliss of the attributes of the Divine and of rendering unremitting service to the Supreme.

Hita.— (a) tad sadhanatopi......ubhaya parikarmita svantasya aikantikatyantika bhaktiyoga labhyah. *Atma Siddhi, P. 9.*

"As regards the means of attaining moksha ...... the Supreme is attainable only by bhakti-yoga by one whose mind has been completely

purified by the two-fold discipline of *Karma-yoga* and *jnana yoga*". This formula has been taken over by Ramanuja and quoted in *Vedartha-samgraha*, (pp. 98-99)

(b) svadharma jnana vairagya sadhya bhaktyekagocharah I
Gitarthasamgraha, St. 1.

"The Highest Brahman, Lord Narayana, is within the range of vision of bhakti alone, brought on, fostered by the scrupulous performance of one's own duty without attachment (nishkama) and by the acquisition of a vision of the self and by the cultivation of complete detachment from worldly desires."

(c) ekantyatyanta dasyaika ratis tvat padamapnuyat |
tatpradhanamidam sastram iti. *Gitarthasamgraha, St. 32*

"He whose only joy is in rendering perfect and absolute service to the Lord at all times will attain the highest state."

(d) Na dharma nishto S smi nachatmavedi nabhaktimamstvaccharanaravinde | akincano S nanyagatissaranya tvat padamulam saranam prapadye ॥ *Stotra-Ratna, St. 22.*

"O Saviour, sure and neverfailing! I lay no claim to steadfastness in *karma yoga* nor to a vision of the self *(jnana-yoga)*; nor to fervent devotion to Thy lotus-like feet; utterly lacking in competence and having no other refuge and looking up to no other end than reaching Thee, I take refuge under Thy feet".

Venkatanatha bears testimony to the fact that "great teachers like Ramanuja, the prince among ascetics, and Yamuna have clearly demonstrated that there is no greater *hita* in all the world than surrendering the responsibility for one's spiritual uplift to Thee, Daye!"

....

Yati pati yamunaprabhrtayah pradayanti Daye |
jagati hitam na nastva yi bharanyasanadhikam ॥
Dayasatakam, St. 59,

PURUSHARTHA.—

(a) ....parama purusharthabhute brahma praptilakshana mokshe S pi ......tad gunanubhava janita niratisaya sukha samunmesh opanita yantika tat kinkaratva lakshana iti. *Atma Siddhi*, p. 8

"In regard to the supreme goal of human endeavour, moksha, which consists in the realisation of Brahman............it is the unsurpassed bliss of continuous and uninterrupted service to the Lord, evoked and sustained by the rising tide of unsurpassed bliss arising from experience of the Lord's qualities, deeds and so on".

The following stanza answers the question of the ontological status of the soul in moksha.

Brahmananda hrdantastho muktatma sukhamedhate

Samvit Siddhi, p. 104.

Moksha is not a state where the soul merges in Brahman and loses its uniqueness, but one where it retains its distinctness, transcends mundane existence and experiences the infinite bliss of service to the Lord.

Yamuna's place in Visishtadvaitic thought:

The debt that Visishtadvaitism owes to Yamuna is inestimable. As Venkatanatha says, this ancient system of philosophy was set on a fresh phase of its career by Nathamuni; it was considerably developed by the works of Yamuna and was greatly strengthened (i-e. rendered proof against attack) by Ramanuja.

Nathopajnam pravrtham bahubhirupachitam yamuneyaprabandai—
stratum samyag yatindraih ......

Tattva-mukta-kalapa, Adravyasara, St 136.

In paying reverential homage to the illustrious hierarchy of acharyas commencing from the Lord Himself, Lakshminatha, Narayana, the consort of Sri and ending with his own preceptor, Ramanuja, Kuresa (Srivatsanka Misra) refers to Sage Natha and Yamuna as occupying the central place.

Lakshminatha samarambham Natha Yamuna Madhy |
asmadacharya paryantam vande guruparamparam ||

Tanian (Laudatory verse)

Yamuna's influence on Ramanuja:—

Ramanuja has unbounded reverence for his pracharya, Yamuna, and acknowledges that he owes everything to him.

yat padambhoruha dhyana vidhvasta seshakalmashah |
vastu ta mupayato Sham yamuneyam namamyaham ||

Gitabhashya, opening verse

"I prostrate before Yamuna—that great personage by meditating on whose sacred feet, I got all my karmas completely dispelled, and became an entity (what I am)." Again in his *Vedarthasamgraha,* Ramanuja glorifies Yamuna thus:—

Param Brahmaivajnam bhramaparigatam samsarati tat
paropadhyalidam vivasamasu-bhasyaspadam iti |
srutinyayapetam jagati vatatam mohanamitam
tamo yenapastam sa hi vijayate yamunamunih ||

Vedarthasamgraha, p. 1.

"Splendidly victorious shines Yamuna, the reputed sage who dispelled the deluding darkness of ignorance in the shape of false beliefs stalking the world despite their running counter to the authority of scripture and reason-delusive beliefs such as. i) that the Supreme Brahman himself, being associated with ignorance and becoming enveloped in illusion gets implicated in samsara or ii) that He is afflicted by alien limiting adjuncts *(upadhis)* and consequently subject to karmic influence or iii) that He Himself becomes the


seat of imperfections.' *Sri Vaikunt a gadya* opens with an expression of his profound regard for Yamuna's works.

Yamunarya sudhambhodhim avagahya yathamati |
adaya bhaktiyogakhyam ratnam sandarsayam yaham ll

" Diving deep into the ocean of Sri Yamuna's ambrosia to the best of my understanding, I have brought therefrom the gem of bhakti-yoga and am holding it up to view for all to see clearly,'

The references made in Sri Bhashya to trayyanta nishnatas (experts in the sphere of vedanta) and to pramanika na bhahumanyate in Sri Bhashya are to be taken, says Sudarsana Suri, as referring to Yamuna.

In the Sri Bhashya, Ramanuja has fully utilised *Siddhi trayam* either quoting from it or paraphrasing it. Specially, in Jijnasadhikarana, sastrayonitvat adhikarana and utpattyasambhavat adhikarana in Sri Bhashya one meets the thought and even the very language of *Siddhi trayam*. The superb manner in which disputed passages from the upanishads are interpreted and the several aspects of vedantic thought synthesised in *Vedarthasamgraha* bears distinctive marks of the impact of the principles and procedures employed by Yamuna in *Samvit Siddhi*. *Gitarthasamgraha* has furnished the basis for Ramanuja's *Gita bhashya*. In his *Nityagrantha* which lays down the code of daily conduct for the *Sri Vaishnavite*, he has emphasised the importance of *panchakalika puja*, a vital feature of Pancharatra Agama, whose authoritativeness was established by Yamuna so effectively in the face of its detractors. Sections of *Saranagati gadya* and *Sri Ranga gadya* are modelled on Yamuna's stotras. Thus in Ramanuja's writings one finds an amplification, explication and systematisation of Yamuna's works.



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" Kāmas saṁkalpo vicikitsā śraddhā āśraddhādhṛtiradhṛtiḥ Hrīrdhīrbhīr ityetat sarvam mana eva " १४४

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॥ श्रीः ॥

सिद्धित्रयम्

आत्मसिद्धिः

१. प्रकृतिपुरुषकालव्यक्तमुक्ता यदिच्छा-
मनुविदधति नित्यं नित्यसिद्धैरनेकैः ।
स्वपरिचरणभोगैः श्रीमति प्रीयमाणे
भवतु मम परस्मिन्पूरुषे भक्तिभूमा ॥ १ ॥

विरुद्धमतयोऽनेकास्सन्त्यात्मपरमात्मनोः ।
अतस्तत्परिशुद्ध्यर्थमात्मसिद्धिर्विधीयते ॥ २ ॥

1. May I have the highest bhakti to that Supreme Puruṣa to whose will matter (prakṛti)[1], bound souls (puruṣa)[2], time, manifest material nature, released souls and innumerable eternally perfect souls always conform, to that Śrīmān,[3] who is ever in bliss along with many eternally perfect souls, whose sole enjoyment is in rendering service to Him. There are many conflicting views concerning the finite self and the Infinite Self. With a view to making the matter clear, the determination of the real nature of the soul is (here) undertaken.

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1. Prakṛti is the primordial source of the material universe. In the state of pralaya (dissolution) it is known as avyakta (the unmanifest); in the state of sarga (evolution) it is called vyakta (the manifest).

2. Viśiṣṭādvaitism recognises three classes of jīvas—baddha (the bound), mukta (the liberated), and nitya (the ever perfect). Jainism accepts a similar classification.

3. As the prayer is for highest form of bhakti to Śrīmān, it is evident that Yāmunācārya considers the Lord Nārāyaṇa along with Lakṣmī the means of salvation, even as He, in conjunction with her, is the supreme goal.

२. सम्मतं हि सर्वसमयेषु आत्मज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुरिति, श्रूयते च—पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति, आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयात्, तरति शोकमात्मवित्, ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्,—इत्यादिः परावरात्मतत्त्वज्ञानस्यापवर्गसाधनत्वं प्रतिपादयन् वेदान्तवाक्यगणः ; तत्रास्मिन्नात्मनि परस्मिंश्चानेकविधा विप्रतिपत्तयस्तीर्थकराणाम्; तद्यथा आत्मविषये तावत् देहमेव केचिदात्मानमाचक्षते, इन्द्रियाण्यन्ये, मन इत्यन्ये, प्राणमपरे, अध्यस्तज्ञातृभावमनहंकारं बोधमात्रमितरे, देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणबोधविलक्षणमाकाशादिवदचित्स्वभावमागन्तुकबोधसुखदुःखाद्यसाधारणगुणाधारमहंकारगोचरमपरे, अपरे तु बोधैकस्वभावमेव स्वभावधवलमिव स्फटिकमणिमुपधानविशेषापादितारुणिमगुणादिनिर्भासमन्तःकरणोपधानापादितरागद्वेषसुखदुःखाद्यशिवगुणनिर्भासमनुदितानस्तमितस्वरूप-

2. That the knowledge of the self is the means of attaining transcendental felicity is indeed admitted in all systems. " On knowing the finite self and the Supreme Controller to be different, and thereby becoming the object of His Grace, he attains immortality " ;[4] " If one should know the self " ; " The knower of the self crosses over sorrow " ;[5] " He who knows Brahman attains the Highest " [6]—these and other texts of the Upaniṣads are found, which declare that the knowledge of the finite self and the Supreme Self is the means of liberation. Eminent teachers hold many conflicting views concerning the finite self and the Highest Person.

With regard to the individual self, some maintain that the body itself is the soul[7] ; others that it is the senses ; others that it is mind (manas) ; others that it is vital breath (prāṇa) ; still others that it is pure consciousness, which is erroneously supposed to possess the quality of being a knower and which does not appear as the 'I' [8] ; others that it is different from the body, the senses, mind, vital-breath and consciousness and that, like ether and the like, it has a non-intelligent nature ; and that it is the substratum of knowledge, pleasure, pain and other adventitious and special qualities, and that it is the object of self-consciousness.[9] Others again say that it is of the nature of pure consciousness itself, which appears to possess inauspicious qualities, such as love, hate, pleasure, pain, etc., produced by the limiting condition of the internal organ, even as a crystal that is in itself white appears to

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4. Śvet. Up. I. 6.
5. Chand. Up.
6. Tait. Up.
7. Cārvāka doctrine.
8. Advaita Vedānta.
9. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

प्रकाशं स्वयंज्योतिषमिममभिदधति, अन्ये तु ज्ञानानन्दस्वभावम्, आश्रयानुकूल्य-प्रतिलब्धानन्दसुखादिव्यपदेशबोधविशेष एवास्य स्वाभाविक इत्यन्ये ।

३. तथा अनुमानसमधिगम्यः, आगमैकवेद्यः, मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यः, ग्राहकतयैव सकलविषयवित्तिषु प्रत्यक्षो ज्ञानस्वभावतयानुदितानस्तमितस्वरूपप्रकाशः स्वयं ज्योतिः, ईदृशोऽप्यागमानुमानयोगजप्रत्यक्षैः स्वेतरसकलविलक्षणस्वाभाव्येन विशदविशदतरविशद-तमतया अन्ततो यथावदपरोक्ष्यत इति ।

४. तथा परममहान्, अणुपरिमाणः, शरीरपरिमाणः, स्वतः परिमाणरहितोऽपि व्याप्यवस्तुपरिमितिकृतपरिच्छेद इति, व्याप्तिरपि चैतन्यमात्रेण स्वरूपेण इति ।

possess redness and other qualities imparted to it by certain specific limiting conditions (say, an adjacent red flower); and that the luminosity of its being is neither born nor destroyed; and that it is self-luminous.[10] Others again hold that it has the nature of knowledge and bliss; still others that its nature is of that knowledge which on account of its agreeableness to its possessor, acquires the name of bliss and pleasure.

3. Similarly (with regard to the means of knowledge by which it is established, divergent views have been offered, such as that) it can be known through inference[11]; that (it) can be known only through scripture; that (it) can be known through mental perception[12]; that (it) is directly known only as the knower in all cognition of objects[13]; that, as it possesses the nature of knowledge, its luminosity is neither born nor destroyed and that it is self-luminous. Though possessed of this nature (though self-luminous), with the aid of scripture, inference, and yogic perception, it is directly perceived in its true nature as having a character different from everything other than itself, (first) clearly, (then) more clearly, and finally most clearly and immediately.

4. Similarly (with regard to its size, the rival views are that) it is infinitely big; that (it is) atomic in size; that (it is) of the same size as the body; that though in itself devoid of magnitude, it is limited to the size of the body pervaded by it. Concerning the manner of its pervasion also, (the different theories are) that it pervades only by its intelligence and that it pervades by itself.

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10. Sāṅkhya.
11. Sāṅkhya.
12. Mīmāmsā.
13. Prābhākara school of Mīmāmsā.

५. तथा क्षणिकः यावच्छरीरोष्मस्थायी, आप्राकृतप्रळयावस्थायी, आमोक्षस्थायी, कूटस्थो नित्य इति ।

६. सर्वशरीरेष्वेकः, प्रतिक्षेत्रं नानाभूत इति च, तथातथा प्रतिपद्यन्ते ।

७. तथा परमात्मविषयेऽपि केचित्समस्तवस्तुसाक्षात्कारिणं सर्वशक्तिमीश्वरमेव नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अभ्युपगच्छन्तोऽप्येके प्रत्यस्तमितमितिमानमातृमेयेश्वरेशितव्यादि-भेदविकल्पकूटस्थविज्ञानैकरसमनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितवियदादिभेदावच्छिन्नज्ञानैश्वर्यादिमहिम-विकल्पतया काल्पनिकमाचक्षते ।

अपरे तु यथोक्तस्वरूपमेव अविद्योपधानेन तद्गुणसारतया प्रकल्पितब्रह्मादि-स्थावरपर्यन्तविविधजीवभेदं स्वाधीनविचित्रविवर्तस्वभावमायोपहिततया समासादित-

5. Similarly (with regard to its duration, it has been stated that) it is momentary; that it endures as long as the bodily heat lasts; that it exists till the material world is dissolved; that it lasts till mokṣa is attained; that it is unchanging and eternal.

6. Similarly (with regard to its number), it is maintained that it is one and the same in all bodies[14]; and that it is different in each body.

7. So also about the Infinite Self, some do not at all admit an Īśvara (God) who directly perceives all things and who is all-powerful. Some, while admitting a God, maintain that he is of the essence of pure consciousness, which is unchanging and which is devoid of the distinctions of knowledge, means of knowledge, knower, and the known, the ruler and the ruled and so on. (They hold that) on account of beginningless avidyā, he is erroneously imagined to possess knowledge of manifoldness, such as ākāśa, and greatness such as sovereignty.[15]

Others, while accepting this characterisation (of the Supreme Self as being of the nature of pure consciousness), state that it is subject to limiting conditions, and that, in association with the limiting condition of avidyā, for the reason of its having avidyā for its essence, it is taken to possess manifold distinctions of jīvas commencing from Brahmā and ending with immovable things; and that, in conjunction with māyā, which is under its control and which assumes diverse wonderful changes,

14. One variety of Ekajīvavāda holds that there is one jīva residing in each of the many bodies.

15. Advaita—ekajīvavāda and also nānājīvavāda where Īśvara too is a reflection. cf. Pañcadaśī. Ch. X.

सार्वज्ञ्यादिसंपदमुपहितमिममभिदधति । तथान्ये प्रकृष्टसत्त्वोपादाननिमित्तस्वतन्त्रप्रधानपरिणामविशेषमात्रनियमनिर्वाहितसर्वैश्वर्यमर्यादमाद्रियन्ते । अनुपहितमपि परिणामिनमपरे प्रतिपेदिरे । अपरिणामिनमपि स्वमायांशभूतविचित्रान्तःकरणदर्पणतलप्रतिबिम्बिततया प्रतिपन्नविश्वतैजसप्राज्ञभावं तमेकमेव चेतनमितरे रोचयन्ते । अन्ये तु स्वाधीनत्रिविधचेतनाचेतनस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिभेदं स्वाभाविकनिरवधिकातिशयज्ञानबलैश्वर्यवीर्यशक्तितेजःप्रभृतिसकलकल्याणगुणमहार्णवं पुरुषविशेषमीश्वरमातिष्ठन्ते ।

८. तथा तद्विशेषेऽपि हरिहरविरिञ्चिभास्करात्मनाऽनभिमतत्तन्मूर्तिपरित्यागेन च चतुस्त्रिद्व्येकमूर्तितया विवदन्ते । मूर्तिविशेषविषयाश्च नित्यत्वानित्यत्वभौतिकत्वा-

it acquires omniscience and other glorious qualities.[16] Similarly, others uphold the view that God possesses universal Lordship which is invariably and exclusively maintained for Him by the modification of independent pradhāna. This modification has for its cause the fact of pradhāna possessing the quality of sattva *par excellence*.[17] Others assert that although He is free from limiting conditions, He is yet subject to modification. Others favour the view that although He does not undergo modifications, yet, on account of being reflected by the reflecting media of the diverse internal organs which are aspects of His own māyā, this intelligent being who is one only acquires the forms of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña.[18] Others hold that the Lord is that Supreme Person who has under His control the diverse forms of essence, existence and the activities of the threefold jīvas and non-intelligent objects, and who is the great ocean of all auspicious qualities, such as jñāna, bala, aiśvarya, vīrya, śakti, tejas,[19] and others which are natural to Him, invariable and unrivalled in excellence.

8. Similarly, even in regard to His particular manifestations, some contend that He has the four forms of Viṣṇu, Śiva, Brahmā and the God of the Sun; others hold that His form is threefold or twofold or single, after eliminating those forms which are unacceptable to them. Concerning the individual manifestations (of God) doubts have been

16. Nānājīvavāda, on the view that Īśvara is the prototype not a reflection.
17. Yoga.
18. Advaita where Īśvara is the prototype.
19. ज्ञानमिह सर्वसाक्षात्काररूपम् *cf.* यो वेत्ति युगपत्सर्वं प्रत्यक्षेण सदा स्वतः । बलं नाम श्रमप्रसङ्गरहितं सर्वधारणसामर्थ्यम् । ऐश्वर्यं नाम अव्याहतेच्छं सर्वनियन्तृत्वम् । वीर्यम्= सर्वोपादानत्वे सर्वधारणे सर्वनियमनेऽपि विकाररहितत्वम् । शक्तिः=स्वेतरसर्वनिर्वाहिका सर्वोपादनत्वात्मिका. यद्वा यदन्यैरशक्यत्वादघटितमिव भाति तद्घटनसामर्थ्यरूपा । तेजः=अस्वाधीनसहकार्यनपेक्षत्वम्; पराभिभवनसामर्थ्यं तेजः केचित्प्रचक्षते ॥

भौतिकत्वस्वार्थपरार्थत्वादिवितर्काः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, परिजनस्थानादिगोचराश्च ।

९. तथा प्रमाणतोऽपि आनुश्रविक एवेत्येके । आनुमानिकश्चेत्यन्ये । विशिष्ट-प्रत्यक्षसमधिगम्यश्चेत्यपरे ।

१०. तथा आत्मपरमात्मनोः संबन्धेऽपि अनाद्यविद्योपादानभेदास्पदोऽयमीश्वरेशितव्यादिरूपः संबन्धः परमार्थतस्त्वेकं तत्त्वमिति केचित् । व्यतिरेकाभावेऽप्यतिरिक्तो जीव इत्यन्ये । स्वतस्त्वैक्यमुपाधितो भेद इति विशिष्टस्वरूपभावेन भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमितरे । नानात्वे सत्येव अभेदो नामान्वयः अंशांशिभावलक्षणः समवायः, परतन्त्रतालक्षणः शेषशेषित्वरूपः, स्वस्वामिभावः भृत्यस्वामिलक्षण इति च नानाविधा वादाः ।

raised about their being eternal or non-eternal, elemental or non-elemental, whether they exist for their own sake or for the sake of others, and doubts too have arisen concerning their attendants, place of residence, etc.

9. Similarly, with regard to the means of knowledge some hold that He is known from the Vedas alone; [20] others that he is established by inference,[21] others that He is also cognised by extraordinary perceptions.

10. Similarly, in regard to the relation of the individual soul to the Supreme Self also, some maintain that relations such as that between the ruler and the ruled are based on a knowledge of distinctions, which is caused by beginningless avidyā; and that, in truth, there is only one reality.[22] Others hold that though there is non-difference, the jīva is other than the Supreme Self. As there is oneness in point of essence and distinction on account of limiting conditions, some posit both difference and non-difference—difference in so far as it (Brahman) is associated with limiting conditions, and non-difference in respect of its essence.[23]

Even when there is diversity, there is the relation of non-difference (between God and the soul); several views concerning this relation are prevalent—that it is the relation of inherence obtaining between the whole and the part; that it is the relation between śeṣa and śeṣi, or in other words, that between the independent entity and the dependent creature; that it is the relation between the owner and the owned exemplified in the relation between master and servant.

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20. Vedānta.
21. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
22. Advaita.
23. Bhāskara.

११. तथा परमपुरुषार्थभूते ब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणमोक्षेऽपि स्वरूपोच्छित्तिलक्षणः, अविद्यास्तमयलक्षणः निश्शेषवैशेषिकात्मगुणोच्छेदलक्षणः कैवल्यरूपः, तद्भाव(साधर्म्य)लक्षणः[२७], तद्गुणसंक्रान्तिलक्षणः, तच्छायापत्तिलक्षणः, सांसिद्धिकानन्दादिस्वरूपाविर्भावलक्षणः, तद्गुणानुभवजनितनिरतिशयसुखसमुन्मेषोपनीतात्यन्तिकतत्किङ्करत्वलक्षण इति तथा तथा विवदन्ते ।

१२. तत्साधनतोऽपि कर्मयोगलभ्यः, ज्ञानयोगलभ्यः, अन्यतरानुगृहीतान्यतरलभ्यः, उभयलभ्यः, उभयपरिकर्मितस्वान्तस्यैकान्तिकात्यन्तिकभक्तियोगलभ्य इति ।

11. Even in regard to the supreme goal of human endeavour, mokṣa, which consists in the realisation of Brahman, the several views maintained are—that it (mokṣa) consists in annihilation of one's self[24]; that it is the destruction of ignorance,[25] that it is the state of aloofness resulting from the complete destruction of all the special qualities of the self[26]; that it is a state of becoming one with Brahman[27]; that it is the inflow of God's qualities[28]; that it consists in attaining similarity with Brahman[29]; that it is the fullest revelation of its (self's) intrinsic attributes of bliss and other qualities; that it is everlasting service to the Lord kindled by the heightened manifestation of unsurpassed bliss arising from the experience of His qualities and so on.

12. About the means of attaining mokṣa also, some contend that it is attainable by karma-yoga and some that it is realisable by jñāna-yoga; some contend that it is attainable by either of these (two) helped by the other[30]; some assert that it is rendered effective by both[31]; some assert that to him whose mind is purified by both (karma and jñāna), it is realisable by bhakti-yoga which is ever-lasting and one-pointed.

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24. Buddhism.
25. Advaita.

अविद्यास्तमयो मोक्षस्सा च बन्ध उदाहृतः

26. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
27. Advaita.

अत्र यद्यपि कोशेषु साधर्म्यपदमस्ति, तथापि तदनुचितमिव; अवश्यवक्तव्यस्य ऐक्यलक्षण मोक्षस्याकथनप्रसङ्गात् ॥

28. cf. Śiva-Saṅkrāntivāda.
29. cf. Śiva-sama-vāda.
30. Here one of the two is primary and the other secondary.
31. Here both are of equal importance. Jñānakarma-Samuccayavāda.

१३. तदेवमनवसितविशेषविमर्शकजनविमतिदर्शनात् तत्तत्पक्षसाधनबलाबलानवगमाच्च ततस्ततः सन्दिहानाः प्रेक्षावन्तो न तावत् परमपुरुषार्थाय घटेरन्, यावदयमात्मा परमात्मा च स्वरूपतः प्रमाणतः संबन्धतः प्राप्तितः तत्साधनतश्च न निर्णीयेतेति तत्प्रतिबोधाय इदमारभ्यते। यद्यपि भगवता बादरायणेन इदमर्थान्येव सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि, विवृतानि च तानि परिमितगम्भीरभाषिणा भाष्यकृता, विस्तृतानि च तानि गम्भीरन्यायसागरभाषिणा भगवता श्रीवत्साङ्कमिश्रेणापि, तथापि आचार्यटङ्कभर्तृप्रपञ्चभर्तृमित्रभर्तृहरिब्रह्मदत्तशङ्करश्रीवत्साङ्कभास्करादिविरचितसितासितविविधनिबन्धनश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धयो न यथावदन्यथा च प्रतिपद्यन्त इति तत्प्रतिपत्तये च युक्तः प्रकरणप्रक्रमः।

१४. तत्र

देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणधीभ्योऽन्योऽनन्यसाधनः।
नित्यो व्यापी[32] प्रतिक्षेत्रमात्मा भिन्नः स्वतः सुखी॥

13. Noticing the conflicting views of inquirers who have not determined anything conclusively, not knowing the strength and weakness of the proofs of the respective views, and entertaining doubts therefrom, wise men will be unable to secure mokṣa so long as the individual self and the Supreme Self are not understood in respect of their nature, the means by which they are established, their relation (to each other), the attainment (of mokṣa by the individual self), and also of the means thereof. For this reason, this work is begun to make them known. The aphorisms (sūtras) having the same end in view were composed by the venerable Bādarāyaṇa; and these have been interpreted by the Bhāṣyakāra (Dramiḍācārya) whose exposition is concise and elegant; and they have been elaborately explained by the venerable Śrivatsāṅka Miśra who elegantly sets forth an ocean of rules of interpretation (nyāyas). Nevertheless, as persons whose understanding has been misled by faith in the various writings, good and bad, of such teachers as Ṭaṅka, Bhartṛprapanca, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, Brahmadatta, Śaṅkara, Śrīvatsāṅka Miśra, Bhāskara, etc., do not know things as they are and even understand them erroneously, the undertaking of this work is but proper for a right knowledge of things.

14. The view to be defended here is that the individual self is different from the body, the senses, manas, prāṇa and intellect; (it) does not depend on anything else (for its knowledge); (it) is eternal, subtle, distinct in each body, and in its essential nature blissful.

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32. श्रीभाष्ये जिज्ञासाधिकरणे अहमर्थात्मत्वसमर्थननिगमनावसरे व्यापी=अतिसूक्ष्मतया सर्वचेतनान्तःप्रवेशस्वभाव इति व्याख्यातम्।

१५. ननु देहमेवात्मानं प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपद्यामहे, अहं जानामीति ज्ञाता ह्यात्मा अहमिति चकास्ति, देहश्चाहङ्कारगोचरः स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमिति दर्शनात्, देहस्य हि स्थौल्यादियोगः, अतस्तत्समानाधिकरणतया अयमहङ्कारश्शरीरालम्बन इत्यवश्याश्रयणीयम्, इतरथा सकललौकिकपरीक्षकव्यवहारोपरोधश्च; न चायं लाक्षणिको व्यवहारः मुख्यवृत्तिभूमेः पृथगसिद्धत्वात्। न चानेकावयवयोगिशरीरालम्बनत्वे ज्ञात्रवभासस्य तदीयरूपावयवाद्यवभासेनान्वयिना भवितव्यम्, येन तदन्वयाभावाज्जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरातिरिक्तमवगमयेत्। बाह्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्ष एव तथा नियमदर्शनात्, स्वान्तस्यान्तरगुणाधारतावभास एव सामर्थ्यनियमात्, अनवधृतावयवविशेषस्याप्यनेकावयवयोगिनो महिमगुणशालिनस्त्र्यणुकस्य

THE CASE FOR THE IDENTITY OF SOUL AND BODY.

15. We perceive the body itself to be the soul. In the cognition 'I know', the ātman, who is indeed the knower, shines forth as the 'I'; and the body is the object of the consciousness of 'I', as is evident from the knowledge 'I am stout', 'I am lean'; in fact, stoutness and the like relate only to the body; hence, as the 'I' is put in apposition with 'lean', 'stout', etc., it must necessarily be admitted to have the body for its object. Otherwise, all usage, popular and learned, would be meaningless. It cannot be maintained that here (in statements like 'I am stout') the 'I' denotes the body by a figure of speech (lakṣaṇā), because there is no other place where it can possibly be said to have a primary significance.

Again, it cannot be said that if the consciousness of the 'I' as knower has for its object the body which consists of several parts, the knowledge of the body should be accompanied by a knowledge of its parts, colour, etc. If there were such a need, as the knowledge of bodily parts and colour does not appear, the cognition 'I know' would reveal the presence of something other than the body. Such a necessity (of the knowledge of parts and shapes accompanying the apprehension of an object) is found to exist only in the case of perception arising from the external senses. The capacity of the mind is restricted to the manifestation of the soul's character as being the seat of internal qualities. In fact, (even in the case of external perception) there is no necessity for the apprehension of number, magnitude, etc., because, though its parts are not comprehended, a triad of atoms consisting of many parts and possessing visible magnitude is admitted to be the minimum visible entity; and because air is known to be perceived by the sense of touch only as the seat of contact (and not as a whole consisting of parts). Just as, even when something other than the body is taken to be the

प्रथमप्रत्यक्षाभ्युपगमात्, वायोश्च त्वगिन्द्रियेण स्पर्शाधिष्ठानमात्रतयोपलम्भदर्शनाच्च न बाह्यप्रत्यक्षगोचर एव संख्यापरिमाणादिग्रहणनियमः।[33] देहव्यतिरिक्तात्मगोचरत्वेऽपि यथा तत्र तदीयगुणान्तराग्रहणं तथेहापि। एवं च प्रत्येकं परमाणुषु चैतन्यानुपलब्धेः तदभ्युपगमे च एकशरीर एवानेकसहस्रचेतनापातात्, अकारणगुणपूर्वकस्य कार्यद्रव्यवर्तिनो विशेषगुणस्यासम्भवान्न शरीरविशेषगुणश्चैतन्यं, अयावच्छरीरभावित्वाच्च इत्यादयोऽनुमानभेदाः प्रत्यक्षबाधितविषयतया न पराक्रमितुं क्षमन्ते। विशेषगुणत्वे च प्रतिषिध्यमाने देहगुणत्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गश्च। अपि च इच्छानुविधायिक्रियत्वेन्द्रियाश्रयत्वादयः[34] शरीरे दृश्यमानाः संप्रतिपन्नाचैतन्यात् घटादेरत्यन्तव्यावर्तमानाः शरीरमेव चेतनमवगमयन्ति।

object of self-consciousness, there is no knowledge of its other qualities, here too (when the body is the object of self-consciousness, there is no knowledge of its parts and colours).

In each of the infinitesimal atoms consciousness is not met with; and if it be accepted (that each super-sensible atom possesses consciousness), there will result belief in several thousands of intelligent beings in one and the same body; and as the special quality of the effect cannot but be based on the quality of the cause, and as consciousness does not continue as long as the body lasts, consciousness cannot be a special quality of the body. These and other kinds of arguments based on reasoning are lacking in force, as they teach what is contradicted by direct perception. If it (consciousness) be denied to be a special quality, it will amount to its acceptance as a common quality of the body. Moreover, qualities such as the character of owning activities dependent on desires and of being the seat of the senses and the like, which appear in the body and not in such objects as pots, whose non-intelligent character is admitted on all hands, reveal that the body itself is the intelligent being.

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33. कोशेषूपलभ्यमानः पाठो नातीव सुन्दरः। नियमस्य द्व्यणुके वायौ च व्यभिचारस्य पूर्वमेव प्रदर्शितत्वान्नञ्रहितः पाठो विरुद्धार्थको भाति। अतः 'अभ्युगमात्' 'दर्शनात्' इति पञ्चम्यन्तद्वयस्य साध्यसाकांक्षस्य न बाह्यप्रत्यक्ष....................ग्रहणनियम इत्यत्रान्वयो युक्तः। बाह्यप्रत्यक्षविषयेऽप्येतादृशो नियमो न संभवति किमुतान्तरप्रत्यक्षविषय इति भावः॥

34. यद्यप्यत्र कोशेषु पाठोऽन्यथोपलभ्यते, तथापि स न समीचीनो भाति। अत्र चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयश्शरीरमिति न्यायसूत्रमभिप्रेतम्। तच्च लक्षणत्रयपरम्। आदिना अर्थाश्रयत्वस्य ग्रहणम्। प्रतिविधानावसरेऽपि इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वादिव्यतिरेकहेतवः न साध्यमुपस्थापयितुमीशत इत्यनूदितम्।

क्रमुकफलताम्बूलदलावयवादिषु प्रत्येकमविद्यमानस्यापि रागस्येवावयविनि संयोगविशेषात् देहारम्भकपरमाणुसंश्लेषविशेषादेव देहे चैतन्यस्याप्याविर्भावो नानुपपन्नः। चर्वणजनित-हुतवहसंयोगसंपादितपाटलिमभिः परमाणुभिर्द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण कारणपूर्व एव तत्र रागोदय इति चेन्न। प्रमाणाभावात्, अपि च सितासितादितन्तुषु प्रत्येकमविद्यमानमपि चित्ररूपं विशेषगुणं तदारब्धे पटे स्फुटमुपलभमानाः कथं कारणगुणपूर्वकत्वमुक्तगुणस्याध्य-वस्येम। न चावयवरूपातिरेकेणावयविनि चित्रं नाम रूपान्तरं नास्त्येव। अवयविनोऽचाक्षुषत्वप्रसङ्गात्, अवयवरूपैरेव तदुपपादने सर्वमेव कार्यद्रव्यं नीरूपमापद्येत, अनुभव-विरोधः, सर्वव्यवहारविरोधश्च। विशेषगुणश्च काठिन्यं करकाद्रव्यवर्ति अकारणगुणपूर्वकं दृश्यत इत्यनैकान्तश्च। न च संयोगविशेषः काठिन्यम्। तस्य द्विष्ठत्वात्, अस्य तु करकाद्रव्यैकवर्तित्वात्, स्पर्शविशेषतया पदार्थविद्भिरभ्युपगमाच्च। दृश्यस्य देहस्य कथं

It is not improper to maintain that just as the red colour, which is absent in the parts of the areca nut and betel leaf severally, emerges on account of a particular combination of these in the whole, even so intelligence emerges in the body, only on account of a particular combination of infinitesimal atoms which give rise to it. There is no warrant for the objection that in the instance cited, from out of the infinitesimal atoms rendered red by the heat generated in the act of chewing (betel leaf and nut) in the order of binaries, etc., red colour emerges strictly only in conformity with the quality of the cause. Further, although the special quality of variegated colour is not found in white, black and other threads severally, we clearly perceive it in the cloth made out of these. How, then, can we assert that the quality of the effect is dependent on that of the cause ? Again, it cannot be said that over and above the colours of the constituent parts there is no other colour known as the variegated colour in the whole ; for, in that case, the whole would become imperceptible. If it be said that the whole becomes visible only on account of the colours of the parts, it would follow that all effects would be deprived of their colours. That would contradict experience as also all usage. As the special quality of hardness existing in ice is not found to be dependent on the quality of the causal substance (water), the argument commits the fallacy of *anaikānta*.

Again, hardness cannot be said to be a particular form of conjunction, because it exists in two objects, while hardness exists in one, namely, ice, and because people who know the nature of things have admitted hardness to be a form of contact. It may be asked how the body which is an object of perception can be regarded as the knower. What

द्रष्टृत्वमिति चेत्को विरोधः, अयमेव यदेकस्यां क्रियायामेकस्य कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं च न घटत इति । यद्येवं व्यतिरेकवादे वा कथमात्मन्यहमिति प्रत्यय; रूपभेदादिति चेत्समानमिदं देहात्मवादेऽपि । अपि च परसमवायिक्रियाफलभागि कर्म, स्वसमवेतज्ञानफलभागिनः शरीरस्य कर्मत्वमेव नास्तीति न पर्यनुयोगावकाशः, अतो देह एवात्मेति बार्हस्पत्याः । तथा च पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवदिति सूत्रम् ॥

१६. अत्र प्रतिविधिर्देहो नात्मा प्रत्यक्षबाधतः ।
न खल्वहमिदङ्कारावेकस्यैकत्र वस्तुनि ॥

अहं जानामीति प्रत्यग्वृत्तिरहमिति मतिः इदंकारगोचराच्छरीरान्निष्कृष्टमेव स्वविषयमुपस्थापयति घटादेरिव । पराग्वृत्तिरिदमिति शरीरविषयिणी च शेमुषी स्वविषयमहङ्कारगोच-

is the contradiction involved in this? The incompatibility lies precisely here—in regard to one act, it is not possible for one and the same substance to be at once the object and the agent of action. If this were so, even on the other view (that something other than the body is the self), how can the self (the perceived) appear as the 'I' (the perceiver)? If it be replied that it is due to a difference of aspect, then it is equally applicable to the doctrine that the body is the self. Besides, an object (of knowledge, and, for that matter, of any activity) is that which shares the fruits of actions which are found in intimate association with something other than itself; but the body experiences the results of knowledge found intimately associated with itself and hence does not possess the character of being an object. Hence there is no room for the objection (How can the body be both the subject and object?). Therefore, the followers of Bṛhaspati hold that the body itself is the soul. To that effect their sūtra runs—intelligence emerges from the elements of earth, water, fire and air, just as the intoxicating quality springs from herbs, etc.

THE REFUTATION OF THIS (DOCTRINE)

16. The body cannot be the soul, because (the doctrine of the identity of the body with the soul is) contradicted by perception. One and the same substance cannot appear as 'this' and 'I' to an identical person. Just as the inward knowledge of 'I' involved in the consciousness 'I know' exhibits its object to be distinct from pots and the like, it reveals its object to be distinct from the body which is the object of the consciousness 'this'. Just as the cognition 'This is a pot' (marks off its object to be distinct from the object of the consciousness of 'I'),

राद्विवेचयति यथायंघट इति। इतरथा स्वपरविभागानुपपत्तेः। नचैकस्मिन्नेव रूपभेदादेवं प्रतीतिः। नहि देवदत्तो दण्डिनमात्मानं दण्डयमिति प्रत्येति। अन्यच्च नियमितबहिरिन्द्रियवृत्तेरवहितमनसोऽहमिति स्वात्मानमवयतः करचरणोदराद्यवयवा न भासन्ते। स्थवीयसि चावयविनि शरीरेऽहमिति मतिगोचरेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने अवश्यमवयवप्रतिभासेनाप्यन्वयिना भाव्यम्। नह्यस्ति संभवः—अवयवी स्थवीयान् प्रचकास्ति, अवयवास्तु न केचन प्रथन्त इति। यत्तु त्र्यणुके व्यभिचार इति। तन्न। वातायनविवरदृश्यनिर्भागत्रसरेणुव्यतिरेकेण परमाणुस्वीकारे कारणाभावात्। प्रत्यक्षयोग्यावयवस्य तथा प्रतिभासनियमाद्वा न व्यभिचारः। न चावयविनि बहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्य एवायं नियम इत्युत्प्रेक्ष्यम्। प्रमाणाभावात्। अन्तःकरणस्य च केवलस्यावयविनि वृत्त्यसंभवाच्च। वायोस्तु रूपाद्यभावात् केवलस्पर्शाधारतयोपलम्भः। तत्रापि तादृशानेकावयवप्रतिभासोऽस्त्येव

even so the outward knowledge 'this' having the body for its object, distinguishes its object to be distinct from the object of self-consciousness. Otherwise, there will be no basis for the distinction between 'myself' and 'others'. It cannot be urged that one and the same thing may, from different aspects, appear in this manner (as 'I' and 'this'), because Devadatta wielding a stick does not understand himself as 'This person possesses a stick' (but only as 'I wield a stick'). Moreover, to a person who has controlled the activities of his external senses and attained mental concentration and known the self as the 'I', the knowledge of organs such as hands, legs and belly does not arise. And if the body which is big and possesses parts were taken to be the object of self-consciousness, a knowledge of the organs must necessarily accompany it. It is impossible for the body which is big and which owns parts to be known when none of its parts is cognised. The instance of the tryaṇuka (triad of atoms) which was cited as disproving the general proposition (that whenever the whole is perceived its parts also should be perceived) does not really disprove it, for there is no warrant for accepting the existence of infinitesimal atoms over and above the triads which are devoid of parts and which are perceivable (in sun's rays proceeding) through the hole of the window. (Even granting the existence of infinitesimal atoms) this general proposition is not falsified, because it applies only to perceptible parts. Again, it cannot be contended that this law obtains only in the case of the complex whole cognised by external organs, as there is no warrant (for the same). Besides, in comprehending a whole composed of parts the internal organ, in itself, does not operate. As for the case of air, it is known as the seat of touch only, because it has no colour, etc.; besides, even here, as in the case of the

स्पृश्यमान इव घटादाविति न तेन व्यभिचारः । यत्तु स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमिति शरीरेऽहं प्रत्ययो दृश्यत इति । तदपि पर्यालोचनीयम् । तत्राप्यन्तश्शरीरमहङ्कारमेव किमपि वस्त्वहंकारो गोचरयति, न पुनश्चाक्षुष इव देहप्रत्ययः स्थौल्यबाल्यादियोगिदेहमात्रम् । अत एव ममेदं गृहमितिवन्ममेदं शरीरमिति भेदप्रतिभासो व्यवहारश्च । नह्यसौ साक्षात्प्रतीतभेदनिमित्तः प्रतीयमानः शिलापुत्रकशरीरव्यपदेशवदौपचारिको युक्त आश्रयितुं ममात्मेतिवत् । तत्रास्मच्छब्दस्य आत्मनि वृत्तेरैकार्थ्यादविवादाच्च युक्तं तथाश्रयणम् । न चैवमत्र । अतो देहव्यतिरेकिणश्चेतनस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् तत्संबन्धिनि लाक्षणिको देहेऽहंशब्दप्रयोगः । बाह्यविषयेषु परस्परविरुद्धरूपपरिमाणसङ्ख्यासन्निवेशग्रहणेन व्यतिरेकस्य स्फुटत्वादात्मनि तादृशरूपान्तराग्रहणेन देहाभेदप्रतिभासोऽविवेकिनाम् । इतश्च इच्छानुविधायिस्वव्यापारोऽयमात्मा, इच्छयैव हि सङ्कल्पयति स्मरत्यूहति च, शरीरमपि

pot which is being touched, there is knowledge of such diverse parts; hence, no discredit to the general law on this score. The contention that from statements such as 'I am stout', 'I am lean', the self is found to have the body for its object deserves examination. Even there, self-consciousness has for its object some entity which is only inside the body; and like the knowledge of the body, gained through visual perception, it does not relate to the body only which has the characteristics of stoutness, youthfulness and the like. Hence the apprehension of difference and the usage 'This is my body', as in the case of the expression 'This is my house'. This usage ('This is my body') being based on directly perceived difference, it is not proper to urge that it has to be interpreted figuratively like the expression 'This is my self', 'This is the body of the doll'. As the word 'my' denotes the self and as the two words (my and self in the statement 'This is my self') have an identical meaning and as there is no dispute concerning this, a figurative interpretation is proper. But it is not so here (in the statement 'This is my body'). Because a conscious entity distinct from the body is established by perception, the word 'I' (in the proposition 'I am stout') denotes by a figure of speech, the body which is related to the self. With regard to external objects, as there is knowledge of mutually exclusive colours, size, number and configuration, diversity is explicit; but, in the case of the soul, as there is no knowledge of such divergent qualities, to the ignorant there arises the illusion of the body being non-different from the soul. Again, the self has his activities determined by his desires, for, he wills, remembers and infers only at the instance of his desires; the body too has its activities, such as lying down, sitting and standing, determined by his desires; hence arises the illusion of

तदिच्छानुविधायिशयनासनोत्थानादिचेष्टमिति भवत्यभेदभ्रमः शुक्तिरजतादाविव । प्रणिहितमनसस्तु ज्ञातृतया सिद्ध्यन्तमहमाकारमर्थमनवयवमिदमिति परिस्फुरतः स्थूलादवयविनश्शरीरात्पृथगपरोक्षयन्त्येव । भवन्ति च जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरविषयो न भवति, अर्थान्तरविषयो वायम् ; अप्रकाशमानतदवयवप्रतिभासत्वात् । य एवं प्रकारः स तथा, यथा अयमिति प्रतिभासः । यच्छरीरविषयं न तत्तथा । यथा उभयसंमतं शरीरज्ञानम् । तथा शरीरं अहंप्रत्ययगोचरो न भवति इदमिति गृह्यमाणत्वात् बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद्वा घटादिवदिति । किञ्च—

अपरार्थं स्वमात्मानमात्मार्थेऽन्यच्च जानतः ।
सङ्घातत्वात्परार्थेऽस्मिन्देहे कथमिवात्मधीः ॥

सर्वस्य बाह्याभ्यन्तरभोग्यवर्गस्य शब्दसुखादेरात्मार्थतां भोक्तुश्चात्मनोऽनन्यार्थतां सर्वस्य शेषितां प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपद्यामहे । न च शरीरमनन्यार्थं सङ्घातत्वात् । सङ्घाता हि सर्वे परार्था दृष्टाश्शयनासनरथादयः । न च संघाताः संहतशरीराद्यर्था दृश्यन्त इत्यात्मनो-

non-difference as in the case of the shell and silver. Thinking minds, however, perceive the entity known as 'I' which has to be recognised as knower and which is devoid of parts to be really distinct from the body which appears as 'this' and which is stout and consists of parts. As the knowledge of bodily parts is absent in the consciousness 'I know', either it does not have for its object the body or has for its object something other than the body. Wherever there is absence of apprehension of bodily parts, the body is not the object of knowledge, but something else, as in the case of the consciousness 'This is a pot'. The knowledge which has the body for its object is, however, different (that is, there is not absence of knowledge of parts of the body), as in the instance of knowledge of the body accepted by both of us. Again, the body cannot be the object of self-consciousness, because it is known to be 'this' or because it is grasped by external senses, as in the case of the pot, and the like. Moreover, how can he who has known his self to exist for the sake of nothing other than himself, and known other objects to exist for his sake, take this body which exists for the sake of others, for the reason of its being a collection of parts, to be the self? We directly perceive that the entire collection of internal and external objects of experience, such as sound and pleasure, exists for the sake of the self; while the self, the enjoyer, does not exist for the sake of others, but is the one object for whose glory and service everything else exists. Being a collection, the body cannot but exist for the sake of others; and all aggregates such as bed, seat and chariot are indeed found to

ऽपि संहतत्वमापद्यत इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति तस्यापि परार्थत्वप्रसंगात् । अपरार्थश्चायमात्मा प्रत्यक्षतः प्रकाशत इत्युक्तम् । योग्यानुपलंभबाधितं चात्मनि संघातत्वम् । संघातान्तरार्थत्वे च तस्यापि तथा ततोऽन्यस्यापि तथेति न व्यवतिष्ठेत । न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामव्यवस्था युक्ता । न च सङ्घातस्य परार्थत्वे परस्य संहतत्वमपि प्रयोजकम् । भोक्तृतयैवात्मनः स्वार्थसंघातं प्रति परत्वोपपत्तेः । व्याप्त्यनुपयोगिनोऽपि दृष्टान्तदृष्टधर्ममात्रस्यानुरोधेनानुमानमिच्छतः सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः ॥

अस्फुटत्वेऽपि भेदस्य शरीरे तदसम्भवात् ।
तद्गुणान्तरवैधर्म्यादपि ज्ञानं न तद्गुणः ॥

सर्व एव कार्यद्रव्यगतविशेषगुणः कारणगुणपूर्वक इति कथमतत्पूर्वकः शरीरे चैतन्यगुणः संभवेत् । यत्तु बार्हस्पत्यं वचनं "पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुरिति तत्त्वानि तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवत्" इति । तदनुपपन्नम् । शक्तेरविशेषगुणत्वेन तथोपपत्तेः ।

exist for the sake of others. It cannot be argued that as all collections are known to be for the sake of the body and the like which are themselves collections, the self also should be an aggregate ; for, if it were so, the self too would have to exist for the sake of others ; but it has already been stated that the self is directly perceived to exist not for the sake of others. On account of the non-perception of the collective nature of the self—a nature which is capable of being perceived—the belief that the soul is an aggregate stands condemned. If the self exists for the sake of another collection, the latter must also exist for the sake of some other collection and that for another and so on *ad infinitum*. But where an end is possible, an unending chain is undesirable. Moreover, when a collection exists for the sake of something else, it is not because that other is itself a collection. It is only in virtue of his nature as enjoyer that the self becomes that other for whose sake all collections exist. For him who attempts to base his inference on all the qualities of the illustrative example, even though they may be unserviceable to the general law, all inference would be impossible.

Even though the distinction between the two (the body and the self) may not be explicit, consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, as it cannot exist in it and as being quite unlike its other qualities. As all the special qualities existing in the effect are dependent on those of the causal substance, how can consciousness exist in the body without depending on the quality of its cause. Bṛhaspati's teaching—that earth, water, fire and air are the realities and that from these consciousness arises just as the intoxicating quality emerges from herbs, etc.—is un-

सर्वद्रव्येषु तत्तत्कार्यसमधिगम्यः तत्प्रतियोगिशक्त्याख्यो गुणस्साधारणः । नैवं चैतन्यम् देहैकगुणत्वाभ्युपगमात् कार्यत्वे सत्येकविधप्रत्यक्षसिद्धतया च विशेषगुणत्वात् । द्रव्यान्तरसंयोगसमासादितमदशक्तिभिरकार्यभूतैः परमाणुभिर्निजगुणपुरस्कारेण स्वकार्यद्रव्येषु मदशक्त्युत्पादोऽपि नानुपपन्नः । ताम्बूलरागस्तु पूर्वद्रव्यावयवविभागानन्तरं द्रव्यान्तरसंयोगजनितरक्तिमगुणैः कारणैः क्रियते । दृश्यते हि तत्रावयवेष्वपि प्रत्येकं रक्तिमगुणः । न च शरीरावयवेषु प्रत्येकं चैतन्यगुणः प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते वा । तदुपगमे च एकशरीर एवानेकचेतनापातादङ्गाङ्गित्वाभावः प्रतिसंधानव्यवहारलोपश्च देवदत्तदृष्ट इव यज्ञदत्तादेः । यत्तु अकारणगुणपूर्वकं चित्ररूपं पट इति । तन्न । नानारूपता हि चित्रता । सा च नानारूपैस्तन्तुभिः क्रियत इति किमनुपपन्नम् ।

tenable. As power is not a special quality, it may be so (that is, need not be dependent on the quality of the causal substance). In all substances the quality known as causal power concerning the effect, cognisable from their respective effects, is a common quality; but consciousness is not so, because it is admitted to belong to the body only and because it is a special quality, as it, while remaining an effect, is cognised by one form of perception. It is not wrong to maintain that, on the basis of their own quality, from out of infinitesimal atoms, which are not effects and which acquire the intoxicating quality from the mingling of different substances, the intoxicating quality arises in their effects.

The redness caused by betels, etc., is, likewise, produced by causes which possess the red colour generated by the mixing of different substances, after their parts have lost their cohesion (in the act of chewing); hence the red colour perceived in each of their parts too. Consciousness is not found in the parts of the body individually, nor have they been said to possess it. If that were admitted, as it would follow that in one and the same body there must be many thinking beings, it is impossible to say which is primary and which is secondary; besides, all reference to recognition would be impossible. Just as in respect of what has been seen by Devadatta, there cannot be recognition on the part of Yajñadatta, here also (what has been perceived by one part of the body cannot be recognised by another). The statement made before, namely, that the variegated colour found in the cloth is not dependent on the quality of the cause, is erroneous. The quality of variegated colour is nothing but that of being many coloured; and this (variegated colour) is produced by threads of different colours; hence there is nothing objectionable here. Though the variegated colour

प्रत्येकमविद्यमानमपि तच्चित्ररूपं तन्तुषु संहतेषु दृश्यत एव चित्रा इमे तन्तव इति ॥ सम्भूय च तेषां पटारम्भकत्वम् । एवं तत्कारणेष्वपि तदिति न क्वचिद्व्यभिचारः । नचैकरूपनियमाभावेनावयविनोऽचाक्षुषत्वम् । महत्त्वैकार्थसमवायिना रूपवत्त्वेनैव चाक्षुषत्वसिद्धेः । अस्तु वा चित्रं नाम एको रूपविशेषः । स तु रूपैरेव कारणगतैर्नानाविधैरारभ्यत इति दृष्टम् । नचैवमवयववर्तिभिरेव चैतन्यैरवयविनि शरीरे चैतन्यविशेषारम्भः । चितितन्मात्रस्यैव तेष्वसम्भवात् । अतो न देहगुणश्चैतन्यम् । एतेन सुखादयोऽपि शरीरगुणाः प्रत्युक्ताः । अपिच दृढ एव शरीरे विरोधिगुणापातमन्तरेण कुसुमविलेपनगंध इव निवर्तमानश्चैतन्यसुखादिर्न तद्गुणो भवितुमर्हति । न खलु तद्विशेषगुणा रूपादयस्तथा निवर्तन्ते ॥

आत्मनः परेषां च शरीरगुणाः प्रत्यक्षयोग्याः बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्याश्च । न च तथा ज्ञानादिरिति नासौ तद्गुणः । किञ्च—

does not exist in each of the threads severally, it is certainly noticed in the threads which combine and are known as threads of variegated colours. The capacity to produce cloth belongs to threads only in their togetherness; thus, the variegated colour exists even in the cause of cloth; hence there is nowhere any violation (to the rule that the qualities of the effect are dependent on those of the causes). It cannot be maintained that the whole (the cloth) becomes invisible inasmuch as it does not possess any one specific colour, for, it may become perceptible by the very fact of its possessing inherently colour along with bigness. Let variegated colour be taken to be one specific colour. Even then it is found to be produced by the different colours existing in the causes. It cannot be asserted that it is only the consciousness resident in the parts that produces the particular consciousness in the body, which is composed of those parts, for, consciousness in general cannot exist in the parts. Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body. On the same count, the belief that pleasure and other qualities belong to the body stands condemned. Besides, as consciousness, pleasure, etc., vanish from the body, like the smell of flower and sandal, even when the body continues to be strong and in the absence of counteracting qualities, they cannot be the qualities of the body. Colour and other special qualities of the body, however, do not leave it in the same manner.

The qualities of the body are perceptible to us as well as to others and are also to be grasped by external senses; but not so consciousness, etc. Therefore, they are not the qualities of the body. Further, the

उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्पारार्थ्यात्सन्निवेशविशेषतः ।
रूपादिमत्त्वाद्भूतत्वाद्देहो नात्मा घटादिवत् ॥
सच्छिद्रत्वाददेहित्वाद्देहत्वान्मृतदेहवत् ।
इत्यादिसाधनैर्न्याय्यैर्निषेध्या वर्ष्मणश्चितिः

एवं प्रत्यक्षविरोधादन्वयमुखेन साध्यमुपस्थापयद्भिरुदीरितसाधनैरपहृतविषयतया इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वादिव्यतिरेकहेतवो न साध्यमुपस्थापयितुमीशते ॥

१७. सन्तु तर्हीन्द्रियाण्येवात्मा । न च तानीदन्तया प्रथन्ते ; येन देहवदहङ्कारगोचराद्बहिष्क्रियेरन् । नापि तथोद्भूतरूपादिगुणानि स्थूलानि ; येन तत्प्रतिभास इव इन्द्रियगोचरत्वे अहंप्रत्ययस्य रूपावयवादिप्रतीतिः प्रसज्येत । तद्व्यापारफलं च ज्ञानं तद्गामि युक्तं स्नानाध्ययनादिफलवत् । अत एव सत्यतपाः द्रष्टुश्चक्षुष इति ।

body is not the soul, as it, like a pot, has a beginning, exists for the sake of others, possesses a particular configuration and has colour, etc., and is an element. Again, because the body has holes and is not the possessor of the body and is a body, consciousness cannot be its quality as in the case of the dead body. These and other logical proofs lead us to reject the view that consciousness is a quality of the body. Thus the subject having been disposed of in this manner with the aid of the aforesaid reasons, which point to the major term on the strength of positive concomitance, purely negative concomitance, such as, the quality of being the seat of the senses, will be powerless to establish the major term.

THE VIEW THAT THE SENSES ARE IDENTICAL WITH THE SOUL

17. Then let the senses themselves be (considered as) the soul. They are not referred to as 'this'. Otherwise, (if they were known as 'this'), they, like the body, may be excluded from that which is the object of self-consciousness. Unlike the body, the senses possess neither visible colour and other qualities nor big size. If they did, and if self-consciousness presented the senses as its objects, knowledge of their colour, parts, etc., may be expected to arise, as in the case of the knowledge of the body. Knowledge which is the result of their activity, like the results of bathing, study, etc., must, properly speaking, belong only to the senses. That is why Satyatapas speaks of 'the seeing eye'.[35]

35. See *Varāha Purāṇa,* Ch. 98, verses 1-26. One day when Satyatapas was engaged in meditation, a boar which was chased by a huntsman took refuge in the vicinity of the sage's hermitage. Presently the huntsman rushed in and inquired

१८. तन्न, विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि—किं प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाणि चेतनानि, संभूय वा । यदि प्रत्येकं इन्द्रियान्तरदृष्टस्य इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसंधानं न स्यात् । अस्ति च तद् यमहमद्राक्षं तमहं स्पृशामीति । अत एव न संभूयापि चेतनत्वम् । न हि पञ्चभिरिन्द्रियैस्संभूय एकं वस्त्वनुभूयते अनुसंधीयते वा । एकेन्द्रियविगमे च प्रायणप्रसङ्गश्च । इन्द्रियचैतन्ये च तत्तदिन्द्रियापाये तदिन्द्रियार्थस्मरणमपि न भवेत् । न च तद्व्यापारफलतया तत्समवायित्वं ज्ञानस्य । शस्त्रादिव्यापारजन्मनोऽपि पापादेः परसमवायित्वात् । अन्यथा च प्रष्टुः मृत्युपपत्तिं शरणागतपरित्यागस्य नृशंसतां च आलोच्य सत्यतपसस्तथा वचनम् ।

THE REFUTATION OF THIS VIEW

18. It (the theory that the senses are the soul) is untenable, as none of its forms stands scrutiny. To explain it further—Do the senses possess knowledge individually or collectively ? If individually, what is perceived by one sense cannot be recognised by another. But such a recognition, viz., 'what I saw I touch', does exist. That is why the senses, even collectively, cannot be said to possess knowledge. No object is either perceived or recognised by all the five senses together. Again, (if this view were correct) even when one sense-organ perished, death must ensue. Besides, if knowledge belonged to the senses, with the decay of each of the different senses, the remembrance of their respective objects could not take place. Moreover, knowledge, though the outcome of the activity of the senses, need not inhere in them. For, sin and the like, though resulting from the activity of weapons, etc., inhere in something other (than weapons). Bearing in mind the fact that if he did not speak the truth, the person who interrogated would meet with death, and that (if he spoke the truth), it would be extreme cruelty to abandon one who had taken refuge, Satyatapas spoke like that.[36]

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of the sage if he saw a boar near by and said that if the animal could not be traced, he himself, his children and his dependents would have to die of starvation. The sage found himself in a dilemma—if he furnished the information regarding the animal's hiding place, he would be guilty of the heinous sin of betraying one who had taken refuge ; if he withheld the information, he would be responsible for the death of the hunter and his dependents. After a moment's reflection, Satyatapas replied, 'Animals are endowed with eyes to see and tongue to speak. The eye that sees has no tongue to report on what it perceives ; the tongue that speaks has no eye to see. Wherefore do you ask me ?' Struck by the ingenuity of his speech, the boar and its pursuer appeared to the sage in their true form as Viṣṇu and Indra respectively and blessed him.

36. See note on page 19.

१९. अस्तु तर्हि मन एव चेतनम् । तथा सति हि पूर्वोक्ता दोषाः परिहृता भवन्ति । तद्धि सर्वेन्द्रियाध्यक्षं प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते च । [37] उपपद्यते च इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसंधानम्, दर्शनानुसंधानाधारस्य मनस एकत्वात् । तत्तदिन्द्रियापायेऽपि स्मरणमप्युपपद्यत एव, मनसो नित्यत्वात् ।

२०. तदपि न, करणत्वात् चक्षुरादिवत् । बाह्यान्तरसकलविषयसंवेदनकरणतया हि मनः प्रकल्प्यते । बाह्येन्द्रियेषु यथायथं निजविषयसन्निकर्षभागिष्वपि यतो न युगपदेव सर्वे विषयाः प्रतीयन्ते, अतोऽवगच्छामः अस्ति किंचिदपरमपि साधनं यत्साहाय्यकविरहान्न सर्वे, प्रकाशन्ते कश्चिदेव एकः प्रतीयत इति । तथा सुखादिसंवेदनान्यपि करणवन्ति क्रियात्वात् संवेदनत्वाद्वा रूपादिज्ञानवदिति । तदेवं ज्ञानकरणतयावगतस्य

THE DOCTRINE THAT MANAS IS THE SOUL

19. In that case, let manas (mind) be the soul. If that were so, the aforesaid difficulties would be got over. Indeed, manas has been known to be the controller of all the senses and has been so declared. Besides, recognition by a different sense becomes appropriate, since manas is the one entity that is the seat of both perception and recognition. Even when the respective senses perish, recognition is still possible, since manas is eternal.

THE EXAMINATION OF THIS DOCTRINE

20. This theory (that manas is the soul) too is erroneous, because manas is an instrument like the eye, etc. Manas has indeed been conceived as the instrument of all knowledge concerning the outer and the inner world. From the fact that even when the different external senses are in contact with their respective objects, they are not apprehended simultaneously, we learn that there exists some other instrument also (besides the senses) and that, on account of the absence of its help, all objects do not appear but some one (object) alone is cognised.[38] Likewise, knowledge of pleasure, etc., as in the case of knowledge of colour and the like, requires an instrument because it is either a form of activity or of knowledge. How can manas, which is thus known to be an instrument of knowledge, be the subject of knowledge ?

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37. Prajñāyate is found in the Telugu edition, but is wrongly omitted in the Benares edition. The presence of the word ca implies that there must be another verb besides pratijñāyate ; and it can only be prajñāyate. *vide infra* p. 17.

38. See *Nyāya Sūtra*, I. i. 16—Yugapat jñānānutpattir manaso lingam.

मनसः कथमिव ज्ञाने कर्तृत्वम् । स्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणं हि तत् । तच्च स्वच्छन्दानुरोधेन साध्यसिद्ध्यनुगुणोपकरणसंपादनसामर्थ्यं स्वसमवेतमेव वा गुणान्तरं तन्त्रीकृत्य प्रवृत्तिः । करणत्वं तु पराधिष्ठानाधीनव्यापारतारूपपारतन्त्र्यनियतं साधकतमत्वमिति कथमिवैकत्र मनसि परस्परविरुद्धतदुभयधर्मसंबन्धं प्रतिपद्येमहि ।

अथ तदपि मनः करणान्तरेण स्मरणादिषु कर्तृभावमनुभवति, तथा सति संज्ञामात्रे विवादः । य एव हि चक्षुरादिभी रूपादीन् आन्तरकरणेन च सुखादींश्चेतयते स एवात्मा । तस्मिन्नेव चेन्मनस्संज्ञा निवेश्यते कामं निवेश्यतां, न नः किंचिद्धीनम्, किंतु तथा सर्वलौकिकव्यवहारो बाध्येतेत्यलमनेन ।

आह—किमिदं मनो नाम । ननु उक्तमान्तरं ज्ञानकरणं द्रव्यमिति । किं पुनरस्य साधनम् । ननु उक्तं युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति । उक्तं नाम तथापि कथं तत्त्वान्तर-

To be a subject is, really, to be independent. Independence consists either in the capacity to secure, in accordance with one's own desires, the means appropriate to the realisation of certain ends, or in the activity brought on by other qualities inherent in oneself. To be an instrument is to be the best means to an end, which is invariably associated with dependence on others, which, in its turn, consists in possessing activity that is subject to the control of others. How can we find in the selfsame manas the association of these two mutually conflicting qualities ?

Moreover, if it is maintained that the manas, which is an agent, acquires the character of an agent in remembering and other (activities) with the aid of another instrument, then the dispute concerns a name only. He alone is called the soul who perceives colour, etc., with (external senses such as) eyes, etc., and (who experiences) pleasure, etc., with the aid of the internal organ. If the name 'manas' be attributed to that, let it be done by all means. It does not affect us in the least. But it would go against all the usage of the world. No more of this.

What, it may be asked, is meant by manas ? It has already been described as an internal substance which is the instrument of knowledge. What is the proof of its existence ? The fact that knowledge of all objects does not arise simultaneously has already been shown to prove the existence of manas. True, it has been so pointed out ; but, how does it establish that it is a distinct entity ? Even after postulating it, you must perforce admit some other reason to account for the absence

सिद्धिः । कल्पयित्वापि हि तद्युगपत्स्मरणानुत्पत्त्युपपत्तये अवश्याश्रयणीयमेव निमित्तान्तरम् । सन्ति हि युगपदस्य स्मर्तुर्नानार्थानुभवभाविताः संस्काराः । अथ च न सर्वे स्मर्यन्ते, किंचिदेव कदाचित् स्मर्यते। संस्कारोन्मेषहेतूपनिपातक्रमात्तथात्वमिति चेत् , एवमपि प्रणिधानमात्रोद्बोधनीयसंस्कारस्य स्मृतियौगपद्यमापद्येत । यावदनुभूतसकलविषयसुस्मूर्षया सर्वतः प्रत्याहृतचेतसस्साधारण्येन प्रणिदधतोऽपि न सर्व एवार्थाः स्मृतिमधिरोहन्ति । यदि तु शुभाशुभरूपतया स्मरणानामदृष्टवशाद् व्यवस्थाक्रमः ज्ञानस्वाभाव्याद्वा आत्मनः, तथा सति बहिरिन्द्रियेषु च यथायथं स्वविषयसंप्रयुक्तेषु तथैव युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिरुपपद्यत इति कृतमिन्द्रियान्तरेण ।

स्यान्मतं कादाचित्कस्य सुखादेरात्मसमवायिनो बाह्यविषयादृष्टनिमित्तकारणस्यासमवायिकारणेन भाव्यम् , तच्च आत्ममनस्सन्निकर्ष इति मनोद्रव्यसिद्धिरिति । तदसत्, सुखदुःखादिपूर्वकालजन्मनः अभिमतानभिमतविषयसंपर्कज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायिन एव

of the simultaneous remembrance of all things. Impressions born of the experience of different objects exist simultaneously in the remembering person. Still all these objects are not remembered, but only some one (of them) is recalled at times. The order in which the causes, that are responsible for stimulating impressions appear cannot be said to account for this (the non-appearance of all remembrance at once). If that were so, to a person whose impressions can be aroused solely by concentration, all remembrance should appear simultaneously. But, even in the case of a person who, with the desire to remember all things he has experienced, withdraws his manas from all things and meditates in general, all things previously experienced do not become the object of remembrance. Should it be supposed that the order in which remembrances appear is due either to unseen forces (adṛṣṭa) inasmuch as all remembrance is either auspicious or inauspicious, or to the fact of the soul being of the nature of knowledge, then, the absence of the simultaneous appearance of all knowledge, even when the outer senses are in contact with their respective objects, would be rendered possible for the same reason; hence no need to posit a different substance.

Again, pleasure and the like which are adventitious, which inhere in the soul and which have external objects and unseen forces for their efficient cause, must have a non-inherent cause and this is the conjunction of soul and manas. To believe that this argument establishes the existence of the substance known as manas is erroneous, for, the knowledge, which is produced by contact with agreeable and disagreeable objects and which originates prior to pleasure, pain and the like, and

असमवायिकारणत्वात् । तस्य च विषयसंप्रयुक्तेन्द्रियसंप्रयोग एव आत्मसमवेतोऽसमवायि कारणम् । तद्धेतुरपीन्द्रियव्यापारः प्रयत्नमदृष्टं चात्मसमवेतमपेक्षमाणादात्मेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षात् असमवायिकारणात् । प्रयत्नस्य तु स्वपूर्वक्षणवृत्तिकर्तव्यताज्ञानम् । प्रयत्न एव त्वदृष्टस्यापीति नात्मविशेषगुणानां बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छादीनामसमवायिकारणसापेक्षतयापि द्रव्यान्तरपरिकल्पनं न्याय्यम् ।

यत्तु नित्यद्रव्यविशेषगुणस्य द्रव्यान्तरसंयोग एव असमवायिकारणम्, पार्थिवपरमाणुषु अग्निसंयोगादसमवायिकारणाद्रूपोत्पत्तेरिति। तदपि स्थवीयः, पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादयो दहनसंयोगादिति कुतोऽवगतम् । कार्यद्रव्ये तथा दर्शनादिति चेत् , इह वा तर्हि किं न दृश्यते इष्टानिष्टप्राप्त्यवगमादनन्तरं सुखादिर्जायत इति । दृष्टकारणव्यभिचारे हि कारणान्तरानुमानावसरः, न चेहास्ति व्यभिचारः । अतः प्रसिद्धकारणभावेष्वेव यत्र कार्यसमवायः तत्समवायिकारणम्

which inheres in the soul, may itself be the non-inherent cause. This (knowledge), in its turn, has for its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the organs, which are (themselves) in contact with objects, with the soul—a conjunction which inheres in the soul. The activity of the organ which is the cause of this (conjunction) has for its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the soul with the organs—a conjunction which is dependent on the effort and unseen forces inherent in the soul. This effort, again, (has for its non-inherent cause) the knowledge of the necessity for action existing at the preceding moment. The unseen force (has for its non-inherent cause) the effort itself. Thus, even the argument that knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire and other special qualities of the soul require a non-inherent cause does not justify the positing of a different substance.

From the fact that the colour of the atoms of earth (pṛthivī) originates from the non-inherent cause, viz., conjunction with fire, it may be said that the non-inherent cause of the special quality of an eternal substance is only the conjunction with another substance ; but this argument too is superficial. Wherefrom is it learnt that the colour and other qualities of earth particles originate from the conjunction with fire ? If the answer is it is so perceived in the resultant substance, then, inasmuch as pleasure and the like arise after the knowledge of the realisation of agreeable and disagreeable (objects), what is it that is not perceived here ? Indeed, there will be occasion to infer other causes only when the perceived causes are found to be defective. And here, there is no defect. Therefore, it is well to accept the following formula—that among the factors well known to be causes, that is the inherent cause wherein lies the inherence of

यत्तु तत्प्रत्यासन्नं तदसमवायि, यदन्यत्तन्निमित्तमिति व्यवस्थाश्रयणमुचितम्, न त्वनपेक्षिताप्रसिद्धद्रव्यान्तरसंयोगाभ्युपगमेन तस्यासमवायिकारणत्वाश्रयणम्। कारणान्तरानुपलब्धेः दृष्टानुसाराच्च अणुगतरूपादौ तथाभ्युपगमः, इह तु तद्विपर्ययः प्रदर्शित एव। एवमपि व्याप्तिबलेन यो द्रव्यान्तरसंयोगोऽनुमातव्यः स तर्हि स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यसमवेतो भौतिक एव चोपलब्ध इति प्रसिद्धदेहादिसंयोग एवानुमानपर्यवसानान्न नवमद्रव्यसिद्धिः।

अथोच्येत भौतिकत्वे हि मनसः पृथिव्याद्यन्यतमत्वेन भवितव्यम्, तच्चानुमानान्तरैर्व्यतिरेकमापादयद्भिः प्रत्यासिद्धम्। तथाहि न पार्थिवं मनः, रसावगमनिमित्तेन्द्रियत्वात् रसनावत्, न पाथसीयं गन्धग्रहणनिमित्तेन्द्रियत्वात् घ्राणवत्, एवम् अतैजसत्वाद्यपि तत्तदिन्द्रियागोचरग्रहणनिमित्ततया शक्याध्यवसानमिति अभौतिकत्वं मनस इति। तदनुपपन्नं धर्मिविशेषविपरीतसाधनात्। रसावगमनिमित्तेन्द्रियमपार्थिवत्वमिव पाथसीयत्व-

the effect; that is the non-inherent cause which is closely associated therewith; and the rest, the efficient cause. It is not proper to posit the conjunction of a different substance which is gratuitous and not well-known and to consider it the non-inherent cause. Such an admission with regard to colour and the like residing in atoms is due to non-apprehension of other causes and to (the logical need for) conformity with perceived things. But the contrary has already been proved here. Even if this were so, that conjunction with another substance, which may be inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance, being known to inhere in objects that can be touched and are elemental, the argument culminates in the conjunction with the well-known body, etc.; hence, a ninth substance (manas) need not be posited.

Again, if indeed, the manas were elemental, it must be one among (the bhūtas or the primal elements) earth and the like; but this is contradicted by other arguments proving it to be otherwise. They are:— Manas cannot be constituted out of the earth, because like the tongue, it is an organ instrumental in experiencing taste; it cannot be related to water, because like the nose, it is an organ instrumental in experiencing smell; similarly, being instrumental in experiencing what is not the object of the respective organs, it is possible to assert that it is not made of fire and the like; hence the non-elemental character of manas. This argument is inappropriate, for it would establish the opposite (conclusion), viz., that it is a distinctive substance (element). The character of being an organ instrumental in experiencing taste, proves that manas is composed of water (rasa), even as it establishes that manas is unrelated to earth. Similarly, the other reasons also prove the cha-

मपि समर्थयति। एवं साधनान्तराण्यपि भूतान्तरव्यतिरेकमिव आत्मीयभूतभावमापादयन्ति।

अथ शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धेषु यद्गुणग्राहि यदिन्द्रियं तदेव तद्गुणकभूतारब्धम्, हन्त तर्हि तदेव तदितरभूतव्यतिरेकितयाप्यवगतमिति न तदवगमकतामात्रेणाभिमतव्यतिरेकसिद्धिः।

अपि च शब्दादिगुणावगमसाधारणसाधनतया शरीरमिव पाञ्चभौतिकमेकं द्वित्रादिमयं वा इतरभूतसंसृष्टमस्तु मनः, यथाऽऽम्नायते अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मन इति। ननु तन्न तत्प्रकृतित्वप्रतिपादनपरम्, अपि तु तदधीनवृत्तितामात्रप्रदर्शनार्थम् आपोमयः प्राणः इत्यादिवत्। अत एव अपवर्गदशायामपि मनोऽनुवृत्तिः, दर्शितं हि तत्रैवाष्टमे मनसैतान्का-

racter of its being related to their respective elements, even as they reveal that it is not the other elements.

Further, that organ which grasps a particular quality among sound, touch, colour, taste and smell—that alone is constituted out of the element possessing that quality. Granting, indeed, that this is so, as it is also known that that organ alone (i.e., that organ which grasps only a particular quality) is not constituted of other elements than its own, by merely showing that (you) cannot establish the negative result which you intend to convey (viz., that manas is non-elemental).[39]

Moreover, being the common instrument apprehending sound and other qualities, manas, like the body, may as well be a single substance made up of the five elements, or it may be two-fold, three-fold and so on being made up of different elements.[40] For instance, it is said in scriptures, 'Gentle sir! manas is indeed food.'[41] It may be argued that it (this scriptural passage) does not seek to teach the fact of manas having its source in food, but, like statements such as 'Prāṇa is water'[42] it only seeks to assert the fact of its (manas) owning activities dependent on it (food). That is why manas continues to exist even in the state of realisation. Indeed, in the eighth chapter of the same (Upaniṣad) this fact has been stated thus: 'Perceiving with the aid of manas the object of his desires, (he) rejoices'; 'To this person, the manas is the

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39. The sense-organ which grasps only one quality may be said to be made of that particular element alone which possesses that quality. But this affords no basis for the inference that manas is non-elemental; for, manas apprehends all the qualities.

40. The variant reading is ekadvitrādimayam.

41. *Chānd. Up.* VI. 5.

42. *Chānd. Up.* VI. 5.

मान् पश्यन् रमते मनोऽस्य दैवं चक्षुः इति। तथा परस्याश्च देवतायाः सोऽन्यं कामं मनसाध्यायत इति महोपनिषदि, मनसैव जगत् सृष्टिं इति च पुराणे ।

उच्यते । सत्यमेवं द्रव्यान्तरपरिकल्पनातो वरमेवं वाश्रयणमित्युक्तम्, परमार्थतस्तु न भौतिकं नापि नवमं द्रव्यम् ।

क्व तर्हीदानीं मनश्शब्दः ? बुद्धावेव, अत एव हि बुद्धिमान् मनस्वी इति व्यपदिश्यते । मनसोऽवस्थाभेदाश्च द्रागेवापरोक्ष्यन्ते क्षुभितं मे मनः प्रसन्नं मे मनः इति । एवं च मनसः करणतया व्यपदेशो बुद्ध्यहङ्कारयोरिव वृत्तिभेदप्रदर्शनपरः पूर्वेषामिति । उच्यते, यदि बुद्धिरेव मनः यदि वा द्रव्यान्तरम् उभयथाऽपि तस्य न चेतनत्वमिति किमनेनाप्रतिज्ञातस्वरूपविमर्शनेन ।

celestial eye.'[43] Similarly, in the Mahopaniṣad it is said of the Supreme Deity that 'He meditates on another object of desire with the aid of manas'.[44] In the purāṇas too, it is said, 'He creates the world with the aid of manas only.'[45]

To the foregoing, it is replied—True, it is so. It was only said that rather than assume a different substance we may as well accept this position. But, in reality, it is neither elemental nor the ninth substance.

In that event, what does the word 'manas' refer to ? It refers only to the intellect (buddhi). That is why the person of (great) intellect is termed manasvī. The differences of states of mind are readily perceived in this way : 'My mind is perturbed'; 'My mind is tranquil.' To conclude, our ancestors' description of manas as an instrument is calculated to bring out the differences of states, just as intellect and egoity (though ultimately one, serve to indicate differences of states). The reply is whether manas is elemental or whether it is a different substance, in either of these two cases, intelligence cannot be attributed to it.[46] Hence, there is no use investigating into the nature of a substance, when no statement regarding that has been advanced.

43. *Chānd. Up.* VIII.
44. *Mahopaniṣad,* I.
45. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa,* V, 11, 15.
46. Is manas an aspect of buddhi ? Or, is it a different substance altogether ? Yāmunācārya leaves this question open, and thinks that, in any event, manas cannot be an intelligent entity.

२१ अस्तु तर्हि प्राण एवात्मा, तथा सति तदन्वयिनि शरीरे सात्मकत्वप्रतीतेः तद्विरहिणि निरात्मकत्वप्रतीतिश्च उपपद्येयाताम् । देहादुत्क्रान्तिर्लोकान्तरगमनं देहान्तरसंचारश्च उपपद्यन्तेतरां, गत्वरस्वाभाव्यात् प्राणस्य । इतरथा परममहतो महतश्च स्पर्शविरहिणः परिस्पन्दानुपपत्तेः उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिश्रुतयो भाक्ताः स्युः ।

२२ इदमप्यसत्, वायुत्वादेव बाह्यवायुवत् प्राणस्य चैतन्यानुपपत्तेः, वृत्तिहीनेऽपि आत्मनि सुषुप्तौ प्राणस्य वृत्तिमत्वाच्च । तद्वृत्या हि सुप्तस्यापि सप्तधातुभावेनाशितपीतद्रव्य परिणामः श्वासप्रश्वासौ च । तनुतरतेजोबन्नानुविद्धः कौष्ठ्यवातो हि प्राणः, स च कण्ठमुखनासाभ्यान्तरे बहिश्च रेचितः त्वचा स्पृश्यमानो घटादिरिव स्फुटमनात्मतया चकास्ति ।

THE THEORY THAT PRĀNA IS THE SOUL

21. Then, let the vital breath (prāṇa) be (called) the soul. If that were so, the apprehension of the body, which is associated with it (prāṇa), as one which is connected with the soul, and the apprehension of the body, where there is absence of prāṇa, as one which is not associated with the soul will both be appropriate. Departing from the body, going to other worlds, and wandering in other bodies would be even more appropriate inasmuch as it is prāṇa's nature to move. Otherwise (i.e., if prāṇa is not the soul), scriptural passages referring to departing, going and coming would have to be given a secondary significance, because movement cannot reasonably belong to that which is infinitely big and to that which is big, but which is devoid of contact.

CRITICISM OF THIS THEORY

22. This (theory) too is not correct. Intelligence cannot belong to prāṇa, because, like external air, it is only air, and because in the state of deep sleep, even when the soul is devoid of activity, the prāṇa possesses activity. Indeed, it is only on account of its activity that even in the case of the person who is asleep, transformation of substances that have been eaten and drunk into the sevenfold tissues of the body (dhātus)[47], inhalation and exhalation take place. The prāṇa is, indeed, the air which is mixed up with a little fire, water and food, and which resides in the viscera. This (air) too, being exhaled into and out of the throat, mouth and nostrils, and being sensed, like pots and others similar to it, by the organ of touch, clearly shines forth as the non-soul.

47. Dhātu (from the root dhā, 'to hold') is that which supports or sustains the body. It is usual to mention seven dhātus or tissues of the body—chyle (rasa), blood (rakta), flesh (māmsa), fat (medas), bone (asti); marrow (majja); semen (śukra). Sometimes hair (keśa), skin (tvac), and muscle and tendons (snāyu) are added to the list. See *Tait. Ār.* X. 54.

किञ्च–निरस्तो देहचैतन्यप्रतिषेधप्रकारतः ।
प्राणात्मवादो न पृथक् प्रयोजयति दूषणम् ॥

अविभुत्वेनास्यात्मनः स्पर्शविरहिणोऽपि प्रयत्नादृष्टप्रेरणानुगुण्येन मनस इव उत्क्रान्तिगत्यादयो युज्यन्त इति न तन्निर्देशानां मुख्यार्थता । परिमाणनिरूपणेऽप्येतद्भविष्यतीत्यलममुना ।

२३. भवतु तर्हि संविदेवात्मा अजडत्वात् । जडत्वप्रतिबद्धं ह्यनात्म्यं घटादिषु दृष्टम्, जडत्वं च संविदो निवर्तमानं तदपि निवर्तयति । अजडत्वं च संविदस्सत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वात् । न हि सती संवित् घटादिरिवाप्रकाशमानाऽवतिष्ठते, येन परायत्तसिद्धिरास्थीयेत ।

स्यान्मतं जातायामपि संविदि विषयमात्रं प्रथते । न खलु नीलमिदमिति प्रतियन्त-

Further, the doctrine that prāṇa is the soul, being refuted in the same manner in which intelligence has been negatived of the body, does not call for separate disproof. Because the soul is not all-pervasive, even though it is devoid of contact, departing, going and other (activities) conforming to the direction of effort and unseen forces, may appropriately belong to the soul, as (they belong) to the manas; hence, the passages declaring these activities as belonging to the soul are not to be taken as carrying a secondary significance. As this will be taken up again in inquiring into the size (of the soul), let this suffice (for the present).

THE THEORY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE SOUL

23. Then, let consciousness itself be (taken as) the soul, because it is not non-intelligent. The quality of non-soul is found in pots and the like, to be concomitant with the quality of being non-intelligent. The quality of being non-intelligent, which is foreign to consciousness, excludes its concomitant (the quality of being non-soul) from consciousness. The quality of being non-intelligent belongs to consciousness, because consciousness shines merely by its own being. Indeed, while it exists, consciousness, unlike jars and the like, does not remain without shining; if it fails to shine, it may be acknowledged that its shining is dependent upon something other than itself.

Perhaps you may hold the following view: Even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth.

स्तदैवानीलमनिदंरूपमपि संवेदनं प्रतीमः । अतः स्वरूपसत्यैव संविदा इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेणेव विषयः प्रकाश्यते, ततश्च तद्गतागन्तुकप्रकाशातिशयदर्शनेन पश्चात् संविदनुमास्यत इति । तन्न, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकिणोऽर्थधर्मस्य प्रकाशस्य निपुणमपि निरीक्षमाणानां रूपादिवदनुपलब्धेः, उभयाभ्युपेतसंविदैव सकलव्यवहारोपपत्तौ च तत्कल्पनानुपपत्तेः ।

वित्तिवेदितृप्रतिभासशून्यायां च विषयवित्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां घटस्तावदयम् अहं तु जानामि न वेति न ज्ञायत इति च कदाचित्प्रतिभासः स्यात् , न चैवमस्ति ।

अतीतानागतविषयग्रहणस्मरणेषु व्याहारव्यवहारयोरभावे, भावेऽपि ततः प्रागेव

When we have the knowledge 'This is blue'[48] we are not at the same time, conscious also of a consciousness, which is not blue and which is different from what may be pointed to by the word 'this'. Hence, by the very existence of consciousness the object is illumined as in the case of the sense-relation (where the object is brought to light, though the relation itself is not manifested). Immediately after, by noticing therein (in the object) a peculiar illumination,[49] which is adventitious, consciousness is inferred. This view is untenable, because, unlike colour and other qualities, that illumination, which is an attribute of things and which is something different from consciousness, is not apprehended even by keen observers. As all worldly experience and usage is explicable solely in terms of consciousness, which is admitted by both of us, it is not proper to posit that (illumination).

If the knowledge of objects be admitted to be devoid of the manifestation of knowledge and knower, sometimes the following experience must occur: 'This is a pot; it is not known whether I know it or not.' But it does not occur like this.

In respect of the apprehension of objects, past and future, if there is no speech and no action, the manifestation of such objects cannot be

48. In older philosophical works, more especially in Buddhistic writings, it was usual to take nīla as an illustration for an object. In later works, ghaṭa does duty for nīla.

49. According to the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāmsā, when cognition of an object arises, the latter is affected in a particular way; it becomes illumined, manifested or made known (prakāśa-viśiṣta). It is from this illumination or manifestedness (prākaṭya or jñātatā) that we infer that knowledge has previously arisen. Thus, it is held, that consciousness is not perceived, but is inferred from its result. For a refutation of this view see Vedānta Deśika's *Tattvamuktākalāpa,* page 394. See also *Sarvārthasiddhi.*

विदितत्वप्रतीतेः नानुमानिकी तत्र विषयसिद्धिः, नतरां तत्पूर्विका तत्र बुद्धिसिद्धिः। तथा हि—केनचित्प्रेरितः प्रणिधाय स्मृत्वानन्तरमेव प्रतिवदति स्मृतमद्य मयेति। न चायमेव व्यवहारस्तत्र लिङ्गम्, तत्पूर्वकत्वादन्योन्याश्रयणापत्तेश्च। स्वव्याहारेण स्वज्ञानानुमानं क इव निरपत्रपः प्रतिजानीत।

अन्यच्च यत्संबन्धादर्थान्तरे यो व्यवहारः धर्मभेदो वा स तस्मिन्नुपलभ्यमानस्तत्स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः न तु तत्संबन्धनिबन्धनः, यथा सत्तासंबन्धात् पृथिव्यादिषु सद्व्यवहारः रूपसंबन्धाच्चाक्षुषत्वं सत्तायां रूपे च। एवं संवित्संबन्धात् प्रवर्तमानो घटादिषु प्रकाशत इति

proved by inference. And the manifestation of consciousness which is based thereon (the manifestation of objects) would be even more impossible. If there are no speech and action, the manifestation of objects is not established by inference, because it appears to have been known prior to them (speech and action).[50] To explain—Being prompt- by somebody, it is only after concentrating (the mind) and recollecting that a person replies, 'Now it is remembered by me.' It cannot be maintained that the aforesaid speech itself is the cause of this recollection, because it is a pre-condition of this (speech), and because of reciprocal dependence. Which shameless fellow will maintain that the knowledge of an object is inferred from statements concerning itself ?

Further, the statements and different properties found in that through whose connection these arise in another object are dependent upon the existence of the former itself and not upon its connection. For instance, the reference to existence arising in the case of earth and the like, on account of association with existence, does not arise in the case of existence itself through the connection with (another existence); the visibility found in earth and the like, by virtue of connection with colour, does not arise in the case of colour itself through the connection with (another) colour. Thus statements, such as it 'shines forth', and qualities, such as, knowability, found in pots and the like, arise

50. Against the view that cognition is inferred from its result, namely, jñātatā, it is urged that, in respect of objects past and future, as we cannot perceive the prākaṭya, we cannot infer the knowledge of such objects. To this it may be replied that though the jñātatā of past and future objects is not perceived, it may be inferred from the speech and action concerning them and that from the jñātatā thus inferred, knowledge of those objects can be easily inferred. This reply is unsatisfactory, because if speech and action do not exist, jñātatā cannot be inferred, and much less can consciousness of objects, which is based thereon, be inferred; if they exist, they are not found to prove jñātatā, for the objects appear to have been known previously.

व्यवहारः प्रकाशमानत्वं वा धर्मः संविदि तु परिदृश्यमानो न संवित्संबन्धापेक्षः अपि तु तत्स्वरूपप्रयुक्त इति स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात्सैवात्मेति । किंच योऽपि संविदोऽन्यं संवेदितारमभ्युपगच्छति, अभ्युपगच्छत्येवासौ संविदम् । न ह्यसत्यामेव संविदि संवेत्तीत्युपपद्यते। एवं चेदुभयवादिसंप्रतिपन्नतया सैव परं वेदित्री भवतु किमन्येन कल्पितेन ।

ननु अहं जानामीति ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्तदाश्रयभूतोऽयमात्मा प्रतीयते । सत्यं, स तु विकल्परूपतया साक्षात्प्रत्यक्ष इति न शक्यः संश्रयितुम् । भेदज्ञानसिद्धवत्कारेण पृथग्वस्तुतया गृहीताव्यभिचारेण सहोपलम्भनियमेनाप्रकाशात्मनश्च स्वभावविरोधादेव प्रकाशायोगात्

from connection with consciousness; and these (statements and qualities) found in consciousness are not dependent on the connection with consciousness, but are dependent on its own being. Hence, consciousness itself (should be considered as) the soul, as it is self-luminous. Further, whoever admits a knower apart from knowledge admits also consciousness. Indeed, if consciousness were non-existent, the reference to the knower would not be appropriate. If this is so, as it is admitted by both parties, let that (consciousness) alone be the knower. What is the use of that other entity which has been assumed ?

It may be urged that from the statement 'I know' it is evident that the soul appears to be distinct from, and to be the seat of, consciousness. True, but as it is determinate (savikalpaka) perception, it cannot be admitted as a valid perception.[51] Proceeding on the assumption that the knowledge of distinctions is real, that being, which is of the nature of luminosity and which is referred to as 'I,' cannot be taken to be a separate entity, because of the invariable association of awareness (of knowledge and knower) to which no exception has been noticed, and because it (the entity which is admitted by you to

51. According to the Buddhists, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception merely apprehends the specific individuality of its object (svalakṣaṇa) and does not grasp its qualifications. This is passive reception of sense impressions. But the sense material thus received is invariably subjected to a process of mental elaboration. The forms of thought (vikalpa), which are of five kinds—generality (jāti), quality (guṇa), action (karma), name (nāma), and substance (dravya)—are superimposed on the svalakṣaṇa, so that every object perceived has to appear through their medium. We cannot help perceiving an object otherwise than as belonging to a class, bearing a name, as characterised by an attribute and as related to another substance. This is determinate (savikalpaka) perception. As it makes considerable additions to the material presented by sense, it may be said to distort the real. Hence, the Buddhists think that, strictly speaking, it is not perceptual in character. cf. kalpanāpoḍa mabhrāntam pratyakṣam nirvikalpakam vikalpo vastu nirbhāsādasamvādādupaplavaḥ.

प्रकाशस्वाभाव्ये च संवेदनत्वमित्यादिना वा प्रकाशात्मनोऽहमित्यंशस्य तत्त्वमेव दुरुपगमम्। ग्राह्यविकल्पप्रत्युद्धारेऽप्येष एव प्रकारः। अतो वासनाभिधानसमनन्तरप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात् अनाद्यविद्यावशाच्च समारोपितावास्तवग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पोल्लेखिनी स्वयंप्रकाशा संविदेव परमार्थसती, सैव आत्मेति सौगताः प्रकटाः प्रच्छन्नाश्च। यथाहुः प्रकटाः।

अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते॥

इति। यथा वा प्रच्छन्नाः

शुद्धं तत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य न हेतुरनिवृत्तितः।
ज्ञातृज्ञेयविभागस्य मायैव जननी ततः॥ इति।

अत्राह क्षणभङ्गिनी प्रतिविषयमन्यान्या च संविच्चकास्ति, सैव चेदात्मा पूर्वेद्युर्दृष्ट-

be distinct from consciousness) cannot be said either to possess the quality of luminosity or not to possess it. For, if the former, it cannot shine forth, as that will go against its nature; if the latter, it will amount to consciousness itself. Even in the matter of setting aside differences among perceived things, the very same mode (of reasoning) will apply. Therefore, the avowed Buddhists as well as the disguised Buddhists (declare) that the self-luminous consciousness alone truly exists and that it alone is the soul, and that this consciousness, on account of the capacity of the immediately preceding cognition known as vāsanā (impressions of previous experience), and on account of beginningless ignorance (avidyā), has for its object the erroneously imagined and unreal distinctions of knower and the known. For instance, the avowed (Buddhists) say—" Although consciousness, in its nature, is devoid of distinctions, yet, on account of erroneous knowledge, it appears as possessing the distinctions of object-consciousness and subject-consciousness.[52] The disguised Buddhists, for instance, say—The spotless reality cannot be the cause of the world, because (then) it (the world) would have no cessation. Hence, māyā alone is the originator of the distinctions of the knower and the known.

THE REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE SOUL

24. The reply (to this view) is:—Consciousness manifests itself as perishing every moment and as being different in regard to every object. If that (consciousness) were the soul, how could a person recognise on the subsequent day what he perceived the previous day, as, 'I saw this'?

52. Quoted in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*, in the chapter on Bauddha Darśana.

मपरेद्युरहमिदमदर्शमिति कथमिव प्रत्यभिजानीयात्। न च निरालम्बनप्रतिभाभेदमात्रतया इह समाधेयम् । निरालम्बनत्वप्रतिज्ञायाः प्रत्यक्षादिसकलप्रतीतिबाधितविषयत्वात् । साधनस्य च सालम्बनत्वे तदविशेषादशेषशेमुषीणां तथात्वापत्तेः, निरालंबनत्वे च साधनाभावादेव साध्यासिद्धेः । प्रपञ्चितश्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसाभागयोर्निरालम्बनप्रतिषेधः यथार्थख्यातिसमर्थनेन च शास्त्र इति न वर्ण्यते ।

अत एव न संतानाश्रयणेनापि प्रत्यभिज्ञोपपादनं साधीयः । विज्ञानलक्षणव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्थायिनः अनुसंधायिनः संतानस्य अभ्युपगमे स्वसिद्धान्तत्यागः परसिद्धान्ताभ्युगमश्च । अनभ्युपगमे प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिः । न ह्यन्येनानुभूते अन्यस्य प्रतिसंधानसंभवः । न च सुसदृशतया भेदाग्रहणेन प्रदीपादाविव प्रमातरि प्रत्यभिज्ञाभ्रान्तिः । युज्यते हि तत्रै-

This cannot be met with the aid of different objectless consciousnesses alone, for the statement that knowledge is characterised by objectlessness has for its meaning what is contradicted by every form of knowledge, such as perception and the like. If the middle term (which in this argument is no other than consciousness) possesses an object, there being no distinction between this consciousness and all other consciousnesses, they would also be similar (*i.e.,* possess objects); if it (the middle term) be objectless, then, as there is no middle-term, the conclusion cannot be established. As the doctrine that consciousness is objectless has been condemned at length both in the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsā sections,[53] and as the yathārtakhyāti has been established in Śaśtra,[54] it is not dealt with here.

That is why even on the (Buddhist's) admission that consciousness is a stream, the justification of recognition fares no better. If a stream of consciousness which is different from (momentary) consciousness, and which endures and which remembers is admitted, it will amount to giving up his own (Buddist's) position and accepting another's; if it is not admitted, recognition becomes inexplicable. Indeed, in regard to what is experienced by one person, recognition cannot arise in another. It cannot be maintained that the illusion of recognition arises in the knower on account of the non-apprehension of difference due to close similarity, as in the case of the flame and the like. Indeed, there (in the case of the flame), to one and the same individual who per-

53. *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra,* I. i. 5; *Śābara Bhāṣya,* pp. 28-30, Ānandāśrama Series; *ślokavārtika,* Nirālambana section, pp. 24-90, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series; *Vedānta Sūtras,* II. ii. 27. ....

54. Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva* is, in all probability, the Śāstra here referred to. The opening stanza of that work refers to itself as a śāstra—

Yo vetti yugapat sarvam pratyakṣeṇa sadā svataḥ
tam praṇamya harim śāstram nyāyatattvam pracakṣmahe.

कस्यैव पूर्वापरव्यक्तिदर्शिनस्तुल्यसंस्थानतया व्यक्तीनां भेदमविदुषस्तथा भ्रमः, इह तु संविद्व्यक्तयः परस्परवार्तानभिज्ञा निरन्वयविनाशिन्यश्च सुगतमत इति न तास्वेकत्व-भ्रमस्याश्रयता विषयता वा संभविनी। न च सुसदृशत्वेऽपि अन्येन कृतमात्मकृततयाऽन्यो-ऽनुसंधातुमलमित्यागमापायिसंवित्संतानाश्रयः प्रत्यभिज्ञानक्षणस्थायी चेतनोऽभ्युप-गन्तव्यः।

कश्चिदाह—न संविदनित्या, प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धेः। तदसिद्धिश्च तस्याः स्वतस्सिद्धत्वात्, न हि स्वतः सिद्धस्य प्रागभावादयः स्वतोऽन्यतो वा सिध्यन्ति। स्वयं हि स्वभावमवगम-यत् सद्वा असद्वा साधयेत्, असत्त्वे अभाव एव नास्तीति कथं साधयेत्। असत्त्वादेव साधकस्य पक्षान्तरे नतरां साधकत्वमिति न स्वतस्तावत्तत्सिद्धिः। नाप्यन्यतः, अनन्य-गोचरत्वादनुभूतेः। अनुभाव्यत्वे च घटादिवत् अननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गात्, अतः सा न जायते,

ceives the earlier and the later entities and who, on account of their possessing similar shapes, fails to notice their differences, the illusion is but natural. But here, in as much as the several consciousnesses are described in Buddhism as being ignorant of any information about one another, and as perishing without a remainder, neither the character of being the seat nor that of being the object of the illusion of identity can arise in these (consciousnesses); because, even if there be great similarity, one person cannot regard what has been performed by another as having been executed by himself. Hence, an intelligent entity, who is the seat of the stream of consciousnesses that appear and perish, and who exists at the time of recognition, must be admitted.

Here one may point out that consciousness is not non-eternal, for, its antecedent non-existence is not ascertainable. Its being unascertainable follows from the fact of consciousness being self-established. Indeed, in the case of what is self-established, antecedent non-existence and the like cannot be demonstrated either by itself or by another. That which manifests, by itself, its own non-existence must do so either by being existent or non-existent. If it (consciousness) exists, as there will be no non-existence, how can it establish (its antecedent non-existence)? On the other alternative (if consciousness is non-existent), by reason of its very non-existence, it is even less capable of establishing (its antecedent non-existence). Hence, it (antecedent non-existence of consciousness) is not established by consciousness itself. Nor is it proved by another, for, consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. If it were the object of consciousness, it would, like the pot, etc., cease to be consciousness. Therefore, (that is, as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not established either by itself or by another), it (consciousness) has

जन्माभावादेव इतरेऽपि भावविकारा निराकार्याः तत्प्रतिबद्धत्वात् तेषाम्। अत एव नानात्वमपि संविदि प्रत्युक्तम्। उत्पत्तिमत्त्वव्यापकनिवृत्त्या तद्व्याप्यभूतनानात्वस्यापि निवृत्तिसिद्धेः। न ह्यजं विभाग्यस्ति। चेत्यत्वाच्च भेदेतरेतराभावादयो न तद्धर्माः रूपादिवत्। अतो नास्यानुभाव्यः कश्चिदपि धर्मोऽस्ति। अतो निर्धूतनिखिलभेदविकल्पा निर्धर्मप्रकाशमात्रैकरसा कूटस्थनित्या संविदेवात्मा परमात्मा च। यथाह—यानुभूतिरजाऽमेयाऽनन्तात्मेति। सैव च वेदान्तवाक्यतात्पर्यभूमिः इति तेषां परिभाषा। यथाह तद्वार्तिककारः।

परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता।
संवित्सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः॥

no origin. And, as it has no origination, other positive changes have also to be denied.[55] For, they are concomitant therewith (origination). That is why plurality of consciousnesses is also to be denied. The absence of the pervader (vyāpaka), namely, the character of having an origination, involves also the denial of what is pervaded by it (vyāpya), namely, plurality. For, what is unborn cannot possess differentiations. Moreover, because differentia, mutual non-existence and the like are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, they cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, nothing that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute.[56] Therefore, consciousness alone, which is devoid of all kinds of differences and which is attributeless and which has luminosity alone for its sole essence, and which is unchanging and eternal, is both the finite and the infinite self. It has, for instance, been said 'that consciousness which is unborn, unknowable and which is of the nature of the Infinite self . . . . . . ' Their technical jargon (has it) that (consciousness) alone is the ultimate purport of the Vedānta texts. The Vārtikakāra[57] for instance, says that the scriptural testimony teaches that consciousness alone, which is supposed to be the result of those means of knowledge that have external things for their objects (*i.e.*, perception, inference, etc.), is the gist of the upaniṣadic texts. If something other than this (cons-

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55. Bhāvavikāra may also be taken to mean changes of positive entities. See *Śrutaprakāśikā*, pages 181-2.

56. The reading in the Benares and Telugu editions is anumeyaḥ.

57. Sureśvara (A.D. 800) is the Vārtikakāra here referred to. His chief works are the *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi* and *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vārtika.* The latter work has been commented on by Ānandagiri in his *Śāstraprakāśika* and by Ānandapūrṇa in his *Nyāyakalpa-latikā.*

अप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिश्च स्यादितोऽन्यार्थकल्पने ।
वेदान्तानामतस्तस्मान्नान्यमर्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ इति ।

तदिदमलौकिकमवैदिकं च दर्शनमित्यात्मविदः । तथाहि—संविदिति स्वाश्रयं प्रति सत्तयैव कस्यचित् प्रकाशनशीलो ज्ञानावगत्यनुभूत्यादिपदपर्यायनामा सकर्मकः संवेदितुरात्मनो धर्मः प्रसिद्धः । तथैव हि सर्वप्राणभृत्प्रत्यात्मसिद्धोऽयमनुभवः अहमिदं संवेद्मीति । तस्योत्पत्तिस्थितिनिरोधाश्च सुखदुःखादेरिव प्रत्यक्षाः प्रकाशन्ते ।

स्वापमदमूर्च्छादशासु च योग्यानुपलम्भनिराकृतस्तत्सद्भावो नाभ्युपगममर्हति । यदि

ciousness) were postulated (to be the object of perception, and other pramāṇas), there would result the non-authoritativeness of the Vedānta texts; and hence something other than consciousness ought not to be postulated.[58]

Those who have understood (the true nature of) the self (assert) that this doctrine does not conform either to worldly experience or to the Vedas. To explain further—what is termed consciousness is well-known to possess the character of manifesting by its very existence, some object to its own substrate (i.e., the substrate of knowledge), to have the words jñāna, avagati, anubhūti, etc., as its synonyms, to have an object and to be the quality of the knowing self. It is, indeed, in this manner that the experience 'I know this' occurs to all beings individually. As in the case of pleasure, pain, and the like, the origination, existence and destruction of consciousness manifest themselves directly.

The existence of consciousness in the states of deep sleep, drunkenness and swoon cannot be accepted, as it is negatived by effectual non-

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58. This translation of these two verses (159th and 160th) from the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-Vārtika is based on Ānandagiri's commentary. According to him the first verse means that granting that pratyakṣa and other pramāṇas have external things for their objects, still their result, viz., consciousness, is the gist of the vedāntic texts. The second verse states that the pramāṇas cannot have external things as their objects, for, otherwise the vedāntic texts would lose their authoritativeness, inasmuch as they would be powerless to establish differenceless Brahman. Hence, the pramāṇas cannot have for their object anything other than vedāntic teaching, namely, consciousness. See *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika,* Ānandaśrama Series, p. 51.

हि तास्वपि दशासु संवेदनमवर्तिष्यत ततः प्रबोधसमये अनुसमधास्यत । न च अनुसंधीयते । अत एव हि इयन्तं कालं न किंचिदहमज्ञासिषं इति प्रबुद्धः प्रत्यवमृशति । यावदनुभूतपदार्थस्मरणनियमाभावेऽपि संस्कारविच्छेदनिमित्तप्रायणादिप्रबलहेतुविरहेऽपि नित्यवदस्मरण मनुभवाभावमेव साधयति ।

न च सत्यपि संवित्प्रकाशे विषयावच्छेदविरहात् अहंकारगोचरापायाद्वा तत्स्मृत्यनुदयः । अर्थान्तराभावस्य तदग्रहणस्य च अर्थान्तरप्रकाशप्रयुक्तकार्यप्रतिबन्धकत्वायोगात् । त्रितयावभासेऽपि यथास्वमवभासानां स्वगोचरस्मरणहेतुत्वात् । न च प्रत्यभिज्ञाबललब्धस्थेमाऽहमर्थः स्वापादिदशासु निधनमुपगत इति शक्योऽभिधातुम् । अत एव हि इयन्तं कालमहमस्वाप्समिति प्रबोधे परामर्शः ।

perception. If in those states also consciousness were to exist, then, at the time of waking, it should be remembered; but (as a matter of fact), it is not remembered. That is why the person who wakes up realises, on reflection, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.' Though there is no general rule to the effect that there should be remembrance of all the things experienced, and though there is absence of death and other powerful causes responsible for the obliteration of traces of previous experience, the uniform non-remembrance establishes only the non-existence of experience (during states of deep sleep, etc.).

Nor may it be said that even though there is manifestation of consciousness, non-origination of its remembrance may be due either to the absence of delimiting objects or to the extinction of the object of self-consciousness. For, the absence of one thing and the non-apprehension of that (thing) cannot possibly be the obstacles in the way of the result which is caused by the manifestation of some other object. Even if there be the manifestation of the three (consciousness, objects and self-consciousness) the manifestation of each of these is the cause of the remembrance of its respective object. Again, the object referred to by 'I,' which secures permanency on the strength of recollection, cannot be said to meet with death in deep sleep and other similar states. That is why on waking there is the judgment 'All the while I slept well'.

न च निर्विषया निराश्रया वा संविन्नाम काचित्संभवति, अत्यन्तानुपलब्धेः। संबन्धिशब्दाश्च संविदनुभूतिज्ञानप्रकाशादिशब्दा इति शब्दार्थविदः। न हि अकर्मकस्य जानात्यादेरकर्तृकस्य वा प्रयोगो लोके वेदे वा।

यत्तु स्वतः सिद्धस्य सत्त्वे तद्विरोधादेव प्रागभावादेः तदनीमवस्थानासंभवात् न ततः सिद्धिरिति। तदतिस्थवीयः, न हि संविदा स्वकालवर्तिन एव अर्थाः सिद्ध्यन्तीत्यस्ति नियमः, अतीतानागतयोरसंवेद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

अथ संवित्प्रागभावादेः सिद्ध्यतः तत्समकालतया भवितव्यमिति। किमेवं क्वचिद् दृष्टम्? हन्त एवं सति तत्सिद्धेर्न प्रागभवाद्यसिद्धिः। तत्प्रागभावः तत्समकाल इत्युन्मत्तवचः। ऐन्द्रियकप्रत्यक्षस्वभावो ह्ययं स्वसमकालपदार्थप्रकाशकत्वं नाम, न ज्ञानमात्रस्य प्रमाणमात्रस्य वा।

Moreover, something known as consciousness (samvid) which is devoid of objects and substrate cannot exist, as there is absolute non-apprehension (of the same). Those who have understood the true import of words maintain that the words samvid, anubhūti, jñāna, prkāśa and the like are relative terms.[59] Indeed, neither in common speech nor in scripture do we meet with the usage of roots, such as jānāti without being associated with an agent or an object.

It was maintained that from consciousness its antecedent non-existence cannot be proved, because when what is self-established exists, at the same time its antecedent non-existence cannot exist, being opposed to it. But this contention is superficial. For, there is no rule to the effect that only such objects as exist at the time of consciousness are proved by it; (were it so) the past and the future would become unknowable.

If it is contended that when the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is established, it must be contemporaneous with consciousness; (we ask) has it been perceived like this anywhere? If it is so (perceived), as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is established thereby, the negation of antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) is not proved. The statement that the antecedent non-existence (of anything) is contemporaneous with that thing is a mad man's declaration. Indeed, this quality, namely, that of bringing to light objects that are contemporaneous with itself is the nature of perceptual knowledge arising from the senses. But this is not the nature of all forms of knowledge or of all means of knowledge.

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59. A relative term depends for its meaning on its relation to some other name.

एतेन तदपि पराकृतम् ।

मानं स्वयं प्रकाशत्वात् स्वतः सच्चेत् सदास्त्यतः ।
तन्मेयं च सदास्त्येव मानं मेययुगेव हि ॥

इति। न हि मानस्य स्वसत्ताकाले अर्थाविनाभावो मेययोगः। किंतु यद्देशकालादिमत्तया मेयमवभासते तादृशतद्रूपमिथ्यात्वविरोधित्वम्। अत एव स्मृतिर्न बाह्यविषया नष्टेऽप्यर्थे स्मृतिदर्शनात् इत्यपि प्रलापः ।

अथ संवित्प्रागभावादेः अवर्तमानतया न प्रत्यक्षत्वं लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च न प्रमाणान्तरतः सिद्धिरिति, यद्येवमकारणं तर्हि स्वतः सिद्धत्वं प्रागभवाद्यसिद्धेः । प्रमाणाभाव एव हि इदानीं वाच्यः, न च तदभावः शक्योऽभिधातुमित्युक्तमेव । योग्यानुपलब्ध्यैव अभावस्य समर्थितत्वात् ।

For the same reason, the following (contention) also stands condemned. If the means of knowledge is real on its own right, inasmuch as it is self-luminous, it must exist at all times; therefore, its object too must exist at all times; for, the means of knowledge is always associated with the object of knowledge. For, the association of means of knowledge with objects of knowledge does not consist in the invariable relation of the objects of knowledge with the means of knowledge at the time of its existence; but it consists in the negation of the unreality of that particular form of things in which the latter have been apprehended as existing in a certain place, time, etc. That is why the statement that memory has no external object, because even when external objects have perished memory is noticed, becomes a prattle.

It may, however, be said that the antecedent non-existence and the like of consciousness are not ascertained by perception, because it is not something present at the time of perception; and that it cannot be established by other means of knowledge, since there are no signs (linga) and the like. If this were so, the character of being self-established would not prove the absence of antecedent non-existence; indeed, it has now to be maintained that there are no means of proving it. But it has already been said that it is impossible to hold that there are no means of proving it, for non-existence is established by effectual non-perception itself.

अपि च प्रत्यक्षसंवित् स्वसत्ताकाले स्वविषयस्य सद्भावं साधयन्ती यत्तस्य न सर्वदा सत्तां साधयति । तदवसीयते अहमिदानीमेवास्मि नान्यदेति कालविशेषावच्छिन्नैव सा चकास्ति इति । इतरथा घटादेरपि नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवमनुमानादिसंविदोऽपि । न च प्रत्यक्षानुमानादिभेदशून्या निर्विषया निराश्रया धीः संभवतीत्युक्तमेव ।

न चान्याविषयत्वात् संविदोऽन्यतस्तत्प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धिः । अज्ञासिषमिति प्राक्तनसंविदोऽद्यतनधिया विषयीक्रियमाणत्वात् । प्रतिकूलानुकूलविषयनियतहानोपादानादिलिङ्गावगम्यत्वाच्च परसंविदः । तदनभ्युपगमे च शब्दार्थग्रहणासंभवेन वैदिकलौकिकसमस्तव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गः, गुरूपसर्पणाद्यनुपपत्तिश्च ; ज्ञानवत्त्वेन तस्याप्रतीतेः ।

Moreover, perceptual knowledge establishes the existence of its object at the time of its own existence, and not the existence (of the object) at all times. Hence, it has to be stated that consciousness manifests itself only as being limited by time, taking the form 'I exist only at this moment, not at other times.' Otherwise (if knowledge were not limited by time, its object too, namely) the pot and the like would be eternal. Similarly, inference and other kinds of knowledge (must be limited by time; otherwise, they would reveal their objects also to be eternal). And it has already been said that a pure consciousness, which is devoid of the distinctions of perception and inference, and which is objectless and supportless, cannot exist.

The contention that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved by anything other than consciousness on the ground that consciousness cannot be the object of anything else (p. 35) is indefensible; for (one's own) previous knowledge is made the object of present cognition, as in the judgment 'At one time I knew'. Besides, the consciousness of other persons is inferred from reasons (linga) such as, the invariable rejection and acceptance respectively of disagreeable and agreeable objects. And, if it is not admitted that the consciousness of others is inferred, there would result the impossibility of all scriptural and wordly usage, in as much as it would be impossible to grasp the meanings of words.[60] Further, approaching the guru and the like would be impossible, for there could be no apprehension that he is possessed of knowledge.

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60. The meanings of words may be understood from vyavahāra. Thus, for example, a youngster notices the pupil fetching a cow when his master utters the words 'Fetch the cow,' and immediately concludes that the action of fetching the cow was the result of the pupil grasping the desire of the master when he uttered the words 'fetch the cow.' At that time, he takes the words in one mass

न चान्यविषयत्वे अननुभूतित्वम् । स्वाश्रयस्य स्वसत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वं स्वविषयसाधनत्वं वाऽनुभूतित्वम् । ते च संविदन्तरविषयभावेऽपि स्वानुभवसिद्धे न भ्रश्येत इति कथमननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः । घटादेस्तु तथास्वाभाव्याभावादेव अननुभूतित्वम्, नानुभाव्यत्वात् ।

The belief that if consciousness is the object of anything else, it would cease to be consciousness is untenable. The character of being consciousness consists in the quality of manifesting itself solely by means of its own existence to its substrate; or in the quality of being the means of manifesting (by its own existence) its object (to its substrate).[61] These two characteristics (of consciousness, namely, that of manifesting itself and its object to its substrate), which are established by one's own experience, do not fall away even when consciousness becomes the object of another consciousness. How then can it be maintained that consciousness ceases to be consciousness (when it becomes the object of another consciousness)? Pots and the like, on the other hand, do not possess the quality of being consciousness, simply because they do not possess the aforesaid characteristics and not because they are objects of experience.

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as conveying one complex whole of meaning. Which word in that whole stands for the animal, and which signifies the action is not apprehended there. Later, when the teacher says 'fetch the horse,' a different animal is brought. Again, when he says 'tie up the cow,' a different action follows. By observing varied actions resulting from the different utterances, the youngster understands that the word 'cow' denotes an animal of a certain description, that the word 'horse' an animal of another kind, the word 'bring' denotes the action of bringing, and so on.

61. In commenting upon these definitions, Sudarśanācārya observes that if consciousness is defined as that which manifests itself, this definition would also apply to pots and the like, for, they too manifest themselves. To exclude them, the qualification 'to its own substrate' is added; the pot manifests itself, not to its substrate, the ground on which it stands, but to the knowing person. Again, the further qualification 'solely by means of its own existence' is included in order to exclude certain attributes of the self, such as, atomic size, eternity and so on, which are manifested to their substrate, not by themselves, but by an act of knowledge. The Śrī Bhāṣya would add yet another qualification 'at the present time' with a view to excluding past states of consciousness. Even without this addition, past states of consciousness stand excluded, since every past experience is revealed not by its own existence, but by another act of knowing. But this qualification serves to emphasise the fact that any state of consciousness can manifest itself by its own existence only at the time it exists, and that a past state of consciousness can be apprehended by another state—a fact denied by the opponent. 'At the present time' denotes 'the time when the rela-

अपि च अननुभाव्यत्वेऽपि समानस्तत्प्रसङ्गः गगनकुसुमवत् ।

न चात्मनोऽनुभूतित्वम्, अनुभवितृत्वात् । नाप्यसावननुभाव्यः, अनुभवस्येव स्वतः सिद्ध्यतोऽप्यस्य स्वपरसंवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । वेद्यत्वेऽनात्मत्वापादनं अवेद्यत्वेऽपि समानं पूर्ववत् ।

यदि तु गगनकुसुमस्यासत्त्वमेव अनात्मत्वाननुभूतित्वप्रयोजकमास्थीयेत, आस्थी-

Further, (even on your view) that consciousness does not possess the character of being the object of another consciousness, the same difficulty, namely, that it will cease to be consciousness, does exist as in the case of the sky-flower, (which is not an object of cognition, and which is not a cognition).

The quality of being consciousness cannot be attributed to the self, for it possesses the character of being the seat of consciousness. Nor can it be said that it (the self) is not the object of consciousness; for, though it is self-luminous like consciousness, it is admitted to be capable of being known by oneself and others. The objection that, if the self is knowable, it would cease to be self would, as stated before, equally apply even to the view that it is not knowable.

If it is contended that it is only the non-existence of the sky-flower (rather than the fact that it is not the object of experience) that is responsible for the sky-flower not being soul or consciousness, then let it be

tion of consciousness to its object exists'. Since a state of consciousness cannot manifest itself, solely by its own sake, to any person other than its own substrate, the words 'to its own substrate' become necessary. This definition is acceptable only to those who maintain the svayamprakāśatva theory; hence, a second, which will be acceptable to all is offered. The qualifications 'to its own substrate,' 'by its own existence' and 'at the present time' have to be supplied in this definition also. 'Means of manifesting' would apply also to the potter's stick, wheels and other instruments; and hence the qualification 'to its own substrate.' The knowledge arising from one sense organ cannot be the means for the manifestation of an object revealed by another sense; visual perception, for example, does not manifest that which is the object of auditory perception. Hence the need for the words 'its own object.' The qualification 'by its own existence' serves to exclude the sense organs, which are instrumental in revealing objects, not by their own being, but in so far as they give rise to knowledge. As in the case of the first definition, here also the expressions 'at the present time' and 'to its own substrate' are intended to exclude respectively past states of consciousness and the experience of others.

यतां तर्हि घटादेरप्यसंविदाश्रयत्वाज्ञानाविरोधित्वयोरेव तत्प्रयोजकत्वम् । अथ ते अपि विषयत्वे स्यातामिति चेत्, अविषयत्वेऽपि तथैवेत्यलमप्रतिष्ठितकुतर्कोपहसनेन ।

यदपि जननविरहादनुभूतेर्विकारनिरसनम्, व्यभिचरति तदपि प्रागभावे । जन्माभावेऽपि तस्य विनाशदर्शनात् । भावविशेषणोपादानेऽपि भवदभिमताविद्ययानैकान्त्यम् । सा ह्यनादिरपि विविधविकारवती विनाशवती च तत्त्वज्ञानोदयात् । अपरमार्थास्तद्विकाराः सन्ति इति चेत्, परमार्थाश्च ते किं विकाराः सन्ति? जन्मवन्तो वा परमार्थाः? येन पारमार्थ्येन विशेषणं साध्यस्य साधनस्य वा अर्थवत्तामश्नुवीत । तथा च सति साधु समर्थितं तर्ककुशलेनेत्यलमनेन ।

held that even in the case of pots and the like, it is only their character of not being the seat of consciousness and of their not being opposed to ignorance[62] that is responsible for their being non-soul and non-consciousness. Should it be contended that if consciousness is the object of consciousness these two qualities (namely, the quality of not being the seat of consciousness and of not being opposed to ignorance) must belong to it, (we reply) that even on the view that consciousness is not the object of consciousness, it would likewise possess those two qualities, (as in the case of the sky-flower). No further need to ridicule these devious and flimsy arguments.

Again, the assertion that as consciousness has no origin, other modifications of it are negatived is fallacious; for, (the implied general proposition, namely, that whatever has no origin has none of the other changes, is falsified by the contradictory instance of antecedent non-existence, because,) although antecedent non-existence has no origin, it is found to have destruction. Even if the qualification 'positive entity' be added, the falsity (of the general proposition as modified viz., All positive entities having origin have none of the other changes) will be proved by the ignorance (avidyā) which is admitted by you. For, this ignorance, even though it has no origin, is subject to manifold changes and terminates through the rise of knowledge. If it is said that its modifications are unreal, (we ask) do you admit changes which are ultimately real, and believe in any entity having an origin and still being ultimately real? It is only if these are admitted, the qualification 'ultimately real' can be fruitfully applied either to the major or to the middle term. If these are admitted, then your case has, indeed, been ably defended by one skilled in logical acumen!

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62. It is not necessary that if external objects, such as pots, exist at all, they ought to be known. Hence, they are not considered to be opposed to ignorance (ajñānavirodhi). Knowledge, however, is opposed to ignorance (ajñānavirodhi), because when it exists it must necessarily shine forth.

यदपि न ह्यजं विभाग्यस्तीति, तदपि न। अजस्यैवात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो विभागस्य समर्थितत्वात्। अनादित्वेनाभ्युपगतस्याज्ञानस्यात्मनो व्यतिरिक्ततया अवश्याश्रयणीयत्वात्। अपरमार्थस्स विभाग इति चेत्, परमार्थभेदः किं जन्मप्रतिबद्धः क्वचिद् दृष्टः?। निर्बाधप्रतीतिसिद्धश्च दृग्दृश्यभेदः परमार्थ एवेत्यनन्तरमेवोपपादयिष्यामः।

यदपि नास्या मेयो धर्मोऽप्यस्ति, चेत्यानां न चिद्धर्मत्वमिति च, तदपि शास्त्रानुमानादिप्रमाणसिद्धैः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वनित्यत्वादिधर्मैः स्वयमभ्युपगतैरनैकान्तिकम्। न च ते

The statement that what is unborn cannot possess differentiations is not correct; for, the distinction of the self, which is assuredly unborn, from the body, senses and the like has already been established; and because ignorance, which is admitted to be beginningless, has necessarily to be taken as being distinct from the self.[63] If it is said that this differentiation is phenomenal, (we ask) have you observed anywhere real distinction to be invariably concomitant with origination?[64] It will be shown presently that the distinctions existing between various kinds of knowledge and objects of knowledge, which are established by uncontradicted experience, are ultimately real.[65]

The contention that consciousness does not possess the attributes which are objects of knowledge, and that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities is proved to be fallacious by the qualities of self-luminosity, eternity and the like, which are established, by scriptural testimony, inference and other means of knowledge to exist in consciousness, and which are acknowledged by yourself.[66] It cannot be pointed out that these attributes are in reality

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63. All systems of Indian thought, with the exception of the Cārvāka darśana, accept the distinction of the self from the body, senses and so on; and the opponent admits, in addition, the distinction of the self from avidyā. Hence, he cannot deny vijātīyabheda.

64. In order to prove that consciousness admits of no real distinctions, because it has no origin, the negative concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti)—whatever has real distinctions must have an origin—must be cited. But as the opponent does not admit real distinctions, he cannot point to any instance of this negative generalisation. Hence, his argument commits the fallacy of vyāpyatvāsiddhi. Moreover, if the distinction of avidyā from the self is not real, it follows that ignorance itself may become the self.

65. The distinction between objects of knowledge necessarily points to the distinction between kinds of knowledge. This shows that sajātīyabheda is real.

66. The admission that consciousness possesses the attributes of self-luminosity, eternity and the like implies that consciousness admits of internal differences (svagatabheda).

चितिमात्रमिति वाच्यम् । तत्सिद्धावपि तेषु विमतिदर्शनात् । अभ्युपगम्यैव हि संविदं तदनुमेयत्वक्षणिकत्वादि प्रतिजानते वादिनः । स्वरूपभेदाच्च । स्वाश्रयं प्रति सत्तयैव कस्यचित्प्रकाशनं हि संवेदनम् । स्वयंप्रकाशता तु सत्तयैवात्मने प्रकाशमानता । प्रकाशश्च चिदचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणो धर्म इति संवित्सिद्धावेव साधितम् । तदनभ्युपगमे तु व्यवहारानुगुण्यवचनः प्रकाशशब्दः । नित्यता तु सर्वकालवर्तमानता । एकसंख्यावच्छेदः एकत्वमिति ।

न च जडत्वकालदेशनानात्वाद्यवच्छेदशून्यतारूपत्वात्तेषां न यथोक्तदोष इति युक्तम् । तथारूपैरपि तैश्चितिधर्मभूतैरनैकान्त्यस्यापरिहार्यत्वात् । संविदि च निषेध्यत्वाभिमतजडत्वानित्यत्वनानात्वादिविरुद्धविविधधर्माभावे निषेधोक्तिरुक्तिमात्रमेव ।

only pure consciousness; for, even though it (consciousness) is admitted to exist, conflicting views with regard to these attributes are noticed. It is only after admitting the existence of consciousness that disputants maintain its inferability, momentariness, and the like. Besides, consciousness and these attributes are in their essential nature distinct. Indeed, consciousness is that which, solely by means of its own existence, manifests some object to its own substrate. But self-luminousness consists in shining forth or being manifest solely by means of its own existence to the soul. While determining the nature of consciousness,[67] 'shining forth,' which is implied therein, has been taken to be a quality common to all sentient and insentient things alike. If you were to (confuse this 'shining forth' with prākaṭya and) say that it is not admitted by Vedāntins, (we point out that) the expression 'shining forth' refers to the quality of being fit to be an object of reference. Eternity, again, is the quality of existing at all times. Unity is limitation by the number 'one.'

It is not proper to suggest that as these attributes (self-luminosity, eternity and unity) constitute the negation of non-intelligence, of spatial and temporal limitations and of plurality respectively, the aforesaid difficulties are got over. For, even if they are of this nature, as they will still be the attributes of consciousness, you cannot meet the charge of anaikānta (straying reason). The denial of non-intelligence, non-eternity, plurality and the like would be empty statement signifying nothing, if the several qualities opposed to these were not present in consciousness. Ignorance (avidyā), which

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67. The expression 'samvitsiddhāveva sādhitam' has been interpreted to mean 'while determining the nature of consciousness' and not 'in the book called *Śamvitsiddhi,*' because it is a subsequent work of Yāmunācārya.

चेत्यं चाज्ञानमात्मनि दृष्टमिष्टं च भवताम् ।

अपि च अस्या इति षष्ठ्या अनुभूतेः संबन्धमभिधाय निर्धर्मत्वं प्रतिज्ञायमानं वन्ध्यात्वमिव जनन्या विरुद्धार्थमापद्येत ।

सिद्धिश्चेदभ्युपेयेत संविदः स्यात्सधर्मता ।
न चेत्तुच्छत्वमेवोक्तं भवेच्छशविषाणवत् ॥

ननु सिद्धिरेव सा । कस्य भोः ? । यदि न कस्यचित्, न तर्हि सिद्धिरेव । सा हि पुत्रत्वमिव कस्यचित् कंचित्प्रति । आत्मन इति चेत्, कः षष्ठ्यर्थः ? । तदेवं व्योमारविन्दसदृशवपुषि यथोदितदृशि वेदान्ततात्पर्यवर्णनं वेदान्तायैव स्यात् ।

अपि च नित्यत्वेऽप्यनुभूतेः प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिस्तदवस्थैव । सा ह्यनुभवितारं

is knowable, is found in the self; and this is a position admitted by you. (Hence, it cannot be maintained that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities).

Further, after suggesting the relation of consciousness to something with the aid of the genitive case ending found in the word asyāḥ (occurring in the statement nāsyā meyo dharmaḥ) to assert the attributelessness (of consciousness) will, like the attribution of the quality of being a barren woman to one's mother, convey the opposite meaning. If consciousness is admitted to be manifest, it will follow that it possesses attributes; otherwise, (if it is not admitted to be manifest) it amounts to positing an absolute non-entity like the horns of a hare. If it is said that manifestation itself is consciousness, (we ask) 'Oh, Ye! tell us whose manifestation it is. If the reply is that it is not the manifestation of anything, then, it cannot be manifestation at all, for, manifestation, like the quality of being the son, always refers to some entity and belongs to somebody. If it is said that it (manifestation) belongs to the self, (we ask) what is the meaning of the genitive case ending ?[68] Hence, to maintain that a consciousness, which has been described as above and which has a character similar to that of sky-lotus, is the ultimate end of the Vedānta will only lead to the destruction of the Vedas themselves.[69]

Further, even if consciousness were eternal, the impossibility of recognition would still persist; for, recognition which takes the form—

68. Pāṇini's Sūtra,—Ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe—declares that the genitive case ending invariably refers to some relation or other. The expression 'soul's manifestation' (ātmanaḥ siddhiḥ) must, therefore, indicate that there is some relation between soul and the quality of manifestation. Hence, it cannot be maintained that the soul is attributeless.

69. There is a pun on the word vedānta.

पूर्वापरकालावस्थायिनमुपस्थापयति, अहमिदमन्वभूवमिति। अनुभूतिस्त्वनुभूतिरेव भवताम्। न तां प्रति सा कर्त्री कर्म वा।

यद्युच्येत परमार्थतस्तथाभूतापि भ्रान्त्या अनुभवितृतया परिस्फुरति रजततयेव शुक्तिः। न हि तथ्यमनवलम्ब्य मिथ्यावभासस्योत्थानमिति। तन्न। तथा सत्यनुभवसमानाधिकरणतया अनुभविता अहमर्थः प्रकाशेत अनुभूतिरहमिति, पुरःस्थितभास्वरद्रव्यशङ्खमुखचन्द्रादेराकारतयेव रजतपीतमुकुरस्थताद्वित्वादि। पृथगवभासमान एव त्वयमनुभवः दण्ड इव देवदत्तमर्थान्तरमहमर्थं विशिंषन्नालक्ष्यते अनुभवाम्य-

'I experienced this at one time'—indicates that there is a conscious subject existing at earlier and subsequent times. But, in your view, consciousness is only consciousness. With regard to itself, consciousness cannot be its own subject and its own object.

Should it be argued that, even though consciousness is ultimately only consciousness, it falsely appears as an experiencing subject, even as the shell appears as silver, and that (this consciousness itself cannot be said to be illusory, for) without a real basis no illusion can arise, this argument is unsound. On this view, the conscious 'I' would shine forth as equivalent to consciousness, taking the form 'consciousness is I,'[70] even as silver, the yellow colour, the quality of being existent in the mirror, duality and the like appear falsely as being the form of the lustrous object presented before us, the conch, the face, the moon and the like. This consciousness which always presents itself as something distinct (from the conscious subject) is marked as taking the form 'I am conscious' and as being the distinguishing attribute of the altogether separate entity known as 'I', just as the stick is found to be the attribute of Devadatta; when the judgment 'Devadatta holds a stick' does not have for its object the stick only, how

70. When a piece of shell is mistaken for silver, the illusion takes the form 'This is silver,' and not 'shell is silver' for, so long as the specific qualities of an object are known, no illusion with regard to it can arise. Likewise, when consciousness erroneously appears as the 'I', the illusion must take the form 'This is I,' and not 'consciousness is I.' Hence, it may be asked: How can it be asserted that the illusion concerning consciousness would take the form 'consciousness is I'? Our reply is that in the case of shell-silver it is not the shell aspect of the presented object, but some other aspect that causes the illusion. But in the case of consciousness, as the opponent describes it to be attributeless, it cannot be said that some aspect other than that of being consciousness leads to the illusion. Hence, it has to be admitted that even when its specific aspect of being consciousness is known consciousness gives rise to the illusion of 'I' and takes the form 'consciousness is I.' See Śruta Prakāśikā.

हमिति । तदेवमनुभवविशिष्टमस्मदर्थमवभासयन्नयमहंप्रत्ययः कथमिव विशेषणभूतानुभूतिमात्रावलम्बनः प्रतिज्ञायेत, दण्डमात्र इव दण्डी देवदत्त इति प्रत्ययः ।

कुतश्चैष निश्चयोऽध्यस्तं ज्ञातृत्वमिति । स्थूलोऽहमितिवद्देहात्माभिमानवतः प्रतिभासनादिति चेत्, नन्वात्मतयाभिमतानुभूतिरपि तद्वत एवावभातीति सापि तथा स्यात् । तत्त्वज्ञानोदयात्परतोऽपि तदनुवृत्तेर्न तथा सेति चेत्, किं भोः तत्त्वज्ञानात् परमबोद्धैव अयमात्मा ? । हन्तैवं वरमितोऽतत्त्ववेदित्वम् । भ्रान्त्यापि हि तत्र बहु भद्रं पश्यतीति ।

ननु ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वं विक्रियात्मकं जडमहंकारग्रन्थिस्थम् । तत्फल-

can it be asserted that (in the analogous case) this consciousness of 'I', which reveals the entity called 'I' as owning consciousness, has for its object this consciousness only, which is, in fact, a mere attribute.

How (we ask) did you arrive at the conclusion that the character of being a knower is an illegitimately transferred quality (adhyasta)? If it is replied that this, like the statement 'I am stout', presents itself only to him who erroneously identifies the self with the body, (and as such, the character of being a knower, like stoutness, is superimposed on the self, we rejoin that) since the consciousness too, which you regard as the self, presents itself only to that person who has that (confusion of the self with the body), this consciousness also must likewise be a superimposition. If it be said that, since it (consciousness) continues even after the dawn of the true knowledge of reality, it cannot be illusory, (we ask) 'Sir, does the self really cease to be a knower after the acquisition of true knowledge ?'[71] Oh ! if that were so, it would be far better not to be the knower of the real than to be the knower of the real; for, at least in illusion, he would perceive, in that state, many a happy thing.

You may maintain that to be a knower is to be an agent in the act of knowing, to be liable to change,[72] to be non-intelligent, and to reside in the knot of the ahamkāra;[73] and that the self is the enjoyer

71. Scriptural passages describing the state of release definitely declare that the released soul continues to be a knower. Hence, it cannot be maintained that with the rise of true knowledge the quality of being a knower vanishes.

72. Knowledge is an activity and it has a beginning and an end; hence, the quality of being an agent in the act of knowing must have a beginning and end, that is, must be subject to change.

73. Ahamkāra is spoken of as a knot (granthi) either because it is the root cause of the tangled mass of illusions or because it binds the jīva closely to the manifold illusions which are, in fact, its own handiwork.

भुक् अकर्ता अविक्रियः साक्षी प्रकाशमात्र आत्मा । कर्तृत्वादिर्हि दृश्यत्वात् रूपादिवन्नात्मधर्मः । कर्तृत्वे ह्यात्मनोऽहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वेऽपि देहस्येव अनात्मत्वपरार्थत्वजडत्वादिप्रसङ्गो दुर्निवारः । दृष्टं च लौकिकवैदिककर्मसु कर्तृतया प्रसिद्धाद्देहात्तत्क्रियाफलभुजः प्रमातुरहंप्रत्ययिनः पृथक्त्वम् । तथेहापि प्रमातुरहमर्थाद्विलक्षणः साक्षी प्रत्यगात्मेति युक्तम् । नैवं युक्तम् । अहं जानामीति ज्ञातृतया सिद्ध्यतः प्रत्यगात्मनो व्यतिरेकेण साक्षिणो नाम प्रकाशमात्रस्य आत्मनोऽनुपलब्धेः । देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणविज्ञानेभ्यो ज्ञानाश्रयतया विविच्यमाने प्रतीपमञ्चतीव निर्भासमानोऽहंभाव एव प्रत्यक्त्वं

of the fruits of the knowing process, a non-agent, a changeless entity, the witness (sākṣin)[74] and pure luminosity; and that the character of being an agent and the like cannot be the attributes of the self; for, like colour and other qualities, they are knowable; and that if the quality of being an agent belongs to the self, even though the latter is an object of the consciousness of 'I', it will be impossible to avoid the unwelcome conclusion that the quality of being non-soul, of existing for the sake of others, of being non-intelligent and the like would belong to the self even as they belong to the body; and that the distinction of the knower, who is the object of the consciousness of 'I,' and who enjoys the results of the activity of the body, from the body, which is well known to be the agent in all secular and sacred duties, is noticed; and that similarly here also it is reasonable to admit that the witnessing inward self is distinct from the knower denoted by the term 'I'. This argument (of yours) is illogical, for, apart from the inward self which shines forth as the knower in the judgment 'I know', no other self which is pure luminosity only and which is termed 'witness' is apprehended. The character of inwardness as attributed to the self (pratyaktva) consists precisely in the quality of being 'I' found in that entity which, by virtue of its being the seat of knowledge, is marked off from the body, senses, mind, vital breath and consciousness, and which, contrary to the procedure of outward objects, proceeds, as it were, and shines

74. According to the Advaitins the ultimate reality, Brahman, which is one, undifferenced, eternal and self-luminous consciousness (caitanya), is particularised by the antaḥkaraṇa in two ways. When Brahman is determined by antaḥkaraṇa as a qualifying attribute (viśeṣana), it is called the jīva; when it is determined by antaḥkaraṇa as a limiting adjunct only (upādhi), it is called the sākṣin. The antaḥkaraṇa is inseparably bound up with jīva, but is separable from the sākṣin. The sākṣin performs the office of manifesting the objects known as well as the knowing subject. Since all diversity takes its roots in ajñāna, the sākṣin which illumines objects of experience and the experiencer, is spoken of as the 'witness of ajñāna.'

नाम । साक्षित्वमपि तस्य साक्षाद् ज्ञातृत्वम् । न ह्यजानन् साक्षीति व्यपदिश्यते । सर्वं च प्रकाशमानं ज्ञात्रेऽहमिति चकासते प्रकाशत इति प्रत्यात्मसिद्धोऽयमनुभवः अहं जानामि मह्यं प्रकाशत इति । न चाव्याकृतपरिणामभेदस्य अहंकारनाम्नो बुद्धिनामधेयस्य वा ज्ञातृत्वम् । देहस्येव अचेतनत्वपरिणामित्वजडत्वपरार्थत्वादिहेतुभिस्तदनुपपत्तेः ।

न च चितिच्छायापत्त्या तयोस्तत्संभवः । अचाक्षुषस्य छायादर्शनात् । न च ज्ञातृत्वं चितावपि ते वास्तवमस्ति, येन अग्निसंपर्कादयःपिण्ड इव औष्ण्यं तत्संपर्कादर्थान्तरे ज्ञातृत्वं जायेत ज्ञायेत वा ।

for its own sake.[75] The character of being a witness as attributed to the same (self) consists in being a direct knower (an eye-witness). Indeed, one who is not knower is not spoken of as a witness. Since all objects that are manifested reveal themselves to the knower who shines forth as 'I', the experience—'I know', 'It presents itself to me'—is shared by every self. The quality of being a knower cannot belong to that modification of unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta) which goes by the name of egoity (ahamkāra), nor to that known as intellect (buddhi), for, as in the case of the body, the quality of not being an intelligent entity, the character of liability to change, insentience, the quality of existing for the sake of others and other similar reasons make it impossible (for the quality of being a knower to belong to either egoity or intellect).

Nor can it be said that the quality of being a knower may well belong to these (egoity and intellect) on account of the reflection of intelligence; for, what is not open to visual perception is not observed to have reflection. Besides, on your view, the quality of being a knower does not really belong to consciousness. If that is so (if the quality of being a knower really belongs to consciousness), on account of conjunction with that (consciousness) the quality of being the knower may appear in another substance (say in egoity or intellect) or be apprehended therein; even as heat appears in the iron-ball on account of contact with fire.

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75. Outward objects present themselves for the sake of the knowing subject, and not for their own sake. The self, on the contrary, shines for its own sake. Svasmai bhāsamānatvam pratyaktvam. Parasmai bhāsamānatvam parāktvam.

यद्युच्येत ज्ञप्तिमात्रमेव आत्मानमभिव्यञ्जन्नचेतनोऽप्यहङ्कारः स्वाश्रयतया तमभिव्यनक्ति । स्वभावो ह्ययं व्यञ्जकानां यदात्मस्थतयाऽभिव्यङ्ग्यमभिव्यञ्जन्ति, दर्पणजलखण्डमुण्डादय इव मुखमिहिरबिम्बगोत्वादीन् । तत्कृतश्चायं अहं जानामीति भ्रमः । अत एव खलु अहमुल्लेखविगमे सुषुप्तिमुक्त्योः स्वाभाविकविशदानुभवमात्ररूपेणात्मनः प्रकाशः । तत एव च अनात्मत्वमहमर्थस्य । तथा च सौरेशं वचः ।

आत्मनश्चेदहं धर्मो यायान्मुक्तिसुषुप्तयोः ।
यतो नान्वेति तेनायमन्यदीयो भवेदहम् ॥ इति ।

तदिदमसंबद्धम् । यतः—

शान्ताङ्गार इवादित्यमहङ्कारो जडात्मकः ।
स्वयंज्योतिषमात्मानं व्यनक्तीति न युक्तिमत् ॥

आत्मत्वाभिमताजडानुभवाधीना हि सर्वपदार्थाभिव्यक्तयोऽभिप्रेयन्ते । तादृशम-

You may perhaps maintain the following view : " In manifesting the self which is none other than pure consciousness, the egoity (ahamkāra), although of non-intelligent nature, manifests the self as residing within itself ; for it is the nature of manifesing entities to reveal the objects that are being manifested as residing in themselves, just as a mirror, a sheet of water, particular instances of a class (say, the short, the hornless cows) and the like reveal the face, the sun, cowness, etc. as dwelling in themselves respectively. The erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know' is the result of that (i.e., the ahamkāra being a manifesting entity reveals consciousness as residing within itself ; in other words, ahamkāra appears as the possessor of knowledge. That is why in states of deep sleep and release, there is manifestation of the self in its true nature of pure consciousness only without the revelation of the 'I'. That is also the reason why the quality of being non-soul has to be predicated of the 'I'. Sureśvara's statement runs to the effect—'If the quality of being 'I' belongs to the self, it must persist in states of deep sleep and release ; for the reason that it does not persist, it must be taken to belong to something else'.[76]" This (argument) is incoherent.

To say that the ahamkāra which is essentially insentient manifests the self-luminious soul is as illogical as to assert that a spent coal manifests the sun. In fact, the manifestation of all objects is known to depend on consciousness, which is not insentient, and which you consider to be the soul. The assertion—that the

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76. *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi.* Bombay Sanskṛt and Prākrit Series. No. 38. Ch. II Stanza 32. p. 70.

शेषार्थसाधकमुदयास्तमयविपरिवृत्तिशून्यप्रकाशस्वभावं तन्तमनुभवं तदधीनसिद्धिरचिदहंकारोऽभिव्यनक्तीति उपहास्यमिदमात्मविदाम् । किंच ।

व्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्यत्वमन्योन्यं न च स्यात्प्रातिकूल्यतः ।
व्यङ्ग्यत्वेऽननुभूतित्वमात्मनि स्याद्यथा घटे ॥

दिनकरकरव्यङ्ग्यकरतलं तदभिव्यञ्जकं दृष्टमिति मा वोचः । करतलस्य तद्बाहुल्यमात्रहेतुत्वात् । तथाभूताश्च दिनकरमरीचयः स्फुटमुपलभ्यन्त इति न करतलव्यङ्ग्यत्वम् ।

अपि च केयमभिव्यक्तिः, या अनुभूतिरूपस्य आत्मनः अहङ्काररूपेण क्रियते इत्युच्यते ? । न तावत्तत्सिद्धिः । तस्य स्वतः सिद्धत्वेनानन्याधीनसिद्धित्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

non-intelligent ahamkāra, which itself depends for its revelation on consciousness, reveals such a consciousness, which manifests all objects without an exception and which has as its essential nature a luminosity that knows neither birth nor extinction, nor any other modification—will be ridiculed by those who have understood the real nature of the soul.

Further, the relation of being the manifesting and the manifested entity cannot obtain between ahamkāra and consciousness, for they are opposite in nature.[77] If the self is admitted to be capable of being manifested, it would imply that, like the pot, it would cease to be consciousness. Do not say that the surface of the hand, which is itself manifested by the sun's rays, is seen to manifest those rays themselves; for, the surface of the hand is responsible only for the accumulation of those rays.[78] The sun beams thus accumulated are distinctly perceived; hence, they are in reality not manifested by the hand at all.

Again, what (we ask) is the nature of this 'manifestation', which is said to be effected by the ahamkāra in respect of the self which is essentially consciousness? It cannot be said to be the origination of consciousness; for, inasmuch as it is self-dependent, it must be admitted not to depend for its existence on anything other than itself. Nor can it

77. Consciousness and ahamkāra have opposite natures. The former has the character of manifesting all objects without an exception; while the latter, being distinct from consciousness, depends for its manifestation on consciousness. Hence, it is impossible for ahamkāra to manifest consciousness.

78. This analogy is unsound, because, unlike the sun's rays, consciousness is not spread out and cannot be said to be collected by ahamkāra.

नापि तद्विषयज्ञानम्, ज्ञानान्तराननुभाव्यत्वात्। अनुभाव्यत्वे हि घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः।

अत एव न ज्ञानकरणानुग्रहः। स हि वेद्यगतज्ञानोदयप्रतिबन्धकापनयनेन वा दीपेनेव संतमसनिरसनेन चक्षुषः, वेद्यसन्निकर्षोपाधित्वेन वा व्यक्तिदर्पणादिनेव जातिनिजमुखादिबोधकस्य नयनादेः, वेत्तृगतकलङ्कक्षालनेन वा शमदमादिनेव परावरात्मतत्त्वज्ञानोपायस्य आगमादेः। न तावदनुभवगतमहङ्कारापनेयमस्ति किंचित् ज्ञानोदयपरिपन्थि। अज्ञानं तु ज्ञानसमानाश्रयविषयतया न तदुभयभावविरहिणि भवदभिमतसाक्षिणि निक्षेपमर्हति। न खलु ज्ञानप्रसक्तिशून्यो घटादिरज्ञानीत्युच्यते।

be said to be the illumination concerning consciousness, since it is not capable of being apprehended by another consciousness. Indeed, if it is capable of being experienced (by another consciousness), it would imply that it, like pots, etc., would cease to be consciousness.

For the same reason (i.e., that consciousness is not the object of another consciousness), it (manifestation) cannot be said to be the assistance rendered to the instruments of knowledge (concerning consciousness). This assistance may be (of three kinds)—(*i*) It is either such as results from the removal of those obstacles to the rise of knowledge which reside in the object to be known, like the service rendered to the eye by light through the dispelling of darkness. (*ii*) Or, it is the help arising from being the means of contact between objects known and the sense-organs, like the help rendered by the particular instance, mirror, etc., to the eye and the like, which reveal respectively general qualities, one's own face, etc. (*iii*) Or, it is the help which accrues from the removal of the impurities residing in the knower, like the service rendered by (virtues such as) tranquillity, restraint and so on to the śāstras, which are the means of the true knowledge concerning the infinite and the finite self.

(It cannot be the first kind, for) there is nothing resident in consciousness which impedes the origination of knowledge (of consciousness) and which could be removed by ahamkāra. (You cannot reply that ajñāna dwells in consciousness and is dispelled by ahamkāra, for) inasmuch as ignorance would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge, it is impossible to locate it in the witness which you have admitted, and which is devoid of the two qualities (of being the seat of knowledge and its object). Indeed, pots and the like, which are devoid of the possibility of knowledge, are never spoken of as possessing

तथैव न जातुचित् ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानमात्रस्येति न तस्याप्यज्ञानं भवेत्। भवदपि तदहङ्कारापनेयं नेष्यते। ज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यत्वादज्ञानस्य, तथाभ्युपगमाच्च। ज्ञानं च स्वविषय एव अज्ञानं निवर्तयति। न च तद्विषयत्वमात्मतयाभिमतस्यानुभवस्येष्यत इति तत्रत्यमज्ञानं न केनचित्कदाचिदुच्छिद्येत। ज्ञानप्रागभावरूपं चाज्ञानं न ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकमिति शक्यं व्यपदेष्टुम्। भावरूपमज्ञानमनिर्वचनीयं जगदुपादानमित्यादि प्रलापमात्रमिति संबन्धनिरूपणे प्रतिपादयिष्यते। अतो न वेद्यदोषापनयनरूपाहङ्कारेणानुभवाभिव्यक्तिः।

ignorance. Similarly, for the reason that the quality of being the knower never belongs to pure consciousness, it can never possess ignorance. Even if it is so (i.e., even if consciousness possesses ignorance), it is not admitted that ignorance is removable by ahamkāra, since ignorance can be put an end to only by knowledge, and since it has been so admitted. Besides, knowledge terminates the ignorance which concerns its own object only.[79] As the quality of being the object of knowledge has not been attributed to consciousness which is regarded as the self, the ignorance residing therein can never be destroyed by anyone at any time. (The ignorance which you speak of as existing in consciousness may be either defined as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge or considered as the indefinable). Ignorance, which is of the nature of the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the rise of knowledge.[80] That the following statements—Ignorance is positive in nature; (it is) indefinable; (it is) the material cause of the world; and so on—are merely incoherent prattle will be shown in the section dealing with the relation (of the finite soul to the infinite self). Hence, it cannot be said that the manifestation of consciousness is effected by the ahamkāra whose essential nature is the removal of defects in the objects known.

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79. When knowledge arises it dispels only that ignorance which centres round the object known. For example, when the shell is known as shell, this apprehension terminates the illusory cognition of that object which existed till then. If knowledge is said to put an end to all ignorance, it would have to be admitted that knowledge of the true nature of the shell dispels every form of illusion. See *Śruta Prakāsikā.*

80. The antecedent non-existence of an object cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the origination of that object.

करणानामभूमित्वान्न तत्संबन्धहेतुता ।
अहमर्थस्य बोद्धृत्वान्न स तेनैव शोध्यते ॥

न च स्वाश्रयतया अभिव्यङ्ग्यप्रकाशनमभिव्यञ्जयितुः स्वभावः, प्रदीपादावदर्शनात् । यथावस्थितवस्तुप्रकाशानुकूलस्वभावत्वाच्च ज्ञानतत्साधनतदनुग्राहकाणाम् । तच्च स्वतःप्रामाण्यन्यायात् । तदनभ्युपगमे च सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् ।

व्यक्तेस्तु जातिराकार एवेति तथाप्रत्यायनम् । न व्यञ्जकत्वप्रयुक्तम्,

(It cannot be the second, for) as consciousness is beyond the reach of the senses (the assistance rendered to the means of knowledge by ahamkāra) cannot consist in being responsible for the contact (of the objects known with the senses). (Nor can it be the third, for) as the entity known as 'I' is (in your view) the knower, it cannot be cleansed of its impurities by itself.

Nor can it be said that it is the nature of the manifesting entity to reveal the manifested objects as residing within itself; because such a nature is not observed in the lamp and the like (which manifest things without exhibiting them as residing in themselves); and because, knowledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have the nature of promoting the manifestation of things as they really are. That knowledge, the means thereof, and whatever is auxiliary to them have the aforesaid nature follows from the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥprāmāṇya)[81]; and if this is not admitted, there would ensue lack of certainty in anything.

(With regard to the analogy of the particular instance, vyakti, cited by you), such a manifestation (of the universal as residing in the particular instances) is due to the fact that the universal is only the character met with in the instances, and not the fact of those instances being the manifesting entities, as it has already been shown (that the case of

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81. On the question of the validity and invalidity of knowledge four views have been held. According to the Sāṅkhyas the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both inherent in it. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika takes the opposite position and contends that both the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external factors. On this view, knowledge, in itself, is neither true nor false; it is rendered valid or invalid by outside factors. The Buddhists take invalidity to be intrinsic to knowledge, and validity extrinsic. The Mīmāmsakas and Vedāntins, while admitting the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view in regard to invalidity of knowledge, maintain that validity is inherent in knowledge.

उल्काादेव व्यभिचारात् । दर्पणादिस्तु नायनमहःप्रतिफलनलक्षणदोषहेतुर्नाभिव्यञ्जको वदनादेः । व्यञ्जकस्त्वालोकादिरेव । व्यञ्जकत्वेऽपि प्रतीपगमनदोषप्रयुक्तस्तत्रान्यथावभासः । न चेह तथाहमर्थस्य तादृशदोषापादकत्वं स्वभावः । तथासति सर्वस्यापि प्रत्यक्षादेरप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् न किं चित्तथ्यं स्यात् । तस्मात् ज्ञातृतया सिद्धयन्नहमर्थ एव प्रत्यगात्मा न ज्ञप्तिमात्रम् ।

यत्तु सुषुप्तिमुक्त्योर्ज्ञप्तिमात्रतया स्फुरणम्, अहमिति तु न प्रतिभातीति । तत्र सुषुप्तौ तथावस्थितिः पुरस्तादेव निरस्ता । अहमित्येकरूपेण आ प्रबोधात्तत्राप्यात्मनः

the lamp flame) falsifies the view (that all manifesting entities reveal objects as taking their abode in themselves). (As for the analogy of the mirror, etc.) mirror and similar objects are only responsible for the mistake, namely, the reflecting of the ocular rays, and are not manifesting agents of faces and other objects.[82] The real manifesting agents, however, are only light and the like. Although light is the real manifesting agent the false impression (of the face appearing within the mirror) is the outcome of the mistake of the deflection (of the ocular rays). But here, the capacity to produce a similar mistake (in the self-luminous consciousness) does not belong to the entity known as 'I'. If it is so, (i.e. if that capacity belonged to the 'I'), then perception and other forms of knowledge would lose their validity; and hence, nothing would be true. Therefore, what constitutes the inward self is not pure consciousness, but the entity 'I,' which reveals itself as a knower.

As regards your contention that in deep sleep and release the self manifests itself only as mere consciousness and does not appear as 'I', the belief that in deep sleep such a condition of consciousness (i.e., consciousness shining forth without an object or a substrate) prevails has already been refuted. Since even in deep sleep the self does present itself up to the time of waking only in the form of the 'I', (the manifestation of the 'I' cannot be said to be absent in that state).[83] If

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82. The general proposition 'all manifesting entities reveal their objects as residing within themselves' was sought to be established on the strength of instances such as mirror, etc. In refuting this view, it was first pointed out that there are instances against this generalisation. Now it is shown that even the instances cited by the opponent do not prove his case. The mirror for example, is responsible only for reflecting the ocular rays, and not for manifesting the face. The real manifesting agents are light and the like.

83. Ekarūpeṇa also suggests that the presentation of the self as 'I' is common to everybody.

स्फुरणात् । यदि परं परागर्थाननुभवात् तमोगुणाभिभवाच्च न विविच्य स्फुटं चकास्ति भवदभिमतानुभूतिरपि तदानीं तथैव हि प्रथत इति वाच्यम् । 'नाहमहम्, नाप्यर्थान्तरम्, अपि तुअनुभूतिमात्रमज्ञानसाक्षितयाऽवतिष्ठत' इत्येवंविधं स्वापसमयभवमनुभवं न हिसुप्तोत्थितः कश्चित् परामृशन्नुपलब्धचरः ।

एतावन्तं कालं न किंचिदहमवेदिषमितिपरामर्शनादेव तथात्वं लभ्यत इति चेत्, कथमिव ? । न किंचिदिति निर्देशादिति चेत्, नन्वेवमनुभूतिप्रतिभासोऽपि प्रत्याख्यातः स्यात् । अपि च सुषुप्तिसमयसिद्धमात्मानमहमिति परामृश्य न किंचदवेदिषमिति तस्य वेदने प्रतिषिध्यमाने तात्कालिकीं वित्तिसिद्धिं अहमर्थस्य चासिद्धिमभिदधानोऽनुभवविरोधमपि न जानाति देवानांप्रियः । निर्विषया निराश्रया च वित्तिर्नास्तीत्युक्तमेव ।

it is said that on account of the absence of consciousness of external objects, and prevalence of darkness (tamas) in deep sleep, the 'I' does not present itself clearly and distinctly, (we reply that) it must be admitted that even the consciousness assumed by you does not, likewise, present itself clearly and distinctly in that state. No one who has risen from deep sleep is found to recall the experience which occurred to him during sleep, namely, 'I am not I (ahamkāra); nor am I anything else (the knower or the known); but I am only pure consciousness and I stand as the witness of ignorance.'

If you were to say that from the reflection 'For so long a time I knew nothing at all' such a position (namely, that in deep sleep there is presentation of pure consciousness only) is made out, (we ask) how (is it made out)? (If your reply is that) this follows from the expression 'nothing at all' (occurring in the aforesaid reflection, we rejoin) in that case, the manifestation of consciousness also would have to be denied. While in the judgment, 'I knew nothing at all,' the word 'I' denotes clearly the self which is manifested in deep sleep and the words 'knew nothing at all' negative (all) knowledge on the part of that 'I', the fool who maintains (that the self-same judgment establishes) that in deep sleep there is manifestation of pure consciousness along with the absence of the presentation of 'I' does not know its contradiction to experience. It has already been said that there can be no knowledge without an object and without a substrate.

ननु मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवान् प्रसुप्त इत्यस्ति हि प्रबोधे प्रत्ययः । सत्यम् । स तु वर्णाश्रमादिविशिष्टतया प्रबोधसमयसंवेद्यमानं देहिनं मामित्यादाय स्वाप्ययावस्थाप्रसिद्धाविशदस्वानुभवैकतानाहमर्थस्य तेन रूपेणाज्ञातत्वं प्रज्ञापयति । न पुनर्ज्ञस्वभावस्य अहमर्थस्यापि । एवमिव खल्वयमनुभवः, " अत्र सुप्तोऽहमीदृशश्चेति एवं मामपि न ज्ञातवानहम् " इति ।

अपि च आत्मा सुषुप्तावज्ञानसाक्षित्वेनास्ते इति हि यौष्माकी स्थितिः । साक्षित्वं च साक्षात् ज्ञातृत्वमित्युक्तम् । स चायं जानामीति प्रतिभासमानोऽस्मदर्थ एवेति कथमिव तदानीमहमर्थो न प्रथेत । स्वस्मै स्वयंप्रकाशमानोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशत इति ।

यत्तु मुक्तावहमर्थो नानुवर्तत इति । तद् वार्तम्; यतस्तथा सति वैनाशिकदर्शन इव आत्मनाश एवापवर्गः प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातः स्यात् । नो खल्वहमिति धर्ममात्रम्,

You may ask: Do we not, on waking, get the knowledge 'I, who slept, was not even conscious of my self'? (Does it not indicate that in sleep there is absence of the manifestation of 'I'?). True, (we reply); that knowledge (namely, the reflection 'I was not even conscious of myself') after indicating by the word 'myself' the self, which, in the waking state, is understood as being characterised by caste, stage in life, etc., shows that the 'I', which shines forth in sleep, which is not clearly experienced, and which manifests itself for its own sake, is not known in such a manner (i.e. as characterised by caste, stage in life, etc.); but it does not show that the 'I' whose essential nature is to be the knower, is itself not apprehended. Indeed, our reflection is to the effect: 'I did not even know myself as having slept in a particular place and as possessing certain characteristics.'

Moreover, your position indeed is this, namely, that in deep sleep the self exists as the witness of ignorance. And it has already been said that to be a witness is to be a direct knower. This witness too is nothing but the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then, could this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which illumines itself for its own sake appears only as the 'I'; hence, it follows that the self, which shines forth even in sleep and other similar states, appears only as the 'I'.

To maintain that the 'I' does not persist in the state of liberation is unsound; for, it amounts to asserting, as is done in Buddhism, in a somewhat different way, that release consists only in the annihilation of the self. The 'I' is not a mere attribute of the self; if it were an

येन तदपगमेऽप्यविद्यानिवृत्त्यामिवात्मनः स्वरूपेणावतिष्ठत इत्युच्यते । अहमित्येव हि तस्य स्वरूपम् । ज्ञानमपि हि तद्धर्मत्वेन तस्यैव प्रकाशते, ज्ञानं मे जातमिति । का कथा पुनरर्थान्तरस्यात्मत्वे ।

अन्यच्च यः सांसारिकदुःखैर्दुःखित्वेनात्मानं तत्त्वतो भ्रान्त्या वा प्रत्येति दुःख्यहमिति, स सर्वमिदमनिष्टजातं कथमहमपुनरुदयमपनुद्य अव्याकुलं स्वस्थो भूयासमिति संजातमुमुक्षः तत्साधने प्रवर्तते । स यदि साधनानुष्ठानादहमेव न भविष्यामीत्यवगच्छति, अपगच्छेदसौ मोक्षकथाप्रसङ्गादपि । ततश्चासंभवदधिकारितया सर्व एव वेदान्तविधयः सर्वाणि च मोक्षशास्त्राणि प्रामाण्यादेव प्रच्यवेरन् । अहमुपलक्षितः प्रकाशोऽपवर्गेऽवस्थास्यत इति चेत्, किमतः ? । न हि मयि नष्टेऽपि कोऽपि प्रकाशः स्थास्यतीति

attribute, it may be said that even after its destruction the self exists in its true being, as it persists on the dissolution of ignorance. In fact, the true being of the self is nothing but the 'I'; and knowledge appears to the self as an attribute of the latter, as is evident from the judgment 'knowledge has arisen in me'. (It has been shown that even granting your position that the self exists as a witness of ignorance in deep sleep, it does not follow that the 'I' disappears in that state.) There is no need to argue the point, when something other than the witnessing consciousness (sākṣicaitanya) is the self.

Moreover, he who considers himself to be afflicted by the miseries of worldly existence, whether in truth or in error, and thinks 'I am suffering pain', and in whom the desire for release has arisen, making him reflect: 'How may I become tranquil and blissful, setting aside this entire collection of miseries ?', he alone enters upon the means for realisation. If (on the other hand) he were to realise 'I should be no more if I practised the means (for the attainment of release)', he would run away at the very mention of the topic of release. As a consequence of this, since there can be none possessing the requisite qualifications (to enter upon the study of the scriptures), the entire upaniṣadic texts and all the śāstras relating to liberation would lose their validity.[84]

If you were to say that mere luminosity which is indicated by the word 'I' would persist in the state of release, (we ask) 'Of what use is it ?' For, no sensible person would exert himself under the influence

84. The validity of scriptures consists in their generating true knowledge in the mind of the aspirant. If there were no qualified pupils to study them, they would lose their validity.

कश्चित्प्रेक्षावान् प्रयस्यति ।

एतेन तदपि परास्तम्—अस्मत्प्रत्यये योऽनिदमंशश्चिदेकरसः प्रकाशः स आत्मा । तस्मिंस्तद्बलनिर्भासिततया लक्षणतो युष्मदर्थ एव अहं जानामीति सिद्ध्यन्नर्थ इति । प्रत्यक्षविरोधात् । अहं जानामीति सिद्ध्यंश्चेतनो युष्मदर्थ इति माता वन्ध्येतिवद्व्याहतार्थं वचः । न चासावन्याधीनावभासः । चैतन्यस्वभावतया स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वात् ।

of the idea 'Though I shall perish, there will remain some luminosity.'[85]

For the same reason, even the contention—that in self-consciousness (which expresses itself in the judgment 'I know') that element which is not referred to by the word 'this' (i.e. the non-objective element, pratyagartha), which has consciousness for its sole essence, and which is luminosity, is the self; and that in the same self-consciousness what has to be considered as objective element (yuṣmadartha, parāgartha), for the reason that it depends for its manifestation on consciousness, is the 'I' referred to in the judgment 'I know'—stands condemned.[86] It is also contradicted by direct perception, (for the judgment 'I know' implies that knowledge is an attribute and that the 'I' is its possessor, and that knowledge is an objective element (parāk), while the 'I' is a non-objective element, pratyak).

The statement that the intelligent entity referred to in the judgment 'I know' is an objective element (parāk) is as self-contradictory in its meaning as the assertion 'My mother is a barren woman'. Nor can it be said that this intelligent entity depends on something else for its manifestation (and is hence parāk, i.e., non-soul), for, being of the nature of consciousness, it is self-luminous.

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85. Cf. Srī Bhāṣya.

Nirastākhiladuḥkhoham anantānandabhāk svarāt |
Bhaveyamiti mokṣārthī śrvaṇādau pravartate ||
Ahamarthavināśaścet mokṣa ityadhyavasyati |
Apasarpedasau mokṣakathāprastāvagandhataḥ ||
Mayi naṣṭepi mattonyā kācit jñaptiravasthitā |
Iti tatprāptaye yatnaḥ kasyāpi na bhaviṣyati ||

86. Two arguments of the opponent are here referred to. The first seeks to prove that consciousness is the soul, for the reason that it is a non-objective element; that it is non-objective is inferable from its being self-luminous; its self-luminous nature follows from its being consciousness. The second tries to establish that the entity 'I' is not the self, because it is an objective element. That the 'I' is an objective element is shown by its dependence on consciousness for its manifestation. Its dependence on consciousness for its manifestation is inferred from its being distinct from consciousness.

प्रकाशश्च प्रकाशत्वादेव कस्यचित् भवेत् दीपादिप्रकाशवदिति नात्मा भवितुमर्हति। अतो ज्ञातृतया अहमिति सिद्ध्यन्नर्थ एव आत्मा।

स च मुक्तावप्यात्मनेऽहमित्येव प्रकाशते। स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वात्। यो यः स्वस्मै प्रकाशते स सर्वोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशमानो दृष्टः। यथा तथाप्रकाशमानत्वेनोभयवादिसंमतः संसार्यात्मा। यः पुनरहमिति न चकास्ति नासौ स्वस्मै प्रकाशते, यथा घटादिः। प्रकाशते चायं मुक्तात्मा। तस्मात्सोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशते।

न चैवं प्रकाशमानत्वे मुक्तस्याज्ञानित्वसंसारित्वादिप्रसङ्गः आपादनीयः। मुक्तत्वविरोधात् अतदुपाधित्वाच्च तत्प्रत्ययस्य। न ह्यज्ञानोपाधिरहंप्रत्ययः।

Since luminosity, by the very fact of its being luminosity, must necessarily pertain to something or other, as in the case of the luminosity of the pot, etc., mere luminosity cannot be the soul. Therefore, that entity alone which shines forth as the knower and termed 'I' is the self.

This self, even in the state of release, shines to itself only as the 'I', for it shines for its own sake. (There is the general principle that) whatever shines for its own sake is found to shine only as the 'I'; for example, the self which is subject to the round of births and deaths is admitted by both the contending parties to shine in such a manner. Whatever does not appear as 'I' does not shine for its own sake; as pots and the like. The released soul does appear for its own sake. Therefore, it appears as the 'I' and in no other way.

It cannot be said that if the released self appears in such a manner (i.e., as the 'I') it would imply that it is involved in ignorance and samsāra; for, this would contradict the nature of being a released soul; and moreover, the consciousness of 'I' does not have for its cause the quality of being subject to ignorance and samsāra. Since even persons

ब्रह्मात्मापरोक्षज्ञानक्षपितनिरवशेषाविद्यानामपि वामदेवादीनां तत्प्रत्ययदर्शनात् । श्रूयते हि "तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च अहमेव च वर्तामि भविष्यामि" इत्यादि ॥ तथा कथंचिदप्यविद्यादिक्लेशैर्लेशतोऽपि जातुचिदपरामृष्टस्य परमपुरुषस्याहमित्यात्मपरामर्शः प्रज्ञायते, 'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवताः, बहु स्यां प्रजायेय, स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा' इति । तथा

यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥
तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता, अहं बीजप्रदः पिता ।
वेदाहं समतीतानि ॥

इत्यादिभिः ।

like Vāmadeva, who have had their ignorance destroyed in its entirety by means of the direct realisation of Brahman as the self of all, are found to have the consciousness of 'I', the latter cannot, in fact, have ignorance for its cause. The scriptures say—'Seeing this, the sage Vāmadeva understood : *I* was Manu and the Sun.'[87] '*I* alone exist and shall exist.'[88] From the following passages and others like them it is clear that a similar reference to Himself as 'I' is noticed even in the case of the Highest Person, who is not afflicted even in the least by ignorance and other evils in any manner and at any time. (The following scriptural passages are found) 'Let *me* enter these three divinities (i.e., fire, water and food)';[89] 'May *I* become manifested and be born';[90] 'He thought: "May *I* create the worlds"'[91] (It is said in the Gītā) 'Since *I* transcend the destructible (kṣara) and am also superior even to the Indestructible (akṣara), therefore, *I* am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the Highest Person'; [92] '*I* am he who lifts them . . .'; [93] '*I* am the giver of the seed, the father'; [94] '*I* know the things past'; [95] and so on.

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87. *Bṛh. Up.* I. iv. 10.
88. *Atha. Up.* I. i.
89. *Chānd. Up.* VI. iii. 2.
90. *Chānd. Up.* VI. ii. 3.
91. *Ait. Up.* I. i.
92. *Bh. Gītā.* XV. 18.
93. *Bh. Gītā.* XII. 7.
94. *Bh. Gītā.* XIV. 4.
95. *Bh. Gītā.* XII. 26.

एवं च साक्षादहमर्थादात्मनो विलक्षणेऽपि देहे येनाव्यक्तिकपरिणामभेदेनाहमिति भ्रमः तदभिप्रायोऽहंकारस्य क्षेत्रान्तर्भावोपदेशः भगवतः 'महाभूतान्यहङ्कारः' इति। बहुमन्तव्यजनावधीरणहेतुश्चासौ गर्वापरपर्यायस्तत्र तत्र शास्त्रेषु प्रायशो हेयतयोपदिश्यते। तस्मादहमिति मतिर्बाधकापेता साक्षादात्मगोचरैव। आनात्मनि तु शरीरे भवन्ती अविद्येति युक्तम्। उक्तं च—

'श्रूयतां चाप्यविद्यायाः स्वरूपं कुलनन्दन।
अनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिर्या'—इति

महर्षिणा वसिष्ठनन्दनेन॥ न च ज्ञप्तिमात्रप्रतिभासः कस्यचिच्छरीरेऽस्ति, येन तन्मात्रात्मवादिनोऽप्यनात्मबुद्धिरुपपद्येत।

(It may be asked) 'If the 'I' really constituted the self, how could the Highest Lord have included ahamkāra among the elements that go to make up the material embodiment of the self (kṣetra), and how could he have classed it among the evils to be rejected ?[96] (Our reply is) the teaching of the Highest Lord found in the verse (of the Gītā XV. 5) commencing with the words 'The great elements, the ahamkāra . . . ', to the effect that ahamkāra is to be included among the objects that constitute the material embodiment of the self (kṣetra) really refers only to that modification of the unmanifest prakṛti by whose instrumentality the body, which is distinct from the real self denoted by the word 'I', is erroneously taken to be 'I'. And this ahamkāra, which is responsible for our slighting persons who are worthy of respect, and which is termed conceit, is often referred to by śāstras as meriting rejection. Therefore, it is proper to conclude that the consciousness of 'I,' which has nothing to contradict it, has really the self for its object; and that, on the other hand, the consciousness of 'I' which arises in regard to the body that is not the soul, is ignorance. (In agreement with this) it has been said by (Parāśara) the grandson of Vasiṣṭha : 'O thou ! the giver of delight to thy family ! Hear from me the essential nature of ignorance ; it is the consideration of the not-self as the self.'[97] (Our position squares well with Parāśara's definition of ignorance ; but yours does not ; for,) the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness occurs to no one. Even to you, who maintain that pure consciousness alone is the self, the consideration of the non-soul as the self will be possible, if there is the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness. As is proved by perception

96. *Bh. Gītā.* XVI. 18.

97. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa.* VI. vii. 10.

अतः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादुक्तन्यायागमान्वयात् ।
अविद्यायोगतश्चात्मा ज्ञाताऽहमिति भासते ॥

यदुक्तम् अजडत्वाद्भित्तिरेवात्मेति ; तत्रेदं वाच्यम्–किमिदमजडत्वं नामेति । यद्युच्येत सदपि यत् न प्रकाशते तज्जडं तद्विपरीतमव्याभिचरितप्रकाशसत्ताकमजडम् इति ; तथासति सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारी हेतुः । न खलु सुखदुःखेच्छादयो विद्यमाना अपि कदाचिदनवभासमाना भवन्ति । स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशत्वमपि दीपादिभिरनैकान्तिकम् । ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशानङ्गीकाराच्चासिद्धता विरुद्धता च । यदि मतम् अव्यभिचरितप्रकाशोऽपि सुखादिरन्यस्मै प्रकाशत इति घट इव जडतां नातिवर्तते तेना-

(the judgment 'I know' establishes knowledge to be an attribute and the 'I' to be its possessor), and as it results from the application of the aforesaid reasons (such as, if pure consciousness alone persisted and the 'I' disappeared in the state of release, no one would strive for realisation), and as scriptural texts (declare that even released souls refer to themselves as 'I'), and as there is the possibility of ignorance (only on our position), it follows that the self which is the knower presents itself as the 'I'.

With regard to (your) assertion that consciousness itself is the self, because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent, it has to be pointed out (that you must explain) what you understand by 'not non-intelligence'. If it is replied that a non-intelligent entity is that which may (at times) fail to manifest itself, even though it be existent, and that an intelligent entity is that which has an opposite nature, namely, an existence invariably associated with manifestation (we point out that) since pleasure and the like are not considered to be soul even though they are not non-intelligent, your reason is fallacious. Indeed, when pleasure, pain, desire and the like exist at all they never fail to present themselves. (If an intelligent entity is defined as) that which depends for its manifestation on its own existence, (we point out that) since the lamp and the like are not taken to be the soul even though they depend for their manifestation on their own existence, your reason is fallacious. Besides, as a manifestation different from consciousness is not admitted (by you) your hetu (reason, namely, intelligence occurring in the argument that consciousness itself is the soul, because it is intelligent) becomes unestablished (i.e. commits the fallacy of svarūpāsiddha); it also contradicts your theory (that consciousness is attributeless). If it is your view that pleasure and the like, although invariably associated with manifestation, are bound to be non-intelligent, for the reason that, like the pot, they manifest themselves for the sake of others, and are in consequence, to be considered as not-soul, (we ask

नात्मेति, ज्ञानं वा किं स्वस्मै प्रकाशते । अन्यस्यैव हि तदपि जानतोऽहमर्थस्य प्रथते अहं जानामीति अहंसुखीतिवत् । तेन स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वमभिप्रेत्य प्रयुज्यमानो जडत्वहेतुरसिद्धः संविदि । अतः सत्तयैव स्वमात्मनं प्रति सिद्ध्यन्नजडोऽहमर्थ एवात्मा । तत्सम्बन्धायत्ता तु ज्ञानस्यापि प्रकाशता । अत एव हि स्वाश्रयचेतनं प्रति प्रकटता इतरं प्रत्यप्रकटता च ज्ञानस्य सुखदुःखादेरिव । न चैवमात्मान्तरसम्बन्धमर्थान्तरं वापेक्ष्यायमात्मात्मने प्रकाशते । एतच्चानन्तरमेवोपपादयिष्यते । न च ज्ञानेन सहोपलम्भनियमोऽहमर्थस्यार्थान्तरं वारयति । ज्ञानस्यापि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात्, तदपि हि तेन नियतेन सहोपलम्भमित्यहमर्थादनर्थान्तरं मिथ्यारूपमेवापद्येत । असिद्धश्च संविद्विशेषैः सहोपलम्भनियमः ; प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारदर्शनात् ।

in reply,) Do you mean, then to suggest that knowledge too manifests itself for the sake of something other than itself, namely, the knower, the 'I'? The judgment 'I know' establishes this, even as the judgment 'I am having pleasure' (proves that pleasure presents itself for the sake of the 'I'). Therefore, the quality of being not non-intelligent (ajaḍatva), taken in the sense of the quality of manifesting for one's own sake, does not exist (asiddha) in consciousness (which is the minor term or pakṣa in your argument). Hence, it is only the entity known as 'I', which is not non-intelligent, and which manifests itself for its own sake by its own existence, that constitutes the self. The luminosity of consciousness itself is dependent on its connection with the self. That is why knowledge, as in the case of pleasure, pain and the like, manifests itself to that intelligent person who is its own substrate, and not to anybody else. The self, on the contrary, does not present itself for its own sake by depending on its connection with some other soul or some other entity. This will be explained presently.

You cannot maintain that the invariable association of the manifestation of 'I' with consciousness prevents us from taking the 'I' to be a distinct entity ; for, on the same count, it might as well follow that consciousness itself cannot be taken to be a distinct entity. Since it (consciousness) invariably manifests itself along with the 'I', it would follow that consciousness also is not an entity different from 'I' and that it is unreal.

Moreover, since in each item of knowledge we meet with the absence of the invariable association of the manifestation of 'I', the invariable manifestation of 'I' with any particular item of knowledge does not exist.

न च विशेषमात्रं निर्धूतनिखिलविषयविशेषोपश्लेषं वा वित्तिमात्रमस्ति, येन सहोपलम्भनियमः संवेदितुरभिधीयेत। सामान्यं तु सदपि सौगतैर्न वस्तुतयाऽऽस्थीयते। समस्तवृत्तिप्रत्यस्तमयेऽपि स्वयंज्योतिरयमात्माऽवतिष्ठत इति च वक्ष्यामः।

स्ववाग्विघातश्च; एकं द्वाविति निर्देशात्। द्वयोर्हि एकक्रियानुप्रवेशे सहशब्दः; शिष्येण सहागच्छत्याचार्य इति यथा। अपि च नीलतद्धियोरिति द्वे उपादायाभेद इत्येकत्वविधिः सवित्रीवन्ध्यात्वविधिरिव।

Besides, there is neither an object (viṣaya) apart (from its knowledge) nor pure knowledge divested of any relation to all particular objects; if either existed, then the invariable concomitance of the manifestation of knower with knowledge could be posited.[98] And even if the property common to all knowledge (jñānasāmānya) is existent, it is not considered to be a positive entity by the Buddhists.[99] We shall show that even in the absence of all (knowledge due to mental) modifications, the soul exists as a self-luminous entity. From the assertion that the two (i.e., knowledge and knower) are one, there arises a contradiction in his own (the opponent's) statement; for, the word *saha* (with) is used only when two entities enter on an identical course of action, as in the instance 'with the pupil, the preceptor comes'. Further, after referring to the two (i.e. blue and its awareness) by the expression *nīlataddhiyoḥ* to assert (their) identity by the word *abhedaḥ* (non-difference)[100] is like stating that one's mother is a barren woman.

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98. Having pointed out that the sahopalambhaniyama itself is impossible for the reason that there is the presentation of the 'I' even in the absence of any particular item of knowledge, Yāmunācārya proceeds to establish the defective nature of the illustrative example, which the opponent must cite in his argument, namely, wherever there is invariable apprehension of two things together there must be non-difference between them, as in the case of knowledge and its object. In order to prove that knowledge and its viṣaya are non-different, the object by itself and the knowledge by itself must be taken and shown to be invariably concomitant. But, in truth, neither exists apart from the other. Hence, the illustrative example is subject to the charge of being unproven.

99. The Buddhists cannot hope to escape the difficulty by saying that between viṣayatva (the property of being an object of knowledge) and jñānatva (the property common to all knowledge) there is invariable concomitance, for they do not consider sāmānya (universal) to be a positive entity. Its admission, they say, leads to all sorts of absurdities. The universal is, at best, a working fiction, a useful device in thinking. When certain things are regarded as similar, it is not in virtue of their possessing some common features, but because of their distinction from the rest. The perception of a cow, for example, does not indicate that cowness, as a positive quality, exists in that creature; it only signifies that it is different from all non-cows (*apoha*). See *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts.*

100. The reference here is to the Buddhistic dictum—sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ.

अनेकान्तश्च, संविदि प्रतिषिध्यमानैर्जडत्वादिभिः सर्वज्ञज्ञानेन सहोपलम्भनियम-भागिभिः संसारिज्ञानैश्च। तेषामभेदाभ्युपगमे ज्ञानस्य जडत्वमूर्तत्वादि, बुद्धस्य बद्धत्वमित्यापद्येत। नियमेन एकज्ञानसिद्धत्वमप्युक्तप्रकारेण प्रत्युक्तम्। विपक्षव्यतिरेकश्चासिद्धः। भवतु नियमेन एकज्ञानसिद्धत्वं ज्ञानज्ञेयज्ञातृणाम्, मा च भूदभेदः। को विरोधः?

किमप्रकाशरूपत्वात्प्रकाशमनुरुध्यते।
व्यवहाराय नीलादिराहोस्वित्तदभेदतः॥

Besides, in view of the fact that qualities such as non-intelligence and the like are denied to consciousness, and in view of the fact that the knowledge of the soul in bondage is invariably apprehended along with the all-embracing knowledge of the omniscient being (sarvajña) (your hetu) is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*.[101] If, in their case (i.e., between consciousness and its object and between the knowledge of the soul in bondage and that of the sarvajña), non-difference is admitted, the quality of non-intelligence and that of having a form and the like would have to be ascribed to consciousness, and the quality of being a bound soul would have to be attributed to the Buddha. As shown before, even the contention of their (knowledge and knower) being invariably the objects (viṣaya) of one and the same knowledge stands condemned.[102] Besides, here the non-existence of the hetu in cases where the sādhya is known to be absent (vipakṣa) cannot be established; for, there may be the invariable presentation of knowledge, the known and the knower in one and the same knowledge, and still there may not be non-difference between them.[103] What is the inconsistency here? Do (objects of knowledge, such as) blue and the like depend for their apprehension and consideration on knowledge either because they are not self-luminous or because of their non-difference (from knowledge)? As, in this manner, it becomes a matter

101. By drawing attention to the fact that the hetu (sahopalambhaniyama) is present even in cases where the sādhya (non-difference) is not known to exist, Yāmunācārya exposes the fallacy (i.e. *anekānta*) vitiating the argument of the opponent. The latter may try to meet this by admitting that even in those cases the sādhya is really present. In reply to this, Yāmunā says in this next sentence that this admission leads to absurdities.

102. To obviate the contradiction involved in sahopalambhaniyama to which the attention of the opponent was drawn, he shifts his ground and employs a different hetu, namely, *niyamena ekajñānasiddhatvam.*

103. The opponent argues that knowledge and the knower must be identical; for they are invariably apprehended together in one and the same knowledge.

इति सन्दिह्यमानत्वान्नाभेदः शक्यनिर्णयः ।
बोध्यस्थश्चैष नियमो न पुनर्बुद्धिबोद्धृगः ॥

स्पष्टश्च प्रत्यक्षबाधः, सर्वज्ञानेषु वेद्यादिव वित्तेरपि वेदितुर्भेदस्यापरोक्षत्वात् । न च प्रतियोगिनः प्रत्यक्षत्वं दृश्यत्वं वा भेदस्यापरोक्ष्ये त्वपेक्षितव्यम्; सिद्धिमात्रेण तदुपपत्तावप्रयोजकत्वेन तद्विशेषस्यानाक्षेपात् । अनवभासमानेऽपि प्रतियोगिनि भावाः स्वरूपत एव विलक्षणाः प्रत्यक्ष्यन्त इति सर्वलोकस्वसाक्षिकमेतत् ।

for doubt, it is impossible to determine that there is this non-difference. And this generalisation (that everything depends for its manifestation on consciousness) obtains only in the case of objects known and not in that of knowledge or the knower.

Besides, the conflict (of this theory) with perceptual experience is obvious; for, in every knowledge, the distinction of the knower from knowledge is directly perceived, even as his distinction from objects of knowledge is apprehended. (At this stage the opponent may object and say that the distinction of knower from knowledge cannot be perceived, since the counter-correlative (i.e., knowledge) is not perceived; and that even if it is admitted to be perceptible on the strength of the doctrine of svayamprakāśatva, it does not help, since it is not visible. To this we reply) in the matter of the perception of difference there is no necessity for the counter-correlative (*pratiyogi*) to be either perceptible or visible; for when the direct perception of difference is possible with the aid of the mere thought of the counter-correlative, a particular variety of this knowledge is not required, in as much as it is not responsible (for the perception of difference). (We may go a step further and say that) even when the counter-correlative is not apprehended, things are directly perceived as being distinct in themselves;[104] and this will be testified to by everybody from his own experience.

Against the possible objection that they may be so apprehended and still may not be identical, he must adduce the indirect proof (*tarka*) that if they were not identical, they could not be apprehended together in the self-same knowledge. It is shown here that he is unable to do so.

104. The apprehension of the generic property (jāti) of a thing, say a pot, is nothing more than the apprehension of the distinction from other things, i.e., non-pots; and it prevents erroneous identifications. In fact, difference (bheda) is nothing more than generic property (jāti). To grasp the generic property in itself it is unnecessary that the counter-correlative (pratiyogi) should have been perceived. But the generic property, in its aspect of eliminating erroneous identifications, is known as bheda (difference), and is, certainly, found to pre-suppose knowledge of the pratiyogi. See *Śrī Bhāṣya*. Ānanda Press edn. p. 29; see also verses 13-14 of *Adravyasara* in *Tattvamuktākalāpa* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* 'yadā punaḥ adhyāsa

ननु जीवतो भेदप्रत्यक्षस्य शिरसि पदनिधानेन सहोपलम्भनियमस्याभेदेन प्रतिबन्धग्रहणमिति कथमिव ततस्तद्बाधसम्भवः । तथा सति हि ज्वालाभेदानुमानमपि तदेकत्वप्रत्यभिज्ञयापोह्येत । अविशेषज्ञो देवानांप्रियः । तत्र हि क्लृप्तकारणदोषानुवृत्तौ सत्यां जायमानोऽपरोक्षावभासः न निरवद्यप्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमनुमानं बाधितुमर्हति । तथाहि—अचिरनिर्वापितारोपितेषु एकवर्तिभागवर्तिषु बहुषु दीपेषु तद्भेदादर्शिनः सुसदृशतया स एवायमिति स्मृतिरुपजायत इति दृष्टम् । अतोऽन्यत्राप्यप्रतिबन्धपुष्कलकारणक्रमोपनिपातादवयवविश्लेषाच्च सुसदृशनिरन्तरप्रवृत्तप्रदीपप्रवाहालम्बनैव तथा मतिरिति निश्चीयते । तथा एकस्मिन्नानात्वप्रत्ययः स्वतःप्राप्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिविपर्ययप्रयुक्तः समसमयोपजायमानानेकान-

(The opponent may ask) since, by trampling on the head of the perception of difference which is alive, (we) notice the universal concomitance between the invariable manifestation (of two things) together and their non-difference, how can the sublation of non-difference be effected by perception of difference? If it could be effected, even the inference regarding the difference of the flames (at successive moments) would be sultified by the recognition of their identity. (The reply is that) the fool (of an opponent) is ignorant of the distinction (between these two cases). Indeed, in the case of the flame, the perceptual knowledge, which arises when there is continuity of the defects in the settled causes (of knowledge) is incapable of sublating the inference which is based upon defectless perception. To make the point clear—it is found that, on account of close similarity between the different flames that are extinguished and lighted immediately after and which exist in the parts of one and the same wick, the remembrance "This is, certainly, that flame which I saw before" occurs to one who has not noticed their difference. Therefore, even in other cases (where the flames are not extinguished and kindled afresh), as there is the occurrence of a series of the complete set of causal factors, which have no counter-acting circumstances, and as there is the separation of parts (of the causal conditions) it is to be concluded that such a knowledge (of identity) has for its object closely similar and incessantly flowing flame-series. Similarly, as the cognition of diversity in regard to one and the same thing is found in the case of seeing the moon double and the like as being occasioned by the swerving from the normal mode

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nivartakatvarūpadharmāntaravaiśiṣṭyena vyavahriyante, tadā bhedā itī ucyante | tena teṣāmeva dharmāṇām vastusvarūpeṇa vyavahriyamāṇānām na pratiyogisāpekṣatvam | adhyāsanivartakatvarūpadharmāntaravaiśiṣṭyena vyavahriyamāṇānām pratiyogisāpekṣatvam iti |'

वद्यप्रत्यक्षप्रतिक्षिप्तविषयश्च द्विचन्द्रादौ दृष्ट इति नासौ तत्रैकत्वानुमानमभिभवितुं प्रभवति । न चैवमिह ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयविवेकसाक्षात्कारी प्रत्यय इति प्रतिरुणद्ध्येवायमिहाभेदानुमानोदयप्रसक्तिम् ।

न चोपलब्धिसाहित्यनियमादेव तथात्वमत्रानुमेयमिति युक्तम् ; विपक्षे बाधकानु-

of the working of the sense-organ,[105] and as having its object contradicted by the simultaneously arising defectless cognitions of many persons, this (perception of diversity) is not capable of setting aside the inference of identity in those cases. But here, the knowledge which immediately apprehends the distinction of the knower, knowledge and the known is not of such a nature ; hence, here it certainly does prevent the very possibility of the birth of the inference of identity.

But, here it is not proper to say that identity is inferable on the mere basis of the invariable manifestation of two things together ;[106] for we know of no obstacle preventing the existence of this hetu (*probans*) in

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105. Either through pressure of the finger upon the eye or on account of some defect in the visual mechanism, the rays of the organ of sight (nāyanaraśmi) split and travel in two directions, thereby creating, for all practical purposes, two mutually independent apparatuses of vision. One apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place, without, however, apprehending her unity ; the other, which moves somewhat obliquely, apprehends, at first, a place close by the moon, and subsequently the moon herself, without, however, noticing the intervening space separating this place and the moon. These two perceptions—one manifesting the moon in her proper place, and the other in a place close by—arise in such quick succession that the perceiver fails to notice the order of their occurrence, and thereby omits to note their varying natures. Thus, the double apparatus causes two apprehensions ; and as the apprehensions differ, there is also difference in the character of the object apprehended. The mistake here lies in the failure to notice the fact that the duality found in the places is unrelated to the moon. Hence, the perception of two moons. The Prābhākara account, which is closely similar to this, would, however, say that the double apparatus yields a duality of apprehensions, but it fails to grasp that the duality present in the apprehensions is unrelated to the moon. Compare : 'netravṛttiḥ vittigatadvitvam candrañca agṛhītabhedam gṛhṇātīti Prābhākarāḥ | yathā *Samvitsiddhau* Prābhākaramatopanyāse "netravṛttir dvidhābhūtā dve tu vṛttī vitanvatī | dvitvam candrañca yugapat nirbhāsayati tatra naḥ" | iti deśagatadvitvam candrañca agṛhītabhedam gṛhṇātīti tatotra vaiṣamyam |' *Śrutaprakāśikā*. The verse quoted from *Saṁvitsiddhi* is not found in the printed books and manuscripts examined so far.

106. Upalabdhisāhityaniyama and sahopalambhaniyama are identical. The fallacy of anekānta vitiating this hetu was first exposed. Here it is shown that the inability to cite indirect proof applies to this, as it does to the other hetu, namely, niyamena ekajñānasiddhatvam.

पलब्धेः । संविदधीनसिद्धितयापि तथा नियमोपपत्तेः । अनैन्द्रियकत्वेन च तद्वृत्ति-* विपर्ययस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । योग्यानुपलम्भपराकृतत्वाच्च बाधकप्रत्ययस्य ।

अपि च विषयसिद्धिर्हि संवित् । सा च स्वयंप्रकाशेत्यविवादः । तेनावर्जनीयस्तथा नियमः । न च भेदोऽपि सिद्धिमन्तरेण सिद्ध्येदित्यनुन्मत्तेन युक्तमापादयितुमित्यलमनेनानुभवपराहतमतातिव्याकुलीकरणेन ।

अप्रकाशात्मनश्च नीलादेः प्रकाश इत्यनुभवसिद्धत्वान्न समर्थनान्तरं प्रार्थ्यते । आत्मा तु प्रकाशस्वभाव एव । न च तावता ज्ञानत्वम्, स्वतन्त्रत्वात् । परतन्त्रमागन्तु यावदर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिकारणसन्निधानमवतिष्ठमानमर्थावच्छिन्नरूपं ज्ञानमिति प्रागेवावोचाम । आत्मा तु स्वतन्त्रो ज्ञाताऽहमिति प्रत्यात्मं प्रथते ।

cases where the sādhya (that which is to be proved) is absent. It may as well be that this invariable apprehension is due to objects depending for their manifestation on consciousness. Since the reference to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses serves no purpose for the reason that (knowledge and knower) are not cognised by the senses, (you cannot point out that the perception of difference, like the perception of two moons, is due to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses). As the existence of a sublating cognition is denied by effectual non-perception, (the perception of difference cannot be declared to be false).

Moreover, consciousness is well-known to be the manifestation of objects ;[107] and that it is self-luminous is beyond dispute ; hence, such an invariable manifestation of knowledge and the known is unavoidable. The contention that distinction (of objects from one another) can be established without the aid of consciousness is not likely to be put forward by any one who is not mad. Let this violent shaking of the doctrine which is opposed to experience suffice.

Since the notion that the manifestation of objects, such as, blue and the like, which, in their nature, are not self-luminous, (is effected by consciousness) is vouched for by experience, it requires no other proof. The self, on the contrary, is essentially self-luminous. On this count alone, the self cannot be said to be knowledge, as the former is self-dependent. It has already been stated that knowledge is dependent (on the self), that it is occasional, that it exists only so long as the causes, such as, the contact of the senses with their objects, persist, and that its nature is to pertain to some object or other. The self, on the contrary, is independent, and is the knowing subject ; it shines as the 'I' in every self.

*The Benares edition reads *vitti ;* the variant reading found in the Telugu edition and in some manuscripts has been preferred.

107. See note 104.

यदि पुनरीदृशोऽप्ययमनन्याधीनसिद्धितया ज्ञानमभिलप्यते, अभिलप्यतां कामम्; तथापि ज्ञानवदेवेदं ज्ञानम्। न ज्ञप्तिमात्रं तथा। अत एव हि छन्दोगाः "अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा" इत्याद्यामनन्ति। तथा "कतम आत्मा" इति प्रश्नपूर्वकमिदमेव लक्षणमामनन्ति वाजसनेयिनः "योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः" इति। अत्र हि योऽयं सर्वलोकानुभवसिद्धो विविधविषयवेदनप्रचुरः प्राणेषु प्रेरकतया स्थितो हृदयायतने अन्तर्ज्योतिरहमिति प्रत्यक्त्वेन प्रकाशते, स पुरुष इति यथोदितमेवात्मस्वरूपमुपदिश्यते। "एष हि द्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः" इत्याथर्वणाः। तथा "विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति," "न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम्" "स उत्तमः पुरुषः" "नोपजनं स्मरन्निदं

Even when it is of this nature, if the self is termed knowledge, on the ground that it does not depend for its manifestation on something other than itself, you are welcome to say so. Even when it is so (described), surely, this knowledge is the possessor of knowledge, and not such a pure consciousness (as is held by you). Indeed, for that very reason, the *Chandogas* (those who chant the Sāma-veda) declare "He who has the awareness of 'let me smell this' he is the self."[108] Similarly, after the question "what is the soul?" has been raised, *Vājasaneyins* offer the same definition (of the soul, namely "He who is in the midst of the senses and vital breath, who has knowledge for his essence and who is the light inside the heart, he is the person."[109] It is only in the manner indicated already that the true nature of the soul has been here described as follows—"He who is experienced by everybody, who is filled with knowledge concerning diverse objects, who resides among the senses and the breath as their director, who is the inward light in the region of the heart, and who shines for his own sake as the 'I,' is the puruṣa." The followers of Atharvaveda say "Truly, this entity, the seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker (māntṛ), knower (boddhṛ), doer (kartā), he who has knowledge for his essence, is the puruṣa."[110] Similarly, the following and other passages are found:—"Lo! whereby would one understand the understander?"[111] "The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world"[112]; "He (the highest light to which the jīva reaches up)

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108. *Chānd. Up.* VII.xii.4.
109. *Bṛh. Up.* IV. iii. 7.
110. *Praśna. Up.* IV.
111. *Bṛh. Up.* II. iv. 14.
112. *Chānd. Up.* VII. xxvi. 2.

शरीरम् ," "एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमाः षोडश कलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति," "तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयादन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः" इत्याद्याः।

सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यत्रापि ब्रह्मलक्षणनिर्देशे ज्ञानशब्दो न ज्ञानमात्रवचनः। अपि तु तद्वद्वचनः ; तद्वचनत्वे "लिति" इति आद्युदात्तत्वप्रसक्तेः। अन्तोदात्तश्चायं ज्ञानशब्दः। मत्वर्थीयाच्प्रत्ययान्तत्वे तथात्वं घटते, नान्यथेत्येतत् परमात्मनिरूपणेऽतिनिपुणमुपपादयिष्यामः। ऐतरेयकोपनिषदपि "प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म" इत्युक्त्वा "स एतेन प्राज्ञेनात्मना" इति प्रकृष्टज्ञानवन्तमेवेश्वरं दर्शयति। तत्सिद्धं ज्ञातैवायमात्मेति।

is the Supreme Person," "The jīva experiences him in diverse ways . . . not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin";[113] "Even so, the sixteen parts (kalās) of the experiencer (jīva), which depend (for their existence, nature and continuance) on the Highest Person, on reaching Him, become incapable of entangling Him in pleasure, pain, etc."; [114] "Different from that made of mind is another inner soul consisting of knowledge." [115]

Even while defining Brahman, in the text—'Brahman is satya, jñāna........' the word jñāna does not refer to mere knowledge, but to the possessor of it; for, if it referred to the former according to the sūtra-liti[116]—it would follow that the first syllable must have the principal accent. But this word, jñāna has its principal accent on the last syllable. The word jñāna being so accented will be appropriate only if it has, at its termination, the suffix *ac*, which conveys the same meaning as the suffix *matup*. Otherwise, it would not be (appropriate). We shall explain this very clearly while treating of the Supreme self. The Aitareya Upaniṣad also, after describing Brahman in the words 'Prajñāna is Brahman', refers to the lord as the possessor of supreme intelligence, by the expression 'he (Vāmadeva), by means of this Self possessed of intelligence.'[117] Therefore, it is clear that this soul is truly the knower.

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113. *Chānd. Up.* VIII.xii.3.
114. *Praśna. Up.* V.
115. *Tait. Up.* II.4.
116. *Aṣṭādhyāyī.* VI.i.193.
117. *Ait. Up.* Part V.

२५. किं पुनरस्मिन् देहादिव्यतिरेकिणि चेतने प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रमाणम् । अनुमानमिति नयविचक्षणोऽक्षपादः । यदाह "इच्छाद्वेषसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मलिङ्गम्" इति ।

किममीषामात्मना अविनाभावो दृष्टः, धूमध्वजविशेषेणेव धूमविशेषस्य । हन्तैवं तत एव तत्प्रमितेः किमनुमानेन । माभूद्विशेषतोदर्शनं सामान्यतस्तु भविष्यति । तथाहि—इच्छादयः कार्यत्वानित्यत्वगुणत्वादिभिः शब्दादय इवाश्रिततयानुमीयन्ते । यश्चैषामाश्रयः स आत्मा । गुणत्वञ्च परिशेषात् । न सामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः, अनित्यत्वात् । न द्रव्यं कर्म वा, व्यापकद्रव्यसमवायादिति । विशेषगुणत्वञ्चानित्यत्वे सत्यस्मदाद्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वनियमात्, रूपादिवत् ।

THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE BY WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF THE JĪVA IS ESTABLISHED

Established through Inference—(*a*) The Nyāya View.

25. What is the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which this individual self, which is distinct from the body and the like, and which is intelligent, is established ? Akṣapāda, who is master of the science of logic, thinks that it is inference. What he says is—' Desire, hate, pleasure, pain and knowledge are the reasons pointing to the existence of the soul.'[118] Has invariable concomitance between these and the soul, like that between smoke and fire (dhūmadhvaja), been observed anywhere ? Indeed, if so, as the knowledge of the self is obtained thence itself, what is the need for inference ? (The opponent replies) no invariable concomitance may have been observed in particular (between qualities such as desire, etc., and the soul) ; but, in general (i.e., between qualities and their substrate), it may be noticed. To make the point clear—Desire and other qualities, like sound and so on, are inferred to be dependent upon something, for the reason of their being effects, non-eternal (entities), attributes, and so on. That which is the substrate of these (qualities) is the self. That desire and the like are qualities is inferred by elimination. Being non-eternal, they cannot be either generality (*sāmānya*), or particularity (*viśeṣa*), or inherence (*samavāya*), or non-existence (abhāva). As they are inherent in all-pervasive substances, they cannot be either substance (*dravya*) or action (*karma*). That they are specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇa*) is established by the fact that at all times, like colour and other qualities, they, while being non-eternal, are grasped by one of our senses.

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118. Icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduhkhajñānānyātmano liṅgāni. *Nyāya-Sūtra,* I. i. 10.

एवमाश्रयमात्रमुपस्थापयन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकिणो हेतवः द्रव्यान्तरगुणत्वं प्रत्याचक्षाणैः केवलव्यतिरेकिसाधनैरात्मगोचरतया नियम्यन्ते। तथाहि भवति—इच्छादयो न महाभूतगुणाः; स्वात्मन एव प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, अबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद्वा। ये भूतगुणास्ते स्वात्मपरात्मप्रत्यक्षा बाह्यकरणप्रत्यक्षाश्च, यथा रूपादयः; न तथा इच्छादय इति न तद्गुणाः। दिक्कालमनांसि पुनर्न विशेषगुणवन्ति, नापि तद्गुणानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति न तेषामपि गुणाः। अकारणगुणपूर्वत्वात् अयावच्छरीरभावित्वादित्यादयः शरीरविशेषगुणत्वप्रतिषेधहेतवः प्राचीनाश्च अत्रानुकृष्टव्याः। तेन इच्छादयो न शरीरगुणाः तद्गुणभावापवादकप्रमाणवत्त्वे सति गुणत्वात्, ये यथोक्तसाध्या न भवन्ति ते यथोक्तसाधना अपि न भवन्ति, यथा रूपादयः। यथोक्तसाधनाः पुनरिच्छादय इति यथोक्तसाध्या एवेति।

The reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (*anvaya-vyatirekiṇo hetavaḥ*), which, in this manner, indicate only (the need of) some substrate (for desire, etc.), are narrowed down in their scope in such a way as to refer to the soul by the reasons which are concomitant in negation only (*kevalavyatirekisādhanaiḥ*) and which disprove the view that they are the qualities of substances other than the soul. That this is so is evident from the following :—Desire and the like are not the qualities of the primal elements (mahābhūtas), because they are perceived only by oneself, or because they are not to be grasped by the outer senses. The qualities belonging to the primal elements, as colour and the like, are perceivable by oneself and others and are perceived by the outer senses ; but desire and the like are not so (perceivable) ; hence, they are not the qualities of primal elements. Again, space (dik), time and mind (manas) do not have specific qualities ; and their attributes are not open to perception ; hence, desire and the like are not their qualities. Reasons, such as the following—since they are not dependent on the causal substances ; since they do not exist as long as the body lasts—(reasons) which were cited before, and which refute the view that they are the specific qualities of the body, are to be brought forward and applied here also. Therefore, desire and the like are not the qualities of the body ; for, while there is evidence contradicting the view that they are the qualities of the body, they are qualities. Whatever does not possess the sādhya does not have the aforesaid sādhana either, as in the case of colour. Desires and the like, however, possess the aforesaid hetu, and hence, they possess the sādhya.

विमतिपदास्पदेभ्यः शरीरादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरगुणा इच्छादय इति वा प्रतिज्ञा। यथोक्त एव हेतुः उदाहरणञ्च प्रयोक्तव्यम्। सामान्येन वाऽन्वयः प्रदर्शनीयः। यो यद्गुणभावापवादकप्रमाणवत्त्वे सति गुणः, स ततोऽर्थान्तरस्य गुणः, यथा पृथिव्यादिभ्यः शब्दः, इति आकाशसिद्धिवदात्मसिद्धिरिति।

२६. इदमपि न समीचीनमित्येके। तथाहि—अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतुभिर्देहादि-साधारणमाश्रयमात्रमवगमितम्। न च तावताऽऽत्मसिद्धिः। केवलव्यतिरेकी तु साधनदशामेव नासादयति, सपक्षान्वयविरहादसाधारणवत्। न चैवं केवलान्वयिनो विप-

Or, the thesis to be proved (instead of being 'Desire and the like are not the qualities of the body') may be the following—Desires and the like are the qualities of some substance other than the body, which is the point under dispute.[119] The aforesaid hetu and illustrative example may be cited (in the case of this thesis also). Positive concomitance too may be shown in a somewhat general way. That which is a quality, when there is evidence contradicting the view that it is the quality of a given entity, is the attribute of something other than that given entity, just as sound is the quality of something other than earth and the like. In this way, just as ether (ākāśa) is proved (to be the substrate of sound), the self is established (to be the substrate of desire and the like).

Refutation of the Nyāya View

26. Some consider that this (view) is not correct. To elucidate this point:—with the aid of reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (*anvayavyatirekī*) it was only made known that there is some support (for desire and other qualities), which might be either the body or some other substance. By this reasoning alone, the soul is not established (to be that substrate); whereas, the reason concomitant in negation alone (*kevalavyatirekī*) does not even possess the quality of being a correct reason; for, as in the case of the fallacy called *asādhāraṇa,* there is absence of the probans in instances where the sādhya is surely met with (sapakṣa).[120] The objection that on this admission, even the reason con-

119. The point at dispute is not the existence of the body, but its possessing desires, etc., as attributes.

120. In the argument, 'sound is eternal, because it is sound' the hetu is vitiated by the fallacy of *asādhāraṇa*; for, it is not present in any sapakṣa (i.e., similar examples where the sādhya is present) even as it is not present in the vipakṣa. Similarly, in cases where reasons concomitant in negation alone (*kevalavyatirekī*) are employed, there being no sapakṣa, it is impossible to show the presence of the hetu in sapakṣas. Hence, *kevalavyatirekī* is considered fallacious. It is defective for another reason also. In order to show that wherever the sādhya is absent the

क्षव्यतिरेकदर्शनविकलतया साधारणवदसाधनत्वम् । देशकालादिशङ्कितोपाधिविगमेऽप्यन्वयदर्शनेन साध्यान्वितस्वभावतया परिनिश्चितत्वात् । न च साधनाभावे साध्याभावदर्शनमात्रेण साध्यान्वितस्वभावत्वं शक्यं निश्चेतुम् । अभावस्यानन्तदेशव्यापितया अनवयवेन ग्रहणस्यैव दुष्करत्वात् । कलयाऽप्यन्यत्र वृत्तौ सम्बन्धे नियमासम्भवात् । सन्देहग्रस्तत्वाच्च किं साधनाभावप्रयुक्तः साध्याभावः, किं वा निमित्तान्तरप्रयुक्त इति । पृथिव्यादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरगुणत्वप्रतिज्ञापि द्रव्यान्तराप्रसिद्धेरप्रसिद्धविशेषणा ।

comitant in affirmation alone cannot be considered a correct reason, for, as in the fallacy known as *sādhāraṇa,* there is the failure to show the absence of the reason in the counter-example (vipakṣa)[121]—(this objection) does not stand. Since, even in the absence of suspected limiting conditions (upādhis), such as space, time and the like, the co-presence (of the hetu and the sādhya) is found, it is definitely ascertained that the hetu has the character of being connected with the sādhya. From the mere observation of the absence of the sādhya when there is the absence of the hetu, it is not possible to ascertain that the hetu has the character of being connected with the sādhya. As the non-existence of the sādhya is met with in innumerable places, it is impossible even to take note of them all exhaustively. If even in a single place the hetu were to be present in some manner, the universality of the connection cannot be maintained. Besides, it is a matter for doubt whether the non-existence of the sādhya is due to the absence of the hetu or to some other cause. Even the thesis (that desire and the like) are the qualities of some entity other than earth and the like may be charged with having an unproven attribute (*aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa*), for that other entity has not been proved.

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hetu is also absent, the sādhya must first have been understood previously; but it is not met with anywhere. Hence, the Vedāntins dismiss *kevalavyatirekī* as being faulty. Cf. 'sādhyābhāvo vipakṣe kathamiva viditaḥ tasya sādhyāprasiddheḥ.' *Tattvamuktākalāpa, Buddhisara,* verse 53. See also *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi* (Memorial edition, pp. 66-75) and *Dīdhiti.* The *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* rejects *kevalānvayī* also, on the score that the *kevalānvayī* requires a sādhya which is present everywhere, and such a sādhya is inadmissible on the theory that Brahman is nirguṇa.

121. The opponent says—In the argument 'the mountain has fire, because it is knowable,' the hetu is defective (*sādhāraṇa*), because it is not absent in the vipakṣa. Similarly, in arguments employing reasons concomitant in affirmation alone (*kevalānvayī*), there being no vipakṣa, the absence of the hetu in the vipakṣa cannot be cited. Hence, *kevalānvayī* also is a defective process of reasoning.

२७. एतेन साङ्ख्योदीरितसाधनभेदा अपि अपोदिता वेदितव्याः सङ्घातपरार्थत्वादयः। तथा च तानेव तावदादितो व्याकुर्महे।

" सङ्घातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात्।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ "

अयमर्थः—देहेन्द्रियादयः परार्थाः सङ्घातत्वात्, शयनासनशरणादिवत्। प्रत्यक्षञ्च शरीरस्य सङ्घातत्वं भूतानाञ्च। अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारेन्द्रियाणाञ्च सुखदुःखमोहात्मतया तथात्वमनुमेयं तद्वदेव।

न चेन्द्रियाणामाहङ्कारिकत्वस्याभ्युपेतस्य साध्यत्वाभिमतपारार्थ्यधर्मस्य चासंहतपरार्थत्वस्यान्यथात्वापादनादुभयविशेषविरुद्धत्वं हेतोः। अहङ्कारान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानेन

(b) The Sāṅkhya View

27. By the same reasoning, even the various reasons (such as, that collocations exist for the sake of others) are to be understood as having been set aside. Let us analyse them in the order of their presentation. "Since collocations exist for the sake of something other than themselves, since (in this other) there is the absence of the three guṇas and the like, since there must be control (of these collocations), since there must be an experiencer, and since there is activity for securing aloofness (from prakṛti), the soul exists."[122] This means—Being collocations, the body, the senses and so on, like a bed, a seat, a house, etc., exist for the sake of something other than themselves. The character of being a collocation attributed to the body and the primal elements is vouched for by perception. That the same character (of being a collocation) belongs to unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta), mahat, ahamkāra and the senses, as to the body and elements, is to be inferred from the fact that the former are of the nature of pleasure, misery and delusion.

(A possible objection is that) when the senses are admitted to be derived from the ahaṁkāra and when the meaning of what is accepted as the sādhya, namely, the quality of existing for the sake of another is the quality of existing for the sake of another which is itself not a collocation, the respective reasons for the above only prove the opposite, and hence, they are subject to the fallacy of *ubhaya-viśeṣaviruddha*.[123] (The Sāṅkhya replies) this objection can-

122. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. verse 17.

123. It is interesting to note that this identical argument has been cited as an example of *ubhayaviśeṣaviruddha* (*i.e.* Dharmadharmyubhaya, viśēṣaviruddha), by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Śloka-Vārttika*, Anumānapariccheda. sl. 105-7. The six varieties of *viruddha*—Dharmasvarūpabādha, Dharmaviśeṣabādha, Dharmisvarupabādha, Dharmiviśeṣabādha, Dharmadharmyubhayasvarūpabādha and Dharmadharmyu-

न तस्यासंहतत्वात्रिगुणत्वादिरभिमतविशेषः शक्यनिश्चयः। तथाहि—सङ्घातस्य सङ्घातान्तरार्थत्वनियमदर्शनबलादापतन्ती परा परा सङ्घातकल्पना न दोषाय कार्यतयेवानादिकारणपरम्पराकल्पना।

न चाप्रयोजकत्वमपि। असङ्घातस्यासङ्गस्याशेषविक्रियाशून्यस्याऽनाधेयातिशयकूटस्थचितिमात्रवपुषः पुरुषस्य सङ्घातं प्रति परत्वानुपपत्तेः। तद्धि तस्य शेषीभवति, तच्च तदर्थम्, यद्येनोपक्रियते क्रियते वा, यच्चोपकरोति करोति वा। न च तथा साङ्ख्यपुरुष इति कथं तस्य सङ्घातं प्रति परत्वं कथन्तरां च सङ्घातस्य तादर्थ्यम्। अनुपकार्योऽप्युपकार्यतया आत्मानं मन्यत इति चेत्; कामं मन्यतां किमायातमुपकार्यत्वस्य। न खलु बालास्तलमलिनतादिमत्तया गगनमभिमन्यन्त इति तस्य तथात्वं भवति।

yet, (with their aid) the qualities of not being a collocation and of not possessing the three guṇas, which are admitted by you, cannot be determined as belonging to it. To explain—The positing of a series of collocations, made on the strength of the observation that a collocation, always exists only for another collocation, like the positing of a series of causes having no beginning, made for the reason that something is an effect, is not wrong.

It cannot be said that (the quality of being a collocation) is not responsible (for anything being a śeṣi, an independent being for whose sake others exist); for, in respect of any collocation, the soul, which is not a collocation, which is unattached, which is bereft of all modifications and which is mere consciousness itself, which is unchanging and for which no service is rendered by anything else, cannot be that other for whose sake the collocation exists. That which is served or produced by another becomes the śeṣi in respect of that other. That which serves or produces anything exists for the sake of the latter.[128] But, since the puruṣa admitted by the Sānkhyas is not so (served or produced by a collocation), how can he be regarded as being that other in respect of the collocation? What is more, how can the collocation be treated as existing for his sake? If it be said that though the puruṣa is not really rendered any service, he imagines himself as being served, (we reply) by all means let him imagine like that; how does it help to establish that he is being served? For the reason that children imagine ether to possess the dirt found in a region, the character of being dirty will not belong to it.

128. Cf. *Jaimini-Sūtra*. III. i. 1.—śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt.

अपि च तथाविधभ्रमोऽपि कस्य कथमुदयत इति विवेचनीयम् । न तावच्चिच्छक्तेः, सर्वविक्रियाशून्यतया अतिविशुद्धायामशुभशतनिदानभूतभ्रमपरिणामासम्भवात् । अन्तःकरणं तु बुद्ध्यपरपरिभाषाभिधानमचेतनतया तनुरिव न भ्राम्यति ।

अचिदपि स्वच्छतया चिच्छायामापन्नं चेतनायत इति चेन्न; नीरूपायाश्चितेर्बुद्धेश्च छायातद्ग्रहणानुपपत्तेः । छायेव छायेति चेत्; कः खल्विवार्थः ? चितिसरूपत्वमिति चेत्; हन्तैवमशेषविकाररहितचितिसरूपतापत्तावन्तःकरणमपि प्रत्यस्तमितसमस्तवृत्तिकमापद्यत इति दुरुपपादतरोऽयं भ्रमसुखदुःखादिविकारयोगः प्रत्यात्मसिद्धः ।

चेतनत्वेन सरूपत्वमिति चेन्न; चितिरेव हि ते पुरुषः, न चेतयिता । यथाह तत्र भगवान् पतञ्जलिः " यदा चितिरेव पुरुषः किमत्र केन व्यपदिश्यते " इति ।

Further, to whom such an illusion occurs and how must be investigated. It cannot occur to the power of consciousness; for, the illusion, which is a mode of change and which is the root cause of a hundred ills, cannot arise in the exceedingly pure consciousness, as it is devoid of all modifications. The internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) too, for which buddhi is another technical expression, cannot experience the illusion; for, like the body, it is non-intelligent.

If it be urged that, though it is non-intelligent, the internal organ, being transparent, receives the reflection of consciousness and becomes a conscious subject, as it were, (we reply) not so; for, reflection and its reception cannot properly belong (respectively) to consciousness and buddhi, which are alike formless. If it be contended that to be a reflection is to be like it, (we ask) what is meant by 'being like' (consciousness)? If the reply is that it consists in having a nature similar to that of consciousness, (we rejoin) if, indeed, that were so, when buddhi attains similarity with consciousness, which is free from all modifications, it too becomes devoid of all modifications; and hence, it would be impossible to account for the contact of modifications, such as, illusion, pleasure and pain, which are met with in every soul.

If it be said that buddhi has a nature similar to that of consciousness only in so far as it possesses consciousness, (we reply) not so; for, on your view, the soul is, in fact, consciousness itself and not a conscious entity; the venerable Patañjali, for instance, says, 'If consciousness alone is the soul, what is it that is referred to here, and by what.'

अजडायमानत्वमिवार्थ इति चेत्; अजडत्वमपि न ज्ञातृत्वातिरिक्तं किञ्चिदित्युक्तमेव, तेनैव तद्विवरणमिति च न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

अपि च चितिसन्निधानाधीनां बुद्धिसिद्धिमभिदधानः कथमिव तदजडिमानं प्रतिजानीयात् । न च चितिस्वान्तयोः बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बाधाराभिमतयोरन्यतरस्मिन्नप्यविद्यमानस्य विषयविशेषोपरक्तज्ञातृत्वलक्षणधर्मभेदस्य प्रतिबिम्बे सम्भवः । प्रत्युक्तश्चायं प्रतिबिम्बवादः प्रच्छन्नबाह्यमतप्रत्यादेशे ।

यदुच्यते निर्विकारायापि पुंसे तत्सन्निधिमहिमसमुत्थापितप्रमाणविपर्ययादिविचित्रवृत्तिभेदं स्वान्तमेव स्ववृत्तिं विषयविशेषांश्चोपदर्शयति, सामन्तचक्रमिव पराक्रमीयः* प्रति-

If it be urged that 'being like' (consciousness) means 'being like not-non-intelligent', (we reply that) it has already been shown that not being not-intelligent is nothing more than the quality of being a knower and that the explanation of 'being like' (a conscious entity) is sought to be made in terms of itself;[129] and hence, this (interpretation of 'being like') is pointless.

Further, how (we ask) can he who maintains that the existence of buddhi is dependent upon the nearness of consciousness posit its being not-non-intelligent? And, when this particular quality, known as the character of being a knower—a quality associated with some object or other—does not exist in either consciousness or buddhi, which are considered to be the original and the basis of reflection, it cannot occur in the reflection. This reflection theory has already been refuted while discarding the view of the heretics in disguise.

It may be said that, though the puruṣa (self) is changeless, the antaḥkaraṇa itself, which possesses wonderful and diverse activities, such as *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*[130] produced by the power belonging to the nearness of the puruṣa, exhibits its activities and different objects to the puruṣa; and thereby, he comes to be called witness (sākṣī), enjoyer

129. "Being like a reflection of consciousness, it becomes a conscious entity as it were" was the reply to the question "How can the antaḥkaraṇa, which is non-intelligent, be a conscious entity and experience illusions?" "Being like a reflection of consciousness,' when explained, finally amounts to 'being like a conscious entity.' Thus, the answer reduces itself to the tautalogous proposition "Being like a conscious entity, it becomes a conscious entity, as it were.'

130. *Pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā* and *smṛti* are the five vṛttis of the antaḥkaraṇa. For an account of these see *Yoga-Sūtras* I.5-11.

* The word *parākramīyaḥ* has been formed in accordance with Pāṇini's sūtra 'vinmatorluk' (V. iii. 65). Compare the stems srajīyas, tvacīyas. Atiśayena parākramavat parākramīyaḥ (one possessing extremely great valour).

All printed books and manuscripts read pratibalavilolanādivṛttī; but pratibalavilolanādivṛttīm is obviously a better reading.

बलविलोलनादिवृत्तिं स्वामिने; ततस्साक्षी भोक्ता चापदिश्यते राजेति विक्रमी विजयी चेति।

तदनुपपन्नम्। द्रष्टे हि दर्शनीयं दृश्यते। न च दृशिमात्रात्मवादिनां साङ्ख्यानां तदुपजीविनाञ्च प्रच्छन्नानां द्रष्टृत्वं वास्तवमस्ति। न च काल्पनिकेन शेषित्वसम्भवः। कल्पनापि न सम्भवतीत्युक्तमेव। राजा तु सामान्यतो विशेषतो वा तेषु कर्मस्वमात्यान्नियुञ्जानस्तत्फलमैश्वर्यादि चाश्नुवानः स्वस्वामिभावहेतुक्रयप्रतिग्रहजननादिव्यापारयोगी न निष्क्रियस्यानाधेयातिशयस्य पुंसो निदर्शनमिति यत्किञ्चिदेतत्।

स्थूलोऽहं गच्छाम्यहमित्यादि प्रत्यक्षमृदितविषयतया प्रसिद्धैवातीतकालता व्यतिरेकानुमानभेदानामित्यानुमानिकीमप्यात्मसिद्धिमश्रद्दधानाः श्रौतीमेव तां श्रोत्रियाः सङ्गि-

(bhoktā); just as the gathering of generals possessing extremely great valour exhibits to the master its activities, such as entering the enemy's camp and causing consternation therein, and, as a consequence, he comes to be termed a monarch, a man of valour and a conqueror.

But, this view is unsound. In fact, it is only for the sake of the seer that the visible object is found to exist; and for the Sānkhyas or for their followers, the heretics in disguise, who alike maintain that consciousness alone is the soul, the quality of being the seer is not real. And, the quality of being a śeṣi (one for whose sake others exist) cannot be brought about by the fictitiously imagined quality of being the seer. Besides, it has already been said that even this fictitious imagination cannot arise. (As for the analogy), the king, who commands his generals, in a general or in a specific manner, in those activities, and who acquires the fruits resulting therefrom, such as, sovereignty, and who engages in activities such as purchasing, receiving and inheriting,[131] which are responsible for the relation of being owner and property, is not an analogue to the soul, which is inactive, and which is rendered no service by anybody; hence this view is valueless.

The different arguments seeking to prove that the soul is distinct from the body and the like are well known to be stultified (*atītakālatā*),[132] in as much as their subject-matter is shattered by perceptual knowledge, such as, 'I am stout,' 'I go,'; for this reason, those well-versed in the vedas, having no faith even in the view that the proof of the soul is afforded by inference, assert that this proof is furnished by the vedas

131. Perhaps, in preference to birth (janana) mention may be made of conquest (jaya), since, in the case of kṣatriyas, conquest is regarded as a special title to ownership. cf. svāmī rikthakrayasamvibhāga parigrahādhigameṣu | brāhmaṇasya adhikam labdham | kṣatriyasya vijitam | nirviṣṭam vaiśyasūdrayoḥ. *Gautama Dharma-Sūtra*. X. 38-41.

132. The fallacy of *atītakālatā* or *kālātyayāpadeśa* has, in later Nyāya terminology, come to be called *bādha*.

रन्ते—श्रुतयो हि साक्षादेवात्मनः शरीरादिव्यतिरेकमादर्शयन्ति—"स एष नेति नेति" "अकायमव्रणमस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्" "योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः स्थाणुमन्ये" "न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित्" "जीवापेतं वाव किलेदं म्रियते" "न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति" "अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः" इत्याद्याः। कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गादिसाधनविधयश्चाक्षिपन्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तं नित्यं चेतनमिति श्रुतितदनुपपत्तिप्रमाणकोऽयं प्रत्यगात्मेति।

२९. ननु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारमात्रपरस्याम्नायस्य शिरसि किमिति महानयं भारः प्रक्षिप्यते। अनुमानागमाद्यशेषप्रमाणमूलभूतेन प्रत्यक्षेणैव ह्येनं प्रतिपद्यामहे। ममेदं शरीरं इदमहं जानामीति घटादिदृश्येभ्य इवायं द्रष्टा देहादपि पृथग्भूतः प्रत्यक्षम् परिस्फुरति।

alone. In fact, scriptural passages, such as the following, directly reveal the distinctness of the soul from the body and the like. "The soul (ātman) is not this; it is not that."[133] "The bodiless, the scatheless, the sinewless, the pure (śuddha), unpierced by sins (apāpaviddha)";[134] "Some go into a womb for assuming bodily form; others become immovable objects";[135] "He is never born, nor does he die"; "Indeed, only this (body) which is devoid of life dies"[136]; "Verily, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain so long as he is embodied; when he is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him."[137] Even the injunctions prescribing means for realising heavenly bliss and the like, which are to accrue after bodily death, lead to the positing of an eternal, conscious entity, that is distinct from the body, and so on; hence, the individual soul has for its means of proof the scripture and the presumptive testimony connected therewith (*śrutārthāpatti*).

The Existence of the Jīva deduced from Perception by External Senses

29. (One may ask) why should this heavy load be placed on the head of the vedas, whose sole aim is to teach the means for realising the good and avoiding the evil? Indeed, we know the soul with the aid of the testimony of perception itself, which is the basis of all pramāṇas, such as, inference and scripture. From cognitions such as, 'This is my body,' 'I know this,' it is evident that this seer shines forth in direct perception as being distinct from the body also, just as he is distinct from objects known, such as, the pot.

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133. *Bṛh. Up.*
134. *Īśa. Up.* 8.
135. *Kaṭha. Up.* V. 7.
136. *Chānd. Up.* VI.xi.3.
137. *Chānd. Up.* VIII.xii.1.

३०. मैवं वोचः। इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं हि विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्, न चेन्द्रियाणि रूपादि-व्यतिरेकिणि निरतिशयसूक्ष्मे प्रतीचि परागर्थ इव सन्निकर्षेण ज्ञानं जनयितुमर्हन्ति। यथाम्नायते "पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयंभूः" इति।

अचित्त्वप्रतिबद्धश्च सर्वोऽपीन्द्रियगोचरः।
तेन नैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानमात्मानं स्प्रष्टुमर्हति ॥

३२. स्यान्मतं भौतिकत्वाद्बहिरिन्द्रियाणि मा नामात्मनि प्रवर्तिषत; मनस्तु प्रवर्तिष्यते, अभौतिकत्वादिति। तन्न। तस्यापीन्द्रियत्वे भौतिकत्वस्यापरिहार्यत्वात् यथाम्नायते—"अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मन" इति। प्रपञ्चितश्चैतन्निरूपणे।

अथोच्येत, अस्ति तावदहमित्यपरोक्षावभासः प्रत्ययः। न चैन्द्रियकत्वमन्तरेणासौ सम्भवति। क्लृप्तं च बहिरिन्द्रियागोचरेऽपि सुखादौ स्वान्तस्वातन्त्र्यमिति तन्निमित्त

Refutation of this View

30. (We reply) do not say so; for, that is perceptual knowledge which arises from the contact of the senses with objects;[138] and from their contact with the inward soul, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and which is exceedingly subtle, unlike their contact with outward objects, the senses are incapable of originating knowledge (concerning the soul). It has been so declared in the vedas: "The self-existent (svayambhūḥ) made the senses proceed outward (and thus troubled them)."[139] All objects revealed by the senses will invariably be accompanied by the quality of non-intelligence; therefore the knowledge born of the senses is incapable of touching the soul.

The Existence of the Soul established through Perception by Manas

31. It may be said, "Let the external senses not come into contact with the soul and present it, since they are elemental (bhautika); but the manas, being non-elemental, may enter into contact with the soul and present it." (Against this, we reply) it is not so; for, if that too be a sense-organ, it must inevitably be elemental. It has been so declared in the vedas: 'Gentle sir; the manas is, indeed, made of food (anna)"[140]; when dealing with this (manas) it has been fully explained.

It may be urged: "Certainly, there is a cognition of 'I'—a cognition which is direct awareness. And this (cognition) cannot but be what has arisen from the senses. The claim of manas in regard to (the manifestation of) pleasure and the like, even though they do not fall within the

138. indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam . . . pratyakṣam. *Nyāya-Sūtras,* I. i. 4.
139. *Kaṭha. Up.* IV.1.
140. *Chānd. Up.* VI.v.4.

एवायमहंप्रत्ययो युक्तः । प्रयोगश्च भवति, आत्मा मानसप्रत्यक्षग्राह्यः, बहिरिन्द्रियायोग्यत्वे सति प्रत्यक्षत्वात् सुखादिवदिति ।

३२. तन्न । संवेदनेन व्यभिचारात् । न च तदप्रत्यक्षम्; जानामीत्यनन्योपाधिकतया प्रतिभानात् । अप्रत्यक्षत्वे च संवेदनस्यासिद्धिरेव स्यादित्युक्तमेव ।

न च तदपि मानसप्रत्यक्षतया सपक्षे निक्षेपमर्हति; विमर्दासहत्वात् । यदा खलु कुतश्चिदात्ममनस्संयोगाद्विषयसंविदुदयमासादयति, तदैव किं तत एव तद्गोचरमपि वेदनं जन्यते, उतान्यदान्येनेतिवाच्यम् । न च युगपदुभयजननं सम्भाव्यते; तथाहि सति परापरतत्तद्गोचरनिरवधिकधीनिकुरुम्बजन्म तत्कालमेवापद्येत । न च तदस्ति । युगप-

scope of the external senses, is well established. Hence, it is but proper that the cognition of 'I' should have this (manas) for its cause. This can be expressed syllogistically. The soul, like pleasure and so on, is to be grasped by mental perception; for, while it is not capable of being grasped by the external senses, it is still an object of perception.

Refutation of this View

32. (Our reply is) it is not so; for, from the case of (samvedana) jñāna, (where the sādhya is absent while the hetu is present), it is found that this argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. (To escape this fallacy), you cannot point out that jñāna is not open to perception; for, without depending on anything else, it manifests itself as 'I know;' and it has already been stated that if it were not an object of perception, it would, in fact, cease to be knowledge.

It cannot be contended that, since it is an object of mental perception, jñāna too is fit to rank among similar examples (sapakṣa); for this contention will not stand scrutiny. (If that is your view), you must point out whether even the knowledge concerning the knowledge of an object is produced exactly at the time when, by virtue of a certain conjunction between soul and manas, the knowledge of an object takes birth, and whether (it is produced) by the selfsame contact, or whether it is produced at a different time and by a different contact. (Regarding the first alternative), the origination of the two (i.e. knowledge of an object and knowledge concerning the knowledge of an object) at the same time is impossible. If that were so, the birth of a collection of limitless items of knowledge, each of which has the other for its respective object, would have to take place at the same time. But, it does not take place. If it

दुत्पत्तौ विषयविषयित्वनियमश्च निर्निबन्धनः । असमसमयजन्मना ज्ञानेन वेद्यत्वे न प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, क्षणिकत्वेनाऽग्रिमज्ञानस्याऽऽग्राहकज्ञानोदयमवस्थानाभावात् । भावे च सर्वज्ञानानां सर्वदावस्थानप्रसङ्गात् । कार्यविरोधित्वे चानन्तरमेव संस्कारोदयान्न कालान्तरे स्थितिरितिसंविदो न मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यत्वम् । न चाप्रत्यक्षा संविदिति स्फुटो व्यभिचारः ।

ऐन्द्रियकत्वस्यानात्मत्वप्रतिबद्धत्वाद्विरुद्धता च । साध्यविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः; सुखदुःखयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वानभ्युपगमात् । अनभ्युपगमश्च इन्द्रियपौष्कल्यनाशयोरेव सुखदुःखत्वात् । न हि तस्मिन्नप्रत्यक्षे तत्पौष्कल्यं वैकल्यं वा प्रत्यक्षं भवति । इन्द्रियस्वरूप इव अभ्यासपाटवात्तयोरपरोक्षत्वाभिमानः, मनोऽवस्थाभेदेष्विव चानुमेयमनोवादिनाम् ।

takes place simultaneously, the distinction made between being an object of knowledge and owning the object (viṣayaviṣayitvaniyamaḥ) would become baseless. (Regarding the second alternative), if it (knowledge concerning knowledge) is made known by a knowledge arising at a different time, it would cease to be an object of perception; for, as knowledge is momentary, the earlier knowledge will not last till the rise of the knowledge which reveals it. If it lasts, all cognitions would have to exist at all times. If it be urged that it is incompatible with its effect (i.e. if it perishes as soon as its effect springs up), (we reply that) as its effect, namely, the mental impression arises immediately after, it will not exist at a different time (i.e. at a time when the revealing consciousness arises). Hence, jñāna cannot be an object of mental perception. And it cannot be said that it is obvious that the argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. Besides, as the quality of being grasped by the senses is invariably concomitant with the quality of being non-soul, your argument commits the fallacy of *viruddha* also (i.e. is guilty of employing adverse probans). Further, the illustrative example cited in the argument is defective in not possessing the sādhya; for, pleasure and pain are not admitted to be objects of perception. And it is not so admitted, because pleasure and pain are nothing more than the flourishing or the decaying state of the senses. Indeed, when the senses are not perceptible, their flourishing or decaying state will not be the object of perception.

In the case of pleasure and pain, as in that of the senses, or again, in that of the different states of mind (manas) on the view of those who maintain that manas is inferable, the false impression that they are directly perceived is due to the power of long continued experience.[141]

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141. With continued practice one infers the existence of pleasure, pain, the states of mind and the like so effortlessly and quickly and without noticing the

यस्तु सुगतमतावलम्बी विज्ञानाभिन्नहेतुजतया तयोरपि तदन्तर्भावमभिमन्यते कणभक्षपक्षाश्रयणेन वा तयोरात्मविशेषगुणत्वं ताभ्यां सुखदुःखाधिकरणं व्याचक्षीत, स्वतस्सुखीत्येतद्विमर्शं वात्रत्यम् ।

The section dealing with pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkhādhikaraṇa*)[142] or the discussion of the description of the soul (vide p. 8) as being in its essential nature blissful (svatassukhī) found in this work itself[143] ought to be explained to those who, following the Buddhistic doctrine, believe that pleasure and pain are included in the category of knowledge, for the reason that they are produced by causes which are non-different from knowledge, and to those who, by accepting the system of Kaṇabhakṣa (the exponent of the Vaiśeṣika system), believe that they are the special qualities of the soul (and not the flourishing and the decaying states of the senses).[144]

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several steps of the argument, that one comes to think that he directly perceives them.

142. *Sukhaduḥkhādhikaraṇa* is the sixth section of the first pāda of Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva-śāstra*, a work which is not extant now. Yāmuna refers to a few other adhikaraṇas of this śāstra. In fact, his *Ātmasiddhi* may be regarded as a brief exposition of *Nyāyatattva*. Compare *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, Buddhipariccheda—" Nyāyatattva-prakaraṇam hi Ātmasiddhiḥ."

143. This discussion over svatassukhī is included among the portions of *Ātmasiddhi* lost.

144. Those who identify pleasure and pain with the flourishing or the decaying state of the senses mean by 'senses' the internal sense (manas) and not the outer senses; for, pleasure and pain are nothing more than the tranquil and the disturbed states of manas. cf. " tathā ca antaḥkaraṇaprasādāvasādayoreva sukhatvaduḥkhatvavyapadeśadarśanāt tatprasādāvasādāveva sukhaduhkharūpāvityarthaḥ." Raṅgarāmānuja ṭikā on *Nyāyasiddhāñjana, Buddhipariccheda.*

Though this view is defended here and elsewhere in *Ātmasiddhi,* it cannot be considered to be his final view, for, later on, he says that all reference to certainty, doubt, pleasure, pain and the like has for its object either some particular form of contact of knowledge with its object or knowledge possessing that contact. cf. *Nyāyasiddhāñjana, Buddhipariccheda* " . . . sukhaduhkheca nātmadharmau ityāditu vaibhavena matāntareṇa vā abhihitam anyathā kathamevam upasamhārārambhe brūyāt 'tadevam ātmasvabhāvabhūtasya caitanyasya viṣayasamśleṣaviśeṣagocara eva niścayaśamśayādi vyavahārabhedaḥ tadviśeṣabhāji caitanyevā.'" Rāmānuja says, in *Vedārthasamgraha,* 'that knowledge, which is in contact with a particular object, and which is considered the cause of pleasure or pain, is really pleasure or pain itself and not its cause. Besides knowledge, nothing else which could be called pleasure or pain is noticed.' 'yena viṣayaviśeṣeṇa viśeṣitam jñānam sukhasya janakamityabhimatam tadviṣayajñānameva sukham tadatireki padārthāntaram nopalabhyate.'

रागद्वेषादयस्तु चैतन्यस्यैवावस्थाविशेषास्तद्वदेव प्रत्यक्षीभवन्तीति, न तन्निदर्शनेनानुमानोदयः। सुखप्रयुक्तविषयीकारचैतन्यं रागः। तद्विरोधप्रयुक्तविषयीकारं तदेव द्वेषः। भूतदुःखज्ञानेन चेतश्चलनं * शोकः। आगामितज्ज्ञानेन चेतश्चलनं भयम्, इत्यादि लक्षणग्रन्थादेवावगन्तव्यमित्यलं प्रविस्तरेण ॥

एकस्य चात्मनो निरंशस्य‡ न स्वापेक्षया ग्राह्यग्राहकभावः, विरोधादित्यप्युक्तमेव। अंशभेदाश्रयणे तत्सिद्धये चांशान्तरमाश्रयितव्यम्; तथा तत्र तत्रेत्यनवस्था। सङ्घातत्वञ्चात्मनः।

ननु च ग्राहकावभासश्रुत्या स्वसिद्धान्तश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धिभिरभिहित इन्द्रियादि-

Being, in fact, only different states of consciousness, desire, aversion and the like must be perceptible, even as consciousness is; hence, with these as illustrative examples, you cannot advance your argument. Desire is consciousness which is directed towards objects, with a view to obtaining pleasure. The same (consciousness), when directed towards objects with a view to obtaining the opposite of pleasure, is aversion. Sorrow is mental agitation caused by consciousness of past pains. Fear is mental excitement produced by the awareness of pains to come. Since these (i.e., terms, namely, desire, aversion, sorrow and fear) and others like them may be understood even from treatises dealing with definitions, it is needless to discuss them (here) at length.

It has already been shown that, as it involves a contradiction, one and the same self which is partless, cannot possess, in respect of itself, the quality of being at once the perceiver and the perceived. If the distinction of parts (within the self) be admitted, to establish the same, (for each of these parts) other parts would have to be admitted; similarly, for these latter, other parts, and so on *ad infinitum.* Besides, the quality of being a collocation would have to be attributed to the soul.

(Here is yet another attempt to show that the self is open to mental perception). A consciousness, like the following: 'I perceive the pot' posited to exist on the strength of scriptural references to the awareness of the perceiver,[145] by those whose intellect has been blinded by excessive faith in their own system, must be said to exist on some

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* The reading *taccalanam* found in the Chowkamba and Telugu editions is manifestly wrong; it has been altered into *cetaścalanam.* If, however, the original reading must stand, the sentence "bhūtaduḥkhajñānena taccalanam śokaḥ" must come after and not precede the sentence "āgāmitajjñānena cetaścalanam bhayam."

‡*Niraṁkuśasya* is a variant reading. In the context, it makes no sense.

145. cf. tadātmānamevāvet aham Brahmāsmi, *Bṛh. up.* I. iv. 10.

प्रत्यासन्नतत्तत्पदार्थमात्रस्फुरणात् तादृशोऽपि क्वचिदस्तु नाम प्रत्ययः। स त्वागन्तुकात्मप्रतियोगिकप्राकट्यप्रकाशादिपदाभिधेयार्थधर्मानुमितज्ञानविशिष्टमानसप्रत्यक्षसिद्धात्मनिबन्धनः।

उच्यते—अहो खलु स्वानुभव एव विभ्रमः परोक्षकाणाम्, यद्विषयानुभवसमये पूर्वावस्थातो न किञ्चिद्विशेषमयमात्मनोऽवबुध्यत इति। उक्तं ह्येतत्—'ईदृश एवायमर्थः, ज्ञायते न वेति न विद्मः, मम वा प्रतिभासते परस्य वेत्यपि न विद्मः' इति न जातुचिदेव प्रतीतिरस्ति; ज्ञानज्ञात्रोरनवभासे तादृश्यपि प्रतीतिरापद्येतेति। सोऽयं परसञ्चेतितात्स्वसञ्चेतितस्यातिशयस्सर्वत्र परिस्फुरन् असति ग्राहकावभासे नोपपद्येत। अनुमितज्ञानावलम्बनत्वे चाज्ञासिषमित्येव प्रतिभासः स्यात्; न जानामीति। ज्ञानजन्या-

occasions (at least); for, (often) only the several objects which are near the senses are apprehended (and not the self). Such a consciousness pertains to the self which is established by mental perception, and which is associated with a knowledge, whose existence is inferred from the quality found in the object (known)—a quality which is occasional, which is related to the soul, such as, *prākaṭya* and *prakāśa*.[146]

To this it is replied—"It is, indeed, surprising that the confusion—namely, that, in respect of their own experience the self does not notice any difference at the time objects are apprehended—should occur to eminent investigators. It has already been stated (vide p. 30) that the following experience—"This object is really such and such; we do not know whether it is known or not; nor do we know whether it appears to me or to others"—does not exist at any time, and that, when there is no apprehension of knowledge and the knower, such an experience would also have to occur. If there is no apprehension of the knower, the special feature observed everywhere in what is perceived by us rather than in what is perceived by others, cannot be appropriately explained. If the consciousness 'I perceive the pot' has for its object a knowledge which is inferred, then, the experience would only take the form 'I knew' and not 'I know'; for, when there is the observation of the special feature (*prākaṭya*) produced in the object by

146. Briefly stated, this view maintains that on some occasions, at least, we get a consciousness like 'I perceive the pot'; it involves three factors—the 'I,' knoweldge and the pot. Of these, the second is inferred from the illumination (*prākaṭya*) found in the object known; and the third is directly perceived by the outer senses. Regarding the 'I,' as it is beyond the reach of the external senses, and as it has already been shown that it is not open to inference, it must, by a process of elimination, be concluded that it is open to mental perception.

र्थातिशयदर्शनतद्व्याप्त्यनुसन्धानानुमानोदयसमयेऽनुमित्सितज्ञानस्यातिवृत्तत्वात् । ज्ञानानुमानासम्भवः पूर्वमेवोक्तः । मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वञ्चात्मग्राह्यधीनिरस्तम् । तथा सति हि स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयः स्यात् ।

ननु कथमिव ग्राहकानवभासे स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयप्रसङ्गः ? न हि ग्राहकसिद्धिनिबन्धनः स्वपरवेद्यविशेषः । स्वसमवेतविषयबोधजन्मना परसमवेतबोधजन्मना च तद्विशेषोपपत्तेः । स्वपरसम्बन्धिबोधविशेषोदयव्यवस्थापि स्वीयपरकीयेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादिज्ञानहेतुसामग्रीभेदनिबन्धना । न चात्मसिद्धिरपि तत्सामग्र्यनुप्रवेशमर्हति ; इन्द्रियादे-

knowledge, and when its (i.e., of *prākaṭya*) invariable concomitance with knowledge is brought to mind, and when the inference originates, the knowledge which is sought to be inferred must have already disappeared. The impossibility of inferring knowledge has already been pointed out. Besides, the view that the soul is open to mental perception is refuted by the very fact that knowledge (which is said to be inferred) is grasped by the self as belonging to itself. If it be said that knowledge is inferred without any reference to the self, then, between what is known by oneself and what is apprehended by others there would have to be no distinction.[147]

How, it may be asked, could the indistinguishability of what is known by oneself from what is known by others be said to result when there is non-apprehension of the knower ? Indeed, the distinction of what is known by oneself from what is known by others is not dependent on the apprehension of the knower. Their distinction can be rendered intelligible by the fact that the knowledge of objects takes birth as being inherent in oneself or as being inherent in others. This demarcation, too, in the birth of the several items of knowledge of objects which belong to oneself and to others is explainable on the basis of the distinction of the means namely the causes of knowledge, such as, the contact of the senses, belonging to oneself or others, with objects. It cannot be said that the manifestation of the self too deserves to be included among the causes of knowledge ; for, in the manner of the senses and the like, it (i.e., the self) may act as the cause (of know-

147. Every one of the statements made by the opponent is refuted. First, it is shown that the knowledge of 'I' as perceiver cannot be occasional, and that, in fact, all cognitions of objects involve, in addition, the apprehension of the self and knowledge. Next, it is pointed out that knowledge cannot be inferred with the aid of *prākaṭya*. Lastly, the attention of the opponent is drawn to an inconsistency in his argument. He must admit that when knowledge is inferred, it is necessarily inferred as related to the self. Hence, in the very act of inferring knowledge, the self also is apprehended ; and it is futile to talk of the self being open to mental perception.

रिवानवभासमानस्यैव हेतुत्वसम्भवात् । न च विषयबोध एवात्मबोध इति साम्प्रतम् । न ह्यर्थान्तरसिद्धिरर्थान्तरस्य सिद्धिर्भवति ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अपि च यदधीना भावानां रूपभेदव्यवस्था तदपि हि संवेदनं तदानीं निलीनरूपमेव इन्द्रियादिवत् ; कुतस्तु पुनस्तदाश्रयस्यात्मनः प्रतिभासप्रसक्तिः ? यदाहुः—इदमहं जानामीति त्रितयावभासः सार्वत्रिक इति, तदप्यनुभवानारूढमेवानन्तरमेव प्रतिक्षिप्तमिति ।

अस्तु तर्हि ग्राहकतयैव सर्वार्थग्रहणसमयेष्वात्मसिद्धिः । अभ्युपगन्तव्या हि संविदः स्वतःसिद्धिः, सर्वप्रकारसाधनान्तरनिराकरणात् सत्याश्च तस्याः कदाचिदनवभासादर्शनाच्च । यथा च संविदः प्रकाशाव्यभिचारस्तथा प्रपञ्चितं प्रथमाधिकरण इति

ledge) without itself being manifest. It is not right to maintain that the manifestation of the object is itself the manifestation of the self. Indeed, the manifestation of one object cannot be the manifestation of another; for, otherwise, an unwarranted extension of this principle would become possible. Further, at the time objects are presented, even knowledge itself, one on which the very distinction of the respective shapes of objects depends, is altogether hidden from view, even as the senses and the like (remain hidden). (When that is so) where is the possibility for the manifestation of its substrate, the self.[148] Even the contention of some that the threefold manifestation occurs everywhere taking the form 'I know this' does not fit in with experience; and is forthwith refuted.

If that be so[149], let it be granted that the self is manifested as the knower at the time every object is apprehended. The self-luminosity of knowledge has necessarily to be admitted, because, the refutation of the view that knowledge depends for its manifestation on some means other than itself has been effected, in every possible manner; and because when knowledge does exist, it is never noticed to be unmanifest. How knowledge never fails to be manifest has been

148. When objects are known, knowledge which is responsible for bringing to light the respective shapes of objects is not itself revealed; just as when things are perceived, the senses which are the instruments of perception are themselves not cognised. While knowledge itself remains unmanifested, there is absolutely no room for the presentation of its substrate, the self.

149. If the consciousness of the self as the perceiver in every cognition of objects is not necessary for accounting for the distinction between objects known by oneself and those known by others, at any rate, on the ground that knowledge which is self-luminous has the quality of revealing everything, it should be admitted that, when it reveals objects, it manifests the self also.

नात्रोपक्षिप्य प्रतिक्षेप्तव्यम् । सतोऽपि प्रमेयजातस्य स्वापादिसमयेऽनुपलब्धेरभ्युपगतं तत्संविदस्तत्साधकत्वम् । अतः क्लृप्तार्थान्तरसाधनभावया तयैवात्मनोऽपि सिद्धिरभ्युपगन्तुं न्याय्या ।

यत्तु विषयवित्त्युपरमेऽपि स्वापसमयेऽयमात्मा प्रकाशत इति, तदुपपत्तिभिरुपपद्यमानमपि यथाप्रतीति व्यवहरतां न चित्तमनुरञ्जयति ।

अपवृक्तस्य तु ज्ञानं हेत्वभावान्न सम्भवि ।
नित्यत्वे नित्यमुक्तिस्स्यादर्थवादास्तथोक्तयः ॥

निर्धूतनिखिलकरणकलेबरज्ञानकर्मवासनानुबन्धस्यापवृक्तस्य न खलु स्वपरसंवेद-

elaborately dealt with in the *Prathamādhikaraṇa*.[150] Hence, it is needless here to refer to the view (that knowledge depends upon something else for its manifestation) and refute the same. For the reason that during states, such as sleep, even though collections of objects of knowledge exist, there is non-apprehension of the same, it has to be admitted that the capacity to reveal the same belongs to knowledge. Therefore, it is but proper to admit that the manifestation of the self also is effected by knowledge itself, which has definitely been proved to possess the quality of revealing other objects.

(If it be said that the self need not depend on knowledge for its manifestation, for the reason that even in the absence of the latter, the self shines forth, it is thus replied to). The view that even when knowledge of objects is absent in deep sleep the self is revealed may be rendered intelligible by arguments, but (it) does not satisfy the mind of those who think and act in the light of experience. Again, to the released soul knowledge cannot arise, as its causes do not prevail (in that state). If it be contended that the knowledge which obtains in the state of release is eternal, being independent of causal conditions, then, there must be perpetual release; and those scriptural passages (which teach the existence of jñāna in this state) must be considered to be *arthavādas*.[151]

There is no possibility of the occurrence of any cause which could account for the birth of knowledge concerning himself and others to the released soul, who is devoid of all senses, body and contact with

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150. The elaborate treatment of the nature of jñāna set forth in Prathamādhikaraṇa of Nāthamuni's *Nyāya-tattva-śāstra* is, unfortunately, not available. But there are some extracts from this work in Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana*. cf. 'Nyāyatattvetu Prathamādhikaraṇe lakṣaṇāntarāṇi bahūni dūṣayitvā "atyantavegitātyanta saūkṣmyam nirbharatā tathā svasattākāla bhāvyāptiḥ jñāne lakṣma catuṣtayam" iti svoktalakṣaṇopasamhāraḥ kṛtaḥ' Buddhipariccheda, p. 249.

151. Arthavādas are those scriptural passages which do not directly convey positive or negative injunctions; but which, by extolling prescribed or censuring forbidden acts, aim at infusing in the mind of the listener a keen desire to engage in his sacred duties at the earliest opportunity.

नोदयनिबन्धनं किञ्चित्सम्भाव्यते । न च मनसो नित्येन्द्रियत्वेन तत्संयोगादेव तदा ज्ञानं जन्यत इति युक्तम् ; स्वरूपतो गगनवन्नित्यस्यापि सतस्तस्येन्द्रियभावेन ज्ञानोत्पादकत्वस्य धर्माधर्मावरोधनिबन्धनत्वात् ।

धर्माधर्मावरुद्धं सन्मनो ज्ञानस्य साधनम् ।
सति नित्येन्द्रियत्वेऽपि श्रोत्रवत्करणत्वतः ॥

ननु योगजधर्मानुगृहीततत्संयोगस्य साधनत्वम्, 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि' 'तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः' इत्यादिशुक्लेतरसकलकर्मप्रक्षयश्रुतिविरोधात् । धर्मफलत्वे चापवर्गस्य पुनरावृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, 'नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन,' 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते' इत्यादिश्रवणाच्च ।

impressions of knowledge and actions. And, it is not right to maintain that, as the mind (maṇas) is an eternal organ, through its conjunction itself knowledge is caused in that state; for, although, like ether, mind is, in its essential nature, eternal, its being the originator of jñāna by acting as an organ is dependent on its association with merit and demerit.[152] Being associated with merit and demerit, manas acts as the means of knowledge; for, although it is an eternal sense organ, the mind, like the mechanism of hearing, acts as an instrument of knowledge.

Nor is the view tenable—namely, that contact with manas, which is assisted by the merit resulting from concentration, is itself the instrument of knowledge; for, it contradicts scriptural passages which declare that all good and bad deeds perish; for example: "The deeds of this person (i.e., the released soul) perish";[153] "Then, he who knows (Brahman), shaking off good and evil deeds, leaving the spotless. . .".[154] If final release were the result of good deeds, there would be a further return (to the state of bondage). Besides, in view of the following scriptural passages (it is evident that release does not result from deeds). "The uncreated (Puruṣa) cannot be attained by what is created (i.e. deeds).[155] "Hence, just as here the world won by deeds perishes, even so after bodily death, the world won by good deeds perishes."[156]

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152. Even though the organ of hearing is nothing but ether (*ākāśa*) it is only the ether which is limited by the winding walls of the auditory apparatus (*karṇaśaṣkulī*) that can function as a sense-organ and possess the capacity to appreciate sounds. In the same way, though manas is eternal, it can act as the originator of knowledge not always, but only when associated with merit and demerit.

153. *Muṇḍa. up.* II. ii. 8

154. *Muṇḍa. up.* III. i. 3.

155. *Muṇḍa. up.* I. ii. 12.

156. *Chānd. up.* VIII. i. 6.

न चात्मा सत्तयैव तदानीं तज्ज्ञाननिमित्तमिति वाच्यम् ; क्लृप्तत्यागाक्लृप्तकल्पनप्रसक्तेः । तन्मात्रनिमित्तत्वे च सर्वदा आत्मनि स्वरूपवत् * तदपि विद्यत इति संसारानवतारप्रसङ्गात्, बन्धमोक्षावस्थयोरविशेषापत्तेश्च । न च देहेन्द्रियादिप्रतिबद्धतयेदानीं तदभाव इति वाच्यम् । तत्खलु प्रतिबन्धकम्,यत्सति पुष्कलकारणे कार्योदयं निरुणद्धि । न चाद्याप्यात्मनस्तत्पुष्कलकारणत्वं सिद्धम् । शरीरेन्द्रियवतामेव ज्ञानदर्शनात् , क्लृप्तज्ञानकारणभावस्य तस्यैव तद्बन्धकत्ववचनमुन्मत्तवचः । अतो नास्त्यपवर्गदशायां ज्ञानम् । तात्कालिकज्ञानसुखादिवादास्तु आत्मज्ञानविधिशेषतया गुणवादेन नेतव्याः । अतो

Nor can it be contended that in the state of release, the self, by its very existence, acts as the cause of knowledge concerning itself; for, that would involve the rejection of what is well-established and the positing of something unproved. If the very existence of the soul were itself the cause of knowledge, knowledge also would, like the existence of the soul, persist therein at all times; and, as a consequence, the stream of births and deaths would not arise at all; hence, there would be no distinction between the states of bondage and release. It is not helpful to suggest that as knowledge is obstructed by the body, senses and other impediments, it comes to be absent in the state of bondage. Indeed, that must be the obstructing factor which prevents the origin of the effect, even when the entire set of causal conditions is present. So far it has not been proved that the self is the entire cause of jñāna. While the body and senses are well established to be the cause of knowledge, for the reason that the latter is found to arise only to those possessing them, to speak of the very body and senses as constituting an impediment to jñāna is a mad man's assertion. Therefore, jñāna must be said to be absent in the state of release; and the scriptural passages speaking of the existence of jñāna, pleasure and the like as prevailing in that state, must be taken as being auxiliary to the injunction prescribing knowledge of the self,[157] and interpreted in accordance with *gauṇī vṛttī*.[158] Therefore, since there is

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* *Ātmasvarūpavat* is a variant reading.

157. cf. ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ. *Bṛh. up.* VI. v. 6.

158. In the proposition 'Devadatta is a lion,' the term 'lion' cannot, obviously, be understood in a literal sense. The judgment only signifies that Devadatta possesses a strength, ferocity, cruelty and the like which are similar to the corresponding qualities owned by the lion. This interpretation of the word *lion* is in accordance with what is known as *gauṇī vṛtti*. *Gauṇī vṛttī* has been defined by Khaṇḍadeva in his famous *Bhaṭṭadīpikā* and *Kaustubha* thus: 'Svaśakyasamavetavattā gauṇī vṛttiḥ | samavetavatvañca kvacit āropitatvasambandhena kvacit svasamāna jātīyaguṇavattāsambandhena iti bhedaḥ.' Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra*, I. iv. 23 mentions six varieties of gauṇī vṛtti: 'tatsiddhi jāti sārūpya praśaṁsā bhūma liṅgasamavāyā iti guṇāśrayāḥ.'

विषयवित्तिसमय एवात्मसिद्धिनियमाद्यथोक्तनीत्या अर्थवित्तिषु वेदितृतयैवात्मसिद्धिरिति ।

इदमप्यात्मतत्त्वापरिज्ञानोल्लसितपरिमितमतिविकल्पजल्पितमिति न रोचयन्ते त्रय्यन्तविदः । विषयवित्तिर्हि विषयवित्तिरेव, न हि तया आत्मवित्तिः स्वरूपं वा सेद्धुमर्हति ; अतद्विषयत्वात् । यो हि यत्संविद्विषयो न भवति नासौ तया सिद्ध्यति, रूपसंविदेव रसः । अविषयौ च विषयवित्तेर्बुद्धिबोद्धाराविति तावपि न तया सिद्ध्यतः ।

ननु वेद्यस्वभावोऽयं यत्स्वविषयसंविदा सिद्ध्यतीति । वित्तिस्तु वित्तिरेव, वेदिता च वेदितैवेति कुतस्तयोर्वेद्यस्वभावानुप्रवेशः । उक्तं हि तयोर्मानसप्रत्यक्षागोचरत्वमनुमेयत्वासम्भवश्च । कुतस्तर्हि वित्तिसिद्धिः ? । स्वतन्त्रैव स्वयंप्रकाशा हि संवित् ।

मैवम् ; सापि हि विषयवदेवान्यस्यैव प्रकाशमानतया न स्वतः सिद्ध्यति,

invariable presentation of the self at the very time when the knowledge of objects arises, it must be concluded that, in the manner indicated already, the self presents itself as the knower in all knowledge of objects.

Those who have understood the (true import of the) Vedānta do not countenance this view either, as it is the prattle of that form of narrow mind which is the result of ignorance of the true nature of the self. Indeed, the knowledge of objects is no other than the presentation of objects ; and with its aid neither the self, nor its knowledge is capable of being presented ; for, neither of these is the object of the cognition of objects (*viṣayajñāna*). That which is not the object of a given consciousness cannot be presented by that consciousness ; just as taste could not be revealed by the consciousness of colour. Knowledge and knower are not the object of viṣayajñāna ; hence, they too are not manifested by it.

(The opponent may say) the quality, namely, that of being manifested by knowledge concerning itself is the character of objects known ; (and may ask) how can the character of objects known be thrust on knowledge and knower, when knowledge is only knowledge and the knower is only the knower ? It has already been shown that they are not open to mental perception ; and the impossibility of inferring them has also been proved. (It may be asked) If so, how is knowledge manifested ? (The opponent's reply is) it does not depend on anything else ; because consciousness is self-luminous.

(The reply to the above is :) it is not so ; for, consciousness too cannot shine forth by its own aid, since, like objects, it is revealed for

स्वतः सिद्ध्यन्ती च सा किमिति कञ्चिदेव प्रति चकास्ति? न सर्वान्प्रति? तत्समवायादिति चेत्---यत्समवायिनी हि या संवित् तस्यैव सा चकास्ति नेतरस्य तदसमवायादिति---यद्येवम् आश्रितस्तर्हि आत्मसम्बन्धनिबन्धन एव संविदः प्रकाशः, तद्भावाभावानुविधानात् ।

यदुच्यते प्रकाशस्वभावाया एव सत्याः प्रतियोगिविशेषावच्छेदायैव तदपेक्षा, न स्वरूपसिद्धये इति ; कुतः खल्वयं निश्चयः? यदि हि प्रतियोगिनिरपेक्षैव कदाचिदात्मस्वरूपमिव संवित्प्रकाशेत, तत एवमध्यवस्येमापि । न च तथास्ति ; आश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षैव संयोगपुत्रत्वादेरिव तस्याः स्वरूपसत्तेति न पृथक्सिद्ध्युत्प्रेक्षावकाशः ।

सत्यास्संविदः प्रकाशव्यभिचाराभावात् स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः प्रकाश इति चेत् ; सत्याः किं तस्याः आत्मसम्बन्धव्यभिचारोऽस्ति? अपि चैवं सुखदुःखादयोऽपि त्वन्मते स्वतः सिद्धाः स्युः । न हि तेऽपि सन्तो न प्रकाशन्ते ।

some one other than itself. How can self-consciousness, which, on your view is self-luminous, shine forth to some one person only and not to all? It may be argued that because of its inherence in that particular self, (it shines forth to that self only). In other words, that consciousness which is inherent in a given self can manifest itself only to that self and not to others ; for, it is not inherent in the latter. If so, (we reply) it amounts to admitting that the manifestation of consciousness is dependent upon the relation of consciousness to the self ; for, the presence or absence of this manifestation is dependent respectively upon the presence or absence of this relation.

If it be said that while consciousness is, in its essential nature, self-luminous, it still stands in need of this relation for being associated with the different correlates (*pratiyogin*) and not for its own manifestation ; (we ask) how did you arrive at this conclusion ? If at any time consciousness, like the soul, presents itself without depending upon the correlatives, then, we may come to this conclusion ; but such a presentation is not met with. The very existence of consciousness, like that of the quality of being son or conjunction, presupposes a substrate and a correlative ; hence, there is no room for thinking of the manifestation of knowledge apart from these.

If it be maintained that the manifestation of jñāna is dependent upon its very being, for the reason that, as long as it exists, it never fails to present itself ; (we ask) when it exists is its relation with the self absent ? Further, if this were so, even pleasure, pain and the like would, on your view, be self-dependent ; for when they exist, they never fail to be manifested.

अथ अर्थान्तरसाधकतया सर्ववादिसम्मतायाः संविद एव परं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमाश्रितम्, तयैव तथाभूतया तदितरबाह्याभ्यन्तरसकलपदार्थसिद्ध्युपपत्तेः किमनेकस्वयंप्रकाशभावाभ्युपगमेनेति भावः; तथा सति,

सर्वस्यार्थस्य तद्वित्तेः साक्षी सर्वत्र सम्मतः ।
आत्मैवास्तु स्वतःसिद्धः किमनेकैस्तथाविधैः ॥

किञ्च

यो यस्य साक्षी तेनैव तस्य सिद्धिर्न लौकिकी ।
अर्थस्येवार्थवित्तेरप्यात्मा साक्षी हि लक्ष्यते ॥

सन्तु नामार्थवित्तयः स्वतःसिद्धाः, तथापि न ताभिरयमात्मा प्रत्यक्षीभवति; तत्साक्षित्वात् । यत्साक्षी खल्वयं पुरुषः न तेनासौ प्रत्यक्षः; घटसाक्षात्कारीव घटेन । अर्थसंविदां च साक्षात्कारी चेतन इति सोऽपि न ताभिरपरोक्षीभवति ।

सजातीयस्वसाध्यार्थनिरपेक्षात्मसिद्धयः ।
∴ सर्वे पदार्थास्तेनात्मा निरपेक्षस्वसिद्धिकः ॥

If it is your intention to say that the quality of being self-luminous has been admitted to belong only to consciousness, which is accepted by all disputants as being the means for the manifestation of all things other than itself, and if you were to ask where the need is for positing self-luminous entities, when with the aid of such a consciousness alone, the manifestation of all other objects, internal and external, becomes intelligible, (we may as well reply:) Let the self alone which is admitted on all hands to be the witness (sākṣin) of all objects and their cognitions, be considered self-luminous; (and ask you in turn) where is the need for several entities of that description?

Moreover, the view that the revelation of what stands witness to a given entity is effected by that given entity itself is not supported by everyday experience. The soul is, indeed, found to be the witness of the knowledge of objects, even as it is the witness of objects. Let all items of knowledge concerning objects be admitted to be self-established; even then, with their aid, the soul cannot be directly apprehended; for, it is their witness. Indeed, the self cannot be revealed by that for which he stands witness; just as he who witnesses the pot cannot be revealed by the pot. As the conscious entity is the witness of all object-cognitions, it cannot be directly revealed by them.

All objects possess a manifestation concerning themselves, a manifestation which is not dependent on something similar to them or on something manifested by themselves. Hence, the soul owns a manifestation concerning itself—a manifestation which is not dependent

न हि कश्चित्पदार्थः स्वप्रकाशाय स्वसाध्यसाधारणजातीयार्थान्तरापेक्षो ‡दृष्टः। न खलु घटः स्वसिद्धये घटान्तरमपेक्षते, अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमालोकादि। एवमालोकोऽपि प्रकाशमानो नालोकान्तरमपेक्षते; नापि स्वापेक्षप्रकाशं घटादिकमपेक्षते; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमिन्द्रियम्। एवमिन्द्रियमपि नेन्द्रियान्तरम्, स्वापेक्षप्रकाशं आलोकादि घटं वापेक्षते; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं संवेदनम्। एवं संवेदनमपि संविदन्तरं स्वाधीनसिद्धिकमिन्द्रियादिकं वा नापेक्षते स्वसिद्धौ, अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं स्वाश्रयभूतं स्वतन्त्रमात्मानम्, एवमात्माप्यात्मान्तरं स्वाधीनसिद्धि संविदिन्द्रियादिकमपि स्वापरोक्षे नापेक्षते इत्यनन्यापेक्षा ह्यात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः।

तदेवं चित्स्वभावस्य पुंसः स्वाभाविकी चितिः।
नानापदार्थसंसर्गात्तत्तद्वित्तित्व*मश्नुते ॥

(upon something similar to it or on anything revealed by itself). No object is found to depend for its manifestation on some other entity which is similar to itself, or on something which is manifested by that object itself. In fact, the pot does not require for its manifestation some other pot; but it stands in need of light and so on. Likewise, light also, when it shines forth, does not require some other light; nor does it need pot and the like, which depend for their manifestation on light itself; but it stands in need of the sense-organ, an entity which is dissimilar to it. Similarly, the sense-organ also does not require (for its manifestation) light and the like, or the pot, which alike depend on the sense-organ for their manifestation; but it requires consciousness, which is an altogether different type of entity. Similarly, consciousness, in its turn, does not depend (for its manifestation) on some other consciousness; nor on the sense-organ and the like, whose manifestation is dependent on itself; but it requires the self-dependent soul, which is its substrate and which is a different type of entity. In the same manner, the self, in its turn, does not require for its direct presentation some other self; nor does it require consciousness, sense-organ, and the like, whose presentation is dependent upon it. That is why the presentation of the essential nature of the self is not dependent upon anything other than itself.

To the soul which has thus been shown to have consciousness as its essential nature, consciousness must indeed be an invariable attribute. On account of its conjunction with manifold objects, conscious-

‡ The reading *asādhāraṇasajātīyārthāntarāpekṣaḥ* found in the mss. and printed copies makes no sense. Hence the following emendation *svasādhyasādhāraṇajātīyārthāntarāpekṣaḥ* has been suggested.

**tattadvittitvam* is the reading found in some manuscripts. It is preferable to *tattaccittatvam* found in the Cowkamba and Telugu editions.

यथैव खलु सूर्यालोकस्तेन तेनार्थभेदेन संसर्गात्तत्प्रकाशो भवति घटप्रकाशः पटप्रकाश इति, एवमात्मनः प्रकारभूतं चैतन्यं अर्थविशेषसंसर्गात् घटसंवित्पटसंविदित्यादिप्रख्योपाख्ये प्रतिपद्यते। ते च चैतन्यस्य दशाविशेषाश्चेतयितुरात्मनो धर्मविशेषत्वादेव तस्यापरोक्षा भवन्ति, कादाचित्कबोधवादिनामिव बोधस्य विषयभेदावच्छेदादयः।

ननु आत्मनश्चैतन्यमागन्तुकमिति **न्यायवैशेषिका**स्तन्मतोपजीविनश्चा**भिनवमीमांसकाः**; अर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात्, गच्छामि, अगच्छमित्यादिवज्जानामि, अज्ञासिषमित्यादिकालावच्छेदप्रतीतेः, स्वापतुरीयादिदशासु च बोधाधारत्वे सुप्तप्रबुद्धबद्ध-

ness comes to be such and such a knowledge (e.g. knowledge of the pot, knowledge of the cow, and so on). Just as the rays of the sun, by virtue of their contact with several different objects, come to be treated as different illuminations, such as the illumination of the pot, the illumination of the cloth and so on; even so, consciousness which is an attribute of the soul, on account of its contact with diverse objects, acquires different names and comes to be spoken of as being distinct, such as the cognition of the pot, the cognition of the cloth, and so on. And these (different cognitions) are merely the several states of consciousness. As they are, thus, the different attributes of the self, which is a conscious entity, they become perceptible to the self; even as, on the view of those who maintain that consciousness is an occasional attribute of the self, the delimitation of knowledge by the different objects is perceptible to the self.

Those who know the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas and the Neo-Mīmāmsakas who follow their doctrines declare that consciousness is an occasional quality of the soul; because consciousness depends (for its presence or absence) on the presence or absence of such factors, as the contact of the senses with the objects; and because experiences, such as, 'I know,' 'I knew,' are known to be limited by time; and because the distinction between the sleeping person and the person awake, and that between the soul in bondage and the soul released, would disappear, if the soul were regarded as the substrate of consciousness even in states such as, sleep and *turīya*[159]. Further, in respect of con-

159. The psychology of the Upaniṣads mentions four states of the soul—*jāgrat* (waking), *svapna* (dreaming), *suṣupti* (deep sleep) and *turīya*. During the waking state, manas and the outer senses are active. In the dream state, the outer senses are in abeyance, but manas continues to function. In deep sleep, even manas is quiescent. *Turīya* is a transcendental state not to be grasped by the experience of the ordinary man. While it resembles dreamless sleep in so far as there is complete withdrawal of normal consciousness, and the absence of desires, it differs from it in so far as in this state the self reveals itself fully.

मुक्तादिव्यवस्थाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च। नित्यस्य च ज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायिनः प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थापि दुरुपपादैव। तदा हि प्रकाशनशीलतया तस्या एकस्यां संविदि सर्वमेव प्रकाशेत ; न वा किञ्चिदविशेषात्। अन्यदा तु यदर्थसन्निकर्षजुषा इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिना या धीर्जन्यते तदीयैव सेति व्यवस्था युक्तिमती।

स्यान्मतम्—इन्द्रियादिप्रणाडिकया चैतन्यमेव तेन तेनार्थेनानुरज्यमानं तत्प्रकाशतया तदीयत्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते; अनुरागस्य चागन्तुकतया इन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानं कालावच्छेदस्वापादिव्यवस्था चोपपद्यत इति—तदसत्। अर्थान्तरसन्निकर्षेऽर्थान्तरस्यानुरागासम्भवात्। चैतन्यमपि तथा निष्क्रम्य सन्निकृष्यत इति चेन्न; अमूर्तस्याकाशस्येव निष्क्रमणप्रवेशाद्यनुपपत्तेः। गुणश्च चैतन्यं गुणिनमपहाय कथमन्यतो यास्यति। न चार्थोऽन्तः

sciousness which is eternal and which is inherent in the soul, all distinctions based on each object known become unintelligible. Indeed, then (i.e. if consciousness is eternal), as it possesses the nature of manifesting (objects), either all objects will shine forth in one and the same knowledge or none at all, there being no distinguishing feature (favouring one object rather than another). When it is admitted to have a different character (i.e. when it is occasional), the distinction of knowledge (into, knowledge of the pot or knowledge of the cloth) based on this principle, namely, that knowledge which arises from the sense-organ or probans or something similar, coming into contact with a particular object, pertains to that object only—becomes reasonable.

It may be contended that consciousness itself, through the medium of the senses and the like, becomes coloured by different objects, and (thereby) comes to be distinguished into such and such a knowledge pertaining to such and such an object ; and that, as this process of being coloured is accidental, the dependence on the senses, the limitation by time into the past, present, etc., and the distinction of states, such as, sleep and the like become intelligible. This (contention) is erroneous. When one object is near, another (which is not near by) cannot be coloured (by it). If it be said that consciousness itself proceeding outward gets so close a contact (with the object as to be coloured by it), (the reply is :—) not so ; for, in the case of a formless object, such as ether, proceeding outward, entering and the like are impossible. How can consciousness, which is an attribute, depart from the substance wherein it inheres and proceed elsewhere ? Nor does the object enter into (consciousness) ; for the object is perceived by everybody as being

प्रविशति। स हि बहिर्देशसम्बद्धः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः। जात्यादिषु चानुपपत्तिस्तुल्यैव।

अथोच्येत द्वेधा खल्वयं प्रत्यगर्थोऽवतिष्ठते—बहलो विरलश्च। तत्र बहलः प्रत्यक्चेतनक्षेत्रज्ञादिपदपर्याय आत्मा; विरलस्तु चैतन्यज्ञानादिपदाभिधेयः प्रत्यगर्थतन्त्रतया गुण इत्युपचर्यते तेजोवत्, यथा बहलस्तेजः प्रदीपोऽग्निरिति, विरलं तु प्रभा ज्योतिरिति। अतो विरलात्मप्रदेशतया चैतन्यस्यालोकस्येव गमनं संयोगादिकमुपपद्यत इति।

इदमनुपपन्नम्। निरवयवस्यामूर्तस्यासङ्गस्यात्मनो बहलविरलादिधर्मानुपपत्तेः। यदि सावयवत्वमूर्तत्वानित्यत्वसंसर्गित्वादिकमपि धर्मजातमात्मन्यनुमन्वीमहि, तत एवमङ्गीकुर्वीमहि। न च तदनुमन्तुमुचितम्, अचेतनत्वापातादित्यलमनेनार्हतमतानुकारदूषितेनात्मवादेन।

located in the space outside. Besides, in the case of (formless) entities, such as, generality, the same difficulty (i.e. the impossibility of proceeding outward or coming in) holds good.

It may be said that the inward entity, like the luminous substance, exists in two forms, viz., in a dense and in a sparse form; of these the entity in the dense form is the self; and it has the words *pratyak, cetana, kṣetrajña* and the like as its synonyms; but the entity in the sparse form, referred to by the terms *caitanya, jñāna* and the like, is called, by courtesy, a quality, for the reason that it is dependent on the pratyagartha (the inward entity in the dense form); even as the luminous entity in the dense form is termed flame, fire and the like; while the same entity in its sparse form is referred to as *prabhā* (radiance) and *jyotiḥ* (light); proceeding outward and coming into contact would be appropriate in the case of consciousness, as in that of light (*āloka*); for, consciousness is only the sparse region of the self.

But this view is untenable: For, qualities, such as, those of existing in a dense and in a sparse form cannot be attributed to the self, which is without parts, and without forms and which has no contact (with anything else). We could admit the self to exist in such a manner, if we were prepared to admit the following set of qualities, viz., the character of possessing parts, of having forms, of being non-eternal, and of having relations, as belonging to the self. But it is unreasonable to make such an admission; for it would result in reducing the self to a non-intelligent entity. This peculiar theory of the self, which stands condemned for the very reason of its imitating the Ārhata (Jaina) doctrine, need not detain us any further.

अथ मतमात्मा अयमनवयवेन सर्वतः सर्वार्थावभाससमर्थचैतन्यानुबन्धः सर्वव्यापी अथ च न सर्वमस्य परिस्फुरति, तमोगुणप्रतिबन्धात्। सत्त्वोत्कटैस्तु करणैः स्वकस्वकपाटवानुसारेण पाटिते तु तमसि, ते तेऽर्थाः प्रतिभासन्ते। अतोऽन्तरेणापि ज्ञानार्थयोर्निष्क्रमणप्रवेशावुपपद्यत एवार्थविशेषोपरागः संविद इति।

एवमप्यर्थातिशयमात्रहेतुत्वादिन्द्रियलिङ्गादेर्ज्ञानस्येव ज्ञापकत्वं न स्यात्, ज्ञानहेतुत्वाभावात्। न चार्थप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानत्वम्; प्रकाशमानतयार्थस्यापि ज्ञातृत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

यदाहुः—आत्मधर्मस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयेण संयोगो ज्ञानमित्युच्यत इति; तत्रापि संयोगस्योभयनिष्ठतया स एव प्रसङ्गोऽनुभवविरोधश्च; अहमिदमिदानीं जानामि, नेदानीमित्यात्मसमवायिनोरेव ज्ञानभावाभावयोरनुभवात्।

It may be contended that the self is, in its entirety, related to consciousness, which is capable of illuminating all objects and in all ways; that it is all-pervasive, and that although it is of this nature, all objects do not present themselves to it, since there is the obstruction proceeding from the quality of darkness (*tamas*); and that when, with the aid of the sense-organs, wherein the sattva quality predominates, this darkness (tamas) is dispelled in accordance with their different capacities, the respective objects shine forth; and that, thus, without there being any proceeding outward or coming in on the part of consciousness and objects, all reference to knowledge as pertaining to particular objects becomes intelligible.

Even if this were so, the senses and probans (*hetu*), like jñāna, could not be considered the cause of knowledge, for, they are responsible only for helping objects to be illumined (by removing the enveloping tamas), and not for originating knowledge. (It is no escape to say that) the illumination of objects is itself knowledge; since (in that case) the objects also, for the reason of their being illumined would have to be considered the knower.

Even on the view advanced by some that the conjunction of consciousness, which is a quality of the self, with the object is spoken of as knowledge, the same difficulty (the unwelcome result, viz., that the object would have to be considered as the knower) persists, since conjunction exists in both (the self and the object); and, in addition, there is contradiction with experience, since the presence or absence of knowledge is experienced to inhere in the self only (and not in the object), as is evident from the experience 'I know this now,' 'I do not know this now.'

अविकृतप्रकाशहेतुकिरणसंहतावप्यहिममहसि प्रकाशकत्वप्रख्योपाख्यानवदुपपद्यत इति मा वोचः। तत्र हि गभस्तीनां द्रव्यतया अकुञ्चनप्रसारणद्रव्यान्तरसंयोगविभागादेस्सम्भवादुपपद्यते व्यवस्थोपलब्धिः; चैतन्यं तु गुण इति न तथा व्यवस्थामर्हति।

अथोच्येत—द्विधा हि ज्ञानमात्मनः स्वस्मिन्नन्यत्र च। तत्राद्यमुदयास्तमयरहितमात्मस्वरूपप्रयुक्तमनवरतमनुवर्तते, इतरत्तु तत्तदर्थसम्बन्धीन्द्रियाद्यागन्तुकहेतुभेदायत्तात्मलाभं तद्भावाभावानुविधायि तत्तदर्थप्रकाशतयोदीयते लीयते च। तदपेक्षयैव स्वापजागराद्यवस्थाव्यवस्थापि सङ्गंस्यत इति। उच्यते—अभ्युपगच्छेमाप्येवं यदि नित्यमात्मनि ज्ञानमस्तीत्यत्र किमपि साधनमुपलभेमहि।

ननु अङ्गीकृतस्तावज्जाग्रदवस्थायां सर्वदात्मानुभवः स्वापादिषु चानुमीयते;

Do not say that, just as in the case of the sun which is unchanging and which possesses hosts of rays which are responsible for manifesting objects, it is the sun, and not the object, that is considered to be the manifester and called like that, (here also, the reference to the self, and not the object, as the possessor of knowledge becomes intelligible). For, in the case of the sun, since the rays are substances, contraction and expansion, contact with objects and separation therefrom, are possible; and hence, the consideration (of the sun rather than the object) as the manifester is quite intelligible. Consciousness, on the other hand, is a quality; hence, in this case, there is no adequate basis for the consideration of the self, rather than the object, as the knower.

It may be said that the knowledge belonging to the self is twofold—one relating to itself, the other to everything else; and of these, the former is without a beginning and an end, is dependent on the very existence of the self and persists at all times; while the latter, whose very existence is dependent on several occasional factors, such as, the senses which are in contact with the various objects, originates and perishes as the knowledge of such and such an object—a knowledge whose presence or absence is based respectively on the presence or absence of the causal factors. And it is on this basis that even the distinction of states into those of sleeping, waking and the like would be rendered intelligible. To this it is said in reply that we may accept this if we notice any proof for the assertion that knowledge exists in the self eternally.

(One may ask: Does not the following argument prove that consciousness is an eternal and not an occasional property of the soul?) It is admitted on all hands that in the state of waking the consciousness

तात्कालिकस्वविषयज्ञानाभावस्योत्तरोत्तरकालं परामृश्यमानत्वात् । यत्कालीनोऽभावः परामृश्यते तत्कालीनेन तदाश्रयस्वरूपज्ञानेनापि हि भाव्यम्, मध्याह्नकालपरामृश्यमान इव प्रातस्समयपरिदृष्टतटाकतीरादिवर्तिनि कुञ्जराद्यभावे । यत्कालीनाभावाश्रयतया यः परामृश्यते सः तत्कालीनस्वरूपानुभववान्, यथा प्रातरनुभूततटाकतीरादि । स्वापादि कालिकार्थानुभवाभावाश्रयतया चायमात्मा परामृश्यते; अतस्तात्कालिकस्वरूपानुभववानिति।

मैवम् । अनैकान्त्यात्, प्रातस्तत्र नाहमासमिति स्वाभावभूमितया प्रतीतेन

of self always exists; but its existence in states of sleep and the like is inferred, for the non-existence of knowledge of objects in those states is remembered on subsequent occasions. Whenever the non-existence of a thing is remembered as having existed at a given time, there must necessarily have existed at that time a knowledge of its locus, as in the case of the non-existence of the elephant remembered at noon-day as having prevailed in the morning on the bank of a tank or thereabouts witnessed then. That which is known as the locus of the non-existence obtaining at a given time involves knowledge concerning itself at that time; for instance, the bank of the tank or thereabouts perceived in the morning.[160] The self is remembered as the locus of the non-existence of the consciousness of objects—a non-existence which prevailed in the states of deep sleep and the like; hence, at that time (also) it must have possessed knowledge concerning itself.

The reply is 'not so'. For, in the light of instances such as, the hill, tank and the like which were not noticed in the morning by a person, and which are known to be the substrate of his non-existence as

160. It is well known that in the walking state consciousness always exists. If it could be shown that it exists in sleep and other kindred states also, it would follow that consciousness is an eternal quality of the soul. For this purpose, the following analogy is employed. Just as when a person remembers at noon-day that there was no elephant at the tank in the morning, he must have noticed in the morning the tank which is the locus of the non-existence of the elephant. Even so when a person remembers on walking that he had no cognition of objects at the time of sleep, he must necessarily have known, in the state of sleep, the self which is the locus of the non-existence of the cognition of objects. Thus, it is to be concluded that even in the states of sleep, swoon and the like, there is consciousness In other words, consciousness is an eternal property of the soul.

प्रातरनवगतगिरितटाकादिना। अभावप्रतिपत्तिसमये प्रतिपित्सिताभावसमकालवर्तिनस्तदाश्रयस्वरूपस्यावगत्या, विद्यमानत्वे तत्कालतयावगमप्राप्तस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽनवगत्या च भवितव्यमभावज्ञानस्येत्येतावत्। अन्तरेणापि स्वापकालीनमात्मानुभवमिह तदुभयमुपपद्यते; प्रत्यभिज्ञयैव प्रबोधे स्वरूपसिद्धेः, जाग्रदनुभवस्येव पटीयसः स्वापेऽपि सतोऽनुभवस्य स्मर्तव्यस्य सतस्तदानीमस्मरणाच्च।

'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इत्यादिवृत्तयश्च तात्कालिकदेहेन्द्रियलाघवपाटवादिपर्यालोचनपूर्विकाः न स्मृतयः जातिवेषसंस्थानादिष्विव। तेऽपि हि परामृश्यन्ते, 'एवंजाती-

is evident from his experience 'I was not present there in the morning,' it is clear that your reason is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*. For the cognition of non-existence two conditions would suffice, namely, (i) at the time of the cognition of non-existence, there must be knowledge of its locus—a locus which exists simultaneously with the non-existence which is sought to be apprehended, and (ii) the absence of the knowledge of the pratiyogin (counter-correlative)—which, had it existed, must surely have been grasped as having existed at that time. Here, even without there being any self-consciousness at the time of sleep, those two conditions may possibly exist; for, at the time of waking, there is the knowledge of the locus (i.e., the self), as is evident from remembrance; and in the waking state, there is no remembrance of the experience existing at the time of sleep also—an experience, which is as clear and distinct as waking experience and which is capable of being remembered (if only it existed).[161]

It cannot be said that experiences, such as 'I slept well,' prove the presence of the cognition of 'I', in the state of sleep; for, experiences such as 'I slept well' (found in the waking state) are based on the consideration of the then existing brightness and briskness of the body and senses; and are not remembrances (of what took place in sleep); even as knowledge of caste, dress, configuration and the like is not remembrance. (It cannot be maintained that caste and the like are not experienced, while the 'I' is experienced). They too are cer-

161. The foregoing analogy is shown to be unsound. To be able to say at noon-day that there was no elephant in the morning at the tank, a person need not have noticed the tank in the morning. It is enough if he has a knowledge of the tank at noon-day, and if there is no knowledge of the elephant, which, if it had existed, would surely have been known. Similarly, in order to state that there was no consciousness during sleep, it is enough if the person has a knowledge of the self at the time of waking, and if there is the absence of the cognition of objects.

योऽहमीदृशेन वेषेणानेन संस्थानेनात्र इयन्तं कालमस्वाप्सम्' इति ।

अपि च स्मृतित्वेऽपि जाग्रदवस्थायामिव निद्रालक्षणया प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवृत्त्यभावकारणतमोगुणालम्बनया प्रतीत्या तत्कालप्रसिद्धस्यात्मनः स्मरणम् ; न तु सहजसंवेदनसिद्धस्य स्वप्रकाशस्य वा, प्रमाणाभावात् । निद्रापि प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवत् वृत्तिविशेष इति तत्रभवान् **पतञ्जलिः** । यदाह—' अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा ' इति ।

प्रयोगश्च—विमत्याक्रान्तात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः विषयानुभवनिबन्धना, आत्मस्वरू

tainly experienced thus: "I belonging to this caste, slept here so long, in such and such a dress, in such and such a form."[162]

Moreover, even if the cognition 'I slept well' were admitted to be a recollection, the remembrance of 'I' pertains only to the self which is known at the time of sleep to be in association with the *vṛtti*, known as *nidrā*—a *vṛtti* based on the quality of *tamas* (darkness) which makes for the absence of other *vṛttis*, like *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*—even as it is known in the waking state to be in association with some vṛtti or other; it does not pertain to either the self which manifests itself (*svaprakāśa*) or to that which shines forth with the aid of a knowledge which is its innate quality; as there is no warrant (for stating that it refers to either of these). The revered Patañjali thinks that *nidrā* (sleep) also, like *pramāṇa viparyaya* and so on, is a form of *vṛtti*.[163] He says, "*Nidrā* (sleep) is the *vṛtti* which has for its object tamas, which is the cause of the non-existence of other *vṛttis*, (like waking and dreaming.")[164]

The same may be expressed in syllogistic form.—The knowledge of the self—the matter under dispute—is dependent upon the cognition of objects, because it is knowledge of the self, like the knowledge of self

162. Even those who think that the self is cognised in deep sleep admit that its caste, dress and the like are not cognised then, but are apprehended from a consideration of the state of the person on waking. Similarly, it could be said that the cognition 'I slept soundly' does not point to a knowledge existing at the time of sleep, but is based on a consideration of the condition of the body, senses, etc., at the time of waking.

163. *Vyāsa Bhāṣya* on *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10 and Vācaspati Miśra's ṭīkā thereon deal with the question whether *nidrā* must rank as a *vṛtti* alongside of *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*.

164. Pātañjala *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10. The translation of this sūtra is based on Vācaspati Miśra's ṭīkā. See also Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's *Yoga-Sūtra-Vṛtti*.

पसिद्धित्वात्, जाग्रतस्तत्सिद्धिवत् इति । तथा आगन्तुकं ज्ञानं, आत्मविशेषगुणत्वात्, सुखादिवत् । न च सुखदुःखादयो नात्मगुणाः; अप्रसिद्धाश्रयान्तरत्वे सति अहम्प्रत्यय-सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रकाशमानत्वात्, ज्ञानवदिति ।

अत्राहुरात्मतत्त्वज्ञाः स्वतश्चैतन्यमात्मनः ।
स्वरूपोपाधिधर्मत्वात्प्रकाश इव तेजसः ॥
चैतन्याश्रयतां मुक्त्वा स्वरूपं नान्यदात्मनः ।
यद्धि चैतन्यरहितं न तदात्मा घटादिवत् ॥
चितिशक्त्या न चात्मत्वं मुक्तौ नाशप्रसङ्गतः ।

बुद्धिसुखदुःखादिनिश्शेषवैशेषिकात्मगुणात्यन्तिकोपरमलक्षणो हि मोक्षः कणभक्षाक्षचरणमते । न चात्यन्तलुप्तकार्यं वस्तु तत्कार्यजननशक्तमित्यत्र किञ्चित्प्रमाणं क्रमते ।

found in one who is awake.[165] Knowledge is an occasional quality; for it is a specific quality of the self, like pleasure and so on. It cannot be maintained that pleasure, pain and the like are not the qualities of the self; for, while they are not known to have any other basis, they shine forth as residing in the same substrate wherein self-consciousness resides; as knowledge and the like (which are not known to have any other substrate than the self and which are known to dwell in the self (e.g., we may say 'I am happy').

Those who have understood the true nature of the soul declare that consciousness is an innate quality of the soul; for, it is a quality dependent on the soul itself; just as illumination is an innate quality of light. Apart from being the substrate of consciousness, the self has no other form. That which is devoid of consciousness cannot be the soul, as in the case of the pot and the like. It cannot be said that the soul becomes a soul by virtue of its capacity to know; for, (if that were so) in the state of release, it would have to perish. For in the systems of Kaṇāda and Gautama release consists in the total annihilation of all special qualities of the soul, such as, intelligence, pleasure and pain. There is no warrant to declare that a substance, which altogether fails to produce its effect, possesses the capacity of producing it.

165. Just as the consciousness of the self found in waking is dependent upon the cognition of objects, even so, in sleep also the consciousness of self must depend on the cognition of objects. But as there is no knowledge of objects then, there cannot be consciousness of the self.

देहादिविशिष्टसम्बन्धितया दृश्यमानसुखदुःखज्ञानादिकार्यं विशिष्टवर्तिनीमेवात्मोत्पादशक्तिं कल्पयति धूम इवार्द्रेन्धनसम्बन्धिनि धूमध्वजे स्वोत्पादनसामर्थ्यम्, व्रीह्यङ्कुर इव च सतुषतण्डुले। अपि च बोधे सत्येवात्मनोऽनात्मव्यवच्छेदे सम्भवति कृतं तच्छक्त्याश्रयणेन।

न चैवं सति बोध एव परमात्मेति युक्तम्; तस्याश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षस्वरूपत्वात्, आत्मनश्च तद्विपरीतस्वभावत्वात्; साक्षाच्च चेतयितुरहमर्थस्य स्फुरणात्, अनुभवतर्कागमबलेन चितिमत आत्मभावस्यानन्तरमेव प्रपञ्चितत्वाच्च।

न च चितिमात्रात्मवादेऽपि तस्यागन्तुकविषयसम्बन्धे बोधत्वमध्यारोप्य बोद्धृत्वसमर्थनं साधीयः; सम्बन्धस्योभयनिष्ठतया अर्थस्यापि बोद्धृत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

Effects, such as, knowledge of pleasure and pain, which are found to be associated with one connected with a body, will lead to the conclusion that the potency to produce them resides only in the self thus qualified; even as smoke will only point to the fact that the capacity to produce it resides in the fire associated with wet fuel; or as paddy-sprout leads to the inference that the capacity to produce it resides only in the rice associated with the husk. Further, when it is possible to differentiate the soul from the non-soul with the aid of the presence of consciousness alone, it is unnecessary to posit the potency to know.

It is not right to maintain that consciousness itself is the self; because the nature of consciousness is to depend upon a substrate and a correlative, while the self has an opposite character; and because the self, the knower, unlike consciousness, shines forth directly; and because, on the strength of every-day experience, reasoning (*tarka*) and scriptural testimony, it has already been shown at great length that the quality of being the self belongs only to that entity which is endowed with knowledge.

Even on the doctrine that consciousness itself becomes the soul, owing to the erroneous superimposition of the quality of knowledge on its accidental relation with objects, it is unreasonable to contend that consciousness itself (which possesses this relation) may (as a consequence of this illegitimate transference) be justifiably treated as the knower. For, inasmuch as the relation dwells in both the relata, the object too would have to be regarded as knower.

न च कार्यकारणभाववद्व्यवस्थितत्वम् । तत्र जनिमतो जनयितुश्च परस्परापेक्षा-नियमलक्षणसम्बन्धः । इहापि स एवेति चेन्न; अपेक्षाहेत्वभावात् । किमर्थमर्थश्चै-तन्यमपेक्षते, चैतन्यं वार्थम् ?

सिद्ध्यर्थमिति चेत्, कः सिद्ध्यर्थः ? न तावदुत्पत्तिः; तस्या निर्ज्ञातनिमित्तान्तर-त्वात् । घटादयो हि प्रसिद्धमृद्दण्डचक्रभ्रमणादिपर्याप्तनिमित्तान्तरशालिनो न चितिमपि निजजननेऽपेक्षन्ते । निरस्तश्च विज्ञानमात्रवादः । नित्यस्यात्मन उत्पत्त्यर्थमर्थापेक्षेति सुव्याहृतम् ॥

सिद्धिः प्रकाश इति चेत्, किं भो आत्मा स्वयंज्योतिरप्यर्थाधीनप्रकाशः, यदसौ तदर्थमर्थमपेक्षते ? महनीयमिदमात्मवेदित्वम् ।

It is not right to suggest that, though the relation is found in both the relata, the quality of being the knower is definitely attributed to only one specified member of the relata (i.e. consciousness), just as in the case of the relation of cause and effect (where, while the causal relation resides in both, only one specified member of the relata is taken to be the cause, and the other to be the effect). For there (i.e. in the case of cause and effect) the relation is in the form of invariable mutual dependence of the producer and the produced. If it be said that here also the same mutual dependence prevails, (we reply) not so. For (in the present case) there is no occasion for mutual dependence. Why (we ask) does the object stand in need of consciousness? And why, again, does consciousness require the object?

If you were to reply, (that this dependence is) for the purpose of *siddhi,* (we ask) what is meant by *siddhi?* It cannot denote origination; for origination is well-known to depend on other causes. Indeed, pots and the like have for their causes other well-known factors, which are complete in themselves, such as, clay, staff, the rotation of the wheel, etc.; (hence) they do not require for their origination consciousness also. (If it be said that the so-called factors are in reality only consciousness, and hence, objects such as, pots and the like, really depend on consciousness itself, it may be replied that) the doctrine that things are nothing but thoughts (*vijñāna*) has already been refuted. To maintain that the soul which is eternal depends upon objects for its origination would, indeed, be ridiculous.

If you were to say that *siddhi* denotes manifestation, (we ask) 'Well sir! do you then contend that because it depends on objects for its manifestation, the soul, though self-luminous, possesses a manifestation which is dependent on objects? Your understanding of the nature of the soul would, indeed be praiseworthy!'

प्रकाशश्च न संविदतिरेकी कश्चिदर्थधर्मस्सम्भवतीत्यावेदितम् ॥

सम्भवन्नप्यसौ न चितिस्वरूपमात्रनिमित्तः ; सर्वदा सर्वार्थप्रकाशप्रसङ्गात् । न हि सदा सन्निहितसमग्रकारणं कार्यं कदाचिद्भवति । आगन्तुकातिशयाश्रयणे वा नामान्तरेण ज्ञानमेवाङ्गीकृतमिति तद्वानेवायमात्मा आयातः ॥

नन्वेवमर्थसिद्धिव्यवस्थापकतया अभ्युपगतं ज्ञानमागन्तुकं क्रियारूपमिति कथं तदात्मस्वभावः ? तथाहि—अर्थान्तरगतत्वे सति जनकद्रव्यान्तरं प्रति कार्यत्वादिकेन रूपेणासाधारणो गन्तव्यदेशप्राप्त्यादिर्यं प्रत्यसाधारणः, तत्समवेतागन्तुकासाधारणगमनादिक्रियाजन्यो दृष्टः । तादृशी चार्थसिद्धिर्यं पुरुषं प्रत्यसाधारणी तत्समवेततादृशक्रियाजन्येति शक्यमनुमातुम् ॥

(Nor could the object depend on consciousness for its manifestation; for) it has already been shown that manifestation cannot be a quality different from consciousness and residing in objects.

Even if it were a quality different from consciousness, it cannot be said to be dependent on consciousness alone; for (in that event) there would be the manifestation of all objects at all times. Indeed, all the causal factors being present at all times, the effect could not arise on some occasions only (i.e., since consciousness which is the cause of manifestation is eternal, the manifestation cannot be occasional). If the specific quality (known as manifestation) were treated as an occasional property, then, it would amount to (your) admitting consciousness itself under a different name. Thus, the conclusion is inevitable that the soul is the possessor of consciousness, and not mere consciousness.

(The objector may ask) since knowledge, which has been admitted to account for the manifestation of different objects at different times, is occasional and is of the nature of a process or activity, how can it be treated as an essential quality of the self ? To make the matter clear:— When results, such as, reaching a certain destination, reside in some objects (e.g. the places reached), they are peculiar to others (e.g. Devadatta) who are responsible for these (results) in so far as these are effects; such results are found to be produced by activities, like proceeding and so on, which are occasional, peculiar and inherent in those to whom the said results are peculiar. Hence, it is but right to infer that the manifestation of objects which resembles these (i.e. reaching the destination and the like) is produced by an activity, which is similar to the activities mentioned before and which is inherent in that person to whom the manifestation is peculiar.

मैवम्; अक्रियाजन्येनाभावप्राप्तक्षेत्रादिस्वत्वेन क्षेत्रिणं प्रत्यसाधारणेन क्षेत्रजव्रीह्यादिस्वत्वेन चानैकान्त्यात्। न च निर्व्यापारतया क्षेत्रिणस्तत्राजनकत्वम्; व्यापारकालादिना व्यभिचारात्, तद्भावभावित्वस्य चाविशेषात्। तज्जीवनमेव तत्र जनकव्यापार इति चेत्,

It is not so; for, in view of the fact that the ownership of land and the like is acquired on account of the mere absence of heirs[166] and not in virtue of any activity (on the part of the owner), and in view of the fact that the ownership of paddy and other grains grown in the field—an ownership which is peculiar to the person to whom the field belongs—is not acquired through any activity, (the aforesaid *hetu*) may be said to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣa*. (In order to escape this fallacy it may be suggested that) the owner of the land is not the cause of his ownership in as much as he is devoid of activity;[167] (but this suggestion) is rendered fallacious by instances, such as activity and time (which, though devoid of activity, are still considered to be causal factors). The statement that when they (i.e. time, activity and the like) exist, the effects follow, (and hence they are considered to be causal factors) is equally applicable to the case of ownership.[168] If it be said that the activity which is responsible for ownership is, indeed, the activity involved in being alive, (we ask) "My dear sir, as this activity is responsible in common with this for taking care of the crops and the like also, how can you maintain that ownership is brought on by a peculiar activity on the part of the owner?"

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166. It is likely that *abhāvaprāpta* . . . is a haplographical error for *nābhibhāvaprāpta* . . . As the expression *nābhibhāva* is used in the Dharma śāstras in the sense of relationship, the text as emended, would mean 'on account of the mere fact of a person being a near kinsman.'

167. To prove that consciousness is an occasional property of the soul, the opponent advances the following argument:—Any result which, while remaining in one object, is peculiar to another causal substance, must be produced by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in that causal substance. Manifestation, while remaining in pots and the like, is peculiar to the knower (e.g. Devadatta); therefore it must be caused by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in the knower. As this activity goes by the name of knowledge, it follows that knowledge is an occasional quality of the knower.

The *anekānta doṣa* vitiating this argument is exposed by citing the case of ownership, where the *hetu* is present, while the *sādhya* is absent. Though ownership is peculiar to the causal substance, namely, the owner, it need not be produced by any activity on his part.

The opponent may try to escape the fallacy by suggesting that in the instance cited the *hetu* is absent together with the *sādhya*. In other words, he may say that as the owner is not a causal factor at all, ownership cannot be taken to reside in a causal substance.

168. In other words, when the owner exists, his ownership does follow. Hence, though devoid of activity, the owner is certainly a causal factor in respect of his ownership.

ननु तच्छस्यपालनादिसाधारणमिति कथमसाधारणक्रियाजन्यत्वम् ॥

अपि चैवं सति तदेवार्थप्रकाशेऽपि जनकव्यापारोऽस्तु, किमक्लृप्तकल्पनया ? सत्यपि तस्मिन्नर्थो न प्रकाशत इति चेत्, स्वत्वं वा किं यथोदितं सति जीवने जायत एव ? व्रीह्यादिसत्ताप्यपेक्ष्यत इति चेत्, इहापीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिरिति समानश्चर्चः । अतो यं प्रत्यसाधारणो यथोदितधर्मस्तदीयासाधारणधर्मनिमित्त इत्येतावत् । स चेष्यत एवात्मनश्चैतन्यं रवेरिव तेजस्वित्वम् ।

न च हेतुभेदानुविधायितया 'जानामि' 'अज्ञासिषं' इत्यादि कालावच्छेदप्रतीतेर्गमनादेरिव ज्ञानस्यागन्तुकत्वमनुमेयम्; आदित्यप्रकाशेनानैकान्त्यात् । अस्ति हि तत्रापि 'इमं देशमादित्यः प्रकाशयति, प्राचीकशत्प्रकाशयिष्यति' इति प्रतीतिः ॥

Further, even if being alive were admitted to be a peculiar quality, it might as well be the activity responsible for the manifestation of objects also. Where is the point in positing something unproved ? If it be said that although there is life no object is (sometimes) manifested (and hence, life is not responsible for the manifestation of objects, we ask you in reply) 'Does the aforesaid ownership follow whenever life exists ?'[169] If it be said that the existence of grains, such as, paddy, is also required, (we reply) that here also (i.e. in the case of the manifestation of objects) contact with the senses and the like is required. Thus, in either case the difficulty that may be raised and the explanation offered are similar. Therefore, only this much (can be said) :—the aforesaid quality which is peculiar to a given person has for its cause a special attribute belonging to that person ; and (in conformity with this principle) the fact that the special attribute responsible for the manifestation of objects is consciousness, which belongs to the self even as light belongs to the sun, is acceptable to us.

It is not right to say that, like the act of going, knowledge may be inferred to be occasional, for the reason that there arise cognitions—such as, 'I knew,' 'I know'—which, on account of the fact that they are dependent on several causes, are found to be limited by time. For the instance of the sun's light renders this argument liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa.* Indeed, here also, there are the cognitions 'The sun illumines this place,' 'The sun illumined it' and 'The sun will illumine it.'[170]

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169. A person may live and still have no ownership, if the thing owned is either lost or given away to another.

170. Thus even though light is an essential property of the sun, it appears limited by time. Even so, consciousness, though an essential property of the self, may still be limited by time.

स्वारसिकत्वेऽप्यादित्यप्रकाशस्य प्रकाश्यदेशसम्बन्धकादाचित्कतया अवच्छेदप्रतीतिरुपपद्यत इति चेत्, इहापि तर्हीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिसमासादितयोग्यभावोऽनुभाव्यभेदः स्वाभाविकमात्मनश्चैतन्यगुणमवच्छिनत्तीति तदपेक्षयैवेन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानमतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नत्वप्रत्ययप्रयोगौ चोपपद्यन्ते ।

कथं पुनरत्र निर्णयः द्युमणिमणिप्रकाशादेरिवौपाधिकोऽयं भेदः, न तु गमनपचनादेरिव स्वाभाविक इति? ताद्रूप्येणैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । न हि जातु चिदचिद्रूपोऽयमात्मा लोष्टादिवद्दृष्टचरः । यश्च यद्गुणतयैव साक्षाद्भवति स तत्स्वभावः, मरुदिव स्पर्शगुणतयैवाध्यक्ष्यमाणः । यो यत्स्वभावो न भवति, स तद्विरहेणापि स्वरूपत उपलभ्यते, गमनादिरहिततयेव देवदत्तादिः ।

If it be suggested that even though the light of the sun is its essential quality, the cognition limited by time may be justified on the ground that its contact with the region to be illumined is occasional, it may be replied that here also the various objects cognised, which acquire the capacity (to limit knowledge) from their contact with the senses, limit the quality of knowledge which is an essential property of the self; and it is for this reason that the following become intelligible :— the dependence on the senses and the like, cognitions limited by time into the past, the future and the present and all references to the same.

(The opponent may ask) how can it be determined that in this case the distinction of knowledge (implied in the cognitions—'I knew,' 'I know' and 'I will know'), like the distinction of the light of the sun or that of the precious stone, is dependent upon limiting conditions, and that, unlike the distinction between the activity of going and cooking, it is not based on the essential nature (of knowledge itself)? (We reply) the soul is, certainly, perceived as having that nature (i.e. as having consciousness for its essential quality). Indeed, unlike the clod of earth, the soul is never found to be of a non-sentient nature. That which is perceived as having a certain quality necessarily possesses it as its essential nature, even as air, which is perceived to possess the quality of (*sparśa*) touch, (owns it as its essential quality). That which does not possess a certain quality as its essential nature may also be perceived in itself, bereft of that quality, just as persons like Devadatta are perceived even without the activities of proceeding and the like, (which do not form part of their essential nature).

शरीरवदिति चेन्न, असिद्धत्वात् । स्यादेतत्—यथैव खल्वस्वभावभूतेनापि शरीरेण सध्रीचीन एवायं चेतनश्चकास्ति, तथा चैतन्येनापीति । तन्नैवम्; असिद्धत्वात् । न हि तनुविशिष्टतयैवायं चेतनः परिस्फुरति ; योगिनां प्रणिहितमनसामुपरतबहिरिन्द्रियाणां च देहानुसन्धानविरहेणाप्यहमिति स्फुटमनुभवात् । जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरवर्णसन्निवेशनिर्भासशून्यतया तत्त्वान्तरगोचर इति च प्रागेवावोचम् । कर्मानुगुण्येन सुरमनुजादिजातीयतया भिद्यमानास्वागमापायिनीषु तनुषु मनस इवैकस्य वर्ष्मणः स्वभावानुबन्धित्वेनाश्रयितुमशक्यत्वात् । लिङ्गस्य पुनरनुवृत्तावप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न व्यभिचारित्वम् ।

बोधस्वाभाव्ये पुंसः स्वापमूर्छयोः प्रकाशप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न ; विकल्पासहत्वात् ।

If it be said that consciousness is like the body (in being invariably manifested, though only an accidental possession), (we reply) not so; for (what is said with regard to the body) itself stands in need of proof. In other words, you may contend that just as the conscious entity shines forth as being invariably associated with the body, even though the latter is not its essential nature, it always shines forth along with consciousness also (even though the latter is not its essential property). (Our reply is) it is not so; for what is said of the analogous instance requires proof. Indeed, the conscious entity does not shine forth only as being associated with the body; for to the adepts in yoga whose minds are concentrated and whose external senses have become quiescent the conscious entity clearly shines forth as the 'I,' without there being any thought of the body. I have already stated that the cognition 'I know,' being devoid of the apprehension of the complexion and configuration of the body, must have something other than the body for its object. Further, when bodies become differentiated into several classes, such as, devas and men, in accordance with past deeds, and when they appear and disappear, it is not possible to maintain that a given body, unlike the manas, forms part of the essential nature (of the soul). Although there is the continuity of the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*), the charge of *vyabhicāra* cannot be levelled against the argument, as it is not perceived.[171]

Should it be said that if consciousness is an essential attribute of the soul, it should be manifested in the states of sleep and swoon, (we reply) 'not so'; for none of the possible interpretations of this state-

171. The gross body may appear and disappear and thus may not accompany the soul at all times; but the subtle body, at any rate, being continuous, may accompany the soul at all times and may thus be said to nullify the statement that the soul does not always shine forth along with the body. To this the reply is that as the *liṅgaśarīra* is not open to perception, it cannot be stated that the soul shines invariably along with the *liṅgaśarīra*.

तथाहि—प्रकाश इति पदार्थमात्रसाधारणं बोधजन्यं प्रकटतादिपदपर्यायं धर्ममभिप्रेत्य वायं प्रसङ्गः, अथ बोधमेव, तदविप्रकर्षं *वा ? आद्ये तदभावादेव न प्रसङ्गः। अभावश्च प्रकटित एव संवित्स्वतस्सिद्धिसमर्थनसमये। भावेऽपि तमःप्रतिबन्धादप्यनुदयस्सम्भवी। इतरयोरभिमतमेवापादितमित्यदोषोद्भावनम्। बोधस्वाभाव्ये हि पुरुषस्य स्वापादिदशासु च तथाभावोऽभिमत एवेति, न हि तदापादनं दोषाय॥

अथ मतं स्वापादावपि स्वानुभवसद्भावे जागर इव व्यवहारप्रसङ्ग इति। मैवम्; व्यवहारागोचरत्वात्। कः खल्वात्मनि व्यवहारः ? न ह्यसावादातुं हातुमुपेक्षितुं वा शक्यः। व्याहारः‡ प्रसज्यत इति चेत्; किमङ्ग निर्विकल्पबालमूकादिवेदनविषयो व्याहि-

ment will stand scrutiny. To make the matter clear:—When this unwelcome position is said to result, do you mean by *prakāśa,* (1) the quality which is commonly present in all objects and which is generated by jñāna and which has for its synonyms terms *prakaṭatā* and the like, or (2) knowledge itself, or (3) the proximity of knowledge? On the first alternative, there is no room for this unwelcome position at all, because no such quality (known as *prākaṭya*) exists. The non-existence of *prākaṭya* has already been clearly indicated while establishing the self-luminosity of consciousness. And even if it were to exist, its non-origination might as well result from the obstructing factor, namely, *tamas* (darkness). On the other two alternatives, as what has been said is acceptable to me, no defect in my contention has been brought to light. Indeed, when the puruṣa possesses consciousness as his essential nature, his possessing knowledge even in the state of sleep is acceptable to us; hence, to suggest this as a defect in our contention is no charge at all.

If you were to contend that, in case consciousness of oneself were admitted in states of sleep and the like, there would result the prevalence of everyday activities in these states, as in that of waking, (we reply) 'not so'. For the soul is not the object (*viṣaya*) of any activity. What is the nature of the activity in regard to the soul (which, you think, would result)? Indeed, the soul is incapable of being lifted or cast away or treated with indifference. If it is suggested that there would have to prevail discussion concerning the soul, (we ask) "Dear Sir, is the object of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) knowledge or that of the knowledge of children, dumb persons and others like them ever discussed (by them)?" If it is argued that the non-

* The Benares and Telugu editions read *tadviprakarṣam;* and the Telugu edition refers in a foot-note to a variant reading *tadaviprakarṣam.* In fact, the reading suggested—*tadaviprakarṣam*—is correct.

‡ From the context it is clear that *vyāhāra* is preferable to the variant reading, *vyavahāra.*

यत एव? करणपाटवव्यवजिहीर्षादिसहकारिविरहात्तत्र व्याहारानुदय इति चेत्, समानोऽयं विधिरितरत्रापीति निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ॥

स्मृतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न ; अवृत्तित्वात् । यद्युच्येत मूर्छादावात्मानुभवाभ्युपगमेऽर्थान्तरानुभव इव 'एवमहमन्वभूवम्' इति परस्तात्स्मृतिः प्रसज्यत इति, तन्न ; अवृत्तित्वात् । न हि मूर्छा प्रस्वापो वा बुद्धिवृत्तिविशेषः दर्शनस्पर्शनादिवत्, येन स्मृतिबीजं संस्कारमादधीयाताम् । किन्तूद्भूतेन तमसोपरतव्यापारेषु करणेषु निर्वृत्तिकसांसिद्धिकबोधस्वरूपेणावस्थानमात्रमात्मनः ॥

न च बोधस्वभावत्वादेवास्य संस्काराधायकत्वम् ; अनवरतोपचीयमानसंस्कारतया अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् । अनुभवे च स्वानुरूपसंस्काराधाननिरुद्धे सदृशसम्बन्धिदर्शनादि-

origination of discussion in regard to these cases is due to the absence of auxiliary causes, such as, the efficient condition of the senses, the desire for discussion and the like, (our reply is) as this type of explanation is equally applicable to the other case also, you are addressing your query to the person who cannot be questioned.[172]

If you were to say that remembrance would have to occur, (we reply) 'not so'; for the states of sleep and swoon are not forms of experience (*vṛtti*). To explain:—Should it be stated that knowledge of the self exists in the state of swoon or the like, there would have to occur at a subsequent time remembrance (of the self) taking the form 'I experienced it thus,' as in the case of knowledge of other objects, (the reply is) 'not so.' For swoon and the like are not experiences (*vṛtti*). Indeed, swoon and sleep, unlike the acts of seeing and touching, are not particular modifications (*vṛttis*) of the intellect. If they were such modifications, they would give rise to impressions (*samskāras*) which are responsible for remembrance. But, really, swoon and sleep are nothing but the very existence of the soul in its essential nature of jñāna, devoid of modifications (*vṛtti*), when the senses have been withdrawn from their activities on account of the quality of darkness (*tamas*) which is in the ascendent.

It cannot be said that, for the very reason of its having jñāna as its nature, the soul can itself generate the impressions; for, as the soul would then possess incessantly accumulating impressions (*samskāras*), release would for ever become impossible. When an experience has served its purpose by leaving behind impressions appropriate to itself,

172. Compare-Yaścobhayossamo doṣaḥ Parihāropi vā samaḥ | Naikaḥ paryanuyoktavyaḥ Tādṛgarthavicāraṇe ||
When an identical difficulty is encountered by both the rival disputants and when it could be met by either in the same way, it is not open to one of them to level that difficulty as a charge against the other.

समुद्बोधितनिजबीजानुसारेण स्मरणमुपजायते । न चेहात्मस्वरूपबोधस्य जातु चिन्निरोधो जन्म वा ; नित्यात्मसत्ताप्रयुक्तत्वात् । निमित्तान्तराभावश्चानन्तरमेव व्याकरिष्यते। तदेवमनुवर्तमान एवानुभवे कथं स्मृतिरुदयमासादयेत् ?

'य एवाहं पूर्वेद्युरासं स एवाहमद्यापि' इति स्मृतिसम्भिन्नप्रत्ययोऽपि कालावच्छिन्नस्वरूपगोचरः, न स्वरूपमात्रे ।

अविशदश्च स्वापादौ स्वानुभवः, निर्विकल्पश्च ; पटीयसा सविकल्पकेनावगमेन स्मृतिबीजमाधीयत इति कुतस्तत्प्रसङ्गः ? साम्याचाननुभवाभिमानः, शरीरधारणप्रयत्नाननुसन्धानवत् ।

न चाविकृतस्वाभाविकबोधमात्रेणावस्थाने स्वापमोक्षयोरविशेषापत्तिः ; क्लेशवासनानां

remembrance arises in accordance with its root cause, (namely, the samskāras), which is stimulated by factors, such as, experience of similar objects or of associated things. But here no origination or obstruction for the consciousness of the self can ever exist ; for the consciousness of the self is dependent on the existence of the soul which is eternal. That there is no other cause responsible for the same will presently be shown. Thus, at the very time when an experience continues to exist, how can its remembrance take birth ?

(It may be pointed out that the cognition 'I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day' clearly indicates that there is remembrance of the self ; to this it is replied—). Even the awareness—'I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day'—which is mixed up with remembrance must be said to be concerned with the self limited by time, and not with the self in its pure nature. In sleep and other similar states, the consciousness of the self is indistinct and is also indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*); (only) with the aid of knowledge which is clear and distinct and which is determinate (*savikalpaka*) is the basis of remembrance (i.e. the *samskāra*) produced ; when that is so, how could it be said that remembrance would result? Since, having no knowledge of the self and having a knowledge of the self which lacks clearness and distinctness are similar, there arises the false belief that (in sleep) there is no knowledge of the self, even as there is no knowledge of the effort involved in maintaining the body (while such an effort does exist).

It cannot be maintained that if (in the state of sleep) the self exists in its essential nature as an unchanging consciousness alone, there would be no difference between this state and that of release. For in the one case (*i.e.*, in sleep) impressions (*vāsanās*) born of *kleśas*[173] as well as

173. All the manuscripts and printed editions read *samprajñātasamādhāvapi.* But judging from the context, *asamprajñātasamādhāvapi* appears to be the proper

गुणाभिभवस्य चैकत्र भावात्, इतरत्र तदत्यन्तनिवृत्तेः।असम्प्रज्ञातसमाधावपि [174]परमवैराग्य-शालिना पटुतरनिरोधसंस्कारेण चरिताधिकारिणा अपवर्गिणा विशेषः ॥

कथं पुनर्निद्राया अवृत्तित्वे प्रबुद्धस्य प्रत्यवमर्शः 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इत्याद्यः? न ह्यननुभूतगोचराः स्मृतयस्सम्भवन्ति। सत्त्वसचिवसमुल्लसिततमोगुणानुभवभावित-भावनायोनिः खलु 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' 'प्रसन्नं मे मनः' 'लघूनि मे गात्राणि' इति प्रत्यवमर्शः। रजस्तमस्समुद्रेके तु 'दुःखमहमस्वाप्सम्' 'भ्रमत्यनवस्थितं मे चित्तम्' इति। सत्त्वरजसी त्वभिभूय नितान्तमुद्भूते तमसि 'गाढमूढं* सुप्तोऽस्मि' 'गुरूणि मे गात्राणि' 'मुषितमिव मनो मीलितमिव' इति।

the obscuration of the guṇas exist, while in the other (i.e. in release) they are totally annihilated. (If it be stated that, at least, between sleep and *asamprajñāta samādhi* (super-conscious samādhi) there would have to be no difference, it may be replied that) even the soul existing in the state of super-conscious samādhi that has acquired complete detachment (*vairāgya*), that possesses the most intense saṃskāras conducive to restraint, and that has discharged its duties and is about to enter upon the state of final release, must to be distinguished from the self existing during sleep.

If sleep is not a form of *vṛtti,* how (it may be asked) can remembrances, such as, 'I slept soundly', arise to the person who is awake? Indeed, remembrances having for their object what has not been experienced before never arise. Certainly, remembrances, such as, 'I slept well', 'My mind is perturbed', 'My limbs feel light' have for their causes the impressions (*bhāvanas*) produced by experiences relating to the quality of tamas which is associated with the sattva quality and which is preponderant. When there is an excess of tamas and rajas, there arise cognitions—such as 'I slept uneasily', 'My mind is whirling', 'My mind is unsteady'. When tamas is wholly preponderant having overpowered sattva and rajas, there arise the following recollections—'I have slept wholly oblivious of everything', 'The limbs of my body feel heavy', 'My mind is, as it were, robbed away', 'And it is, as it were, covered over'.

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reading. It is reasonable to suppose that a reference to the state of release is followed up by a doubt concerning a state which is the nearest approximation to it.

174. Compare *Yoga-Sūtra* II. 3. 'Avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ.'

* *Gāḍham mūḍham* is a variant reading.

सत्यमेवम्; दत्तोत्तरं ह्येतत्, नैवामी वासनायोनयः प्रत्ययाः, अपि तु तात्कालिकशरीरेन्द्रियमनोवस्थाविशेषपर्यालोचननिमित्ता आनुमानिका इति। एवंरूपा हीमे, 'यतः प्रसन्नं मे मनः सम्यगाहारपरिणामवशाल्लघूनि चाङ्गानि, अतस्सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति। स्वापावस्थायां वेन्द्रियोपरमतारतम्यवशादविशदतात्कालिकतत्तदनुकूलप्रतिकूलविषयानुसन्धाननिबन्धनतयापि स्मरणमुपपद्यत इति न वृत्त्यन्तरत्वं निद्रायाः।

कथं तर्हि पारमर्षं सूत्रम् 'अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा' इति? निरोधपरत्वात्प्रकरणस्य न वृत्तिस्वरूपे तात्पर्यं विपर्ययवत्। न ह्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठं मिथ्याज्ञानं किञ्चिदस्ति; सर्वसंविदामर्थाव्यभिचारात्। स चाधिकरणसिद्धः। साधयिष्यते चोपरिष्टात्। कैवल्यभागि यच्चित्, तत्प्रत्यनीकतया निद्रादेर्निरोध्यत्वेनोपदेशः॥

(We reply) all this is true enough; but your question has already been answered thus:—Assuredly, these cognitions do not have the impressions (*vāsanās*) for their source; but are based on the consideration of the then-existing specific states of the body, senses and the mind (manas); and these cognitions are the result of inference. Indeed, such cognitions take the following form:—'On account of the fact that my mind is tranquil, and that the organs are light consequent on the proper assimilation of food, 'I slept well'; (hence, they must be inferential). (Even if they are remembrances), the remembrance may become intelligible, for the reason that it is based on the thought of several desirable and undesirable objects—a thought which exists at the moment (of sleep) and which lacks clearness and distinctness, on account of the varying degrees to which the senses have been withdrawn during sleep; hence, *nidrā* need not be a separate *vṛtti.*

(You may ask) how, then, could the sūtra of the great sage have come in at all?—"Nidrā (sleep) is the *vṛtti,* which is the cause of the non-existence of other vṛttis."[175] (The reply is) as the context aims at stating what has to be suppressed, its intention is not to describe the nature of the *vṛttis;* as in the case of *viparyaya* (which, though not a vṛtti, is yet mentioned as that which has to be suppressed). Indeed, a false knowledge which is not based on the object which it reveals cannot be met with; for all knowledge is invariably associated with an objective reality.[176] And this fact has clearly been proved in the *adhikaraṇa;*[177] and later it will be established again. As sleep (*nidrā*) is a hindrance to the soul (*cit*) which is to attain release, it is mentioned as something that deserves to be suppressed.

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175. Vide p. 109.

176. Compare *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 8. 'Viparyayo mithyājñānamatadrūpapratiṣṭham.'

177. Evidently the reference is to an adhikaraṇa in Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva Śāstra.* As the author is generally in the habit of mentioning the name of the adhi-

अस्तु वा पूर्वोक्तप्रमाणादिवृत्त्यभावकारणभूतप्रचिततमतमोगुणावलम्बना वृत्तिरेव निद्रा, सन्तु च प्रबुद्धप्रत्यवमर्शाश्च स्मरणानि, *तथा सत्यप्यनवरतानुवृत्तबोधतया स्थितमेव पुंसो बोधस्वभावत्वम् ।

आह—बोधकारणानुवृत्त्यापि बोधानुवृत्तिरुपपद्यत इति कथं तया‡ स्वाभाव्य-निश्चयः? इत्थम्

यतस्स्वतस्सतो बोधादृते पुंसो यथोदितम् ।
तमस्स्वापादिकालीनं न सिद्ध्येद्धेत्वसिद्धितः ॥

उपरतानि हि प्रस्वापकाले सर्वाण्येवेन्द्रियाणि सह मनसा । संस्कारस्य च न स्मृतेरन्यत्र सामर्थ्यम् । न च स्वप्रकाशं तमः; अर्थान्तरवर्तिनोऽप्यनिशं प्रकाशप्रस-

Let it be granted that sleep (*nidrā*) is a *vṛtti* having for its object the most highly developed tamas, and that it is responsible for the absence of other *vṛttis* mentioned already, such as, *pramāṇa*;[178] let it also be granted that the cognitions arising to the person awake are remembrances. Even then, the fact does remain that the soul possesses consciousness as its essential nature, for the reason that it owns a knowledge which always continues to be.

(The opponent may say that) the continuity of knowledge may as well be explained in terms of the persistence of the causes of knowledge, (and ask) how it can be asserted that knowledge is an essential property of the soul, on the strength of the continuity of knowledge. (The reply is:—this assertion is made) on the strength of the reason that without knowledge, which exists in the very nature of the soul, tamas which prevails in the states of sleep and the like will not be manifest to the soul; for there is no causal factor that could manifest it. (It might be said that though knowledge is absent, tamas may be manifested with the aid of the senses or manas or the saṃskāras; but this is untenable). For in sleep all the senses together with the mind (manas) are quiescent. And the power to produce any knowledge other than remembrances does not belong to the impressions (saṃskāras). (Nor can it be said that tamas may reveal itself; for) tamas is not self-luminous; since it would then have to be invariably manifested to the soul (in the waking state also), when it grasps objects other than tamas.

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karaṇa to which he refers, in all probability, he would have mentioned the name here also. But unfortuntely, it has been lost. cf. pp. 90, 95 and 127.

* The Telugu and Benares editions read *tathā satyanavarata*. The former refers in a footnote to a variant reading *tathā na satyanavarata*. The emendation we suggest is *tathā satyapyanavarata*.

‡ *Katham tathā* is the reading found in the printed editions; the proper reading ought to be *katham tayā*.

178. Vide note No. 163.

ज्ञात्। कृप्तश्च सर्वार्थसाधनतया बोध इति तेनैव करणविरहिणा सता स्वभावभूतेनोद्भूते-नोद्भूतवृत्तेस्तमसोऽन्यस्य वा आत्मवर्तिनो गुणस्य स्फुरणमिति बलादभ्युपगमनीयम्।

नित्यप्रकाशश्च आत्मा, प्रमातृत्वात्। अप्रमातृत्वव्यापकबद्धं ह्यनित्यप्रकाशत्वं व्यापकविरुद्धप्रमातृत्वभोगिन्यात्मनि नात्मानं लभते।

स्वतस्सिद्धप्रकाशत्वमप्यस्य ज्ञातृभावतः।
अज्ञातृत्वेन हि व्याप्ता परायत्तप्रकाशता॥

कः पुनरयं प्रकाशो योऽस्य नित्योऽभ्युपेयेत स्वाभाविकश्च? कश्चास्यात्मना सम्बन्धः? यदि ज्ञानमेव सम्बन्धश्चाश्रयाश्रयित्वम्, ततो हेत्वभावेन साध्याभावस्य व्याप्तिमुपदर्शयितुं निदर्शनतया घटाद्युपादातव्यम्; यदनित्यप्रकाशमन्याधीनप्रकाशं वा तदप्रमातृ,

For the reason that knowledge is established to be the means for the manifestation of all things, it must be admitted, whether you like it or not, that predominant tamas or any other quality residing in the soul becomes manifest (with the aid of this knowledge alone), which, being patent and having in its turn no instrument (for its own manifestation), forms an essential feature of the soul.

Besides, (to put the same syllogistically)—The soul possesses an eternal illumination; for it is a knower. The possession of non-eternal illumination, which is invariably concomitant with what pervades (*vyāpaka*)—the quality of being other than a knower—cannot find a place for itself in the soul which possesses the quality of being a knower —a quality opposed to the *vyāpaka* (i.e. the quality of being other than a knower).[179] The possession of illumination as an innate property is attributed to the soul, because it is a knower. The possession of an illumination which is dependent upon something other than itself is invariably associated with the quality of being other than a knower.

What is meant by this illumination (*prakāśa*) which is said to be eternal and innate to the soul? And what exactly is the nature of its relation to the soul? If illumination means knowledge itself, and if the relation is that of being the container and the contained (*āśrayāśrayitvam*), then (with regard to the aforesaid syllogism) in order to cite the invariable concomitance of the absence of the *sādhya* with the absence of the *hetu*, pots and the like must be cited as illustrative examples in the following way:—Whatever possesses a non-eternal illumination or an illumination depending upon something else is other

179. The syllogism may be stated thus—Nothing possessing non-eternal illumination is a knower. The soul is a knower. Therefore, the soul does not possess non-eternal illumination Cf. *Ved. Sū.* II. iii. 31. Pumstvādivattvasya satobhivyaktiyogāt.

यथा घटादीति । तत्र च विशेषनिषेधस्य सामान्याभ्यनुज्ञाक्षेपकत्वादागन्तुकं ज्ञानं घटादावनुमतमापद्यते ।

अथ तन्मा भूदिति विषयविषयिभाव एव सम्बन्धस्सङ्गीयेत, ततो नित्यवज्ज्ञानविषयत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । ज्ञानविषयीकारश्च साधनविशेषायत्तत्वेन नियत इति न स्वाभाविकत्वसम्भवः ।

अचेतनगोचर एव तथा नियम इति चेन्न ; चेतनान्तरविषयीकारेऽपि तथाभावदर्शनात् । न चानात्मगोचर एव साधनसापेक्षत्वनियम इति वाच्यम् ; आत्मनोऽप्यानुमानिकागमिकयोगज्ञानविषयीकारे तत्सापेक्षत्वदर्शनात् ।

विरुद्धे चैकस्यैकक्रियायां कर्मकर्तृत्वे, सूच्यग्रस्येवात्मनि वेध्यवेधकत्वे । नित्यत्वनिरतिशयसूक्ष्मत्वव्यापित्वचित्स्वाभाव्यादिरूपेण प्रत्यगर्थस्यौपदेशिकत्वमानुमानिकत्वं वा,

than a knower; like pots, etc. Then, as the negation of something specific presumes the affirming of something else belonging to the same general category, it would result in the admission that occasional knowledge resides in pots and the like.

In order to obviate this difficulty if it be said that the relation (in question) is no other than that of being the object apprehended and being the subject apprehending (*viṣayaviṣayibhāva*), then, the soul would have to be the object of an eternal consciousness. And since the quality of being an object of consciousness is invariably concomitant with that of being dependent upon some specific causal factors, consciousness cannot be an innate property of the soul.

If it be said that this universal concomitance is met with only in the case of insentient objects, the reply is 'not so'; for even when some other soul is cognised, this dependence on certain causal factors is noticed. It cannot be said that this general law, namely, that all objects of consciousness depend on specific causal factors, applies only to cases other than oneself; for even in regard to oneself, when it becomes the object of inferential knowledge, knowledge born of scripture, and yogic perception, this dependence upon causal factors is noticed.

Further, in respect of one and the same entity the character of being the object and that of being the subject (or agent) of the self-same activity are contradictory; just as in the case of a needle, with regard to its point, the qualities of being the piercer and the pierced are contradictory. It is not in respect of itself, but in respect of its features—such as, eternity, extreme subtlety, capacity to penetrate all things, the possession of consciousness as its essential nature—that the soul (*pratyagartha*) comes to be the object of knowledge obtained through inference or through instruction. Since the

न स्वरूपतः । स्वरूपापेक्षयैव स्वतस्सिद्धिरभ्युपेयत इत्यसमाधेयो विरोधः । रूपभेदेन गम्यगमकत्वाङ्गीकारपक्षे सपक्षस्येव* शब्दादेर्न स्वतस्सिद्धत्वम् ।

अथोच्येत न प्रकाशो ज्ञानम्, अपि तु तन्निमित्तश्चेतनेतरसर्वपदार्थसाधारणो धर्मः, यद्वशात्प्रकाशत इति प्रत्ययोपाख्ये प्रतायेते सर्वपदार्थेषु । अविशेषेणाश्रयाश्रयित्वलक्षणश्च सम्बन्धस्तेन सह सर्वभावानाम् । स च यथोदितसाधनबलादेव सांसिद्धिको नित्यश्चात्मन इति

पराकृतोऽयं पक्षः, न ज्ञानातिरेकी प्रकाशो नाम ; यद्व्यवहारोपजननानुगुणं ज्ञानं तत्प्रकाशत इत्युच्यते । ज्ञेयस्य ज्ञातुः स्वात्मनश्च व्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानमुदयत इति

illumination described as being innate in the soul is admitted to flow from its very being, the contradiction cannot be reconciled. On the view that the self may be admitted to be at once the knower and the known in virtue of its different aspects, the self, like the examples relied upon, such as, *śabda* (the word), cannot be said to be self-established.[180]

As a third alternative, you might hold that illumination is not knowledge, but a quality which is dependent upon knowledge and which is found alike in all objects, sentient or non-sentient—a quality by whose aid all understanding and reference, namely, 'It is illumined', arise in regard to all objects; and that the relation of this illumination to all objects, without varying from instance to instance, is just that of being the container and the contained; and that, on the strength of the aforesaid reasons themselves, it follows that such a quality is eternal and essential to the soul.

But this view has already been refuted. There is no prakāśa distinct from knowledge. The object about which it could be said 'It is manifested' is that concerning which there is the knowledge capable of rendering it fit for thought and discussion. Since there arises knowledge conducive to discussion concerning the object known, the knower

*180. (*i*) The reading in the text is *pakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ ;* but the correct reading should be *sapakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ*. This argument presupposes a syllogism in which *śabda, dīpa,* etc., are relied upon as illustrative examples (*sapakṣa*). The syllogism may be set forth as follows :—ātmā svaviṣayaḥ ; svaprakāśatvāt, śabdavat dīpavat ca. It may also be added that the Vaiyākaraṇas hold that a word (*śabda*) illuminates itself while illumining its sense and that there is no verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) which does not involve a verbal configuration. Compare Bhartṛhari—na sosti pratyayo loke yaśśabdānugamādṛte.

(*ii*) *Vipakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ* is the reading suggested by some. Ātmā is the *pakṣa* in this argument ; pots and the like constitute the *vipakṣa* (i.e. examples where the sādhya, namely, self-luminosity, is absent). Śabda also must be classed among counter examples. If this reading is accepted the translation of the latter part of the sentence would have to be modified as follows :— . . . . the self, like the counter examples, such as śabda, cannot be said to be self-established.'

युक्तस्त्रिष्वप्येकप्रकारः प्रकाशते इति व्यवहारः ।

तत्त्वान्तरप्रकाशाभ्युपगमे तत्स्वाभाव्ये च पुनः किं चैतन्याश्रयणेन ? न च प्रकाश एव तदिति वाच्यम् ; घटादेरपि प्रकाशवत्तया चेतनत्वप्रसङ्गात् । यद्युच्येत सति चेतनावत्त्वे पुंसः प्रकाशमानत्वमिति, संविदीदानीं का वार्ता ? चेतनैव हि सा, न चेतयते ।

अथ संविदस्तत्सम्बन्धाधीनस्स धर्म इति चेत्, कस्तया सम्बन्धो यस्तन्निबन्धनम् ? नाश्रयाश्रयित्वम् ; घटादेस्तदभावप्रसङ्गात् । न विषयविषयिभावः ; तस्यैवानिरूपणात् । अनिरूपणञ्च भ्रान्त्यधिकरणसिद्धान्तारम्भे संवित्सिद्धौ चानुसन्धातव्यम् । आत्मनस्तस्य चाप्रकाशप्रसङ्गश्च ।

and knowledge itself, it is but right that the reference 'It is manifested' should apply in an identical way to all these three.

If the illumination were to be admitted as a separate entity (i.e. if it is distinct from knowledge), and if the soul has this *prakāśa* for its innate quality, where, again, is the need for attributing consciousness to the soul ? It cannot be said that consciousness is nothing but *prakāśa ;* for even objects, such as pots and the like, would become conscious entities, inasmuch as they possess *prakāśa.* If it is said that (consciousness and *prakāśa* are different and that) *prakāśa* is that which is manifested to the soul when there is possession of knowledge, what about knowledge *(samvit)* ? Indeed, *samvit* is itself consciousness ; and it is not possessed of knowledge.

If it be said that this quality (i.e. *prakāśa*), dependent upon the relation in question, may belong to knowledge, (it may be asked) what exactly is the nature of the relation which acts as the basis of prakāśa ? It cannot be that of being the container and the contained ; for, then, pots and the like would have to be deprived of *prākaṭya.* Nor can it be the relation of being the apprehending subject and the object apprehended, for the precise nature of this relation defies analysis. The impossibility of such an analysis may be ascertained from that part of the *Bhrāntyadhikarana*[181] (of the *Nyāyatattva*) where the statement of the conclusion *(siddhānta)* commences and from *Samvitsiddhi.* Moreover, (if the quality of being the apprehending subject *(viṣayitva)* was the cause of prakāśa, since this quality does not exist in the soul and in non-sentient objects like pots, it (prakāśa) would have to be denied to the soul as well as to non-sentient objects.

181. While discussing the nature of error, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Buddhisara) refers to this *adhikaraṇa.* See the *Tattvamuktākalāpa, Sarvārthasiddhi* p. 404.

ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशाश्रयतैव सिद्धिः, तया चानुमेयं ज्ञानमिति पक्षः प्रागेव प्रतिक्षिप्तः । स्वप्रकाशसंविद्वादिनोऽपि व्यवहारानुकूल्ये वैरूप्यमशक्यपरिहारम् ।

आत्मनि समवेतं ज्ञानमसम्बन्धिन्यर्थे प्रकाशं व्यवहारं वा कथं प्रसुवीतेत्यपि चिन्त्यम् । इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिस्वकारणप्रत्यासत्तिवशादिति मा वोचः । न खलु लब्धात्मकं कार्यं स्वनिमित्तकारणमनुरुध्य कार्यमारभते । मा भूदुदकाहरणादि घटादेः कुलालादिसमानाधिष्ठानम् । न च निमित्तकारणनाशे कार्यनाशः । नश्यति चेन्द्रियसम्प्रयोगादिनाशे रूपादिज्ञानम् । अत इन्द्रियेण सह चैतन्यमपि निस्सृत्य तेन तेनार्थेन सन्निकृष्यते, हस्तादिनेव त्वगिन्द्रियम् । तथा सति हि तदुपाधिकत्वात्तज्ज्ञानस्य युक्तं तद्भावानुविधायित्वम् । अन्यथोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिवृत्तौ किमिति निवर्तते ? ।

The view that *siddhi* is nothing but being the seat of *prakāśa*, which is dependent upon jñāna, and that it is with the aid of that *siddhi* that knowledge is inferred to exist has already been refuted. (The defect of mutual dependence—*anyonyāśraya*—involved in that view can by no means be got over by the suggestion that consciousness is itself self-luminous; and is not inferred with the aid of *prakāśa*). Even to the person who contends that consciousness is self-luminous it would be impossible to get over the diversity in regard to the manner in which objects become fit for discussion.

Again, how knowledge, which is inherent in the soul, could generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a *prakāśa* or discussion is a matter for consideration. Do not say that it is generated by the proximity of the causes of knowledge, such as the senses and reasons (*liṅga*). Indeed, that which has already come to exist does not produce its effect by depending upon its own efficient cause. Activities pertaining to the pot—such as, fetching water—cannot be treated as having for their bases or superintendent (*adhiṣṭhāna*) what is identical with the potter and the like. Further, when the efficient cause perishes, there is no destruction of the effect; but here, when factors—such as, the contact of the senses—perish, knowledge of colour and the like disappears. Therefore, it has to be said that consciousness proceeding outward along with the senses gets into contact with different objects,[182] just as the organ of touch comes into contact with hands and the like. If that were so, since the knowledge of the respective objects is dependent upon this contact, it is but right that such knowledge should be dependent upon the existence of this contact. Otherwise, why should the knowledge which has already arisen vanish when the contact of the senses with objects falls away?

182. Compare *Śrī Bhāṣya* on *Ved Sū* II. ii. 27—nābhāva upalabdheḥ—sambandhaśca samyogalakṣaṇaḥ. see also the *Tattvamuktākalāpa* p. 652. Dravyam prāg buddhiruktā paramiha viṣayaissaṅgamādirnirūpyaḥ samyogam Bhāṣyakārāḥ prathamamakathayan nyāyatattvānusārāt.'

ज्ञानजन्यार्थप्रकाशवादिनोऽपि समानोऽयं दोषः। निमित्तकारणं हि ज्ञानम्। कुतस्तन्निवृत्तावर्थप्रकाशो निवर्तते? कुतो वा यावत्तद्भावमवतिष्ठते? न च सङ्ख्यादिनिदर्शनेनात्र प्रत्यवस्थानं युक्तम्;।

असिद्धत्वेन नाशस्य सङ्ख्याया बुद्धिनाशतः।
एकसङ्ख्येव सङ्ख्यात्वादन्याप्याद्रव्यभाविनी॥
सर्वा ह्येकाश्रया सङ्ख्या नित्यानित्यार्थवर्तिनी।
यावदाश्रयसत्त्येव सम्मता सर्ववादिनाम्॥
द्वित्वादिका परार्धान्ता सङ्ख्या याऽनेकवर्तिनी।
सापि सङ्ख्यात्वसामान्ये सति कस्मान्न तादृशी॥

ननु नैकत्वं सङ्ख्या, स्वरूपानतिरेकात्। अतस्साधनविकलमुदाहरणम्। मैवम्;

The same difficulty confronts also the person who admits *prakāśa* as a quality which resides in objects and which is produced by jñāna. For knowledge is the efficient cause of prakāśa. Then, why (it may be asked) should the *prakāśa* of the objects disappear at the disappearance of knowledge? And why should it exist only so long as knowledge lasts? It is no good trying to meet the difficulty by citing the analogy of number (*saṅkhyā*) and the like.[183] For with the disappearance of the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) there does not result the disappearance of numbers. Like number 1 (unity), the other numbers, namely, 2, 3 and so on, for the very reason that they are numbers, exist as long as objects last. That everywhere the number which is based on a single entity and which resides individually in objects, eternal or non-eternal, (i.e. the number 1, unity) lasts as long as the (particular) support lasts is admitted by all disputants. While the generality, namely, numberness, exists therein, why should not the numbers commencing from 2 and ending in infinity, and residing in multitudinous objects, be similar (to number 1 in lasting as long as the support lasts)?

An objection may be taken to this argument:—Since number 1 is not a number at all, for the reason that it is not something distinct from the *svarūpa* (i.e. the object wherein it is said to dwell),[184] the example cited in the foregoing argument is defective in being devoid of the *hetu*.

183. The analogy may be expressed thus:—When the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*), which is the efficient cause of numbers 2, 3 and so on, disappears these numbers vanish; in the same way, when knowledge which is the efficient cause of *prakāśa* ceases to be, prakāśa also falls away.

184. This objection is met by Vedānta Deśika in the *Tattvamuktākalāpa* (Adravyasara thus—'aikyam svābhedamāhuḥ katicana na bhidāstyekameveti dṛṣṭeḥ bhedādṛṣṭyaikyamohaḥ taditi ca vacanam tattra tatrābhyupetam anyetvetat svasatt-

सङ्ख्यैव सा; द्रव्यान्तरेऽप्यनुवृत्तेः। यदि हि घटादेस्स्वरूपमेवैकत्वं, ततो घट एकः पट एक इति सर्वद्रव्यसाधारण्यमेकत्वस्य न स्यात्। न हि घटस्वरूपस्य पटस्वरूपेण सम्भवति सामानाधिकरण्यम् 'घटः पटः' इति। अस्ति तु तदेकत्वस्य। किञ्च

सङ्ख्यैकता विरुद्धत्वाद्द्विसङ्ख्येवान्यसङ्ख्यया।
एकं द्वाविति न ह्यस्ति सामानाधिकरण्यधीः॥

यत्त्वनेकद्रव्यवृत्तित्वे सति गुणत्वात् संयोगवद्यावद्द्रव्यभाविनी द्वित्वादिसङ्ख्येति, तन्नानात्वेऽनैकान्तिकम्। न हि सतोरेव घटपटयोस्तन्नानात्वं नश्यति। न च तद्द्वित्व-सङ्ख्यैव; त्रयाणां तदभावप्रसङ्गात्। न च तदेकत्वाभावमात्रम्; तुच्छस्यापि नानात्वापत्तेः।

(The reply is) not so. Unity (NO. 1) is certainly a number; for it persists equally in other objects (besides the one with whose very being it is sought to be identified). If NO. 1 were identical with the very being of the pot or anything else, then, unity cannot be common to all objects, as is suggested in the expressions, *one* pot, *one* cloth and so on. Indeed, there is no equation of the being of the pot (*ghaṭasvarūpa*) with that of the cloth to the effect 'The pot is cloth'; but that equation of No. 1 with the pot (as is evident in the expression 'one pot') exists. Being contradictory to other numbers, unity, like NO. 2, must necessarily be a number. In fact, there is no knowledge equating unity with number 2 in the form 'Unity is NO. 2.' It may be contended that, like contact (*samyoga*), the numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as the objects exist, because while they exist in many objects, they are qualities. But such a contention is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa,* in the light of the instance of 'diversity'. For as long as the pot and the cloth exist, diversity will never vanish.[185] It cannot be said that diversity is nothing but duality. (Therefore, it is not possible to get over the fallacy of *anekānta* by suggesting that, after all, diversity and duality are identical). For (if they were identical) in respect of any three objects there would be the absence of diversity. Nor can it be said that diversity is merely the absence of unity. (Hence, the suggestion that diversity is merely a negative quality would not help to remove the fallacy). For (in that case) diversity would have to be attributed to even absolute unreality (*tuccha*). Even though

vam viduritarasamuccityavasthānuvṛttam tatpakṣepi svarūpādadhikamidamiha dvittvamohadisiddheh. pp. 634-5.

185. How the argument comes to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣa* is here explained. In the instance of diversity, even though the *sādhya* is absent, the *hetu* is still met with.

आपेक्षिकत्वाद्वित्वादेः प्रतियोग्यनवग्रहात् ।
बुभुत्सोपरमाच्चापि सत्या एवानवग्रहः ॥

अतश्चैतन्यस्यैवेन्द्रियद्वारा अर्थसन्निकर्ष एव तद्भावानुविधानोपपत्तिः ॥

अन्यच्च—अर्थस्य प्रकाशकं ज्ञानं भवताम् । सर्वं च प्रकाश्यवस्तुसन्निकृष्टमेव प्रकाशकं दृष्टं दीपप्रभादि । अतस्तदपि तथेति युक्तमाश्रयितुम्

व्योमवदमूर्तस्य न क्रियावत्त्वमिति चेत्, केयं मूर्तिर्नाम यद्विरहिणः क्रियाऽयोगः । यदि परिभाषिकी द्रव्यत्वे सति काचित्कतेति, इष्यत एव सा चैतन्ये । न हि तत्सर्वगतं द्रव्यम्; तथा सति युगपत्सर्वार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । काचित्कत्वे तु तद्धि यदैकदैकेन्द्रियेण सम्प्रयुक्तं तदर्थाभिमुखं, न तदेन्द्रियान्तरमधितिष्ठति । अत एव हि युगपत् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः ।

the numbers commencing from 2 exist, being dependent upon enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*), their non-apprehension is due to the non-apprehension of the correlative (*pratiyogin*) and the cessation of the desire to know. Therefore, it is only on the admission that consciousness proceeds by way of the senses and establishes a contact with objects that the dependence of *prakāśa* on the presence or absence of this contact could be rendered intelligible.

Indeed, on your view, consciousness is the entity which manifests the object. All manifesting entities, such as, the light issuing from the lamp are found to manifest objects only by getting into contact with the objects to be illumined. Therefore, it is right to admit that consciousness also is of such a nature (i.e. it manifests objects only by getting into contact with them).

If it be objected that a formless object like ether cannot be endowed with activity (in other words, if it is said that consciousness, being formless, cannot enter on the activity of proceeding and getting into contact), (it may be asked) what exactly is meant by 'form' when it is said that the substance wherein it is absent is devoid of activity. If the reply is that it is a technical term standing for that which, while being a substance occupies a limited area, (we say) the attribution of such a form to consciousness is acceptable to us. In fact, consciousness is not an all-pervasive substance. If it were so (i.e. all-pervasive), there would be the manifestation of all things simultaneously. But, on the view that it pervades a limited area, when it is in contact with one sense-organ and directed to the object falling within the range of that sense, it does not (at the same time) permeate another sense-organ. That is why different kinds of sensory knowledge do not originate simul-

निरतिशयवेगं च तत्; युगपदिवातिशीघ्रमनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानदर्शनात्। अतो यथोदितं मूर्तत्वं सिद्धम्।

स्पर्शवत्ता मूर्तिः, तद्विरहान्निष्क्रियत्वमिति चेत्, शब्देनानेकान्तः। स खलु शङ्खमुखादेर्दवीयसोऽपि देशान्नोदनविशेषेण लोष्टादिरिव यावद्वेगं प्रतिष्ठते स्पर्शविहीनोऽपि। स्पर्शरहितस्यापि मनइन्द्रियस्य क्रियावत्त्वं पदार्थवाक्यार्थविदामुभयेषामपि सम्मतमेव।

कथमतीतानागतयोरसतोश्चैतन्येन सम्प्रयोग इति चेत्, कथं वा विषयभावः? प्रकाशमानत्वं सङ्ख्यादियोगो वा यस्तत्र निर्वाहस्स एवात्रास्तु।

taneously. Consciousness moves with exceeding quickness;[186] for its rapid permeation of the different senses (one after another) is perceived as if it were simultaneous. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the character of possessing a form, in the sense described above belongs to consciousness.

If it is urged that form (*mūrti*) is the quality of possessing touch, and that consciousness, being devoid of such a form, cannot posses any activity, (the reply is) this argument is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa,* in view of the instance of sound (*śabda*). For the sound emanating from the conch, the mouth and the like, though devoid of touch, proceeds, like a missile, with extreme rapidity to places far distant from its source by piercing through space. The fact that manas, though devoid of touch, is endowed with activity is admitted both by the Naiyāyikas who have understood the categories (*padārthas*) and by the Mīmāmsakas who have inquired into the import of propositions.

How (it may be asked) can objects, past and future, which are non-existent, come into contact with consciousness ? (We ask you in turn) how do they become the objects (*viṣaya*) of knowledge ? The same explanations that you offer with regard to these[187]—such as (their becoming the object of knowledge means just this:) their becoming mani-

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186. Compare the definition of jñāna:—'atyantavegitātyanta śaukṣmyam nirbaratātathā tathā . . . . .'—given Prathamādhikaraṇa of the *Nyāyatattva* and quoted in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana,* Buddhiparicchedа. Vide *infra* p. 95 and note 150.

187. Vedānta Deśika quotes these passages and discusses them in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana.* Rangarāmānujaswāmi also comments on them. They identify the first (i.e., the view that objects, past and future, become the object of jñāna) as the view of the Naiyāyikas, and the second (i.e. the view that these objects possess prākaṭya) as that of the Bhāṭṭas. See Buddhiparicchedа, p. 266.

अपि च अतीतयानागततया च तावप्यद्यापि विद्येते इति, तेन रूपेण बोधसन्निकर्षे का अनुपपत्तिः? किञ्च यथा दवीयसि देशे सता ध्रुवशिशुमारादिना दृक् सन्निकृष्यते, तथा दवीयसि काले सता कल्पाद्यन्तवर्तिना स्वयम्भ्वादिनेति नालोकं किञ्चित्। किञ्च—

नातीतानागते बुद्धेर्दूरे भवितुमर्हतः।
बुद्ध्या प्रकाशमानत्वाद्बुद्धिबोद्धृस्वरूपवत्॥

fested, or their possession of qualities like number—may apply here also.[188]

Moreover, since such objects may even be said to exist at this very moment as 'things that have perished' and 'things that are yet to be,' what is the difficulty in stating that consciousness comes into contact with them in the light of their having such a type of existence.[189] Just as the eye comes into contact with the Dhruva and Śimśumāra[190] maṇḍalas existing in vastly remote regions, even so, in regard to entities existing at vastly remote periods of time, consciousness comes into contact with qualities, such as Svayambhu existing at the beginning and end of the kalpa (world epoch). Hence, there is nothing that could run counter to everyday experience.[191]

Further, for the reason that they are manifested by consciousness, things past and future, like knowledge and the knower, cannot be considered to be beyond the reach of knowledge.

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188. The illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) of number may be elaborated thus:—When one says 'There were four mangoes; three of them have been lost,' the No. 3 is associated with non-existent objects.

189. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, according to whom *vyakti* and *jāti* are different and non-different (bhedābheda), maintain that objects, past and future, exist even now in the form of jāti and that they may well be said to possess prākaṭya. Similarly, it may be said that such objects have an existence of some sort. Once that is admitted, it is easy to show that consciousness may come into contact with them. See *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, Buddhiparicchedа, p. 267. Compare: 'atītānāgatam svarūpatosti adhvabhedāt dharmāṇām.' *Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 12 and Vācaspati Miśra's commentary thereon and also the Vyāsa Bhāṣya.

190. The Hindu tradition has it that the Lord Nārāyaṇa, in the form of the celestial body, Śimśumāra (also called Śiśumāra), controls all the heavenly bodies, and that he acts as their support from his abode in the heart of Śimśumāra, and that many of the devas dwell in the several organs of Śimśumāra, (e.g. Agni, Mahendra, Kāśyapa and Dhruva shine forth, without ever setting, from the tail region of Śiśumāra), and that whoever sees this celestial body gets rid of his demerits (*pāpa*). See the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, Aṃśa II, ch. 9 and 12 and the *Bhāgavata purāṇa* V Skanda.

191. In all probability, the proper reading is *nālīkam* rather than *nālokam*. On either reading, the meaning is substantially the same.

एवञ्च चैतन्यस्य निरतिशयवेगितया अन्तराळदेशकालाग्रहणाभिमानोऽलातचक्रगतक्रमवद्देशभेदसंयोगविभागाग्रहाणाभिमानवत् ।

अपि च इन्द्रियलिङ्गसंस्कारादेर्यदर्थप्रतिनियतं रूपं, तेनैवोपश्लिष्य निस्सरच्चैतन्यमपि तद्गोचरेणैव सन्निकृष्यते; यथा गवादिपदशक्तिरेकबुद्धिसिद्धेऽपि सामान्यविशेषात्मके वस्तुनि सामान्यांशेनैव संबध्यते, यथा वा विधिः प्राप्तांशपरिहारेणाऽप्राप्तांशमेव भावनायाः स्पृशति । अत इन्द्रियादिद्वारेण चैतन्यमपि तदर्थाभिमुखं निर्गच्छतीति न्याय्यम् । यथाह **भगवान्** 'तदस्य हरति प्रज्ञां वायुर्नावमिवाम्भसि' इति । **मनुश्च**—

Moreover, (against the possible objection that if consciousness can get into contact with objects far removed from us by vast stretches of space and time, it must be in contact with those of intervening space and time, it may be replied that) as consciousness moves with extreme rapidity, the false impression arises that there is no awareness of (objects existing in) the intervening space and time; just as the false belief arises, namely, that there is no apprehension of the contact (of the point of light) with different points in space or its separation therefrom—a contact and separation which proceeds in a definite sequence and which resides in the circle traced by the fire-brand (*alātacakra*).

Besides, consciousness, proceeding outward having come into association with that form of the different senses, reasons (*hetu*) and impressions (*samskāras*) which is invariably related to their respective objects, gets into contact with those objects only which are respectively related to these (i.e., the senses, etc.) ; just as the significatory potency of words, such as the cow is related only to the universal aspect (of things), even though on hearing a word, like the cow, an object constituted of universal and particular features presents itself in a single cognition; or just as the vedic injunction deals only with that aspect of the *bhāvanā* which is unknown, having neglected the part already known.[191a] Therefore, here it is legitimate to maintain that consciousness proceeds through the senses towards their respective objects. To this effect the Adorable Kṛṣṇa says, "It (the manas) forcibly drags consciousness along, even as the wind drives the boat on water."[192] And Manu says, "From

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191a. For example, the injunction, 'dadhnā juhoti', aims at specifying the kind of oblation to be offered at the Agnihotra, rather than at emphasising the need for performing that homa, the necessity for the latter having been already learnt from the other vidhi, 'agnihotram juhoti'.

192. *Bh. Gītā.* II 67.

'इन्द्रियाणां हि सर्वेषां यद्येकं क्षरतीन्द्रियम् ।
तेनास्य क्षरति प्रज्ञा दृतेः पादादिवोदकम्' ॥ इति ।

यत्तु गुणश्चैतन्यं गुणिनमपहाय कथमन्यतो यातीति ; तदयुक्तम् ; प्रहाणानभ्युपगमात् । अप्रहायैवात्मानमितस्ततश्चेतना इन्द्रियादिद्वारा निश्चरति । विच्छिन्नायाश्च तस्याः संधानाभावश्शास्त्र एवोक्तः ।

दृश्यन्ते च गुणा अपि शब्दगन्धसूर्यालोकरत्नप्रभादयो गतिमन्तो धर्म्यतिवर्तिनश्च । अतिसूक्ष्मो दूरगमनधर्मा भौतिको हि शब्दः ।

ननु नभ इव विभुश्शब्दः व्यञ्जकध्वनिवशेन प्रादेशिक इव गत्वर इव चोपलभ्यते । तथाहि—शब्दः सर्वव्यापी, एकद्रव्यवर्तित्वे सत्याकाशगुणत्वात्, तत्परिमाणवत् । मैवम् ; अतद्गुणत्वात् । वायवीयश्शब्दः, तेन नियतसहोत्पत्तिकत्वात्, तदीयस्पर्शवत्

among the several senses even if one sense organ were to proceed outward, thereupon the person's knowledge also would move outward, even as water would flow from the hole found in the leather-bag."[193]

The objection raised—namely, how can consciousness, which is a quality, proceed elsewhere, leaving its substrate ?—is hardly reasonable ; for it has not been maintained that it leaves its substrate. Consciousness proceeds hither and thither by way of the senses without ever leaving the self. That its reunion (with the self) would become impossible, were it to lose contact therewith has been set forth in the (*Nyāya-tattva*) Śāstra.

(It could even be shown that qualities may leave their substrate and proceed elsewhere ; for) qualities, such as, sound, odour, the rays of the sun and the lustre of the gem are found to be endowed with movement and to leave their substrate. Indeed, sound (*śabda*) is exceedingly subtle and elemental, and has the quality of proceeding to long distances.

A possible objection is the following—*śabda* (sound) is all-pervasive, like ether ; but, with the aid of *dhvani* (vibration) which helps to reveal it, it appears as if it dwells in a particular place, and as if it moves about. And it may be put in syllogistic form thus—*śabda* is all-pervasive ; for, like the magnitude of ether, sound, while residing in one substance, is the quality of ether. (We reply) 'not so'; because *śabda* is not a quality of ether. It really belongs to the air in motion (*vāyu*) ; for, like touch (sparśa) which pertains to the air in motion (*vāyu*), *śabda* invariably originates along with *vāyu*. Any quality which

193. Manusmṛti II 99.

यश्च येन द्रव्येण नियतसहोत्पत्तिर्गुणः, स तद्गुण एव; यथा तथाविधा रूपादयः। नियतसहोत्पत्तिश्च वायुना शब्दः; उभयोरपि भेरीदण्डवंशदळनादिसंयोगविभागजत्वनियमात्।

उत्पद्यते च शब्दः, इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे सति गुणत्वात्, गन्धादिवत्। कृतकश्च; क्रियोत्तरमेवोपलभ्यत्वात्, संयोगादिवत्। न चाभिव्यञ्जकत्वं प्रयत्नादेः कल्प्यम्; गौरवात्। तत्प्रतीतिकारणत्वकल्पनादपि तत्कारणत्वकल्पनैव हि लघ्वी। अभिव्यञ्जकाश्च एकदेशावस्थितान् एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यान् युगपदभिव्यञ्जन्ति; यथा प्रदीपो रूपसंख्यापरिमाणानि करकादींश्चैकप्रदेशवर्तिनः। न चैवं ताल्वादिसंयोगविभागजनितपवन इति नासौ व्यञ्जकः।

नित्यत्ववादिनश्शब्दा निर्भागव्योमवर्तिनः।
श्रावणाश्चेत्यभिव्यक्तिनियमे नास्ति कारणम्॥

invariably originates along with a given substance must necessarily be considered to be a quality of that substance alone; even as colour and the like, which invariably originate along with a substance are treated as its qualities. And sound invariably originates along with *vāyu*; in as much as both invariably originate together from the contact of the drum-stck with the drum or from the separation of the parts of the bamboo caused by its splitting.

Besides, *śabda* does originate, for, like smell, it is grasped by the senses and is also a quality. Moreover, it is created by human activity; for, like conjunction and so on, it is apprehended only after such activity has taken place. Nor can it be fancied that human effort and the like are merely aids to the manifestation of sound; for that would go against the principle of economy (of thought). Indeed, rather than assuming that they are the cause of the manifestation of sound, to postulate that they are the causes of sound itself is to have the advantage of economy (of thought). Whatever serves as a manifester reveals simultaneously everything which resides in one place and is graspable by a single sense organ; for example, the lamp manifests everything existing at an identical place, namely, the number, size, etc., and vessels, like the water-pot. In as much as the air in motion produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the palate and the like is not of such a nature, it cannot be a factor for manifesting sound.

He who maintains that sound is eternal cannot give a reason for certain sounds being manifested while other sounds are not; because sound dwells in partless ether and is the object of the auditory sense. It has

देशैक्ये ग्राहकैक्ये च व्यञ्जकैक्यं हि दर्शितम् ।
तदभावात्प्रयत्नोत्थमारुतः कारणं ध्वनेः ॥
अत एव च नानात्वं प्रत्युच्चारणमिष्यताम् ।
कृतस्य करणायोगाद्धेतुपौष्कल्यभेदतः ॥
किंचोदात्तानुदात्तत्वदीर्घत्वह्रस्वतादयः ।
गादिस्था युगपद्भान्तो न भिन्द्युः स्वाश्रयान् कथम् ॥
स्थानैक्यायातसादृश्यात्प्रत्यभिज्ञापि नैक्यतः ।
प्रदीपप्रत्यभिज्ञेव ज्ञापिता भेदहेतवः ॥

नन्वेवं चैतन्यसंयोगः संयोगजो वा कश्चित्प्रकाशः प्राप्तः ; उभयमपि तन्न चैतन्ये संभवति ; भेदापेक्षत्वात्संबन्धस्य । आत्मनोऽपि न चैतन्येन संयोगः, तद्धर्मित्वात् । न हि

already been pointed out that when the locality (in which objects are apprehended) is one and when the apprehending organ is single, the manifester also must be unitary. Since, in the present case the manifester is not unitary, the *vāyu* originating from human effort must be the cause (and not the manifester) of sound. That is why a multiplicity of sounds has to be admitted, each act of pronunciation producing a distinct sound. Because what is once produced cannot be created again, and because there is diversity in the complete sets of causal factors, the multiplicity of sounds arising from different acts of pronunciation must be admitted. Besides, how can qualities which are known to exist simultaneously in sounds (*varṇa*), such as *ga*—qualities, such as that of possessing the principal accent and the secondary accent, and that of being long and short—fail to differentiate their substrates ? (It cannot be urged that the recognition, namely, 'This is the self-same sound which was met with before' points to the identity of the sound and also to its eternity ; for) even this recognition is based on the similarity arising from the source being identical and not on the identity of the sounds themselves ; even as the recognition of the flame (as self-identical is based on the similarity of the flame-series, and not on identity). The reasons which prove sound to be diverse have already been adduced.

The following objection may now be raised :—(The upshot of the discussion is) *prakāśa* is either the conjunction of consciousness (with the object) or some peculiar property resulting from this (conjunction). But in regard to the manifestation of consciousness neither of these alternatives holds ; for relation always pre-supposes difference (in the relata. Therefore, consciousness cannot enter into relation with consciousness). This conjunction with consciousness cannot occur to the soul either ; for the latter is the substrate of the quality, namely, conscious-

धर्मधर्मिणोः संबन्धः संयोगः । समवायो हि सः ; अयुतसिद्धसंबन्धत्वात् । संयोगस्तु पृथक् सिद्धयोर्द्रव्ययोः क्रियानिमित्ता प्राप्तिः ; अकार्यकारणयोर्वा तयोः निरन्तरस्थितिः ।

चैतन्यसंयोगसमवाययोरन्यतरस्य संबन्धमात्रस्य वा प्रकाशत्वे ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयशरीरेन्द्रियेष्वव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्ती यथायोगमादर्शयितव्ये ।

तत्त्वान्तरप्रकाशाभ्युपगमस्त्वनुपलब्धिबाधितो न दूषणान्तरं प्रयोजयति । अतो यद्व्यवहारोदयानुगुणं ज्ञानं तत्प्रकाशत इत्येवाभ्युपगमो युक्तः । त्रितयव्यवहारानुगुण्यं संविदस्तु स्वभाव इत्यपर्यनुयोज्यं निमित्तवैरूप्यम् । न हि स्वभावाः पर्यनुयोगमर्हन्ति ।

ness. In fact, the relation between the attribute and its substrate is not the relation of *samyoga* (conjunction) ; but really, it is *samavāya* (inherence); for it is of the nature of the relation existing between inseparable entities. *Samyoga* (conjunction), on the contrary, is either the coming into relation of two objects well-known to be disparate—a relation dependent upon activity, or the closely contiguous existence of the aforesaid objects, which do not stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect.

(In order to obviate this difficulty), if *prakāśa* is taken either as one of these relations, namely, conjunction or inherence of consciousness with objects or any one of the other possible relations of consciousness to objects, then the defects of (such a definition) being too narrow (*avyāpti*) or too broad (*ativyāpti*) may be cited, according to the circumstances of each case, in respect of the knower, knowledge, the known, the body and the senses.

The admission of prakāśa as a separate entity, having been effectively discredited by non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), does not call forth any other adverse comment. Therefore, it is but proper to admit the following—that entity concerning which there arises knowledge capable of initiating a thought and discussion of it may be spoken of as being manifested.

As the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all these three (i.e., knowledge, the knower and the known) is an essential feature of consciousness, the diversity in the manner in which the cause (i.e., consciousness) operates (in these three cases) cannot be raised as an objection. It cannot be asked why such and such a nature belongs to such and such an object.

एवं चेत्संयोगसमवायविरहिणोऽपि पदार्थस्य निमित्तभेदानुसारेण व्यवहारहेतुः संविदिति युक्तमाश्रयितुम् । उच्यते—उक्तमत्र न निमित्तकारणमनुरुध्य कार्यं स्वकार्यमारभत इति ।

व्यवहारानुगुणसंवेदनत्वेऽपि प्रकाशपदार्थे, प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदो दुष्परिहर एव । बहुव्रीहिसमासाश्रयणे संविदन्तराभावेन तस्यां तदभावप्रसङ्गात् । कर्मधारयाश्रयणे ज्ञातृ-ज्ञेययोरसंवेदनत्वेनाप्रकाशप्रसङ्गः । व्यवहारोदयानुगुण्यं च व्यवहारतोऽवगन्तव्यम् , ततः प्रागेव च भवति विदितत्वप्रतीतिर्व्यहारश्च ।

If so (i.e., if the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all the three is an essential quality of knowledge, the difficulty raised on p. 128, namely, How can knowledge which is inherent in the soul generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a *prakāśa* or discussion?) may be sought to be overcome by the suggestion that knowledge may, with the aid of various operating causes (such as the senses), be responsible for *vyavahāra* concerning the object, even though the latter be devoid of any relation (to consciousness), whether it be conjunction (*samyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*). (To this it is replied) it has already been shown (vide p. 128) that an entity does not enter on its own activities by depending on its efficient cause.

If the term *prakāśa* were to signify knowledge conducive to thought and discussion (*vyavahārānuguṇa samvedana*), then, the diversity in the significance (*pravṛttinimittabheda*) suggested by this term cannot be got over. If the expression *vyavahārānuguṇa samvedana* is taken as a *bahuvrīhi* compound (i.e., if it denotes 'that which possesses knowledge conducive to *vyavahāra*), prakāśa would have to be denied to consciousness; for there is no knowledge (which this knowledge may be said to possess). If the expression is taken as a *karmadhāraya* compound (i.e., if it denotes 'the character of being knowledge conducive to vyavahāra), prakāśa would have to be denied to the knower and the known; for they do not possess the character of being knowledge. And the character of being conducive to the starting of an action is to be ascertained from the action itself; but, prior to an action there is the knowledge (*prakāśa*) that the object concerning which there is activity) is already cognised and that there is discussion concerning the same.

यद्येवं कस्तर्हि प्रकाशतेपदार्थः? न हि निरवद्यमेकरूपं ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानानुगतं तमुपलभामहे। उच्यते—नूनं भवानश्रुतपूर्वी प्रथमाधिकरणस्य न्यायतत्त्वे। अभिहितं हि तत्रेदं अनुभवे स्मृतिमुपपादयद्भिरनुभवादूरत्वं स्मृतिनिमित्तमिति। एतदुक्तं भवति—संविददूरत्वं प्रकाश इति।

आह—किमिदमदूर इति दूरादन्यस्तद्विरुद्धस्तदभावो वा? तथा विशेषणमुपलक्षणं वा? अदूर इति विशेषणत्वे पक्षत्रयेऽपि नियमेन। संवेदनदूरत्वानुसन्धानपूर्विकया प्रकाश इति प्रतीत्या भवितव्यम्। न च तथाऽस्ति। उपलक्षणत्वे रूपान्तरं वाच्यम्। न च तदवगम्यत इति। उच्यते—अलमस्थाने संभ्रमेण।

If so, what is the significance of the term *prakāśate* (shines forth)? Indeed, we do not know of a *prakāśa* which exists in common in the knower, the known and knowledge, and which has the same form in all these three, and about which no objection could be raised. (To this) it is replied.—evidently, you are not acquainted with the *Prathamādhikaraṇa* of *Nyāyatattva*. While pointing out therein that remembrance arises only in the event of there being experience, it has been clearly stated by the author (Nāthamuni) that *prakāśa* means not being remote (*adūratvam* i.e., nearness) from experience, a nearness which is the cause of *smṛti* (remembrance).[194] It amounts to this, namely, that prakāśa means not being remote (*adūra*) from experience.

(The objector may ask:) What is meant by *adūra?* Does it mean 'different from' or 'opposed to' or 'the absence of' that which is remote? Again, is *adūratva* (not being remote) a qualification (*viśēṣaṇa*) or an *upalakṣaṇa*.[195] If it is a qualification (*viśēṣaṇa*) in each of the three alternatives alike, the consciousness of prakāśa will invariably be preceded by the awareness of not being remote from experience. But, as a matter of fact, it is not so. If it is an *upalakṣaṇa*, what other nature prakāśa possesses besides this *upalakṣaṇa* must be pointed out. But it has been said that this nature is not apprehended. (To this) it is replied, 'Enough of this misplaced excitement'.

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194. The qualification 'the causes of smṛti' is purposely included in this definition of prakāśa. Otherwise, all objects which are presented to experience would have to possess prakāśa. In actual fact, that is not the case. Though several objects are within the focus of attention, all of them cannot be said to be manifested; for, clearly, we are not interested in them all. Hence, only those objects which fall within the range of experience leading to remembrance, that can be said to possess prakāśa. Compare 'pathi gacchataḥ kāṣṭhaloṣṭādijñānotpattyā kāṣṭhaloṣṭādiṣu satopi-anubhavādūratvasya prakāśapadārthatvābhāvāt smṛtinimittamityuktam'.

195. Upalakṣaṇa is a characteristic which reveals certain aspects of a thing already known to possess other aspects.

भवत्वनुभवादूरं दूरादन्यद्विरोधि वा ।
तद्भावश्च प्रकाशत्वं किमत्र बहु जल्प्यते ॥

प्रकाशत इति प्रतिभासोऽपि बुद्धिविप्रकर्षप्रत्यनीकबोधतत्संसृष्टपदार्थस्वरूपविमर्श एव, बाह्यप्रकाशवत् । तत्रापि ह्यालोके तद्व्याप्तभूभागादौ च प्रकटादिप्रख्योपाख्ये आलोकादूरत्वनिमित्ते । यथा च तत्र तन्निमित्ता सन्तमसनिवृत्तिः, एवमिहापि ज्ञानादूरत्वनिमित्ता अज्ञाननिवृत्तिः । अत एव चानुभूते अनुभवे चोत्तरकालं तुल्यवत्स्मरणम् । एवं च चैतन्यसंबन्धविशेषविषयविकल्पोऽप्यलब्धावकाश इति निरनुयोज्यानुयोग एव ।

नैरन्तर्यपदपर्यायमत्यन्तसामीप्यमात्रं च संयोगः । स एव परतन्त्राश्रितः समवाय-

Let *anubhavādūra* mean either 'different from that which is remote from experience' or 'opposed to that which is remote from experience'. And to be manifest is to be different from that which is remote from experience or to be opposed to that which is remote from experience.[196] Why has all this prattle been indulged in?

Like external illumination, even the cognition 'It is manifested' is no other than the awareness of the nature of knowledge and of the object connected thereto—a nature opposed to that of being remote from consciousness. There also the thought and reference 'It shines', arising in respect of the rays of light and the regions of space wherein they pervade, are based on the quality of not being remote from light. Just as, in the one case, the dispelling of darkness is due to the quality of not being remote from light, here also the dispelling of ignorance is due to the quality of not being remote from consciousness. That is why at a subsequent time recollection of the object known as also of the knowledge itself arises. There being no room for the question as to the precise nature of the relation of consciousness (i.e., whether it is *samavāya* or *samyoga*), it follows that the question raised is one that ought not to have been asked at all.

Besides, *samyoga* is merely close contiguity, which in its turn, is synonymous with *nairantarya* (not being separated by intervening space). And it is only this *samyoga*, which obtains between inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) objects of which one is self-dependent and the other dependent,

196. This verse is quoted in *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*. In his tīkā on *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, Rangarāmānuja interprets prakāśatvam as prakāśamānatvam. Our translation, is based on this interpretation. He also suggests the emendation 'prakāśotra'.

It must be understood that the definition of prakāśa set forth in this stanza applies only to the prakāśa residing in objects perceived by the senses, and not to that found in objects inferred or to that residing in knowledge itself.

पदपरिभाषाभूमिर्वैशेषिकाणामिति नार्थान्तरत्वमूरीकृत्य विकल्पस्सम्भवति । यथा च संयोगान्तर्भावः समवायस्य तथा संबन्धविमर्शे दर्शयिष्यामः ।

ज्ञानादूरत्वप्रयुक्तो व्यवहारक्षमतालक्षणो वा परः(?) प्रकाशः । स च सत्यपि स्वनिमित्तपौष्कल्ये प्रतिबन्धाद्योग्यताविरहाद्वा व्यापित्वासङ्गित्वाद्यात्मधर्मान्तरेषु देहेन्द्रियादौ च न सञ्जायते, चक्षुस्सन्निकृष्ट इव कालिन्दीपयसि रूपरसादयः ।

अतो यथोक्तनीत्यात्मा स्वतश्चैतन्यविग्रहः ।
भानस्वभाव एवान्यत्करणैः प्रतिपद्यते ॥

यत्तु सुखादिनिदर्शनेनात्मविशेषगुणतया चितेरागन्तुकत्वमापादितम्, तदपि गुणवृत्तापरिज्ञानेन । यतः—

that is referred to by the technical term *samavāya* in the system of the Vaiśeṣikas; hence, the question whether the relation of consciousness with objects is *samyoga* or *samavāya*, proceeding as it does on the assumption that *samavāya* is a separate entity, does not arise. In the section, dealing with relation (*sambandavimarśa*),[197] we will presently show how inherence (*samavāya*) could be brought under conjunction (*samyoga*).

Or, *prakāśa* may be understood in a different sense as denoting the capacity to initiate thought and discussion—a capacity dependent upon the quality of not being remote from consciousness. Even when its causal conditions are present in their entirety, either on account of the presence of obstructing factors, or on account of the absence of the capacity for being manifested, *prakāṣa* does not arise in the other qualities of the soul (besides its consciousness), such as being all-pervasive and being unattached, and in the body, senses and the like; just as the colour, taste and the like of the water of the Jamna, which is in contact with the eye, are not manifested. Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, the self has consciousness for its structure and consciousness for its nature. The self cognises the rest with the aid of the senses.

Even the charge levelled against us, namely, that consciousness, being a special quality of the soul, must, on the analogy of pleasure (*sukha*) and the like, be an occasional quality proceeds from complete ignorance of the true nature of qualities. For the qualities which are

197. The section dealing with the relation of the finite soul to the Infinite Self is included in the portions of *Ātmasiddhi* lost. Already, on an earlier occasion reference has been made to this section. Vide p. 55.

स्वरूपोपाधयो धर्मा यावदाश्रयभाविनः ।
नैवं सुखादिबोधस्तु स्वरूपोपाधिरात्मनः ॥

यथा च बोधोपाधिरात्मभावस्तथोपपादितम् । सुखदुःखे चानात्मधर्मौ; इन्द्रिय-सौष्ठवनाशयोरेव तद्भावोपपादनात् । व्याकरिष्यते चैतदन्तिमपदार्थसमर्थनावसर इति साधनविकलता च निदर्शनस्य ।

रागद्वेषादयोऽपि मनोवस्थाविशेषा न साक्षादात्मगुणाः । विज्ञायते हि 'कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धा अश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव' इति गीयते च—

dependent upon the very being of anything will last as long as their substrate lasts; but the knowledge of pleasure and pain is not dependent in this manner upon the very being of the self. It has already been shown how consciousness is responsible for the self being what it is.[198] Pleasure and pain, on the contrary, are not the qualities of the self;[199] for they then have been shown to be no other than the flourishing or decaying state of the senses (vide p. 89). This point will be further elaborated when establishing that the soul is in its essential nature blissful, a fact signified in) the last word[200] (i.e., *svatassukī*, occurring in the stanza commencing with '*dehendriyamana prāṇa*). Hence, the defect of not possessing the *sādhana* (means of inference) vitiates the illustrative example.

Desire and aversion also [201] are the different states of manas and are not the direct qualities of the self. Indeed, it is learnt from the scripture: " Desire, will, doubt, faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, contempt, conjecture (*dhīḥ*), fear—all this is truly manas ".[202] This fact has also been stated in the Gītā in the verse commencing with the words,

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198. This text has been quoted by Vedānta Deśika in his *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*. Rangarāmānuja interprets it thus—jñānamātmatve upādhiḥ prayojakamityarthaḥ. Tataśca yāvatprayojyam prayojakāvasthānāvaśyambhāvāt bodhasya svābhāvikatvādi siddhyati iti bhāvaḥ". See *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, Buddhiparicccheda p. 238.

199. Surely, this is not his final view on the matter; for in a subsequent passage he declares that certainty, doubt, pleasure and pain are forms of knowledge, and consequently, qualities of the self. Here, either he defends a view other than his own or shows off his competency to prove any position (*vaibhavavāda*). See note 144 on p. 90.

200. See note 143 on p. 90.

201. When pleasure and pain are shown to be defective as illustrative examples, one may cite desire and aversion instead. Here it is shown that the latter fare no better, for they too are equally liable to be charged with the defect of not possessing the *sādhana*.

202. *Bṛh. up.* I v. 3 and *Maitri up. VI* 30.

'इच्छा द्वेषः सुखं दुःखं सङ्घातश्चेतनाधृतिः' इति। चेतनाधृतिरिति क्षेत्रलक्षणमैकपद्येन। चेतनया ध्रियमाणः संघातो हि देहः। स्ववृत्त्यनुगुणचैतन्यमात्रादेव प्रवर्तमानं क्षेत्रमिति यावत्। अत एव हि—अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे 'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यस्यापः शरीरं यस्यात्मा शरीरम्' इत्यादिनिर्देशः। 'तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः' इति च पुराणे।

किमिदं धीरिति? उत्प्रेक्षाभिप्रायं तत्, न ज्ञप्तिविषयम्। तस्याः स्वाभाविकत्वस्य तस्यामेव श्रुतौ श्रूयमाणत्वात्। श्रूयते हि 'न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते' इति

"Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain."[203] As the expression *cetanādhṛtiḥ* (occurring in this stanza) is one word, it is the definition of *kṣetra* (body). The body is, in fact, the collection (of the primal elements) which is supported by consciousness.[204] It amounts to stating that the body is what enters on its activities only with the aid of consciousness appropriate thereto. That is why descriptions such as the following are found in the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa*—" . . . for whom the earth is body . . . for whom the water is body . . . for whom the soul is body. . ."[205] Such descriptions are met with in the *purāṇa* also.—" All these constitute His body "[206]

(The upaniṣadic passage quoted above reckons *dhīḥ,* which is obviously a quality of the soul, as one among the properties not belonging to the soul. Hence, the objector asks) what is meant by *dhīḥ* (in that text)? (The reply is) it means conjecture (*utprekṣā*), and does not have knowledge for its significance. For in the same upaniṣad it has been declared that knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. Indeed, the scriptural texts assert.—" There is no cessation of the knowing of a knower (because of his imperishability)";[207] "There can be no

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203. How, it may be asked, does this verse from the Gītā declaring that desire and aversion constitute the *kṣetra* bear testimony to the view that they are the qualities of manas? Possibly the author thinks that once this verse excludes the possibility of their being the qualities of the self, it could be shown, on the strength of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, 'etat sarvam mana eva', that they belong to manas.

204. Analysing the expression *cetanādhṛtiḥ* into *cetanayā dhṛtiḥ,* Yāmunācārya arrives at the meaning 'a collection supported by consciousness.' But in the *Gīta Bhāṣya,* Rāmānuja splits it into *cetanasya ādhṛtiḥ* and interprets it to mean 'a collocation which has sprung up as the seat of the soul (who enjoys pleasure and pain, and who seeks worldly experience or liberation therefrom)'. On either interpretation, *cetanādhṛtiḥ* denotes only the body.

205. *Bṛh. up.* III, vii.

206. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa,* I, 22, 86.
yāni mūrtānyamūrtāni yānyatrānyatra vā kvacit |
santi vai vastujātāni tāni sarvāṇi tadvapuḥ. ||

207. *Bṛh. up.* IV, iii, 30.

'न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते अविनाशित्वात्' इति च। ज्ञातुरविनाशित्वादेव ज्ञानस्याविनाशमुपपादयन्तीयं श्रुतिर्ज्ञातुः स्वरूपप्रयुक्तं ज्ञानमिति दर्शयति।

न च दृष्टिविशेषणतया द्रष्टुरुपादानमिति सांप्रतम्; पुल्लिङ्गनिर्देशविरोधात्। हेतोश्च साध्यसमत्वापत्तेः। द्रष्टुः स्वरूपनिर्देशपरत्वेऽपि दृष्टिपदस्यासमाधेयमहेतुत्वम्; स्वपक्षहानिश्च। आत्मनस्तु नित्यत्वमप्रचाल्यानेकन्यायागमसिद्धं युक्तं हेतुतया व्यपदेष्टुम्। न हि सति पदार्थे तत्स्वरूपोपाधयो न भवितुमर्हन्ति, सति कनक इव पैङ्गल्यं, प्रभेव च प्रदीपे। तेनायमर्थः—आत्मस्वभावभूतायाश्चितेर्बाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयवि-

cessation of the seeing of a seer, because of his imperishability."[208] This scriptural text, which establishes that there can be no destruction of knowledge for the very reason that the knower is imperishable, indicates that knowledge is dependent upon the very being of the knower.

It is not right to contend that (in the text in question) the seer (*draṣṭā*) is taken as a qualification of seeing (*dṛṣṭi*), i.e., it is not right to interpret the text thus—'There can be no destruction of seeing which is no other than the seer'); because, in that event, there would be impropriety in the use of the masculine gender, and because the *hetu* would come to be identical with the *sādhya* (i.e., there would be no *hetu* worth the name).[209]

Even if the term *dṛṣṭi* aims at revealing the very essence of the soul, the charge of there being no *hetu* is unanswerable.[210] Moreover, it would amount to the abandoning of your position. It is but right to adduce as *hetu* the proposition that the soul is eternal—a proposition established by several incontrovertible arguments and supported by the śāstras. When an object exists, whatever depends upon the very being of that object cannot but exist; even as yellowness or light cannot but exist when gold or the lamp exists. Therefore, this is the true meaning (of the text under consideration)—at no time, whether in the state of worldly existence or that of release is there cessation of knowledge, which is an essential feature of the soul, and which, as a result of its diverse forms of relation with dif-

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208. *Bṛh. up.* IV, iii, 23.

209. Two difficulties stand in the way of taking *draṣṭā* as a qualification of *dṛṣṭi*—(i) If *draṣṭā* were to qualify *dṛṣṭi*, both the words must be in the same gender; but *draṣṭā* is masculine, while *dṛṣṭi* is feminine. (ii) Again, on this interpretation, the text would mean—'There can be no destruction of seeing which is no other than the seer because it does not perish.' Clearly, it is vitiated by *petitio principii*.

210. If the term *dṛṣṭi*, whose gender does not vary in accordance with that of the object which it qualifies (*niyataliṅga*), is taken as an adjective qualifying *draṣṭā*, the grammatical difficulty may be got over; but the fallacy of *petitio principii* still remains.

शेषसंबन्धप्रकारप्राप्तदृष्टिघ्रातिरसयतिवक्तिश्रुतिमतिस्पृष्टिविज्ञातिव्यपदेशभेदायाः स्वात्मावभा-सिन्याः संसारापवर्गावस्थयोः न जातुचिद्विपरिलोपो विद्यत इति । तथाच श्रुतिः—

'स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघनः' तथा 'स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा' 'आत्मज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच' इति । तथा अपवर्गदशायामेव छन्दोगाः । 'न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम्' 'सर्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति' 'नोपजनं स्मरन्' इति । 'स वा एष एतेन दैवेन चक्षुषा मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते' इति च । अन्याश्च 'जानात्येवायं पुरुषो ज्ञातव्यं तु न वेद' इत्याद्याः सकलकरणोपरमदशायामप्या-त्मनः प्रबोधमभिदधानाः श्रुतयो बोधस्वभावतामस्य द्रढयन्ति । 'निर्वाणमय एवायमात्मा

ferent objects, external and internal, acquires different names, such as seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, reflecting, touching and conceiving, and which shines of its own accord. (The scriptures declare): "Just as a lump of salt, without any distinction of parts, whether they be not-inner or (they be) not-outer,[211] is filled right through with the same taste, even so this soul, right through, without any distinction of parts, is constituted of knowledge (*prajñānaghana*); "... by his own luminosity, by his own light";[212] "O King", said he, "this ātman is self-luminous".[213] The Chandogas say that even in the state of release "The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world. Verily, the seer perceives all."[214]; "The jīva enjoys ... not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin"[215]; "He who, with the aid of manas, the celestial eye, experiences all enjoyments and feels joyous"[216] And other texts like the following—"The puruṣa does know things, but he fails to know what he ought to understand"—which declare that even in the state when all the senses are destroyed knowledge belongs to the soul, strongly affirm that knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. Statements like the following are found in the purāṇas also.—"The soul is constitu-

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211. *Bṛh. up.* VII, v, 13. This text enumerates the parts of the lump of salt in this negative fashion for two reasons:—(1) If the positive mode of expression, viz., inner and outer parts, were used, parts in the middle region would be left out. The negative expressions secure exhaustion. (2) Again, as the soul is *niravayava* (partless), the analogy of the lump of salt would be in order only if it uses the negative expressions.

212. *Bṛh. up.* VI, iii, 9.

213. *Bṛh. up.* VI, iii, 6.

214. *Chānd. up.* VII, xxvi, 2.

215. *Chānd. up.* VIII, xii, 3.

216. *Chānd. up.* VIII, xii, 5.

ज्ञानमयोऽमलः ' इत्यादि च पुराणे । ' ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिः ' इत्यादीतिहासे । भगवान् ;शौनकश्च—

यथा न क्रियते ज्योत्स्ना मलप्रक्षाळनान्मणेः ।
दोषप्रहाणान्न ज्ञानमात्मनः क्रियते तथा ॥
यथोदपानकरणात्क्रियते न जलाम्बरम् ।
सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसतस्संभवः कुतः ॥
तथा हेयगुणध्वंसादवबोधादयो गुणाः ।
प्रकाश्यन्ते न जन्यन्ते नित्या एवात्मनो हि ते ॥

इति । अत एव हि सूत्रकारश्च ' ज्ञोऽत एव ' इति ।

तदेवमात्मस्वभावभूतस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयसंश्लेषविशेषेषु निश्चयसंशयादिव्यवहार-भेदस्तत्तद्विशेषभाजि चैतन्ये वा । चैतन्यस्य विषयेण दृढसंयोगो हि निश्चयः । तस्यैव

ted of bliss and jñāna, and is undefiled."[217] Passages such as the following are found in the itihāsas—"It (the soul), is the light of all lights." The revered Śaunaka says, "Just as the lustre of the gem is not created by cleansing it of its impurities, even so knowledge (which is the very essence of the soul) is not created by the shedding of imperfections. Again, water or space is not created by the digging of a well. Only that which has all along existed is rendered manifest. How can the non-existent ever come into being? Likewise, qualities, such as jñāna, are not created but only manifested by the destruction of evil qualities (*heyaguṇa*); for, in truth, they are the eternal qualities of the soul".[218] For this very reason the Sūtrakāra says, "That is why (the individual soul is) a knower".[219] The usage of the different expressions, doubt (*samśaya*) and certainty (*niścaya*) and the like,[220] has reference either to the different relations of objects to consciousness, which has thus been shown to be the essence of the soul, or to the consciousness that has entered into those relations.[221] Indeed, cerainty is the close conjunction of consciousness with a single object. Loose conjunction of the same

217. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa,* VI, vii, 22.

218. *Viṣṇudharmottara* 104. 55-57. Compare *Vedānta-sūtra*—sampadyāvirbhāvassvena śabdāt. IV. iv. 1.

219. *Vedānta-sūtra* II. iii. 19.

220. 'And the like' includes pleasure and pain.

221. One does not usually speak of conjunction of objects with consciousness as being either doubtful or certain. On the contrary, it is knowledge that is described as being either doubtful or certain. Hence the second alternative. See Ranga-rāmānuja's ṭīkā on *Nyāyasiddhāñjana,* p. 274.

बहुभिर्युगपद्दृढसंयोगः* संशयः । ज्ञानवासनानुसारेण संश्लेषः स्मरणम् , इत्यादिः । उक्तञ्च आत्मधर्मस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयेण संयोगो ज्ञानमित्युच्यत इति ।

न चैवं संयोगस्योभयाश्रितत्वेन विषयस्यापि ज्ञातृत्वप्रसङ्गः ; विषयेण संयोगाभावात् । चैतन्येन हि तस्य संयोगः बाह्यप्रकाशवत् , यथा खल्वालोकसंबन्धेऽपि प्रकाशे सूर्यादेरेव प्रकाशकत्वं न घटादेः । अथ सूर्यादितन्त्रत्वादालोकस्य स एव तद्धर्मी, तत्संबन्धेनार्थान्तरस्य प्रकाशः इत्युच्यते, इहापि तर्हि चैतन्यस्यात्मधर्मत्वात्तेनार्थान्तरं स्पृशन् स एव जानातीत्युपपद्यते । तत्सिद्धं चैतन्यस्वभाव एवायमात्मा आत्मानं विदन्नेवास्ते ।

with several objects simultaneously constitutes doubt.[222] The conjunction following from impressions of previous knowledge (*jñānavāsanā*) constitutes recollection (*smṛti*) ; and so on with the rest. It has already been stated that what is called knowledge is the conjunction of the object with consciousness which is an attribute of the soul.

It cannot be said that since conjunction exists in both (the object and consciousness), the object also would have to be considered the knower. For conjunction with the object is not met with in the object itself. Indeed, the object is in conjunction with consciousness, as with external light. Although illumination is only relation with light, the source of light alone, such as the sun, rather than the pot and the like is considered to be the manifester. If it be suggested that in as much as light is dependent upon the sun, the latter alone is considered the possessor of this quality (light) and that the manifestation of other objects is due to the conjunction with this quality, (we reply) if that be so, in the present case also, the description 'He knows' legitimately applies only to the self who gets into contact with objects through the aid of consciousness, in as much as the latter is his quality. From all this it has to be concluded that the soul has certainly consciousness for its essential nature, and is aware of itself at all

* Dṛdhasamyogaḥ samśayaḥ is the reading found in all manuscripts and printed books. The correct reading is adṛdha samyogaḥ samśayaḥ. See *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*, Memorial Edition, page 30.

222. When we are in doubt as to whether the distant object is a post or a person, consciousness is in conjunction with two objects—the post and the person. As two mutually contradictory presentations cannot be given simultaneously in a single cognition, some maintain that in the state of doubt there are really two cognitions ; and that these arise in such a quick succession that they appear to be almost simultaneous. On this view, the conjunction of consciousness with the object is *adṛdha* (unsteady). Even on the view that in the state of doubt there is but a single cognition presenting two objects simultaneously, the conjunction of consciousness with the objects may be characterised as *adṛdha*. Here *adṛdhasamyoga* will mean 'conjunction involving mutual contradiction'. See *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi*, Memorial edition, p. 30.

अन्यत्तु निमित्तभेदानुसारेण जानाति न जानाति चेति ।

तदेवं चैतन्यस्वभावः परिस्फुरन्नप्ययमात्मा गम्भीरजलाशयचरमीनवज्जल-संसृष्टक्षीरवच्च न विविच्य स्फुटं चकास्तीति, तदुपपादनन्यायानुगताः पूर्वानुमानभेदा वचनानि चाद्रियन्ते । तैरप्यपरितुष्यन्तो यमनियमादियोगाङ्गानुष्ठानक्षपिताशुद्ध्यावरणमला निरोधाभ्यासपुटपाकनिर्धूतरजस्तमःकळङ्कसत्त्वोद्रेकसमुत्थस्वेतरसकलविषयवैलक्षण्यापरोक्षज्ञानाय प्रयतन्ते । भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्ते चापरोक्षज्ञानमुदयत इति सर्ववादिनिर्विवादमिति न तदुपपादनायाद्य प्रयत्यते ।

times; and that in regard to other objects (besides itself), owing to various causal conditions, it has to be said 'He knows', 'He does not know'.

Although the soul shines forth as having consciousness for its essential nature, yet, like the fish which moves about in the deep lake or the milk mingled with water, the soul does not shine forth clearly and distinctly. That is why the several arguments which have been advanced by the teachers of old, and which are consistent with the reasons employed for demonstrating the true nature of the soul, and the scriptural texts are held in esteem. Not deriving any satisfaction from these, (for, after all, they could only lead to *parokṣa jñāna*), persons who have got rid of the veiling obscurities and evils by the practice of *yama* (restraint) *niyama* (discipline) and other means of yoga[223] endeavour to secure immediate knowledge (*aparokṣa jñāna*) of the distinctness of the self from everything other than itself—a knowledge which arises from (1) the removal of impurities, such as, tamas and rajas, by the process of purification by fire (*puṭapāka*), in other words, by the practice of mental control, and (ii) the predominance of the sattva quality. Since the fact that this immediate knowledge arises at the culmination of the highest stage of concentration is not called in question by any of the rival disputants, no attempt is here made to establish it. Thus, with the

223. Yama (restraint), niyama (discipline), āsana (posture), prāṇāyāma (control of breath), pratyāhāra (withdrawal of senses from their objects), dhāraṇā- (concentration), dhyāna (meditation), and samādhi (realisation), constitute the eightfold (*aṣṭānga*) of yoga. Of these, the first, namely, yama signifies non-injury (ahimsā), truth-speaking (satya), abstinence from stealing (asteya), brahmacarya and giving up of possessions (aparigraha). Niyama denotes the cultivation of virtues, such as, purity (śauca), contentment (saṁtoṣa), fortitude (tapas), study (svādhyāya), and devotion to God (Īśvara-praṇidhāna). See *Yoga-sūtra* II, 28-32.

एवमात्मा स्वतस्सिद्धयन्नागमेनानुमानतः ।
योगाभ्यासभुवा स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षेण प्रकाश्यते ॥

३३. अथास्य कालावच्छेदपरीक्षा—तत्र सुगतमतानुसारिणः सन्मात्रानुबन्धिनीं क्षणिकतामाचक्षाणा नित्यात्मदर्शनमेव सर्वानर्थमूलं मन्यमानाः क्षणभङ्गिनमेनं सङ्गिरन्ते ; यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं सँश्चायमात्मेति । कथं पुनः सन्मात्रानुबन्धिनी क्षणिकता ? अक्षणिकस्य सत्तानुपपत्तेः । यन्न कस्मैचित्कार्याय अन्ततः सार्वज्ञविज्ञानगोचरत्वायापि न प्रभवति, न तस्य सद्भावः संभाव्यत इत्यर्थक्रियाकारितैव सत्ता भावानाम् । न च सा स्वव्यापकभूतक्रमयौगपद्यविरहिण्यक्षणिके सम्भविनीत्यन्यत्र निरवकाशतया क्षणिकतयैवानुबध्यते ।

aid of scriptural testimony, inference and perception resulting from the practice of yoga, the soul which is in itself self-luminous, is manifested more clearly and explicitly.

INQUIRY INTO THE DURATION OF THE SOUL

The Buddhistic View

33. Henceforth, the inquiry into the duration of the soul may be taken up. Maintaining that momentariness follows from the very fact of existence, and holding (also) that the root cause of all miseries is only the belief that the soul is eternal, the followers of the Buddhistic doctrines assert that the soul is momentary; and their argument is as follows:—Whatever exists is momentary; the soul exists; (and, therefore, it is momentary). Should it be asked how momentariness follows from the mere fact of existence, (it may be replied) 'because existence cannot be attributed to what is not momentary'. Since it is impossible to attribute existence to what cannot lead to fruitful activity, not even that of being the object of the comprehension of the Omniscient Being, the existence of objects is no other than the quality of leading to fruitful activity. And this (fruitful activity) is invariably associated only with momentariness; since it cannot be met with in that which is not momentary; for herein its invariable associates, namely, action all at once and action in a successive series, are absent.

कथं पुनः क्रमयौगपद्ययोरर्थक्रियाव्यापकत्वम्? कथं वा तयोरक्षणिकत्वान्निवृत्तिः श्रूयताम्।

अर्थक्रियासु भावानां कर्तृत्वस्य द्वयी गतिः।
क्रमेण युगपद्वेति न विधान्तरसम्भवः॥

भावाभाववदनयोरन्यतरनिवृत्तावन्यतरव्यवस्थानादर्थक्रियाजनने भावानां न तृतीयप्रकार-संभव इति क्रमाक्रमप्रतिबद्धैवार्थक्रिया। न चाक्षणिके क्रमयौगपद्ये संभवतः॥...........

*   *   *   *   *
*   *   *   *   *

आत्मसिद्धावितः परं ग्रन्थो नोपलभ्यते।

How could these, viz., action all at once and action in a successive series, be regarded as being associated with fruitful activity? How, again, could they be said to be absent from what is not momentary? (It is replied) 'Well, listen (to what follows)'. Objects may be said to bring about fruitful activity in one of two ways, either all at once or in a succession and there is no other possibility. In the case of these two (alternatives), as in that of being and not-being, if one is absent, the other is bound to exist; hence in the matter of objects generating fruitful activity, there could be no third possibility; therefore, fruitful activity is invariably associated with action, successive or non-successive. And activity taking place all at once, and action that is successive cannot be met with in what is not momentary. . . . .

*   *   *   *   *
*   *   *   *   *

All the manuscripts examined are incomplete and end here abruptly.

श्रीः

। श्रीमते यामुनाय नमः ।

॥ ईश्वरसिद्धिः ॥

तत्र कस्यचिदेकस्य वशे विश्वं प्रवर्तते ।
इति साधयितुं पूर्वं पूर्वपक्षं प्रचक्ष्महे ॥

तत्र मीमांसकाः प्राहुः——नायं सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिसम्पन्नः पुरुषोऽभ्युपगममर्हति; अतिपतितसकलसाधकप्रमाणसम्भावनाभूमित्वात् स्फुटविविधबाधकत्वाच्च । तथा हि— तस्य प्रत्यक्षमन्यद्वा साधकं भवेत्? प्रत्यक्षमपि लौकिकं वैदिकं वा?

व्यवस्थितमितस्वार्थं न तावदिह लौकिकम् ।
साधनं तेन सर्वार्थतज्ज्ञानादेरसिद्धितः ॥

In order to establish the truth that the universe runs its course under the control of some one person, let us, at the very outset, state the *prima facie* view on the matter.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA VIEW

In regard to this question, the Mīmāmsakas say:—A person endowed with the capacity to perceive all things directly cannot be posited; for such a person is beyond the reach of all the pramāṇas that could possibly help to prove his existence; (besides) there are several conclusive means of proof running counter to it (belief in such a person). To make the matter clear—(It may be asked) is it perception or some other pramāṇa that proves his existence? (If the reply is perception, there is the further question) is it ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*) or super-normal perception (*yaugika-pratyakṣa*)? The objects of ordinary perception being specific for each of the senses and being limited (to the *here* and *now*), ordinary perception cannot serve to prove the existence of the supreme soul; for, with its aid, all objects (without an exception), knowledge concerning them, and so on, cannot be apprehended.

सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिशालिनमवगमयता हि देशकालस्वभावविप्रकर्षव्यवधानजुषस्सर्व एवार्थास्तद्दर्शनं शक्तिश्च गोचरयितव्यानि । न च विद्यमानेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षयोग्यकतिपयविषयनियतवृत्तेर्लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य निरवधिरयं महिमा सम्भावनाभूमिरिति कथमिव तदिह साधनमिति मन्येमहि । नापि योगिप्रत्यक्षमस्य साधकम् ; यतः—

प्रत्यक्षत्वे तदप्येवं विद्यमानैकगोचरम् ।
भूतादिगोचरं वा न प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभादिवत् ॥

तत् खलु योगिविज्ञानमैन्द्रियकं न वा ? ऐन्द्रियकमपि बहिरिन्द्रियसम्भवमान्तरकरणजनितं वा ? बहिरिन्द्रियाणि तावत्समधिगतनिजविषयसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि तद्गोचरज्ञानजननानीति जगति विदितम् । अतो न रसनादिभिः रजतातिवृत्तव्यवहितादिसकलविषयवेदनप्रसङ्गः । न चाविद्यमानै रजतादिभिस्सम्भवति सन्निकर्षः; तस्य द्व्याश्रयत्वादाश्रया-

The instrument of knowledge which could reveal a person endowed with the capacity to perceive everything must necessarily have for its object (1) all things, notwithstanding their distance, their time of existence and nature, and notwithstanding the factors obstructing their apprehension, (2) knowledge concerning all these, and (3) the capacity to have this knowledge. When it is impossible even to think of such an illimitable greatness ever becoming the object of ordinary preception, which operates as a rule (according to the specific capacities of the different senses) in certain objects which are capable of coming into contact with the senses at the time, how could we imagine ordinary perception to be the effective means of proving the existence of a person (endowed with such greatness)?

Nor could the perception of the yogin be a means of proving his existence. For, if it is a mode of perception, it too can only reveal present objects. Were it to comprehend objects, past and future, it would, like intuitive insight (*pratibhā*), scarcely be perception. Besides, (there arises the question) is the knowledge of the yogin born of the senses or not? Even on the view that it is sensory knowledge, there crops up the further question, is that knowledge born of the outer senses or of the internal sense? It cannot originate from the outer senses; for it is well-known that the outer senses, provided with the auxiliary causes, namely, contact with the object appropriate thereto, give rise to knowledge concerning those objects. That is why there is no possibility of knowledge concerning all things, (e.g.) silver, bygone objects, and whatever is screened from view, arising from the senses, such as, the tongue. With objects, such as silver, that do not exist at the moment, there can be no contact; for contact presupposes two bases, and in the

भावे तदसम्भवात् । अतोऽपेक्षितोऽर्थसन्निकर्षः । सहकारिविरहे कथमिन्द्रियाण्यतीतादि-विषयसाक्षात्काराय कल्पेरन्?

भवति च—यत् यत्सहकारि यत्कार्यजननं, तत्तदभावे न तज्जनयति, यथा क्षिति-सलिलसहकारि अङ्कुरकार्यजननबीजं क्षित्याद्यभावेऽङ्कुरम् । अर्थसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि बहिरिन्द्रियाणि ज्ञानजननानीति तान्यपि नातीतेऽनागते वार्थे ज्ञानं जनयन्तीति न तदुपजनितं प्रत्यक्षं यथोक्तविषयनियममतिक्रामति ॥

नाप्यान्तरकरणसम्भवम्; आन्तरगोचर एव सुखादौ स्वान्तस्वातन्त्र्यात् । बाह्य-विषयमितिषु मनसो निरङ्कुशकरणताङ्गीकारे हि कृतं चक्षुरादिभिः । अतश्च न कश्चिद-न्धो बधिरो वा भवेत् ।

भवति चात्र—विमतिपदं मनो बहिरिन्द्रियनिरपेक्षं न बाह्यप्रत्यक्षगोचरे प्रवर्तते, तत्र

absence of either basis, there is no possibility of contact. Therefore, contact with objects is required (for perception arising from the outer senses). When the auxiliary cause is absent, how would the senses be capable of directly apprehending objects, such as by-gone things?

This may be expressed in syllogistic form:—That which produces a certain effect, when in association with a given auxiliary cause, cannot produce it in the absence of that auxiliary cause; for example, the seed which produces the sprout, when in association with the soil and moisture, does not produce the same in the absence of the soil and the like. The external senses, in association with the auxiliary cause, namely contact with objects, lead to knowledge. Therefore, in conformity with this principle, the outer senses do not also lead to knowledge of the past object or the future one. It has, therefore, to be concluded that the knowledge generated by the external senses cannot override the rule herein mentioned with regard to objects (that they should be present at the time, unclouded and appropriate to the senses).

Nor can it (i.e., the knowledge of the yogin) originate from the internal sense. For it is only in the domain of pleasure and other internal states that the mind holds complete sway. If even in regard to knowledge of external objects, the manas were admitted to be the unfettered and unaided instrument, then, the outer senses would become superfluous. It would follow therefrom that none could be either blind or deaf.

To express it in syllogistic form:—Without seeking the assistance of the outer organs, manas, whose precise mode of apprehending external objects is under dispute, cannot enter upon the province of external perception; for in regard to this field the activity of manas is dependent

तत्तन्त्रवृत्तित्वात्। यत् यत्र यत्तन्त्रवृत्ति, न तत्तन्निरपेक्षं तत्र प्रवर्तते; यथा आलोकापेक्ष-प्रवृत्ति चक्षुः स्वगोचरे अन्धतमस इति।

न च सिद्धौषधमन्त्रतपस्समाधिमहिमसमासादितातिशयानि इन्द्रियाणि कदाचिदपजहति समधिगतविषयनियममिति सम्भवति; सांसिद्धिकसामर्थ्याविर्भावैकफलत्वात्तेषाम्; सामर्थ्यस्य च प्रतिनियमात्। न खलु सुप्रयुक्तभेषजशतविहितसंस्कारमपि श्रोत्रं रूपरसविभागावगमाय कल्पते।

भवति च—विवादाध्यासितबाह्याभ्यन्तरकरणपाटवातिशयोऽनुल्लङ्घितसीमा, ऐन्द्रियकप्रकर्षत्वात्, दृश्यमानतत्प्रकर्षवत्, इत्यैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानं नातीतादि गोचरयति।

भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मनस्तु सत्यपि विशदनिर्भासित्वे प्राच्यानुभवगोचरादनधिकमधिकं वा अध्यवस्यतः स्मृतिविभ्रमस्रोतसोरन्यतरावर्तपरिवर्तिनः कुतः प्रामाण्यकूलप्रतिलम्भः? कुतस्तराञ्च प्रत्यक्षतयोत्तम्भनम्? प्रत्यक्षस्य वा सतः कथमिव विदितविषय-

upon the outer senses. That whose activity in a certain sphere is dependent upon a given entity cannot act in that sphere independent of that given entity; for example, the eye, whose proper functioning is dependent upon light, does not operate in its province, (viz., that of colour) in darkness.

It is impossible for the senses even occasionally to transcend the limitations which are known to prevail with regard to the object by virtue of the merit acquired through the efficacy of the drugs administered by perfected souls, of *mantras* (charms), austerities (*tapas*) and yogic concentration. For these (i.e., drugs, etc.) have for their result only the manifestation of the capacity inherent in the different senses; and this capacity is well-defined (for each of them). Though the ear may have acquired excellent powers through a hundred drugs properly administered, yet it is incapable of apprehending such diverse qualities as colour and taste.

To put the matter in syllogistic form:—The excellence of the skill belonging to the senses, external and internal, concerning which there is dispute, does not transcend its limits or bounds; for it is sensory excellence like the one perceived by us. Hence, sensory knowledge cannot make known bygone things and the like.

Though the knowledge that arises at the culmination of the highest stages of concentration shines forth clearly and distinctly, whether it sets forth something additional to what is revealed in previous experience or embraces nothing more than that, such a knowledge has to whirl in the eddy of the one or the other of the two streams of remembrance (*smṛti*) and illusion (*vibhrama*), and has no chance whatever of reaching the shore of validity (*prāmāṇya*). There is much less chance of trying to

नियमव्यतिक्रमः ? अतिक्रमतो वा कुतः प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति न विश्वानुभवैश्वर्यशालिनि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् ।

नापि प्रमाणान्तरम् । तत्खल्वनुमानमागमो वा ? अनुमानमपि विशेषतो दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं वा ? तत्र सकलपदवीदवीयसि भगवति न तावत् स्वलक्षणसाक्षात्कारपूर्वकाविनाभावावधारणाधीनोदयत्वादिदमनुमानमुदेतुमलम् । न ह्यनवगतचरहुतभुजस्तदविनाभावितया धूममनुसन्धातुमीशते । न च सर्वार्थनिर्माणसाक्षात्कारपटीयसि लिङ्गं सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि किञ्चन लभ्यते ।

नन्वेकचेतनाधीनं विवादाध्यासितं जगत् ।
अचेतनेनारब्धत्वादरोगस्य शरीरवत् ॥
तथा सर्वार्थनिर्माणसाक्षात्करणकौशलम् ।
कार्यत्वादेव जगतस्तत्कर्तुरनुमीयताम् ॥

enchance its validity by stating that it is perceptual knowledge. If it were a perception, how could it transcend the well-known limitations with regard to objects ? If it were to transcend these, how could it still be perceptual in character ? Hence, perception cannot be a valid means of proof in regard to the person endowed with the superhuman power of experiencing all things.

It cannot be any other pramāṇa either. (If it be) is that other pramāṇa inference or scripture (*āgama*)? If it is inference, is that *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* ? (It cannot be *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa ;* for) concerning the existence of God, who is beyond the reach of all the means of proof, no inference can arise ; since the birth of the latter is dependent upon the assurance of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the hetu and the sādhya, which, in its turn, presupposes the direct perception of what is proved. Indeed, those who are ignorant of fire would be incapable of understanding smoke as a universal concomitant of fire. Nor is a mark of inference (*linga*) of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* variety available in inferring the existence of a person who is competent to create all things and to perceive them directly.

THE NYĀYA ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The world, concerning which the question is raised :—Is it, or is it not, due to divine creation ?—is subservient to a single intelligent entity ; for, like the body of one who is free from disease, it is constituted of non-sentient matter. Further, as the world is an effect, the ability to create all things and perceive them directly must be inferred to belong to its author.

सर्वं हि कार्यमुपादानोपकरणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनसंवेदिचेतनरचितमवगतं घटमणिकगृहादि । कार्यञ्च विमतिपदमवनिगिरिमहार्णवादीति तदपि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्धेतुकमध्यवसीयते ।

न च कार्यत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम्; अवयवसन्निवेशादिभिर्हेतुभिस्तत्सिद्धेः । इह चान्त्यावयविभ्यः प्रभृति आद्व्यणुकमखिलमवयविक्रमनिहीयमाननानावयवव्यतिषङ्गविशेषजनितमवगतमित्यन्तत उपादानं चतुर्विधाः परमाणवः प्रपञ्चस्य । तेषामादिपरिस्पन्दश्च तदनुगुणादृष्टविशिष्टतत्तत्क्षेत्रज्ञसंयोगासमवायिकारणक इति उपकरणमपि समस्तक्षेत्रज्ञवर्तीनि धर्माधर्मलक्षणान्यदृष्टानि । प्रयोजनं पुनस्तदभिनिर्वर्तितविचित्रार्थक्रियाकार श्चेतनोपकारप्रकारभेदोऽपर्यन्तः । तदुपभुजस्त एव क्षेत्रज्ञास्सम्प्रदानम् । न चामी स्वसमवायिनावपि धर्माधर्मावलमवलोकयितुमिति तदतिरेकी निखिलभुवननिर्माणनिपुणोऽधिकरण-

Indeed, all effects such as pots, water-jars and houses are found to be created by intelligent beings who know the material and the auxiliary causes and also know for whom and for what purpose they are intended.[1] The objects under discussion, such as the earth, the mountain and the wide ocean, are effects; hence it has to be concluded that they, too, have for their cause an intelligent entity.

It cannot be contended that their being effects is itself unestablished; for this is well established on the strength of reasons such as the arrangement of the parts. All objects, commencing from wholes which are not themselves the parts of other wholes (*antyāvayavi*) and ending with the diads (*dvyaṇukas*), are known to be constituted by the peculiar combinations of diverse parts which decrease (in number) in accordance with the scale of wholes; hence it follows that ultimately four different kinds of infinitesimal atoms are the material causes of the world. As for the auxiliary cause (*upakaraṇa*), it must be the unseen powers (*adṛṣṭa*) in the shape of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) existing in all individual souls (*kṣetrajña*); for the initial movement (*parispanda*) of the infinitesimal atoms has for its non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) their conjunction with the manifold souls associated with unseen powers in the form of merit and demerit (*adṛṣṭa*) which are appropriate to this movement. As regards the purpose (of creation), it is the limitless and manifold forms of help rendered to the jīvas, a help which is in the shape of diverse, fruitful activities performed by them. The self-same jīvas who derive this help are the very persons for whom (*sampradāna*) the universe is intended. For the reason that these jīvas are incapable of perceiving the merits and demerits,

1. Compare Pāṇiniś sūtra-karmaṇā yamabhipraiti sa sampradānam. I. iv. 32.

सिद्धान्तसमधिगतनिरतिशयसहजसकलविषयसंविदैश्वर्यशक्त्यतिशयः पुरुषधौरेय एकः किमिति न सामान्यतोदृष्टलिङ्गादनुमीयते ।

तदिदमविदितानुमानवृत्तस्य स्वमतिरचिततरळतर्कोल्लसितमिति परिहसन्ति मीमांसकाः । तथा हि—किमिदमेकचेतनाधीनत्वन्नामाभिप्रेतं तनुभुवनादेः ? तदायत्तत्वमिति चेत् ,

किमस्य तस्मिन्नायत्तं किन्नु जन्माथवा स्थितिः ।
प्रवृत्तिर्वा द्वयोस्तावत्साध्यहीनं निदर्शनम् ॥

न खलु शरीरमेकचेतनाधीनोत्पत्तिस्थिति । ये हि यद्देहाधीनसुखदुःखोपभोगभागिनः, भवति हि तदुचितादृष्टशालिनां सर्वेषामेव तेषां तद्देहिन इव तदुत्पत्तिस्थितिनिमित्तत्वम् ।

अपि च शरीरावयविनः स्वावयवसमवायलक्षणा स्थितिः अवयवव्यतिषङ्गविशेषादृते

even though they are inherent in themselves, why should it not be inferred with the aid of a mark of inference (*linga*) of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* variety that there is a Supreme Person, who as understood from the *Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta,* is different from these finite souls, who is competent to create all the worlds, who is endowed with a knowledge of all things, which is of the most excellent kind and which is natural to him, and who is endowed with lordship and power of unsurpassed excellence.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The Mīmāmsakas ridicule this line of thought as being the outcome of arguments which are unsustainable and which are framed by the imagination of one who is ignorant of the methods of inference. To make the matter clear—What is the precise significance of the statement that the body, the world and the like are subservient to a single conscious entity ? If it is said that it signifies dependence upon that entity, (it may be asked) what is it that is dependent upon him ? Is it their origin or continuance or activity ? On the first two alternatives, the illustrative example cited would be defective in not possessing the *sādhya.* Indeed, the body is not dependent for its origin and continuance upon a single intelligent entity. All persons who share in the enjoyment of the pleasures and pains dependent upon a given body must also, equally with the person who owns it, be responsible for its origin and continuance; since they are endowed with unseen powers (*adṛṣṭa*) appropriate to that enjoyment.

The continuance of a complex whole like that of the body, which is in the form of the inherence of the whole in its parts, requires no

न चेतयितारं परमपेक्षते। या पुनस्तदपेक्षिणी प्राणनलक्षणा स्थितिः, न सा पक्षीकृते क्षित्यादौ सम्भवतीति स्थितिमपि नैकरूपां पक्षसपक्षानुयायिनीमुदीक्षामहे।

एकचेतनाधीनप्रवृत्तित्वे तु प्रबलबहुजनसरभसप्रयत्नप्रचाल्यैरुपलतरुरथादिभिर्व्यभिचारः। आरब्धत्वादेव चैतत्साध्यसिद्धावधिकमिदमुपादानविशेषवचनम्।

चेतनाधीनतामात्रसाधने सिद्धसाध्यता।
चेतनैर्भोक्तृभिर्भोग्यः कर्मभिर्जन्यते हि नः॥

युक्तश्चैतत्, यदुभयवादिसिद्धानामेव चेतनानां कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमः; लाघवात्।

न चोपदानाद्यनभिज्ञतया तत्प्रतिक्षेपः;

उपादानं पृथिव्यादि यागदानादि साधनम्।
साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमन्ते यत्सर्वे एव च चेतनाः॥

intelligent being apart from the peculiar inter-relation of the parts themselves. Continuance, understood in the sense of breathing, which stands in need of an intelligent person, is not met with in the earth and the like, which are offered as the *pakṣa* (minor term) in your argument; hence we fail to discern a uniform type of continuance existing in common in both the minor term (*pakṣa*) and the illustrative example (*sapakṣa*).

Should it be said that 'dependence' means having an activity subject to the control of a single intelligent entity, then, in consideration of instances like huge boulders or trees or cars which could be moved only with the strenuous effort put forth by several strong persons, the argument is liable to be charged with the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. Again, when the conclusion (namely, that the world presupposes an intelligent cause) follows from the very fact of the cosmos being constituted of (matter), the addition of the qualification 'endowed with a knowledge of the material cause and so on' is superfluous. If the argument were to establish only dependence upon a conscious entity, then, the argument is liable to be charged with the defect of proving what is already well-established; for this world has been created by our own past deeds (*karma*) as something fit for enjoyment by conscious beings, experiencers (*bhoktā*). It is proper to admit that the agency for the creation of the world belongs only to the conscious beings posited by both the rival disputants; for this hypothesis has the merit of economy of thought (*lāghava*).

It is impossible to deny agency to finite souls, on the score that they are not acquainted with the material cause and the like. For all intelligent beings are quite competent to perceive directly the material causes, namely, the elements like earth, and the auxiliary causes such as sacrifice (*yajña*) and gift (*dāna*).

अद्यवदेव विश्वम्भरादयः क्रमप्राप्तागन्तुकोपचयापचयैकदेशशालिनो न युगपदेव निरवशेषविलयजननभागिन इत्यन्तिमपरमाणुसाक्षात्कारो न कर्तृभावोपयोगी ॥

कर्मणश्शक्तिरूपं यदपूर्वादिपदास्पदम् ।
मा भूत्प्रत्यक्षता तस्य शक्तिमद्ध्यक्षगोचरः ॥

न खलु कुलालादयः कुम्भादिकार्यमारम्भमाणास्तदुपादानोपकरणभूतमृद्दण्डचक्रादिकार्योत्पादनशक्तिं साक्षात्कृत्य तत्तदारभन्ते । यदि परं शक्तिमविदुषामभिलषितसाधने तदुपादानादिव्यवहारोऽनुपपन्नः । इह तु

आगमादवगम्यन्ते विचित्राः कर्मशक्तयः ।
तेन कर्मभिरात्मानस्सर्वं निर्मिमतां पृथक् ॥

अपि च तदेव चेतनकर्तृकं जगति परिदृश्यते, यदेव शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादानादि च । न तथा महीमहीधरमहार्णवादीति कथमिव तत्तत्कार्यत्वम्? कथन्तराञ्च तदुपादा-

Direct perception of the infinitesimal atoms which are the ultimate building materials is not required for agency; because earth and other elements possessing at all times, as at the present moment, partial growth and decay which take place occasionally and gradually, do not secure at any time total annihilation or creation.

(It is futile to contend that as *yāga* and *dāna* become the causes of creation only through the mystic power (*apūrva*) which they generate and as this power is imperceptible to the jīva, he cannot be the agent; for) the mystic potency of activities which is referred to by terms, such as '*apūrva*,' may not be perceptible; but, surely, the act itself possessing this power is open to perception. In fact, the potter and other agents engaged in producing objects, such as jars, do not enter upon their respective activities only after having directly perceived the potency to produce the effect residing in their material and auxiliary causes, such as, the lump of clay and the wheel. However, in producing objects that are desired, the utilisation of their respective material causes would be impossible to those who are altogether ignorant of their potency. But here, the manifold potencies of activities are learnt through scriptures. Therefore, let it be held that finite souls severally are the agents in creating everything in the world with the aid of their own deeds.

Moreover, only that which it is possible to make, and whose material cause can possibly be known, is found everywhere to have a conscious being for its agent. For the reason that the earth, the mountain and the mighty ocean do not possess this nature (i.e., it is impossible to make them; and their material causes cannot be known), it is difficult to imagine how they can be regarded as the respective

नोपकरणादेस्साक्षात्कारगोचरता? यादृशं हि कार्यमुपादानाद्यभिज्ञपूर्वकमवगतं घटमणिकादि, तादृशमेव हि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वानुमानाय प्रभवतीति ।

अपि चानीश्वरेण परिमितशक्तिज्ञानेन विग्रहवता अनवाप्तकामेन कृतमवगतं घटादिकार्यमिति तथाविधं बोद्धारमुपस्थापयन्हेतुरभिमतपुरुषसार्वज्ञ्यसर्वैश्वर्यादिविपर्ययसाधनाद्विरुद्धः स्यात् ।

न चैवं सति सर्वानुमानव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गश्शङ्कितव्यः । प्रमाणान्तरगोचरे हि लिङ्गिनि लिङ्गबलादापततो विपरीतविशेषांस्तत्प्रमाणमेव प्रतिरुणद्धि । इह पुनरतिपतितसकलमानान्तरकर्मभावे सर्वनिर्माणनिपुणे सिषाधयिषिते यावन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारिताविनाभावभाजो धर्मास्तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयति ।

अपि च—

effects of different causes. It is even more difficult to conceive how their material and auxiliary causes could become the objects of direct perception. Only an effect like the jar or the water-pot, which is known to be dependent upon an intelligent entity acquainted with material and other causes, is capable of leading to the inference that an effect must have for its cause a sentient being possessing a knowledge of that kind (i.e., knowledge of *upādāna, upakaraṇa* and the like).

Further, in as much as an effect like the jar is known to be produced by a person who is different from God and who possesses limited powers and knowledge and who is endowed with a personality, and who has desires which are unfulfilled, the reason (*hetu*) cited by you, establishing as it does a knower answering to this description, is liable to be charged with *viruddha doṣa.* For it establishes the very reverse of omniscience and lordship over the universe which is sought to be proved as belonging to the person who is suggested to be the cause of the world.

(The Mīmāmsaka continues:)—There is no room for the objection that if this were so there would be an end to all reasoning. For, if the thing proved (*liṅgin*) is open to any *pramāṇa* other than that on which it is at the moment based, this other *pramāṇa* itself would dispel the contradictory features suggesting themselves on the strength of the mark of inference (*liṅga*). In the present case, however, when a person who transcends the reach of all other *pramāṇas* and who is competent to create all things is desired to be proved, the reason (*hetu*) will, in addition to proving him, establish also all those features which possess invariable concomitance ascertained on the strength of positive and negative evidence.

स्वार्थकारुण्यभावेन व्याप्ताः प्रेक्षावतः क्रियाः ।
ईश्वरस्योभयाभावाज्जगत्सर्गो न युज्यते ॥

अवाप्तकामत्वान्न तावदात्मार्थे सृजति । प्रळयसमये प्रलीनसकलकरणकळेबरादिभोगोपकरणतया च चेतनानां दुःखाभावाद्दुःखिदर्शनजनितकृपाप्रयुक्तिरपि नास्तीति व्यापकभूतस्वार्थकारुण्यनिवृत्तेर्व्याप्यभूतया प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यापि निवर्तितव्यम् ।

सुखैकतानं जनयेज्जगत्करुणया सृजन् ।
तत्कर्मानुविधायित्वे हीयेतास्य स्वतन्त्रता ॥

• न चोपादानादिसाक्षात्कारिण एव कर्तृत्वमित्यपि नियमः ; उपादानमुपकरणञ्चाविदुष एवात्मनो ज्ञानादिषु कर्तृत्वात् । अतः

असिद्धत्वाद्विरुद्धत्वादनैकान्त्याच्च वर्णितात् ।
कार्यत्वहेतोर्जगतो न यथोदितकर्तृता ॥

प्रयोगश्च भवति—महीमहीधरादि कार्यं न भवति, प्रसिद्धकार्यविलक्षणत्वात्,

The activities of a person in his senses are always invariably characterised by thought of personal gain or love to others. Since, in the case of God, none of these exists, the creation of the world cannot justifiably be ascribed to him. As all his desires are already fulfilled, he does not create the world for his own sake. Since at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) the jīvas are destitute of all the senses, body and other means of enjoyment, no sorrow is experienced by them; as a consequence, creation cannot be the result of the mercy evoked by the perception of persons afflicted by sorrow; hence, with the absence of the *vyāpaka* (the invariably concomitant), namely, personal gain and mercy, there must be the absence of the *vyāpya* (that which is inherent), namely, the activity of a sensible person. He who creates the universe out of mercy must have created it in such a fashion that pleasure alone is present in the universe. If it were suggested that he pays due regard to the past deeds of jīvas, his independence would be lost.

Besides, there is no rule to the effect that agency belongs only to that person who directly perceives the material cause and the like; for in respect of activities, such as knowing, agency belongs to the soul even though the latter is ignorant of the auxiliary causes. Hence, in as much as the *hetu*, namely, 'being an effect' is liable (for the considerations mentioned just now) to be charged with the defects of being unestablished (*asiddha*), adverse (*viruddha*) and *anekānta* (straying), it is impossible that the universe should have for its cause a person like the one suggested by you.

This may be expressed in syllogistic form thus:—(1) Phenomena, such as, the earth and the mountain, are not effects, for the reason that,

गगनवत्, अशक्यदर्शनोपादानोपकरणत्वाद्वा व्यतिरेकेण घटादिवत्। परमाणवः न प्रत्यक्षाः, निरतिशयसूक्ष्मद्रव्यत्वात्, तथैव घटादिवत्। विमतिविषयः कालः न लोकशून्यः, कालत्वात् इदानीन्तनकालवत्। तनुभुवनादि ईश्वरकर्तृकं न भवति, कार्यत्वात्तद्वदेव। ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति, प्रयोजनरहितत्वात्, अशरीरत्वाद्वा मुक्तात्मवत्। इति।

अत्र ब्रूमो न कार्यत्वं क्षित्यादौ शक्यनिह्नवम्।
सभागत्वात्क्रियावत्त्वान्महत्त्वेन विशेषितात्॥
तादृशादेव मूर्तत्वाद्बाह्यप्रत्यक्षतान्वितात्।
ससामान्यविशेषत्वादित्यादिभ्यो घटादिवत्॥

न चेदृश एव सन्निवेशः कार्यो नेतर इत्यवयवसन्निवेशप्रतिनियतं रूपभेदमुदीक्षामहे।

यत्तु शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादानोपकरणं च क्रियत इति, तदस्तु नाम। किन्तु

like ether, they are thoroughly unlike what are well-known to be effects, or for the reason that here, unlike the case of jars, the knowledge of material and auxiliary causes is impossible to secure. (2) The infinitesimal atoms are imperceptible; for, unlike jars and the like, they are exceedingly subtle substances. (3) The period under discussion (i.e., *pralaya*) is not characterised by the absence of the world; for it is also a period like the present one. (4) The body, the world and the like do not have God for their agent; for, like the jar, they are effects. (5) God is not an agent, because he has no purpose in creating the world, or because, like the released soul, he is not possessed of a body.

THE NAIYĀYIKA REPLY TO THE MĪMĀMSAKA CONTENTION

To these arguments of the Mīmāmsaka the Naiyāyika replies:—The character of being an effect cannot be denied to earth (*kṣiti*) and other substances; because, like the jar etc., they are endowed with parts, or with activities while they are yet big in magnitude, or with forms while they are yet big in magnitude, or with wider and narrower generality (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) while they are open to external perception and because of other reasons like this. We know of no distinct feature associated exclusively with a particular configuration of parts, about which it could be said 'This mode of configuration alone is an effect, and none else is.'

The contention that that alone can be said to be created which it is possible to produce and whose material and auxiliary causes can possibly be known may be true enough; but the capacity to do and the power

ते क्रियाज्ञानशक्ती क्रियाज्ञानाभ्यामेव समधिगमनीये । ते च क्षित्यादिषु यथोक्तसाधनबल-संमुत्थापिते इति न विशेषः प्रसिद्धप्राकारगोपुरादिकार्येभ्यस्तनुभुवनादेः । न चैतावानेव क्रियागोचर इति विषयनियमः कश्चित् क्रियाया दृष्टः, येनेदमशक्यक्रियमध्यवस्येम । सिद्धे च कार्यत्वे तदुपादानादिसाक्षात्करणतदधिष्ठानतत्प्रेरणनिपुणः पुरुषविशेषस्सिद्ध्यत्येव ।

अधिष्ठानं च तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणसङ्कल्पवदीश्वरसन्निकर्षः ; क्षेत्रज्ञेनेव स्वशरीरादौ । स च द्रव्यैस्संयोगलक्षणः । तद्गुणैस्तु संयुक्तसमवायरूपः ।

प्रवृत्तिश्च परमाणूनां परिस्पन्दलक्षणा । धर्माधर्मयोस्तु फलोदयानुकूलतादृश-देशकालादिसहकारिसहितता ।

न च* ताभ्यां धर्माधर्माभ्यामेव फलम् ; चेतनानधिष्ठितानां सर्वेषामेतेषामचैतन्ये-

to know can only be inferred from activity and knowledge. And since these have been shown to exist in respect of the earth (*kṣiti*) and the like, on the strength of the reasons adduced already, it is clear that there is no special feature that could mark off the body, the world and the like from well-known effects, such as, the temple tower and the wall. No restriction to the effect 'The scope of activity is only this much' is noticed to limit activity to certain objects alone; and if such a restriction exists, we may assert that this cosmos is impossible of production. If it is proved to be an effect, it necessarily follows that there is a person who is competent to perceive directly its material and other causes, and to control and direct the same.

As in the case of the control of his own body and (senses) by the jīva, here also (i.e., in regard to the cosmos) control (*adhiṣṭhāna*) consists merely in the proximity (to the cosmos) of a God possessed of a will conducive to its activity. With regard to substances (*dravya*) this proximity takes the form of conjunction (*samyoga*) ; and in regard to their qualities, it is inherence (*samavāya*) in that wherein there is conjunction (*samyukta*).

Coming to activity (*pravṛtti*), that of infinitesimal atoms is merely change of place (*parispanda*). With regard to merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), their activity is simply their coming into association with appropriate place (*deśa*) and times (*kāla*) and other auxiliary causes helpful to the starting of the fruits of deeds.

It is wrong to maintain that the fruits of activities result from merit and demerit themselves ; for these and all other things not controlled by an intelligent entity cannot effect anything by themselves ; since they are

*In the printed books and manuscripts this sentence reads thus, without the negative particle, 'tābhyām dharmādharmābhyām phalam'. But from the context it is clear that the text should be 'na ca tābhyām....'

नाकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । न हि चेतनेन वर्धकिनानधिष्ठिता वासी देशकालादिसहकारिशत-समधिगमेऽपि यूपादीन्यापादयितुमलम् । बीजाङ्कुरादयस्तु पक्षान्तर्भूता इति तैर्व्यभिचार-वचनमनभिज्ञतयैव श्रोत्रियाणाम् । एतेन सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः ।

न चोभयवादिसिद्धतामात्रेण क्षेत्रज्ञानामेवेदृशाधिष्ठातृत्वकल्पनमुचितम् ; तेषां सूक्ष्मव्यवहितादिदर्शनाशक्तेर्निश्चितत्वात् । दृष्टानुसारिणी हि सर्वत्र कल्पना ; न दृष्टविरोधिनी । न चैवमीश्वरस्याशक्तिर्निश्चिता ; प्रमाणान्तरतस्तत्सिद्धेः । यथोदितप्रमाणबलेन सिद्ध्यन् सांसिद्धिकसर्वार्थदर्शनतत्प्रेरणशक्तिसम्पन्न एव सिद्ध्यति ; कार्यत्वस्य समर्थकर्तृ-पूर्वकत्वेन प्रतिबन्धात् ।

devoid of sentience. Though provided with auxiliary causes, such as place and time, the axe not controlled by a carpenter, an intelligent being, is, indeed, incapable of making objects like the sacrificial post (*yūpa*). For the reason that instances such as seed-sprout are already included in the *pakṣa* (minor term), the suggestion that in view of the case of seed-sprout (where the non-sentient seed, not controlled by any intelligent agent, produces the seed by its own effort) the foregoing argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra* is the outcome of the ignorance (of the methods of inference) found in persons who are merely versed in the vedas. On the same count, the attempt to level the charge of *vyabhicāra* by citing the instance of pleasure[2] and the like stands condemned.

It is not right to attribute control to finite souls themselves simply because they are accepted by both the rival disputants; for the jīva's incapacity to perceive what is subtle and what is screened from view is well established. (Rather than admitting a separate entity, God, would it not be better to attribute this capacity to perceive the subtle and the hidden to finite souls themselves? The answer is in the negative) for what is posited must everywhere be in conformity with, and not contradictory to, what is known. It is not well established that the incapacity to perceive the subtle and the veiled belongs to God, as it belongs to the jīvas; because by means of other pramāṇas the capacity to perceive them is proved to belong to him. The person whose existence is proved on the strength of the argument already advanced is surely ascertained to possess in his essential nature the capacity to perceive all things and to direct them; for 'being an effect' is invariably concomitant with 'dependence upon a competent agent.'

2. Since pleasure and other affective states, which are devoid of consciousness, produce, even in the absence of any control from an intelligent person, their appropriate bodily responses, such as smiling, flow of tears and several organic and visceral changes, it may be urged that the argument is vitiated by *vyabhicāra doṣa*.

यत्तु परिमितशक्तिज्ञानानैश्वर्याद्यापादनाद्धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनत्वमुद्भावितम्; तदैतिस्थवीयः; अप्रयोजकत्वात्तेषाम्। न हि किञ्चित्क्रियमाणं कर्तुरर्थान्तरविषयमसामर्थ्यमज्ञानं* वा स्वोत्पत्तयेऽपेक्षते; स्वसम्पादनसमर्थकर्तृमात्राक्षेपात् केवलं व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः‡। तावतैवोपपद्यमाने कार्योदयेऽसम्बन्धिनोऽकिञ्चित्करस्यार्थान्तरविषयस्याभावस्य हेतुत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः।

अपि च किं तदितरसमस्तवस्तुविषयमज्ञानादिव्यापकमुत कतिपयगोचरमिति विवेचनीयम्। न तावदशेषविषयम्; अनुपलब्धेः। न खलु कुम्भकारः कुम्भातिरेकि किमपि न विजानाति। अथ कतिपयविषयम्; तदपि न, अनियतविषयतया तस्य तस्य व्यभिचारदर्शनात्। न चास्ति किञ्चिद्व्यवस्थितं, यदविद्यादिमानेव कर्तृतामनुभवति।

The objection raised already (vide p. 162), namely that, as the *hetu* points only to limited capacity and fragmentary knowledge and to the absence of lordship, it establishes only the reverse of the qualities intended to be proved, is highly superficial; for, clearly, the *hetu* in question does not lead to the inferring of limited powers and the like. In fact, for its own production any object that is being produced does not require on the part of its agent either the incapacity to effect other things or ignorance concerning them; for, in as much as it would only lead to the inference that there is a person competent to make it, the absence of the capacity to produce other things does not follow therefrom. When the production of an effect may well take place solely with the aid of knowledge and power concerning the same, it is quite unnecessary to consider what is wholly unrelated to it and what has nothing to do with it, namely the absence (of knowledge and power) concerning other effects, as being responsible for its production.

Further, it has to be carefully ascertained whether what is said to be invariably concomitant (*vyāpaka*), namely, 'ignorance of other things and incapacity to effect them', concerns all things other than the effect in question or certain things only. It cannot be ignorance pertaining to all things; for we know of no such ignorance. Indeed, the potter is not ignorant of everything excepting the pot. If it be urged that the ignorance pertains to certain things only, even this suggestion fares no better; for, so long as the object of ignorance is left unspecified, the argument is liable to be charged with *vyabhicāra doṣa* in view of the fact that even in the absence of ignorance concerning any given object, agency is still possible. No one object has been specified in order to be able

* The reading found in all books is '. . . asāmarthyam jñānam . . .' but it ought to be '. . . asāmarthyamajñānam . . .'

‡ All books examined read 'kevalavyatirekāsiddheḥ'. Perhaps a better reading would be 'kevalam vyatirekāsiddheḥ'.

न च शरीरिणैव कर्त्रा भाव्यम्; शरीरग्रहणेनैवानैकान्त्यात्। न खलु शरीरविशिष्टस्सन्नेवायमात्मा शरीरमुपादत्ते; योगिनो युगपदनेकशरीरग्रहणायोगात्। पूर्वदेहपरित्यागेन देहान्तरप्रापककर्मप्रेरितप्राणसहाय एव देहान्तरं प्रविशतीत्युपपादितमात्मचिन्तायाम्।

किञ्च आत्मनश्शरीरमधितिष्ठतोऽधिष्ठानक्रियाकर्मभूतस्य देहस्याधिष्ठातृदेहानुप्रवेशोऽनुपपन्नः; युगपदेकक्रियायामेकस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधात्। अधितिष्ठासितदेहसंयोगवत एव तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणप्रयत्नयोगलक्षणमधिष्ठानं दृष्टमिति चेत्, नह्येतत्। किन्तु तदसम्बद्धस्य तदधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः* प्रेर्यवस्तुसम्बन्धिना प्रेरकेण भवितव्यमिति। किन्तु न पुनर्देहसम्बन्धेन भाव्यमिति कुतो निर्णयः? इत एव यतोन्यदप्यधिष्ठीयमानं मानदण्डादि स्वसम्बन्धिनैवा-

to assert "Only that person who is ignorant of such and such an object is fit to become an agent."

There is no need to contend that the agent should only be a person endowed with a body; for this contention is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa* in view of the very fact of the activity of assuming a body. Indeed, the soul does not take up a body while being already associated with a body; for, then, it would be impossible for the yogin to take up several bodies simultaneously. When discussing the nature of the soul it has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former body the soul enters upon another solely with the assistance of vital breath (*prāṇa*) which is induced to activity by past deeds which procure a fresh body.

Moreover, the body which is the object of the controlling activity on the part of the self, the controller of the body, cannot intelligibly be included in the very body of the definition of the controller; for one and the same thing being at once the agent and the object in the selfsame activity involves a contradiction. If it be maintained that control, which is simply the possession of an effort conducive to the activity of the body, is known to belong only to him who is in conjunction with the body which is sought to be controlled, it has to be replied: 'let it be admitted that the controller should be related to the object controlled; since the control of a given object is impossible to him who is unrelated to it.' (It may be asked) How is it determined that this relation need not be the bodily relation? (The reply is) "It is for this reason, namely, that other objects also, such as

* In preference to the two readings (i) astvekatattvasambandhasya adhiṣṭhānānupapatteḥ (Chaukamba edition) and (ii) astvekatattvasambaddhasya adhiṣṭhānānupapatteḥ (Telugu edition), the variant reading suggested in the Telugu edition—nahyetat | kintu tadasambaddhasya tadadhiṣṭhānānupapatteḥ—has been adopted.

घिष्ठीयते । तेनाधिष्ठानक्रियापेक्षिताधिष्ठेयपदार्थसम्बन्धमात्रातिरेकेण देहसम्बन्धो नामापरो नादर्तव्यः । अस्ति चेश्वरस्यापि जगदुपादानोपकरणैस्सम्बन्ध इत्युक्तमेव ।

अथ स्वदेहव्यतिरिक्ते वस्तुनि प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरत्वं देहद्वारेणैव ; दृष्टं हि दण्डचक्रादिषु करसंयोगादिना कुलालादेः प्रवर्तयितृत्वमित्युच्येत ; तदपि न ; अभिध्यानमात्रेण परशरीरगतगरनिरसनविसारणदर्शनात् ।

कथमसति शरीरे परप्रेरणात्मकः सङ्कल्प इति चेत्, किं शरीरं सङ्कल्पयति येन तदभावे न भवेत् । करणमिति चेन्न ; मनसः करणत्वात् ।

किमस्तीश्वरस्य मनः ? बाढम् । नन्वेवं विग्रहधर्माधर्मानैश्वर्यादयस्साधारणधर्माः प्रादुष्ष्युः । मैवम् ; कार्यत्वाक्षिप्तसमर्थकर्तृमत्त्वद्रढिम्नैवापास्तत्वात् । मनसो नित्येन्द्रियतया देहापगमेऽपि सम्बन्धाभ्युपगमादनैकान्तिकश्च । यावद्धि दृष्टानुगुणं व्याप्त्यु-

the measuring rod, are controlled by one who is merely related to them." Therefore, apart from what is required for the controlling activity, namely, mere relation to the object controlled, no other relation like the relation to the body, need be countenanced. And it has already been pointed out that relationship to material and auxiliary causes of the cosmos exists in God.

It may be objected that the causing of any particular form of activity in things other that the body is done only with the aid of the body; for it is found that the power in the staff, wheel and the like belongs to the potter and other agents only in virtue of factors, such as contact with the hand. This objection too is untenable; for the extraction and the scattering of the poison that has entered one's body is observed to be effected by another by the mere exercise of his will.

When the body is absent how, it may be asked, could the will to cause movements in other things arise? (The reply is) Then is it contended that it is the body that wills? If that is so, in its absence there will be no will. Should it be urged that the body (does not itself will, but) is the instrument (*karaṇa*) in the act of willing, it may be replied "not so"; for the mind (*manas*) is the instrument of willing.

Has God, then, a manas? (The answer is) "Quite so". If it be said that in that event, certain common features, such as the possession of a body, merit and demerit and the absence of sovereignty, would have to be attributed to God; the reply is "not so." For this objection is set aside on the very strength of the fact of the world having a competent agent, a fact inferred with the aid of the *hetu* that it is an effect. Moreover, since even when the body perishes contact with manas has been admitted, in as much as it is an eternal organ of sense, the argument is vitiated by *anekānta doṣa*. In fact, only that much which is

पयोगि, तावदनुज्ञायते । न चास्मदादेर्मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनस्यापर्यन्तविस्तारस्य महाभूतभौतिकप्रपञ्चस्य प्रादेशिकशरीरकः किञ्चिज्ज्ञः पुण्यपापपरवशगतिरलं निर्माणायेत्यपरिमितज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिः शरीराद्यनपेक्षस्सङ्कल्पादेव सकलभुवननिर्माणक्षमः कर्ता सिद्धः ।

ईदृशेन कर्त्रा घटादिषु कार्यत्वस्य सम्बन्धो न दृष्ट इति चेत्, अतिगहनगिरितटाधिष्ठानेन अतिप्रकृष्टादृष्टचरेन्धननिवहसम्बन्धिना हुतवहविशेषेण महानसादौ धूमस्य वा किं सम्बन्धो दृष्टः, येन धूमविशेषदर्शनाद्गिरिशिखरे तथाविधाग्निरनुमीयते । यादृशो धूमो यत्रावगतस्तत्रैव तादृशस्तत्सम्पादनसमर्थः । दृष्टान्तभूमावपरिदृष्टोऽपि सामान्यव्याप्तिबलेन पक्षधर्मतावशात्सिद्ध्यतीति चेत्, तदिदमस्माभिरभिधीयमानं किमिति न हृदयमधिरोहति भवताम् । इहापि कार्यत्वं

relevant to the inductive relation and which is in conformity with what is perceived is admitted. Since a person whose body occupies a limited area, whose knowledge is limited and whose action is subject to merit and demerit, is incapable of creating the world composed of the primal elements and what is constituted of these, and possessed of a structure inconceivable even by our minds and an extent which is boundless, it has to be concluded that there is an agent who is endowed with illimitable knowledge, sovereignty, and power and who, without requiring the body, is capable of creating all the worlds with the sole aid of his will. If it be said that in instances such as the jar no invariable relation between the character of being an effect and an agent of this description is observed, (we ask in reply) is the relation of smoke with fire of a description which exists on the dense hill side, which is never experienced before, which is huge in volume and fed by an enormous quantity of fuel ever noticed in the kitchen? If it were so, on the perception of a particular kind of smoke it could be inferred that on the hill-top there is fire of that description. If it be said that when a certain kind of smoke is found in a given place (to be concomitant with a particular kind of fire) that kind of smoke will be capable of leading to inference of that kind of fire in that locality alone, and that a fire of a different description, even when it is not noticed in the illustrative example, could still be inferred with the aid of the inductive relation of smoke in general with fire in general, in consideration of the pakṣa wherein it resides (in this argument it is the hill), (we ask) how is it that when we maintain the same position it fails to appeal to your mind? Here also the character of being an effect, which is known in examples, such as the pot, to have an invariable concomitance with dependence

समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियमं क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वसम्पादनसमर्थमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धिमत्कर्तारमुपस्थापयति । यथैव हि देशकालेन्धनपरिमाणादिविशेषानादरेण धूमस्य स्वोदयानुगुणहुतवहमात्रेण सम्बन्धनियमः, तथैव अनीश्वरत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वशरीरित्वपुण्यपापपरवशत्वमनुष्यत्वादिविशेषप्रहाणेन कार्यस्य स्वनिर्माणसमर्थबुद्धिमत्कर्तृमात्रेण सम्बन्धनियमनिश्चय इति न कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

अपि च विभुद्रव्यसंयोगिनः परिस्पन्दवतश्च सर्वत्र स्पर्शवत्त्वाव्यभिचारेऽपि ज्ञानसुखादिनित्यद्रव्यविशेषगुणानुमितात्मसंयोगिनः मनसः कथमिव स्पर्शरहितत्वम्? । कथं च वायवीयद्रव्यस्य महिमगुणशालिनो नियताधिष्ठानस्पार्शनत्वनियमदर्शनेऽपि त्वगिन्द्रिये

upon a competent agent, when noticed in the case of earth and the like, points to an intelligent agent, who is capable of producing them and is hitherto unknown. Just as by ignoring the place where fire is found, the time of its existence, the fuel by which it is fed, the size and other characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is established; even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as, the absence of lordship (*anīśvaratva*), the possession of fragmentary knowledge, the character of owning a body, of being subject to merit and demerit, and of being human, universal concomitance of an effect with an intelligent agent merely, who is competent to make it, is ascertained. Hence, there is no special feature marking off these two cases.

(Difficulties arise when it is insisted that all the special features found in the illustrative example should be found in all the cases coming under that vyāpti. For example) :—When an object, which is in conjunction with an all-pervasive substance and which possesses movement, is known without exception to be everywhere associated with the possession of touch, how can the mind[3] whose conjunction with the soul is inferred from consciousness, pleasure and other special qualities of an eternal substance, be devoid of touch (*sparśa*)? When what is composed of wind and what possesses visible magnitude is found to be invariably concomitant with the character of being the object of the sensation of touch and is also found to have a particular abode, how can the opposite character be met with in the sense of touch ?[4]

3. The Naiyāyika raises this objection against the Prābhākara school, and not against the Bhāṭṭa school, of Mīmāmsā ; for the former believes that manas is atomic, while the latter maintains that manas, like the *ātman*, is all-pervasive (*vibhu*). And on the Naiyāyika view that there cannot be any *samyoga* between two *vibhudravyas*, manas cannot be in conjunction with the soul.

4. Some entities constituted of vāyu, such as prāṇa, apāna, viyāna, udāna and samāna, dwell only in particular regions of the body. For example, prāna is said to dwell in the heart (*hṛdi*); and samāna, in the navel (*nābhi*). And the air outside is cognisable by the sense of touch. The sense organ for touch, however, has the

तद्विपर्ययः ? तैजसस्य वा रूपस्पर्शयोरन्यतरस्य वा प्राकट्यनियमेऽपि रूपोपलम्भसाधनतानुमिततैजसभावस्य चक्षुषो नियमेन तदुभयानुद्भवाभ्युपगमः ? ।

अथ कार्यदर्शनानुमितसद्भावानां तैजसादिभावेऽपि तत्तद्विशेषाणां योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् तदभ्युपगमेऽनेकनियमभङ्गप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाभ्युपगमः, हन्त तर्हि प्रकृतविषयेऽपि प्रसञ्जितधर्मविशेषाणामनुपलम्भबाधाविशेषादनेकनियमविघातप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाभ्युपगम इति सर्वं समानमन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् ।

दृश्यन्ते हि नीतयः—यथा, विवादास्पदं परमाण्वादि प्रेक्षावत्प्रेरितं चेष्टते, अचेतनत्वात् । यदचेतनं, तत्तथा, यथा तथाविधं कन्दुकादि । तथा विवादाध्यासिता बाह्याभ्यन्तरप्रवृत्तयः प्रकृत्युपकरणप्रत्यक्षपूर्विकाः, कार्यत्वात्, तद्वदेव ।

When either the colour (*rūpa*) or the contact (*sparśa*) of fiery objects must invariably be explicit, how could it be admitted that these two are never explicit in the eye, which is inferred to be fiery, for the reason that it is the instrument for cognising colour ?

If it be said that it is so admitted (i.e, that the eye is devoid of explicit *rūpa* or *sparśa*) for the reason that the belief in the special qualities (i.e., explicit *rūpa* or *sparśa*) appropriate to the respective cases is contradicted by effectual non-apprehension (*yogyānupalabdhi*), even though the character of being fiery is attributed to these (i.e., the eye and so forth) whose existence is inferred from a knowledge of their activity, and for the reason that on this admission (namely, that the special features found in the illustrative examples should be inferred to exist in other cases as well), there would be an end to all inference ; (it may be replied) well, if that be so even in the case under discussion it may be admitted that these qualities do not belong to the creator of the world, because the special qualities of the potter, which in your opinion would have to be attributed to the creator of the earth and the like, are likewise contradicted by non-apprehension and because such an admission would mean an end to all inductive generalisation. Thus, the two cases are in every respect similar, except your prejudice.

In fact the following arguments are met with (1) The infinitesimal atoms and so forth, the precise manner of whose activity is under dispute, act under the direction of an intelligent person ; for they are non-sentient and whatever is a non-sentient object, acts in this way ; for example, the ball and other non-sentient objects. (2) All activities, internal and external, concerning which there is difference of opinion, presuppose the perception of their material and auxiliary causes ; because, like the activities of the examples cited in the previous argument,

entire body for its adhiṣṭhāna and not merely a particular region thereof. Nor is it the object of the sense of touch.

*प्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रमेयत्वात्पदार्थत्वाद्घटादिवत् ।
एकेच्छानुविधायीदमचैतन्यात्स्वदेहवत् ॥
एकेनाधिष्ठिताः कार्यं कुर्वते सर्वचेतनाः ।
देहसम्बन्धसापेक्षकार्यकृत्त्वात्त्वगादिवत् ॥

they are effects. (3) The infinitesimal atom is perceptible; because, like the jar, it is an object of knowledge and is an entity. (4) The world is dependent upon the will of a person; for, like our own body, it is devoid of consciousness. (5) All intelligent persons act only under the control of a single intelligent entity (i.e., God); for by standing in need of contact with their bodies they enter upon their

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* In the Chaukamba and Telugu editions the following variant reading for the text commencing after the word योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् and ending with तद्वदेव is suggested:—

तदभ्युपगमेऽनेकनियमदर्शनविघातप्रसङ्गाच्च पक्षधर्मताबललभ्यार्थविशेषावबोधकानेकश्रुत्यादिमानबाधप्रसङ्गाच्च समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियमं कार्यत्वं क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वोत्पादकमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धिमत्कर्तारमद्वितीयं पुरुषधौरेयं साधयतीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तरतमभावापन्नवैचित्र्यवत्तत्तत्कार्येषु कार्यत्वमेव तत्तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमापयति चेत्, महीमहीधरादिरूपजगद्गतकार्यत्वमपि तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमापयतीति कैमुत्यसिद्धेऽर्थे व्यर्थोऽयं निरीश्वरमीमांसकस्यात्र दुरभिनिवेशः । दृश्यन्ते ह्यस्मिन्नर्थे अन्ये च हेतवः (1) त्रैकालिकं कृत्स्नं जगत् तदनुगुणशक्त्यादिगुणगणवदायत्तस्थितिलयकं, अचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनत्वात्, अतिकुशलैकायत्तस्थित्यादिकतया प्रमितचित्रप्रतिमादवत् । (2) विभूतिपदाभिधेयं कृत्स्नं एकाधेयविधेयशेषभावं, तच्छरीरत्वात्, मच्छरीरवत् ।

Except for the two new arguments which this passage sets forth at its end, it contains no substantial change. These arguments are:—

(1) The world existing at all times, the past, the present and the future, possesses a continuance and a destruction which are subject to a person endowed with a group of qualities, such as power, appropriate thereto; because it has manifold wonderful shapes inconceivable even by the mind; for example, pictures and dolls which are well known to have their continuance and so forth subject to a very competent person. (2) All things denoted by the expression *vibhūti* possess the characters of being supported by (*ādheyatva*), being controlled by (*vidheyatva*), and existing for the sake of (*śeṣatva*) a person; for, in the manner of one's own body, they constitute his body.

एकप्रधानपुरुषं विवादाध्यासितं जगत् ।
चेतनाचेतनात्मत्वादेकराजकदेशवत् ॥

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॥ श्रीयामुनाय नमः ॥

एतावानेवायं ग्रन्थ उपलभ्यते ।

activities, like the sense of touch and so forth. (6) The world, which is the object of all this dispute, points to a single Supreme Person; because, like a country ruled over by a supreme monarch, the world consists of sentient and nonsentient entities.

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The text of Īśvara-Siddhi available is only this much.

॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ श्रीमते यामुनाय नमः ॥

॥ संवित्सिद्धिः ॥

एकमेवाद्वितीयं तद्ब्रह्मेत्युपनिषद्वचः ।
ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य सद्भावं ननु तत्प्रतिषेधति ॥
अत्र ब्रूमोऽद्वितीयोक्तौ समासः को विवक्षितः ।
किं स्वित्तत्पुरुषः किं वा बहुव्रीहिरथोच्यताम् ॥
पूर्वस्मिन्नुत्तरस्तावत्प्राधान्येन विवक्ष्यते ।
पदार्थस्तत्र तद्ब्रह्म ततोऽन्यत्सदृशं तु वा ॥
तद्विरुद्धमथो वा स्यात्त्रिष्वप्यन्यं न बाधते ।
अन्यत्वे सदृशत्वे वा द्वितीयं सिद्ध्यति ध्रुवम् ॥
विरुद्धत्वे द्वितीयेन तृतीयं प्रथमं तु वा ।
ब्रह्म प्राप्नोति यस्मात्तद् द्वितीयेन विरुद्ध्यते ॥

It is contended that the upaniṣadic text "Brahman (exists) one only, without a second" denies the existence of everything other than Brahman. Against this contention we argue as follows:—In what light is the compound word *advitīya* to be understood ? Is it a *tatpuruṣa* or a *bahuvrīhi* compound ? If it is the former, the significance of the latter part of the compound word must be considered as primary. Does the latter part declare that Brahman is 'different from' or 'similar to' or 'opposed to' *dvitīya* (the second)? In none of these alternatives does the text deny the existence of something other than Brahman. A second entity is clearly established if the word *advitīya* signifies 'different from' or 'similar to.' If it means 'opposed to the second', then Brahman must be either a first or a third entity ; for what stands opposed to the second is 'the first' or 'the third'. Therefore, hosts of objects, three and more,

अतस्सप्रथमास्सर्वे तृतीयाद्यर्थराशयः ।
द्वितीयेन तथा स्पृष्टास्स्वस्थास्तिष्ठन्त्यबाधिताः ।
ननु नञ् ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य सर्वस्यैव निषेधकम् ।
द्वितीयग्रहणं यस्मात्सर्वस्यैवोपलक्षणम् ॥
नैवं निषेधो न ह्यस्माद् द्वितीयस्यावगम्यते ।
ततोऽन्यत्तद्विरुद्धं वा सदृशं वात्र वक्ति सः ॥
द्वितीयं यस्य नैवास्ति तद्ब्रह्मेति विवक्षिते ।
सत्यादिलक्षणोक्तीनामपलक्षणता भवेत् ॥
अद्वितीये द्वितीयार्थनास्तितामात्रगोचरे ।
स्वनिष्ठत्वान्नञर्थस्य न स्याद्ब्रह्मपदान्वयः ॥
द्वितीयशून्यता तत्र ब्रह्मणो न विशेषणम् ।
विशेषणे वा तद्ब्रह्म तृतीयं प्रथमं तु वा ॥

along with the single entity untouched by duality (i.e., all objects with the exception of the second) do assuredly exist uncontradicted.

Since the term 'the second' (*dvitīya*) has the implicit designation (*upalakṣaṇa*) of also the third, the fourth and so forth, it may be urged that the negative particle denies everything other than Brahman (and not merely the second). But the reply is "Not so." The denial of a second entity should not be inferred from this expression ; it only asserts that Brahman is something 'different from' or 'opposed to' or 'similar to the second.'[1]

If it is said that Brahman may be described as that which has no trace of duality, then words such as *satya* which define Brahman would turn out to be erroneous definitions (for they imply substance-attribute relation). If the expression *advitīya* were to dencte merely the absence of a second, Brahman would be self-existent, and, as such, the negative particle could not be associated with the term Brahman.

'Being without a second' cannot be a qualification of Brahman. Were it a qualification, it would (as already shown) follow that Brahman is either the first or the third entity.

1. Tadanya-tadviruddha-tadabhāveṣu nañ.

प्रसक्तं पूर्ववत्सर्वं बहुव्रीहौ समस्यति ।
ब्रह्मणः प्रथमा ये च तृतीयाद्या जगत्त्रये ॥
ब्रह्म प्रत्यद्वितीयत्वात्स्वस्थास्तिष्ठन्त्यबाधिताः ।
किं च तत्र बहुव्रीहौ समासे संश्रिते सति ॥
व(वृ)त्त्यर्थस्य नञर्थस्य न पदार्थान्तरान्वयः ।
सत्यार्थान्तरसम्बन्धे षष्ठी यस्येति युज्यते ॥
द्वितीयवस्तुनास्तित्वं न ब्रह्म न विशेषणम् ।
असत्त्वान्न ह्यसद्ब्रह्म भवेन्नापि विशेषणम् ॥
तस्मात्प्रपञ्चसद्भावो नाद्वैतश्रुतिबाधितः ।
स्वप्रमाणबलात्सिद्धश्श्रुत्या चाप्यनुमोदितः ॥

Even if the word is taken as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, it would follow that all objects exist. All objects of the three worlds, which, in relation to Brahman, could be spoken of as the first, the third, fourth and so on, would exist safely and without any danger of ever being contradicted; for all that is denied is merely the possession of a second.

Moreover, if the word is taken as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the significance of the negative particle found in the compound cannot be said to be associated with anything else; for it is only in the event of there being a true relation (of Brahman) with something else that the genetive case implied in the compound (*that for which* there is no second) would be appropriate. (It is only if the phrase 'not having a second' could be attributed to something, that *advitīya* could be taken as a *bahuvrīhi* compound).

The phrase 'The absence of a second' does not mean Brahman itself nor an attribute thereof. For it is essentially negative, while Brahman is really not negative. Nor could it be an attribute of Brahman; (for according to the opponent, Brahman is devoid of qualities). Thus the existence of the world is not contradicted by scriptural texts speaking of reality as non-dual. The existence of the world is established by the sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) relevant thereto. Their verdict is further confirmed by scriptural testimony.

इत्यादिकास्समस्तस्य तदित्थंभावतत्पराः ।
वाचारम्भणमात्रन्तु जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम् ॥
विकारजातं कूटस्थं मूलकारणमेव सत् ।
अनन्यत्कारणात्कार्यं पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गवत् ॥
मृत्तिकालोहबीजादिनानादृष्टान्तविस्तरैः ।
नाशकद्दग्धुमनलस्तृणं मज्जयितुं जलम् ॥
न वायुश्चलितुं शक्तस्तच्छक्त्याप्यायनादृते ।
एकप्रधानविज्ञानाद्विज्ञातमखिलं भवेत् ॥
इत्यादिवेदवचनतन्मूलाप्तागमैरपि ।
ब्रह्मात्मना(त्मा ?)त्मलाभोऽयं प्रपञ्चश्चिदचिन्मयः ॥
इति प्रमीयते ब्राह्मी विभूतिर्न निषिध्यते ।
तन्निषेधे समस्तस्य मिथ्यात्वाल्लोकवेदयोः ॥
व्यवहारास्तु लुप्येरंस्तथा स्याद्ब्रह्मधीरपि ।

The world consisting of objects which are liable to modifications and which are either moveable or immoveable exists for purposes of speech. The unchanging and ultimate cause of all these is *sat* alone. Just as the sparks are not different from fire wherein they take their rise, even so the effect is not different from its cause. That the effect is not different from its cause is shown by numerous illustrations, such as clay, iron, seed and so forth. Without being nourished by Brahman's power, fire would not be capable of burning even a blade of grass; water would not be capable of drowning; and the wind would be unable to move. "By an understanding of the one Supreme Being, all become known."

With the aid of scriptural texts such as the foregoing and smṛti texts based thereon, it is learnt that the world constituted of sentient and non-sentient objects derives its very being from the fact of its having Brahman for its soul. The possessions of Brahman are not contradicted by these passages. Should it be contended that their existence is denied, then it would follow that all activities, sacred and secular, nay even the knowledge of Brahman would cease to be; because everything (other than Brahman) would be illusory.

व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वान्मृषात्वेऽप्यविरुद्धता ॥
प्रत्यक्षादेरिति मतं प्रागेव समदूदुषम् ।
अतश्चोपनिषज्ज्ञा(ज्ञा ?)तब्रह्माद्वैतधिया जगत् ॥
न बाध्यते विभूतित्वाद्ब्रह्मणश्चेत्यवस्थितम् ।
ननु सत्त्वे प्रपञ्चस्य नास्तीति प्रत्ययः कथम् ॥
असत्त्वे वा कथं तस्मिन्नस्तीति प्रत्ययो भवेत् ।
सदसत्त्वं तथैकस्य विरुद्धत्वादसंभवि ॥
सदसत्प्रत्ययप्राप्तविरुद्धद्वन्द्वसङ्गमे ।
तयोरन्यतरार्थस्य निश्चयाभावहेतुतः ॥
सदसत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य जैनास्तु प्रतिजानते ।

I have already refuted the contention that although objects are in fact illusory, perceptual experience and the like are not contradicted, in so far as objects are said to possess phenomenal reality (*vyāvahārika satyatva*). Thus, it follows that, since the world is the possession of Brahman, its existence is not contradicted by the knowledge afforded by the Upaniṣads, namely, that Brahman is without a second.

The objector might ask: If the world exists, how could negative judgments (such as "There is no jar") arise? We ask him in reply. "If the world were non-existent, how could affirmative judgments (like "There is a jar") arise?

(Should it be said that since both negative and affirmative cognitions do arise, the world is at once *sat* and *asat*, it is replied that) *sat* and *asat* cannot characterise the self-same entity; for they are contradictory qualities.

When contradictory qualities are attributed to the self-same entity on the strength of contradictory cognitions of 'existence' and 'non-existence', there is no certainty as to which of them is true. For this reason, the Jains declare that existence and non-existence could be attributed to the world.

सत्त्वप्राप्तिं पुरस्कृत्य नास्तीति प्रत्ययोदयात् ॥
सदा सत्वं प्रपञ्चस्य सांख्यास्तु प्रतिपेदिरे ।
सदसत्प्रत्ययप्राप्तविरुद्धद्वन्द्वसङ्कटे ॥
विरोधपरिहारार्थं सत्वासत्वांशभङ्गतः ।
सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्यं प्रपञ्चं केचिदूचिरे ॥
सत्त्वासत्त्वे विभागेन देशकालादिभेदतः ।
घटादेरिति मन्वाना व्यवस्थामपरे जगुः ॥
तदेवं वादिसंमर्दात्संशये समुपस्थिते ।
निर्णयः क्रियते तत्र मीमांसकमतेन तु ॥
घटस्वरूपे नास्तित्वमस्तित्वं यद्यबूबुधत् ।
स्यादेव युगपत्सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च घटादिषु ॥

Since the cognition of non-existence presupposes awareness of existence, the Sānkhyas maintain that the world is always characterised by existence.

In order to get over the contradiction presented by the mutually opposed qualities arising from the cognition of existence and non-existence, some thinkers, rejecting both the features of reality and unreality, assert that the world cannot be defined either as *sat* or as *asat* (*sadasadanirvacanīya*).

Finding that in regard to different times and places, both existence and non-existence could characterise jars and other objects, yet others believe that both existence and non-existence may characterise the world on the basis of certain well-defined spatial and temporal differences.

When doubt is engendered as a result of the keen controversy that rages between these rival theorists, a decision in regard to this matter is arrived at by us in accordance with the Mīmāmsaka theory.

If a person were to cognise the jar as being at once existent and non-existent, then only could the contradictory features of *satva* and *asatva* be attributed to the jar simultaneously. Since our cognitions

व्यवस्थितं निरस्तत्वाद्वादस्येह न संभवः ।
ननु देशादिसम्बन्धस्सत एवोपपद्यते ॥
न देशकालसम्बन्धादसतस्सत्त्वमिष्यते ।
सम्बन्धो द्व्याश्रयस्तस्मात्सतस्सत्त्वं सदा भवेत् ॥
असतः कारकैस्सत्त्वं जन्मनेत्यतिदुर्घटम् ।
आद्यन्तवान्प्रपञ्चोऽतस्सत्कक्ष्यान्तर्निवेक्ष्यते ॥

उक्तं च,

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति नास्ति मध्येऽपि तत्तथा ।
अतो निश्चितसद्भावस्सदा सन्नभ्युपेयताम् ।
असतस्सर्वदाऽसत्त्वं जन्ययोगात्खपुष्पवत् ॥
असत्वे न विशेषोऽस्ति प्रागत्यन्तासतोरिह ।

take the following form—"This exists here at this moment" or "It is not here at present"—as a consequence of differences of space, time and states, it has to be inferred that, on the basis of such distinctions of space, time and states, *satva* and *asatva* could be attributed simultaneously to the jar. Hence, it may be concluded that reality and unreality may both be attributed to the jar and the like on the basis of differences of space, time and so forth. This doctrine need not now be considered, as it has already been refuted.

Relation with space and time is intelligible only in the case of *sat* (i.e. The *asat* could not be in contact with space and time). How, then, could it be maintained that the unreal acquires reality with the aid of its relation with space and time? For relation (*sambandha*) is what is found in two relata. Thus the real (*sat*) always possesses the feature of reality. It is impossible for causal factors, however powerful, to create the quality of existence in what is essentially unreal. Hence the universe which has a beginning and end must be included in the category of reality. It has already been said that what does not exist at the beginning and in the end must also be non-existent in the middle. Therefore, from the certain fact of its existence now, let it be admitted that the world exists at all times.

Since unreality can never be created, it always belongs to the unreal, as in the case of the sky-flower. There is no distinction between what is absolutely non-existent and what does not exist at an antecedent time in so far as the aspect of non-existence is concerned, (i.e., differences of space, time and state could neither make the unreal real; nor could they make the real unreal).

.... ॥
श्वेतकेतुमुपादाय तत्त्वमित्यपि यच्छ्रुतम् ।
षष्ठप्रपाठके तस्य कुतो मुख्यार्थसम्भवः ॥
कार्पण्यशोकदुःखार्तश्वेतनस्त्वंपदोदितः ।
सर्वज्ञस्सत्यसङ्कल्पो निस्सीमसुखसागरः ॥
तत्पदार्थस्तयोरैक्यं तेजस्तिमिरवत्कथम् ।
त्वमर्थस्थे तटस्थे वा .... ॥
गुणे तत्त्वंपदश्रुत्योरैकार्थ्यं दूरवारितम् ।
अज्ञत्वसर्ववेदित्वदुःखित्वसुखितादिके ॥
विशेषणे वा चिद्धातो (द्व्यक्ते) रथवाप्युपलक्षणे ।
विरुद्धगुणसङ्क्रान्तेर्भेदस्स्यात् त्वन्तदर्थयोः ॥

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(The opponent may ask.—) When in the sixth chapter of the *Chandogya Upaniṣad,* taking the instance of Śvetaketu, it is declared "Tat tvam asi," how could the words 'tat' and 'tvam' be assigned their primary meanings? The finite soul which is afflicted by helplessness, misery and, sorrows is referred to by the term tvam. The omniscient Being, who has a will that is ever-realised and who is the sea of illimitable bliss, is the significance of the word 'tat.' How could these two, which are opposed to each other even as light is opposed to darkness, be equated ?

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When the qualities found in the object referred to by the term 'tat' and those belonging to the entity denoted by the term 'tvam' (are wholly opposed to one another?)......the view that the terms 'tat' and 'tvam' refer to an identical entity has been completely rejected. Whether characteristics such as ignorance and omniscience, suffering and enjoyment be taken as attributes (*viśeṣaṇas*) or as secondary marks (*upalakṣaṇas*) of the conscious entity, in any case the meanings of the terms *tat* and *tvam* must be different; since, otherwise, contradictory features would have to be attributed to an identical object.

वाच्यैकदेशभङ्गेन चिदेकव्यक्तिनिष्ठता ।
सोऽयं गौरितिवत्तत्त्वंपदयोरित्यपेशलम् ॥
देशकालदशाभेदादेकस्मिन्नपि धर्मिणि ।
विरुद्धद्वन्द्वसंक्रान्तेः सोऽयं गौरिति युज्यते ॥
स्वप्रकाशस्य चिद्धातोर्विरुद्धद्वन्द्वसंगतौ ।
न व्यवस्थापकं किंचिद्देशकालदशादिके (कं ?) ॥
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निर्धूतनिखिलद्वन्द्वस्वप्रकाशे चिदात्मनि ।
द्वैतानर्थभ्रमाभावाच्छास्त्रं निर्विषयं भवेत् ॥
एतेन सत्यकामत्वजगत्कारणतादयः ।
मा....(योपाधौ ?)परेऽध्यस्ताः शोकमोहादयः पुनः ॥
अविद्योपाधिके जीवे विनाशे(भागे ?)नेति यन्मतम् ।
क्षुद्रब्रह्मविदामेतन्मतं प्रागेव दूषितम् ॥

Nor is it reasonable to argue that here, as in the judgment "This is that cow", part of the primary meaning of the two terms is left out so that the terms *tat* and *tvam* signify only pure consciousness; for since to the self-luminous object two contradictory features could be attributed on the basis of limiting conditions such as time and place, the statement "This is that cow" is quite legitimate; whereas in the case of self-luminous consciousness there is none of the limiting conditions like time or place to justify the attribution of opposite qualities.

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Moreover, since in respect of self-luminous consciousness which is wholly without distinctions of any kind, there is nothing to generate the illusion of difference, which is the root cause of misery, the *śāstras* become purposeless, (i.e., the contention that the *śāstras* purport to dispel the illusion of multiplicity falls to the ground).

To obviate this difficulty, persons imperfetctly acquainted with the nature of Brahman may suggest that the qualities of having desires which are ever fulfilled (*satyakāmatvā*) and of being the cause of the world belong to Īśvara (who has *māyā* for his limiting condition), while qualities such as sorrow and delusion belong to the jīva who has *avidyā* for his limiting condition. But this view has already been refuted.

चित्स्वरूपे विशिष्टे वा मायाविद्याद्युपाधयः ।
पूर्वस्मिन् सर्वसांकर्यं परजीवाविभागतः ॥
उत्तरस्मिन्नपि तथा विशिष्टमपि चिद्यदि ।
चित्स्वरूपं हि निर्भेदं मायाविद्याद्युपाधिभिः ॥
विभिन्नमिव विभ्रान्तं विशिष्टं चेति .... (मन्यते ?)
तटस्थावस्थिता धर्माः स्वरूपं न स्पृशन्ति किम् ।
न हि दण्डि(दण्ड्य ?)शिरश्छेदाद्देवदत्तो न हिंसितः ॥
अचिदंशव्यपोहेन चिदेकपरिशेषता ।
अतस्तत्त्वमसीत्यादेरर्थ इत्यप्यसुन्दरम् ॥
अब्रह्मानात्मताभावे प्रत्यक् चित्परिशिष्यते ।
तत्त्वंपदद्वयं जीवपरतादात्म्यगोचरम् ॥
तन्मु(न मु ?)ख्यवृत्ति तादात्म्यमपि(त्म्यं यतो ?)वस्तुद्वयाश्रयम् ।
भेदाभेदविकल्पस्तु यस्त्वया परिचोदितः ॥

(We may ask:) Do limiting conditions such as *māyā* and *avidyā* relate to pure consciousness (*cit svarūpa*) or to consciousness possessed of qualifications (*viśiṣṭa*)? If it is the former, confusion would result; since it would be impossible to distinguish between jīva and Īśvara. If it is the latter, then also the same confusion would prevail. Should it be suggested that consciousness in itself is devoid of distinctions, but that, in association with *avidyā*, it deludes itself into believing that it is manifold and possessed of qualifications, we reply that the attributes belonging to an object as qualified (*taṭastha*) must certainly apply to it in itself (*svarūpa*). For example, from the fact of the beheading of Devadatta who had rendered himself liable to punishment, it is impossible to maintain that Devadatta in himself is not hurt.

Nor is it reasonable to assert that what is called *abrahman* or *anātman* does not exist, that what is left over is the inward consciousness and that the text "That thou art" signifies only this pure consciousness which remains after the elimination of the aspect of non-sentience. For the two terms, *tat* and *tvam*, of the text, which purports to teach the identity of the *jīva* and the lord, can be assigned their primary meaning (*mukhya-vṛtti*); and surely, identity presupposes two entities.

Since, on your theory, the world of multiplicity is unreal, in respect of the terms *tat* and *tvam* which do not denote at once difference and non-difference, there could be no identity (i.e., the terms are tautologous like "the jar is jar" or unidentifiable like "the jar is cloth"), it

अभेदाभेदिनोऽसत्ये बन्धे सति निरर्थकः ।
अभेदो भेदमर्दीति स्वाश्रयीभूतवस्तुनाः ॥
भेदः परस्परानात्म्यं भावानामेवमेतयोः ।
स्वरूपमभ्युपेत्यैव भेदाभेदविकल्पयोः ॥
....(विधानं ?)तेन वाग्बाधाविरोधेन निगृह्यसे ।
भिन्नाभिन्नत्वसंबन्धसदसत्त्वविकल्पनम् ॥
प्रत्यक्षानुभवापास्तं केवलं कण्ठशोषणम् ।
नीले नोलमतिर्याहृगुत्पले नीलधोर्हि सा ॥
नीलमुत्पलमेवेदमिति साक्षाच्चकास्ति नः ।
यथा विदितसंयोगसंबन्धेऽप्यक्षगोचरे ॥
भेदाभेदादिदुस्तर्कविकल्पाधानविभ्रमः ।
तद्वत्तादात्म्यसंबन्धे श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षमूलके ॥
श्रुतिदण्डेन दुस्तर्कविकल्पभ्रमवारणम् ।
निर्दोषाऽपौरुषेयी च श्रुतिरत्यर्थमादरात् ॥
असकृत्तत्त्वमित्याह तादात्म्यं ब्रह्मजीवयोः ।

is futile on your part to attempt to refute the notion of difference by suggesting that none of its alternatives (i.e. *bheda* being the very essence of the object or different therefrom) is tenable.

Further, since non-difference is what dispels the difference of its two substrates and since difference constitutes one object not being another, you yourself admit the essence of objects (*vastu-svarūpa*) as being distinct from *bhedābheda,* talk of the various alternatives as untenable and are thus vanquished by the inconsistency involved in your own position. All attempts to refute distinction by needless discussions, such as—Is it distinct or non-distinct? Is it related to the very essence of objects or not?—are falsified by perception and experience and are thus mere waste of lungs. The cognition "blue" is the same as the awareness "lotus"; for we directly get the apprehension "this is a blue lotus". When conjunction (*samyoga*) is the object of perception, it is erroneous to raise unnecessary questions such as "Does it relate distinct objects?"; even so when scripture and perception assert the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) of *tat* and *tvam,* such meaningless questions relating to it are knocked down by scripture in the shape of a stick (*danda*). The scripture which is self-existent (not the work of any person) and which is free from all defects earnestly and repeatedly declares that the finite self and the supreme self are identical in this sense.

ब्रह्मानन्दह्रदान्तस्थो मुक्तात्मा सुखमेधते ।
फले च फलिनोऽभावान्मोक्षस्यापुरुषार्थता ॥
एकशेषे हि चिद्धातोः कस्य मोक्षः फलं भवेत्।

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किञ्च प्रपञ्चरूपेण का नु संविद्विवर्तते ॥
न तावद्घटधीस्तस्यामसत्यामपि दर्शनात् ।
न हि तस्यामजातायां नष्टायां वाखिलं जगत् ॥
नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुमुक्तौ प्रत्यक्षबाधनात् ।
नाप्यन्यसंवित्तन्नाशेऽप्यन्येषामुपलम्भनात् ॥
ननु संविदभिन्नैका न तस्यामस्ति भेदधीः ।
घटादयो हि भिद्यन्ते न तु सा चित्प्रकाशनात् ॥
घटधीः पटसंवित्तिसमये नावभाति चेत् ।
नैवं घटो हि नाभाति सा स्फुरत्येव तु स्फुटम् ॥

(That the finite self and Brahman are not absolutely identical, as the opponent believes, and that even in mokṣa the jiva retains its distinctness is shown by the following description:) Dwelling in the depths of *Brahmānubhava*, the released soul experiences illimitable joy.

Since the enjoyer perishes at the time the fruit of his labours is realised, mokṣa would hardly be sought by man. If pure consciousness alone is left over, we ask: For whom is mokṣa?

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Moreover, which consciousness is it that has assumed the form of the world? It could not be the knowledge of the jar; for even in its absence the world is perceived. It is not proper to urge that before this knowledge arises and after it perishes in mokṣa the world does not exist; for this is contradicted by perception. Nor could it be the knowledge of something else; for, after that knowledge perishes, other objects are perceived.

The opponent may say that consciousness is one and indivisible, that there is no apprehension of distinctions within knowledge, for objects such as jars are distinct, while consciousness is not, since it is always present. (We may ask:) In view of the fact that when the cloth is cognised, the jar does not shine forth, how could it be said that knowledge is always present? The opponent may reply that it is only the jar that is not manifest but that knowledge clearly shines forth. To the

घटव्यावृत्तसंवित्तिरथ न स्फुरतीति चेत् ।
तद्व्यावृत्ति(त्त ?)पदेनापि किं सैवोक्ताऽथवेतरत् ॥
सैव चेद्भासतेऽन्यच्चेन्न ब्रूमस्तस्य भासनम् ।
किंचास्याः स्वप्रकाशाया नीरूपाया न हि स्वतः ॥
ऋते विषयनानात्वान्नानात्वावग्रहभ्रमः ।
न वस्तु वस्तुधर्मो वा न प्रत्यक्षो न लैङ्गिकः ॥
घटादिवेद्यभेदोऽपि केवलं भ्रमलक्षणः ।
यदा तदा तदायत्तो धीभेदावग्रहोदयः ॥
कुतः कुतस्तरां तस्य परमार्थत्वसंभवः ।
किंच स्वयंप्रकाशस्य स्वतो वा परतोऽपि वा ॥
प्रागभावादिसिद्धिः स्यात्स्वतस्तावन्न युज्यते ।
स्वस्मिन् सति विरुद्धत्वादभावस्यानवस्थितेः ॥

objection that consciousness does not shine forth as something distinct from jar, the opponent asks what is the precise significance of the expression "something distinct from the jar"? (He goes on to add). If it denotes consciousness, consciousness does shine forth; and if it signifies something else, such an entity is not said to shine. (He continues) moreover consciousness which, in its essential nature, is without a form and which is self-luminous is falsely taken to be manifold for no other reason except the multiplicity of objects known. Distinctions are neither objects themselves nor their attributes; nor are they open to perception and inference. The belief in the multiplicity of objects known, such as the jar, is illusory. Hence, (the opponent asks) how could knowledge become manifold on the basis of phenomenal entities like the jar? And much less could that distinction in knowledge be considered real.

(He goes on to add) Further, self-luminous consciousness has no antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) (i.e., consciousness is without a beginning and is eternal); (for should the antecedent non-existence of consciousness exist, it must be apprehended by consciousness itself or by some other means; but) the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not apprehended with the aid of consciousness itself or something else. The first alternative leads to a self-contradictory position; for when consciousness is, its own non-existence cannot be. When consciousness does

स्वनिमित्तप्रकाशस्य स्वस्याभावेऽप्यसंभवात् ।
अनन्यगोचरत्वेन चितो न परतोऽपि च ॥
किंच वेद्यस्य भेदादेर्न चिद्धर्मत्वसंभवः ।
रूपादिवदतः संविदद्वितीया स्वयंप्रभा ॥
अतस्तद्भेदमाश्रित्य यद्विकल्पादिजल्पितम् ॥
तदविद्याविलासोऽयमिति ब्रह्मविदो विदुः ।
हन्त ब्रह्मोपदेशोऽयं श्रद्दधानेषु शोभते ।
वयमश्रद्दधानाः स्मो ये युक्तिं प्रार्थयामहे ॥
प्रतिप्रमातृविषयं परस्परविलक्षणाः ।
अपरोक्षं प्रकाशन्ते सुखदुःखादिवद्धियः ॥
संबन्धिव्यङ्ग्यभेदस्य संयोगेच्छादिकस्य च ।
न हि भेदः स्वतो नास्ति नाप्रत्यक्षश्च संमतः ॥
यदि सर्वगता नित्या संविदेवाभ्युपेयते ।

not exist, a cognition for which it is itself responsible—cannot arise[7]. The second alternative, namely, that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is proved through some other source fares no better, for consciousness is not the object of anything else. (i.e. Any pramāṇa that is to prove the non-existence of consciousness must first cognize consciousness before it could speak of its non-existence. But consciousness is self-luminous and not the object of anything else).

Besides, since distinction and so forth are knowable, like colour, they cannot be the attributes of consciousness. Hence, consciousness is without a second. It is self-luminous. Therefore, those who know Brahman maintain that the foregoing questions regarding the various alternatives, based as they are on the belief that consciousness is manifold, are all the pranks of ignorance.

To this we reply "Well! all this dogmatic teaching may carry conviction with (blind) believers; we are lacking in such faith and search for logical reasons to convince us. Like pleasure and pain, all items of knowledge concerning various objects and obtained by different persons are directly apprehended as being distinct from one another.[8] Distinction

7. Vide *Ātma-siddhi* p. 35.

8. This and the succeeding stanza have been clearly elucidated in *Śrutaprakāśikā*, Jijñāsādhikaraṇa p. 89 (Nirnayasagara Press Edition.)

ततस्सर्वं सदा भायान्न वा किंचित्कदाचन ॥
तदानीं न हि वेद्यस्य सन्निधीतरकारिता ।
व्यवस्था घटते वित्तेर्व्योमवद्विभवाश्रयात् ॥
नापि कारणभेदेन नित्यायास्तदभावतः ।
न च स्वरूपनानात्वात्तदेकत्वपरिग्रहात् ॥
ततश्च बधिरान्धादेः शब्दादिग्रहणं भवेत् ।
गुरुशिष्यादिभेदश्च निर्निमित्तः प्रसज्यते ॥
ननु नस्संविदो भिन्नं सर्वं नाम न किंचन ।
अतस्सर्वं सदा भायादित्यकाण्डेऽनुयुज्यते ॥
इदमाख्याहि भोः किंनु नीलादिर्न प्रकाशते ॥
प्रकाशमानो नीलादिः संविदो वा न भिद्यते ।

is not denied to conjunction (*śamyoga*), desire (*icchā*) and so forth whose distinction is revealed by the relata. Nor is it admitted that they are not open to perception.[9]

"If consciousness is admitted to be eternal and all-pervasive, then all objects should shine forth at all times or none at all. It would not be appropriate to seek to explain why certain objects alone shine and not others on the basis of the proximity or otherwise of objects known; for, like ether (*ākāśa*), consciousness is admitted to be all-pervasive. Nor could this be explained on the basis of the differences in the causes of knowledge; for knowledge is eternal and has, consequently, no cause. Nor yet could it be explained on the basis of the diversity of knowledge itself; for you advocate the theory that knowledge is single. It would then follow that knowledge of sound and the like would have to arise even in the case of the deaf and the blind. Besides there would be no room for the distinction of teacher and pupil."

The opponent may object and say, "On our theory there is no 'all objects' distinct from consciousness. Hence, there is no propriety in your dogmatic charge that all objects should always be revealed".

To this we reply, "Well, tell me whether the jar and the like do not shine forth (as distinct from consciousness) or whether they appear but are not different from consciousness. If the former, your explanation of

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9. Compare *Śatadūṣaṇī*, Samvidadvaitabhangavāda (33).

आदौ प्रतीतिसुभगो निर्वाहो लोकवेदयोः ॥
यतः पदपदार्थादि न किंचिदवभासते ।
द्वितीये संविदोऽद्वैतं व्याहन्येत समीहितम् ॥
यद्ययं विविधाकारप्रपञ्चस्संविदात्मकः ।
साऽपिसंवित्तदात्मेति यतो नाना प्रसज्यते ॥
न चाविद्याविलासत्वाद् भेदाभेदानिरूपणा ।
सा हि न्यायानलस्पृष्टजातुषाभरणायते ॥
तथा हि यद्यविद्येयं विद्याभावात्मिकेष्यते ।
निरुपाख्यस्वभावत्वात्सा न किंचिन्नियच्छति ॥
अर्थान्तरमविद्या चेत्साध्वी भेदानिरूपणा ।
अर्थानर्थान्तरत्वादिविकल्पोऽस्या न युज्यते ॥
विद्यातोऽर्थान्तरं चासाविति सुव्याहृतं वचः ।

worldly and sacred knowledge is attractive indeed.[9] Since, on your theory, neither words nor their meanings shine forth, (it would be impossible to understand the world and much less the teaching of the scripture). If the latter, your view that consciousness is single would be in jeopardy; for, if the world with its manifold forms is consciousness itself, then consciousness too must be equated with the world and would thus come to be manifold.[10]

The opponent may say that since the world is the handiwork of avidyā (which cannot be described as being distinct or non-distinct), there is difficulty in deciding whether it is distinct or non-distinct from consciousness. But this is untenable; for *avidyā* is like a waxen jewel which is in contact with the fire of reasoning. To explain the matter fully.—If *avidyā* is said to be merely the absence of knowledge (i.e., if it is a negative principle) its nature would be indefinable (*nirupākhya-svabhāva*), it cannot be responsible for anything (i.e. for creating the world.)

If *avidyā* is something distinct from *vidyā* (i.e. if it is a positive entity) it would be ludicrous to hold that it is indescribable. (Your) statement that *avidyā* cannot be described as being distinct or non-distinct from *vidyā*, but that it is really an entity different from *vidyā* is indeed a fine piece of reasoning! If you were to urge that even this character

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10. Compare *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, 8.

अथार्थान्तरभावोऽपि तस्यास्ते भ्रान्तिकल्पितः ॥
हन्तैवं सत्यविद्यैव विद्या स्यात्परमार्थतः ।
किंच शुद्धाऽजडा संविदविद्येयं तु नेदृशी ॥
तत्केन हेतुना सेयमन्यैव न निरूप्यते ।
अपिचेयमविद्या ते यदभावादिरूपिणी ॥
सा विद्या किन्नु संवित्तिर्वेद्यं वा वेदिताऽथवा ।
वेद्यत्वे वेदितृत्वे च नास्यास्ताभ्यां निवर्तनम् ।
न हि ज्ञानादृतेऽज्ञानमन्यतस्ते निवर्तते ॥
संविदेवेति चेत्तस्या ननु भावादसंभवः ।
किंचेयं तद्विरुद्धा वा न तस्याः क्वापि संभवः ॥
यतोऽखिलं जगद्व्याप्तं विद्ययैवाद्वितीयया ।
अभावोऽन्यो विरुद्धो वा संविदोऽपि यदीष्यते ॥
तदानीं संविदद्वैतप्रतिज्ञां दूरतस्त्यज ।
किंचासौ कस्य जीवस्य को जीवो यस्य सेति चेत् ॥
नन्वेवमसमाधानमन्योन्याश्रयणं भवेत् ।

of its being distinct from *vidyā* is illusory, we reply that, if so, *avidyā* itself would in truth be *vidyā.* And we may ask: when consciousness is pure and is not insentient, while *avidyā* is the reverse, why is avidyā not considered to be distinct from vidyā? Is *vidyā,* whose negation is said to be *avidyā,* consciousness itself or the known or the knower? If it is either the known or the knower, *avidyā* cannot be removed by either of these; for *avidyā* (ignorance) cannot be dispelled by anything other than knoweldge. If *vidyā* is knowledge itself, *avidyā* could not possibly exist, since knowledge is eternal.

Further, if *avidyā* is the opposite (contradictory) of *vidyā,* ignorance cannot exist anywhere; for the entire world is pervaded by *vidyā* which is without a second. If *avidyā* is said to be a negative principle, or something other than *vidyā* or something opposed to it, then (you have to abandon the theory that consciousness (*samvit*) is without a second.

Moreover, for whom is this *avidyā*? (You may reply that it is) for the *jīva.* (We ask) who is a jīva? If you were to say the jīva is that to whom avidyā is ascribed, (we reply that) this leads to irreconcilable mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*); for there could be no *avidyā*

न ते(तें ?)जीवादविद्या स्यान्न च जीवस्तया विना ॥
न बीजाङ्कुरतुल्यत्वं जीवोत्पत्तेरयोगतः ।
ब्रह्मणश्चेन्न सर्वज्ञं कथं तद्भ्रमीति ते ॥
अविद्याकृतदेहात्मप्रत्ययाधीनता न ते ।
ब्रह्मसर्वज्ञभावस्य तत्स्वाभाविकताश्रुतेः ॥
भेदावभासगर्भत्वादथ सर्वज्ञता मृषा ।
तत एवामृषा कस्मान्न स्याच्छब्दान्तरादिवत् ॥
यथा शब्दान्तराभ्याससंख्याद्याः शास्त्रभेदकाः ।
भेदावभासगर्भाश्च यथार्थास्तादृशो न किम् ॥
सर्वज्ञे नित्यमुक्तेऽपि यद्यज्ञानस्य संभवः ।
तेजसीव तमस्तस्मान्न निवर्तेत केनचित् ॥

in the absence of the *jīva,* and there could be no *jīva* without *avidyā.* It could not be said that this is similar to the relation of seed and sprout; for it is impossible to ascribe origination to the *jīva.*

If *avidyā* is said to relate to Brahman, (we ask) how could the omniscient Being be subject to delusion? The character of being afflicted by the delusion that the body is itself the self—a delusion born of *avidyā*—cannot be attributed to Brahman whom the scripture declares to be omniscient and whose omniscience is said therein to constitute his essential nature.[11]

Should it be urged that, since it implies apprehension of diversity, omniscience must be considered illusory, (we ask the opponent): For the same reason, why should we not treat omniscience, like *śabdāntara,* and so forth, as being other than unreal? Just as *śabdāntara, abhyāsa, sankhyā*[12] and so on, which imply apprehension of difference and which mark off one *śāstra* from another and are considered real, why should not omniscience be treated likewise (i.e., as real)?[13]

If ignorance were to exist in the omniscient and the eternally free being, even as darkness exists in light, then ignorance could never be removed therefrom by anything whatsoever.

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11. Compare *Śatadūṣaṇī,* vāda 19. The alternative which conceives avidyā as *samsargābhāva* is here criticised.

12. Vide Pūrvā-mīmāṁsā. II. ii sections 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, II. iii. 11.

13. cf. Śrutaprakāśikā, Jijnyāsādhikarṇa—"śāstrabhedahḥ karmabhedo vā." The Prābhākara view is that the second chapter deals with *Śāstrabheda*; while the Bhāṭṭa theory is that it is devoted to a discussion of *Karmabheda,*

सर्वज्ञत्वादिवचनप्रामाण्यं व्यावहारिकम् ।
तात्त्विकं तु प्रमाणत्वमद्वैतवचसामिति ।
नियामकं न पश्यामो निर्बन्धात्तावकादृते ।
आश्रयप्रतियोगित्वे परस्परविरोधिनी ॥
कथं वैकरसं ब्रह्म सदिति प्रतिपद्यते ।
प्रत्यक्त्वेनाश्रयो ब्रह्मरूपेण प्रतियोगि चेत् ॥
रूपभेदः कुतस्त्योऽयं यद्यविद्याप्रसादजः ।
ननु सापि तदायत्तेत्यन्योन्याश्रयणं पुनः ॥

If it be said that the texts referring to omniscience and other qualities have only relative validity (*vyāvahārikaprāmāṇya*), while those speaking of non-dualism alone have absolute validity (*tāttvika-prāmāṇya*) we reply that for such a distinction there is no other basis excepting your own dogmatic assertion.

(If *avidyā* is treated as the mutual non-existence of *jñāna* (knowledge) it will have *vidyā* for its *pratiyogin* (that which is denied) and Brahman for its *āśraya* (support); and since *jñāna* (knowledge, *samvit*) is identified with Brahman itself, your position really amounts to this, that Brahman is at once the *āśraya* and the *pratiyogin* of *avidyā*. Against such a position we ask:) How can Brahman which is through and through of the same nature and which is the Highest Reality possess the two mutually opposed qualities of being the *āśraya* (basis) and the *pratiyogin* (what is denied) of *avidyā*?[14] If the opponent were to reply that, in its aspect as the jīva (*pratyak*), Brahman is the basis of *avidyā*, and that in its essential nature it is the *pratiyogin*, (we ask) whence these two aspects? To the possible answer that this distinction of aspects is the result of avidyā, we reply that, since *avidyā*, in its turn, depends on this distinction, your position is once again liable to be charged with the defect of mutual dependence (i.e. the fallacy of mutual dependence vitiates both the alternatives viz., that avidya relates to the jīva and that it relates to Brahman).

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14. cf. *Śatadūṣaṇī* vāda 19. Here the view that treats avidyā as anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence of knowledge) is critically considered.

अवस्तुत्वादविद्यायाः....(नैतत्तद्दूषणं यदि ?) ।
वस्तुनो दूषणत्वेन त्वया क्वेदन्निरीक्षितम् ॥
*उ....(स्वसाध्यसिद्धव ?)त्कारादोषोऽन्योन्यसमाश्रयः ।
न वस्तुत्वादवस्तुत्वादित्यतो नेदमुत्तरम् ॥
किंचाविद्या न चेद्व....(स्तु व्यवहारः कुतस्त्वयम् ?) ।
....(नचैष व्योम ?) पुष्पादिव्यवहारवदिष्यते ।
नाप्यवस्त्विति चो....(क्तिस्ते वस्तुतां तत्र साधयेत् ?) ॥
....(निषिध्यते ?) समस्तेन नञा वस्त्विति चेत्....(न तत् ?) ।
समस्तेन नञा वस्तु प्रथमं यन्निषिध्यते ।
प्रतिप्रसूतं व्यस्तेन पुनस्तदिति वस्तुता ॥
अतो न वस्तु ना .... (नावस्तु या विद्या तद्बले सति) ।
न न(भेदो न ?)कश्चकास्तीति विवक्षिर्या(क्षीर्मा ?)स्म जातुचित् ।

Should the opponent contend that his position really escapes the defect of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) in as much as *avidyā* is an unreality (*avastu*) we ask: Then in which entity (*vastu*) do you notice *anyonyāśraya*) to be a vitiating factor? (i.e. one who rejects everything other than Brahman as illusory cannot cite an object (*vastu*) where this defect is met with). The character of being a *vatsu* is not responsible for the charge of *anyonyāśraya* being levelled; but when a thing is said to depend for its very existence on its own product, this defect arises. Therefore, it is no proper reply to urge that since *avidyā* is an unreality your position is not open to the charge of *anyonyāśraya.*

Moreover, if avidyā is wholly unreal (avastu), we ask: How then does it come to be responsible for worldly activities (*vyavahāra*)? Wholly fictitious entities like the sky-flower are never noticed to serve the ends of practical life (*arthakriyākāri*). And your very statement that *avidyā* is a fiction hardly establishes that it is fictitious. If the opponent were to argue that reality is denied to avidyā by the negative particle found in compound word *'a-vastu'*, we reply that the negation is negated when single, uncompounded words (*vyasta*) like 'jar' and 'cloth' are used to refer to the world which is the handiwork of *avidyā.* Therefore, the opponent must not think of saying that *avidyā* is neither real nor unreal and that, while distinctions are unreal, they appear to be real on the strength of *avidyā.*

किंच प्रपञ्चनिर्वाहजननी येयमाश्रिता ॥
अविद्या सा किमेकैव नैका वा तदिदं वद ॥
तदाश्रयश्च संसारी तथैको नैक एव वा ।
सा चेदेका ततस्सैका शुकस्य ब्रह्मविद्यया ॥
पूर्वमेव निरस्तेति व्यर्थस्ते मुक्तये श्रमः ।
स्यान्मतं नैव ते सन्ति वामदेवशुकादयः ॥
यद्विद्यया निरस्तत्वान्नाद्याविद्येति चोद्यते ।
मुक्तामुक्तादिभेदो हि कल्पितो मदविद्यया ॥
दृश्यत्वान्मामकस्वप्नदृश्यभेदप्रपञ्चवत् ।
यत्पुनर्ब्रह्मविद्यातस्तेषां मुक्तिरभूदिति ॥
वाक्यं तत्स्वप्नमुक्त्युक्तियुक्त्या प्रत्यूह(ह्य ?)तामिति ।
नन्वीदृशानुमानेन स्वाविद्यापरिकल्पितम् ॥
प्रपञ्चं साधयत्य (न्न ?) न्यः कथं प्रत्युच्यते त्वया ।

State wehther the *avidyā* posited by you as generating and explaining the world-process is single or manifold. State also whether its substrate, viz., the soul in bondage is only one or many. If avidya is *single*, this unitary ignorance, having already been expelled by the realisation of Brahman attained by Śuka, your effort to secure final release (*mokṣa*) would indeed be wholly unnecessary.

It may be argued (by you as follows—) "In reality there never existed persons such as Vāmadeva and Śuka; it is only if they existed, it could be argued that *avidyā*, having already been dispelled by their realising Brahman, does not exist at present. Distinctions such as "releas-ed souls" and "souls in bondage" are projected by my ignorance; for they are perceived, like the world of multiplicity cognised in my dreams. The scriptural text, asserting that final release was attained by them (i.e., Vāmadeva and others) as a result of the realisation of Brahman, is as invalid as dream utterances concerning *mukti*".

We may meet this line of argument thus—How is another person who contends that the world is projected by his *avidyā* refuted by you?

त्वदविद्यानिमित्तत्वे यो हेतुस्ते विवक्षितः ॥
स एव हेतुस्तस्यापि भवेत्सर्वज्ञसिद्धिवत् ।
इत्यन्योन्यविरुद्धोक्तिव्याहते भवतां मते ॥
मुखमस्तीति यत्किंचित् प्रलपन्निव लक्ष्यसे ।
यथा च स्वाप्नमुक्त्युक्तिसदृशी तद्विमुक्तिगीः ॥
तथैव भवतोऽपीति व्यर्थो मोक्षाय ते श्रमः ।
यथा तेषामभूतैव पुरस्तादात्मविद्यया ॥
मुक्तिर्भूतोच्यते तद्वत्परस्तादात्मविद्यया ।
अभाविन्येव सा मिथ्या भाविनीत्यपदिश्यताम् ।
सन्ति च स्वप्नदृष्टानि दृष्टान्तवचनानि ते ॥
ननु नेदमनिष्टं मे यन्मुक्तिर्न भविष्यति ।
आत्मनो नित्यमुक्तत्वान्नित्यसिद्धैव सा यतः ।

The self-same reason which you advance to prove that the universe is projected by your avidyā is also open to him like *sarvajnasiddhi* (i.e. even as the claim that the Buddha is omniscient can also be made on behalf of Kapila).

As your doctrine is thus torn by mutually contradictory assertions, you seem to argue not because you have a case, but because you must be saying something. Just as the statements relating to their (i.e., Vāmadeva and others) release are no better than dream utterances, your propositions also (viz. that the world is a creation of your *avidyā* and that you must, therefore, endeavour to get rid of it) must share the same fate. Hence, your effort to secure *mokṣa* must indeed be futile. Again, if you could maintain that the scriptural passage mentions that, as a result of *Brahma-jñāna*, mukti was attained by Vāmadeva and others even when it was not attained, we might equally well say that your statement also speaks falsely of mukti as realisable in the future, when, in fact, it is not to be realised. The very examples you adduced, namely, utterances found in dreams, could be cited in support of the opposite contention.

(Perhaps your reply is.—) "Such a position, viz. that *mukti* is not something to be realised in future is not unaccepatble to me, because the self is eternally free from bondage and because freedom is ever existent."

तदिदं शान्तिकर्मादौ वेतालावाहनं भवेत् ।
येनैवं सुतरां व्यर्थो ब्रह्मविद्यार्जनश्रमः ।
अविद्याप्रतिबद्धत्वादथ सा नित्यसत्यपि ॥
असतीवेति तद्व्यक्तिर्विद्याफलमुपेयते ।
हस्तस्थमेव हेमादि विस्मृतं मृग्यते यथा ॥
यथा तदेव हस्तस्थमवगम्योपशाम्यति ।
तथैव नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपानवबोधतः ॥
संसारिणस्तथाभावो व्यज्यते ब्रह्मविद्यया ।
हन्त केयमभिव्यक्तिर्या विद्याफलमिष्यते ॥
स्वप्रकाशस्य चिद्धातोर्या स्वरूपपदे स्थिता ।
संवित्किं सैव किं वाऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीतीति कीदृशी ।
यदि स्वरूपसंवित्सा नित्यैवेति न तत्फलम् ॥
अथ ब्रह्माहमस्मीति संवित्तिर्व्यक्तिरिष्यते ।

Against this it may be urged that since, on this view, all efforts to secure *Brahma-vidyā* are wholly superfluous, your position amounts to invoking in ceremonies just those devils which are intended to be exorcised by them.

The opponent may contend that, although *mokṣa* is an eternal state, it is obscured by ignorance and appears, on that account, to be non-existent; and (he may add) that the fruit of knowledge is the manifestation of mokṣa (which has so far remained concealed). The presence of gold on the hand being forgotten, it is searched for; and after realising that it has all the while been on his hand, a person rests content. Even so, it is because of the failure to realise the true nature of the self which is ever free, that bondage is caused to the *samsārin,* and the nature of the self is manifested by knowledge of Brahman.

Our reply to this is.—Tell me what is meant by manifestation" *(abhivyakti)* which is said to result from the knowledge of Brahman. Is it consciousness which is the very essence of self-luminous intelligence? Or is it the knowledge "I am Brahman"? It cannot be the first; for consciousness which constitutes the very essence of Brahman, being eternal, cannot be the result of Brahma-vidyā. Nor could it be said that "manifestation" is merely the knowledge "I am Brahman"; for, on your theory,

ननु ते ब्रह्मविद्या सा सैव तस्याः फलं कथम् ॥
किंच सा तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्या भवन्मते ।
उत्पत्तिमत्यनित्येति मुक्तस्यापि भयं भवेत् ।
अपि च व्यवहारज्ञाः सति पुष्कलकारणे ।
कार्यं न जायते येन तमाहुः प्रतिबन्धकम् ।
इह किं तद्यदुत्पत्तुमुपक्रान्तं स्वहेतुतः ॥
अविद्याप्रतिबद्धत्वादुत्पत्तिं न प्रपद्यते ।
न मुक्तिर्नित्यसिद्धत्वान्न ब्रह्मास्मीति धीरपि ॥
न हि ब्रह्माहमस्मीति संवित्पुष्कलकारणम् ।
संसारिणस्तदाऽस्तीति कथं सा प्रतिबध्यते ॥
यतस्सा कारणाभावादिदानीं नोपजायते ।
न पुनः प्रतिबद्धत्वादस्थाने तेन तद्वचः ।
किंचैको जीव इत्येतद्वस्तुस्थित्या न युज्यते ।

such a knowledge is itself *Brahma-vidyā.* And how, we ask, could it be treated as the result of the latter?

Moreover, on your view, this knowledge arises from upaniṣadic texts such as 'That thou art' (tat tvam asi). And, on the principle that whatever has a beginning must have an end, the fear (that *mokṣa* may be lost at any time) may afflict even the released soul.

Besides the wise have defined *pratibandhaka* (obstacle) as that which prevents the appearance of the effect even in the presence of all the causal factors necesssary therefor. In the present case, what was it that was ready to emerge through the operation of its causal factors but failed to appear being prevented by the obstacle of ignorance (*avidyā*)? It cannot be *mukti;* for it is ever-existent. Nor could it be the knowledge "I am Brahman"; for, in the case of souls in bondage, the full complement of causes necessary for the birth of the apprehension "I am Brahman" not being present, how could it be said that this knowledge is counteracted by *avidyā*? As a matter of fact, this knowledge does not arise at present, not because it is prevented by counter-acting forces, but because of the absence of causal factors. Hence your position is beside the point.

Further the belief that there is only—a single soul (in the universe) is really unacceptable;[15] for, on your view, ignorance (*avidyā*),

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15. cf. *Śatadūṣaṇī,* vāda 61.

अविद्यातत्समाश्लेषजीवत्वादि मृषा हि ते ।
प्रातिभासिकमेकत्वं प्रतिभासपराहतम् ।
यतो नः प्रतिभासन्ते संसरन्तस्सहस्रशः ।
आसंसारसमुच्छेदं व्यवहाराश्च तत्कृताः ॥
अबाधिताः प्रतीयन्ते स्वप्नवृत्तविलक्षणाः ।
तेन यौक्तिकमेकत्वमपि युक्तिपराहतम् ।
प्रवृत्तिभेदानुमिता विरुद्धमितिवृत्तयः ॥
तत्तत्स्वात्मवदन्येऽपि देहिनोऽशक्यनिह्नवाः ।
यथानुमेयाद्वह्न्यादेरनुमानविलक्षणाः ॥
प्रत्यक्षं(क्ष्यं ?)ते तथाऽन्येभ्यो जीवेभ्यो न पृथक् कथम् ।
न चेच्चेष्टाविशेषेण परो बोद्धानुमीयते ॥
व्यवहारोऽवलुप्येत सर्वो लौकिकवैदिकः ।

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association therewith and the character of being *jīva* are only illusory (i.e., when the very notion of *jīva* is deemed illusory, its being single must be equally so).

The suggestion that the *jīva* is one, since it appears to be so, is contradicted by experience, for souls bound to *samsāra* do appear to us to be innumerable. The activities in which bound souls are engaged till the cessation of the cycle of births and deaths are not later shown to be false and are thoroughly unlike dream experiences. The singleness of the self sought to be established by reasoning could be disproved by reasoning iteslf.

Other souls which possess conflicting thoughts and activities and whose existence is inferred from their diverse behaviour cannot be argued away any more than each person could explain away his own existence. The fire whose existence is inferred is certainly different from observed instances of fire. Similarly where is the difficulty in considering that the souls whose existence is inferred from the behaviour of others are distinct from the self of which each person is directly aware? If it is not conceded that the presence of other selves is inferred from their behaviour, all activities, sacred and secular, would cease.

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नचौपाधिकभेदेन मेयमातृविभागधीः ।
स्वशरीरेऽपि तत्प्राप्तेः शिरःपाण्यादिभेदतः ॥
यथा तत्र शिरःपाणिपादादौ वेदनोदये ।
अनुसंधानमेकत्वे तथा सर्वत्र ते भवेत् ॥
प्रायणान्न(न्ना ?)रकक्लेशात्प्रसूतिव्यसनादपि ।
चिरातिवृत्ताः प्राग्जन्मभोगा न स्मृतिगोचराः ॥
युगपज्जायमानेषु....(मिथो ह्यस्मरणात्स्थितः ?) ।
आश्रयासङ्करस्तत्र कथमैकात्म्यविभ्रमः ॥

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It is futile to contend that the distinction of consciousness into 'knower' and 'known' is due to manifold limiting conditions. For (if that were so), the distinction between the various parts of the body such as the head and hands must lead to a belief in a plurality of selves within the selfsame body. Besides, if there be only one soul (in the universe), it must experience what is happening in all places, just as the injury to the head, hands or feet is felt by the organism.

(On the basis of the observed fact that the soul does not remember its own experiences in former lives, the opponent may assert that it is unnecessary for the self to know what is happening elsewhere. To this we reply that) self does not remember its experiences which took place in the remote past in former lives because of factors, such as death, torment in hell and birth-pangs. But as regards what takes place simultaneously (there being no remembrance), the substates of these experiences cannot be mixed up. How then could the delusion that there is only one soul arise?

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न च प्रातिस्विकाविद्याकल्पितस्वस्वदृश्यकैः ॥
जीवैरनेकैरप्येषा लोकयात्रोपपद्यते ।
परवार्तानभिज्ञास्ते स्वस्वस्वप्नैकदर्शिनः ॥
कथं प्रवर्तयेयुस्तां सङ्घाद्येकनिबन्धनाम् ।

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किं च स्वयंप्रकाशत्वविभुत्वैकत्वनित्यताः ।
त्वदभ्युपेता बाधेरन् संविदस्तेऽद्वितीयताम् ।
संविदेव न ते धर्माः सिद्धायामपि संविदि ।
विवाददर्शनात्तेषु तद्रूपाणां च भेदतः (भिन्नता ?) ।
न च ते भ्रान्तिसिद्धास्ते येनाद्वैताविरोधिनः ॥
तत्त्वावेदकवेदान्तवाक्यसिद्धा हि ते गुणाः ।

It cannot be maintained that social activities can be explained on the the basis of a plurality of souls each of which creates, with the aid of its individual avidyā, objects perceptible only to itself. How could *jīvas*, who are severally confined within their own dream creations and who are totally ignorant of the activities of others, carry on worldly activity which is possible only to a group of persons interacting with one another?

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Self-luminosity, unity, all-pervasiveness and eternity posited by you as the characteristics of consciousness really contradict your thesis that consciousness is without a second (*advitīya*). It is idle to argue that these are not the characteristics of consciousness, but that they constitute its very being; these features of consciousness namely, self-luminosity, unity and the like are distinct from one another; besides, while the existence of consciousness is accepted on all hands, keen controversy rages regarding its nature (or characteristics). It cannot be urged that these are illusory and, hence, do not contradict the theory of non-dualism. For these qualities are learnt from upaniṣadic texts which aim at revealing the true nature of reality.

आनन्दस्वप्रकाशत्वनित्यत्वमहिमाद्यथ ॥
ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेवेष्टं तत्रापीदं विविच्यताम् ।
ब्रह्मेति यावन्निर्दिष्टं तन्मात्रं किं सुखादयः ॥
अथवा तस्य ते यद्वा त एव ब्रह्मसंज्ञिनः ।
आद्ये तत्तत्पदाम्नानवैयर्थ्यं वेदलोकयोः ॥
पूर्वोक्तनीत्या भेदश्च जगज्जन्मादिकारणम् ।
अभ्युपेत्यैव हि ब्रह्म विवादास्तेषु वादिनाम् ॥
द्वितीये सैव तैरेव ब्रह्मणस्सद्वितीयता ।
तृतीये ब्रह्म भिद्येत तन्मात्रत्वात्पदे पदे ॥
तत्समूहोऽथवा ब्रह्म तरुवृन्दविनाश(वनादि ?)वत् ।

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If, as you say, bliss, self-luminosity, eternity, greatness and the like are really the essence of Brahman (and not its qualities), let this position be clarified by you. (You must say that) terms such as 'bliss' either stand exactly for what the word Brahman signifies or that what are signified by them belong to him (i.e., they are its attributes); or they alone go by the name of Brahman.

(None of these alternatives is tenable; for) on the first alternative, there would be no need to employ these different expressions in daily life and in scriptures (the term Brahman being quite sufficient). Besides, as already pointed out, while Brahman is posited as the cause of the world, rival philosophers dispute its nature; hence, they (i.e., Brahman, bliss and so forth) must be distinct. The second alternative is scarcely better; for with these for its qualities, Brahman would certainly come to be regarded as having distinctions. On the third alternative, since each of these (i.e., bliss and the like) is itself Brahman, there would be a plurality of Brahmans. To obviate this difficutly, it might be said that all these together constitute Brahman even as a collection of trees constitutes a forest. (But even this would fare no better, because, on your theory, Brahman is a partless whole of reality).

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प्रकर्षश्च प्रकाशश्च भिन्नावेवार्कवर्तिनौ ।
तेन न क्वापि वाक्यार्थाविभागेऽस्ति निदर्शनम् ॥
जाड्यदुःखाद्यपोहेन यद्येकत्रैव वर्तिता ।
ज्ञानानन्दादिशब्दानां न सतस्सद्वितीयता ॥
अपोहाः किं न सन्त्येव सन्तो वा नोभयेऽपि वा ।
सत्त्वे सत्सद्वितीयं स्याज्जडाद्यात्मकतेतरे(स्यादसत्त्वे तु जडात्मता ?) ॥
सदसद्व्यतिरेकोक्तिः पूर्वमेव पराकृता ।
तथात्वे च घटादिभ्यो ब्रह्मापि न विशिष्यते ।
किंचापोह्यजडत्वादिविरुद्धार्थासमर्पणे ॥
नैव तत्तदपोह्येत तदेकार्थैः पदैरिव ।

(It is unreasonable to argue that these descriptions really teach a partless whole of meaning (*akhandārtha*), just as the statement "The sun is resplendent and luminous" denotes a single, partless reality). For the luminosity and splendour existing in the sun are really different; and you cannot cite anywhere an instance in support of your contention that a partless whole of meaning is conveyed by the text.[16]

It may be urged that, since the terms *jñāna, ānanda* and the like merely refer to the absence of non-intelligence, suffering and so forth, and thereby denote only a unitary entity, Brahman could not be said to be possessed of distinctions. But this is futile; for this absence must be either real or unreal or neither real nor unreal. (None of these is acceptable, for) the first alternative would imply that Brahman is endowed with distinctions. On the second alternative, it would follow that Brahman is non-intelligent. And the third alternative has already been refuted. Besides, on that view, Brahman would scarcely be different from objects like the jar. Moreover, so long as the terms *jñāna, ānanda* and the like are not taken to signify the features opposed to non-intelligence and the like which are said to be excluded they could not really be said to have been eliminated; even as terms signifying the character of non-intelligence (*jaḍatva*) are incapable of denying these qualities. (Taking his stand on the view that

16. cf. *Śatadūṣaṇī*, vāda 38.

प्रतियोगिनि दृश्ये तु या भावान्तरमात्रधीः ॥
सैवाभाव इतीहापि सद्भिस्ते सद्वितीयता ।
भूतभौतिकभेदानां सदसद्व्यतिरेकिता ॥
कुतोऽवसीयते किन्नु प्रत्यक्षादेरुतागमात् ।
प्रत्यक्षादीनि मानानि स्वं स्वमर्थं यथायथम् ।
व्यवच्छिन्दन्ति जायन्ते इति यावत्स्वसाक्षिकम् ।
यथाग्रतस्स्थिते नीले नीलिमान्यकथा न धीः ॥
एकाकारा न हि तथा स्फटिके धवले मतिः ।
क्षीरे मधुरधीर्यादृक् नैवं निम्बकषायधीः ॥
व्यवहाराश्च नियताः सर्वे लौकिकवैदिकाः ।
सत्यं प्रतीतिरस्त्यस्या मूलं नास्तीति चेन्न तत् ॥
सा चेदस्ति तया मूलं कल्प्यतां कार्यभूतया ।
क्लृप्तञ्चेन्द्रियलिङ्गादि तद्भावानुविधानतः ॥

negation is merely the perception of an object when some other perceptible entity is not cognized (e.g. the negation of the jar is no other than the perception of the bare ground) the opponent may argue that Brahman is non-dual, since the absence of non-intelligence is no other than knowledge of pure Brahman, and not an attribute thereof. But even then it would follow that Brahman has distinctions (since knowledge of Brahman will not convey the idea of the absence of nonintelligence, sorrow and the like so long as intelligence, bliss and the like are not attributed to it).

Is it perception and the like or scripture that establishes the theory that the elements and what is born of them are distinct at once from reality and unreality? Each one knows for himself that perception and other pramāṇas reveal their respective objects as something specific. The cognition of a blue flower in front of the perceiver is not of the same form as that of a white crystal. The apprehension of milk as something sweet is not of the same kind as that of morgosa as something bitter. Thus, all items of knowledge, sacred and secular, are marked off from one another.

(The opponent may argue as follows.) "True, distinct cognitions do arise; but they have no basis in fact." (To this it may be replied that) if the presence of varied cognitions is admitted, the cause of these must be ascertained. And the senses and reason are their well-known causes; for these cognitions arise whenever they are present.

यौगपद्यक्रमायोगाद्व्यवच्छेदविधानयोः ।
ऐक्यायोगाच्च भेदो न प्रत्यक्ष इति यो भ्रमः ॥
भेदेतरेतराभावधीवेगा(विवेका ?)ग्रहणेन सः ।
स्वरूपमेव भावानां प्रत्यक्षेण परिस्फुरत् ॥
भेदव्याहारहेतुः स्यात्प्रतियोगिव्यपेक्षया ।

The opponent may hold the erroneous view that distinction (*bheda*) cannot be the object of perception, since the object itself (*svarūpa*) and its distinction from other things (*bheda*) cannot be apprehended either simultaneously or in succession, and since these two apprehensions are not identical.[17] This false view is due to his failure to realise that *svarūpa* and *bheda* are non-different.

In the light of the *pratiyogin* (that which is denied), the object itself which is revealed by perception is responsibile for the apprehension and

17. Akhaṇḍavākyārthabhaṅgavāda.

17. Those who do not subscribe to the notion of difference (*bheda*) may argue as follows.—"Whoever accepts the notion of difference believes that it is open to perception. Let him state clearly whether the apprehension of an object itself (*svarūpa-grahaṇa*) and the apprehension of its distinction from other objects (*bheda-grahaṇa*), which are both the result of perception, are identical with or different from each other. If they are distinct, it may be asked, does perception grasp an object or its distinction from others or both these? If perception is said to grasp both, there is the further question: Are both these grasped simultaneously or in succession? *Svarūpagrahaṇa* and *bhedagrahaṇa* cannot be identified as one; for to treat them as identical would amount to attributing to the self-same experience the contradictory qualities of not depending on a *pratiyogin* (in the case of *svarūpagrahaṇa*) and depending upon the *pratiyogin* (in the case of *bhedagrahaṇa*). It is equally difficult to treat them as distinct; for, if perception were to grasp the object (*svarūpa*) only, clearly it cannot apprehend *bheda*. And perception cannot grasp difference only; since the cognition of difference presupposes apprehension of *svarūpa*. Nor is the view that perception apprehends both *svarūpa* and *bheda* tenable; for this apprehension must be either simultaneous or successive. But it cannot be simultaneous, since knowledge of difference presupposes cognition of *svarūpa* and remembrance of *pratiyogin*; while *svarūpagrahana* does not stand in need of any of these. Nor could *svarūpa* and *bheda* be grasped in succession; since perception is momentary and cannot last until the experience of *bheda* which occurs only at the next moment.

Vide *Prameyamālā* of Vātsya Varadaguru, Annamalai University Journal.

यथा तन्मात्रधीर्नाना नास्तिव्याहारसाधनी ॥
ह्रस्वदीर्घत्वभेदा वा यथैकत्र षडङ्गुले ।
एवं व्यवस्थितानेकप्रकाराकारवत्तया ॥
प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रपञ्चस्य सद्भावोऽशक्यनिह्नवः ॥

* * *

आगमः कार्यनिष्ठत्वादीदृशेऽर्थे न तु प्रमा ॥
प्रामाण्येऽप्यन्वयायोग्यपदार्थत्वान्न बोधकः ।
नासत्प्रतीतेर्बाधाच्च न सदित्यपि यन्न तत् ॥
प्रतीतेरेव सत्किन्न बाधान्नासत्कुतो जगत् ।
तस्मादविद्ययैवेयमविद्या भवताऽऽश्रिता ॥

belief in multiplicity (*bheda-vyavahāra*); just as the knowledge of an object in itself leads to manifold negations and just as an object six inches long may (in the light of objects longer or shorter than this) be considered short or long.

Thus the character of possessing distinctions cannot be denied to the world since it is perceived to possess diverse well-defined shapes and forms.

* * * *

(Having shown that perception does not establish that the world is sadasadvilakṣaṇa the author proceeds to show that scripture also fails to establish that point).

Since the scripture speaks of what has to be accomplished (*kārya*), it cannot be considered an authority in this matter (i.e., with regard to matters of fact, namely, *siddha*). Even if it be considered authoritative in this regard it cannot be said to teach this unintelligible doctrine; for the different elements of your doctrine do not fit in with one another.

(Here it is shown that inference too fails to establish that the world is indescribable as *sat* or *asat*).

It is argued that *avidyā* and its products cannot be described as unreal (*asat*), since they are perceived and that it is equally difficult to define them as real (*sat*), since they are later contradicted. But this does not stand to reason; for (it may well be asked) why should not the world be treated as real (*sat*), since it is perceived, and as unreal (*asat*), since it is later contradicted? Hence it is clear that this notion of *avidyā* (ignorance) is posited by you in ignorance.

किंच भेदप्रपञ्चस्य धर्मो मिथ्यात्वलक्षणः ।
मिथ्या वा परमार्थो वा नाद्यः कल्पोऽयमञ्जसा ॥
तन्मिथ्यात्वे प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वं दुरपह्नवम् ।
पारमार्थ्येऽपि तेनैव तवाद्वैतं विहन्यते ॥
सर्वाण्येव प्रमाणानि स्वंस्वमर्थं यथोदितम् ।
असतोऽर्थान्तरेभ्यश्च व्यवच्छिन्दन्ति भान्ति नः ।
तथाहीह घटोऽस्तीति येयं धीरुपजायते ॥
सा तदा तस्य नाभावं पटत्वं वाऽनुमन्यते ।
नन्वस्तीति यदुक्तं किं तन्मात्रं घट इत्यपि ।
अर्थान्तरं वा तन्मात्रे सदद्वैतं प्रसज्यते ।
अर्थान्तरत्वे सिद्धं तत्सदसद्भ्यां विलक्षणम् ॥

Is the character of unreality (*mithyātva*) attributed by you to the world of multiplicity unreal or real? It cannot be the former; because if the unreality of the world is itself phenomenal, then the reality of the world becomes irrefutable. It cannot be the latter, because if mithyātva were real then your theory of non-dualism would have to be given up. As already pointed out, all pramāṇas are known to us as marking off their respective objects from their opposites (*asat*) and from their distincts (*arthāntara*). For example, when there arises the awareness, "The jar exists," it rules out the assertion of the non-existence of the jar or of the attribution of clothness to the jar.

The opponent may try to meet this by arguing as follows.—"In the cognition 'The jar exists', the word 'jar' conveys either the same meaning as 'existence' (Brahman) or something else. If it is the former, it would follow that reality is non-dual; (because other propositions little this, 'the cloth exists', "tree exists" and so on will convey the same idea, viz., existence); if it is the latter what is signified by the term 'jar' must be incapable of being defined either as *sat* or *asat* (*sadasadanirvacanīya*), (because the term *ghaṭa* would then imply something distinct from existence (*sadvilakṣaṇa*) and would at the same time be (asadvilakṣṇa) something positive.

यद्येवमस्ति ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मौपनिषदं मतम् ।
घटवत्सदसत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वाच्यं तवापतेत् ।
आनन्दसत्यज्ञानादिनिर्देशैरेव वैदिकैः ।
ब्रह्मणोऽप्यतथाभावस्त्वयैवैवं समर्थितः ॥
सदसद्व्यतिरेकोक्तिः प्रपञ्चस्य च हीयते ।
यद्यथा किंचिदुच्येत तत्सर्वस्य तथा भवेत् ॥
तस्मादस्तीति संवित्तिर्जायमाना घटादिषु ।
तत्तत्पदार्थसंस्थानपारमार्थ्यावबोधिनी ॥
सजातीयविजातीयव्यवच्छेदनिबन्धनैः ।
स्वैःस्वैर्व्यवस्थितै रूपैः पदार्थानां तु या स्थितिः ॥
सा सत्ता न स्वतन्त्राऽन्या तत्राद्वैतकथा कथम् ।
नच नानाविधाकारप्रतीतिश्शक्यनिह्नवा ॥

To this we reply that, if so, you would have to admit that Brahman also, like the jar, is indescribable as *sat* or *asat;* for the cardinal teaching of the upaniṣads is "Brahman exists" (asti Brahman). And you yourself have established, with the aid of vedic texts speaking of Brahman being bliss (*ānanda*), reality (*sat*), and knowledge (*jñāna*), that Brahman is distinct from bliss and the like. (Logically, in your statement The world is *sadasadanirvacanīya*' the term "world" must signify something different from indescribable as sat or asat). Therefore, it is impossible for you to speak of the world as being distinct from reality and unreality. What is said of one instance should apply to all identical or parallel instances.

The knowledge of *sattā* (existence) arising in the case of objects like the jar does reveal the reality of diverse configurations of objects.

Existence (*sattā*) is no other than the continuity of objects along with their specific and well-defined forms or configurations which are responsible for their distinction from smilar (*sajātīya*) as also from dissimilar (*vijātīya*) objects, (i.e. from objects of the same class as also from those belonging to other classes). And it (*sattā*) is no independent entity. How, then, is it at all possible to speak of non-dualism? It is impossible to deny the apprehension of diverse configurations.

न वेद्यं वित्तिधर्मस्स्यादिति यत्प्रागुदीरितम् ।
तेनापि साधितं किञ्चित्संविदोऽस्ति नवा त्वया ॥
अस्ति चेत्पक्षबाध(पात ?)स्स्यान्न चेत्ते विफलश्श्रमः ।
अतस्स्वरसविस्पष्टदृष्टभेदास्तु संविदः ।
यथास्था(रथा)दिभिर्वा .... ह्यैनैक्यं याति घटादिभिः ।
(यथावत्स्थायिभिर्ह्यैनैक्यं यान्ति घटादिभिः ?) ।
सहोपलम्भनियमान्नान्योऽर्थस्संविदो भवेत् ।
यदेतदपराधीनस्वप्रकाशं तदेव हि ।
स्वयंप्रकाशता शब्दमिति (स्वयंप्रकाशशब्दार्थ इति ?)वृद्धाः प्रचक्षते ।
यस्मिन्नभासमाने हि यो नामार्थो न भासते।
नासावर्थान्तरस्त(रं त ?)स्मान्मिथ्येन्दुरिव चन्द्रतः ।

As regards your statement: 'What is known (i.e. *sattā*) cannot be an attribute of knowledge (Brahman), (we ask:) From this statement is anything established regarding *samvit* (consciousness) or not? If it is the former, your doctrine of non-dualism would have to be sacrificed;[18] if it is the latter, your effort is wholly wasted.

Therefore, various cognitions which are clearly and readily known to be distinct from one another cannot be identified with objects like the jar which endure (i.e., are not momentary like cognitions).

The opponent may argue that objects are not distinct from knowledge, since they are invariably cognized together. The wise declare that the term self-luminous (*swayamprākāśa*) denotes that which is able to manifest itself without depending on anything else. That object which remains unmanifest so long as another does not present itself cannot be considered to be distinct therefrom; just as the falseby perceived double moon is non-different from the real moon.[19] When know-

18. A variant reading is 'pakṣapāta'. On this reading the text would mean—"If the former, you must be considered partial (in as much as you attribute *nirdharmakatva* (the character of having no qualities) to Brahman, while denying all other attributes even when they are established by various pramāṇas). cf *Śrutaprakāśikā*

19. cf. Sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīladaddhiyoh |
Bhedaś ca bhrānti vijñanai dṛśya indāvivādvaye ||

अभासमाने विज्ञाने नचात्मार्थावभासनम् ।
इति संविद्विवर्तत्वं प्रपञ्चः स्फुटमञ्चति ।
.... मैवं .... परिभवः(मा नामैवं भवान्ब्रूतात् ?)प्रत्यक्षेण बलीयसा ।
संरक्ष्यमाणभेदास्ते नानुमानानुवर्तिनः ।
तथाहीदमहं वेद्मीत्यन्योन्यानात्मना स्फुटम् ।
त्रयं साक्षाच्चकास्तीति सर्वेषामात्मसाक्षिकम् ।
प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपक्षं च नानुमानं प्रवर्तते ।
न हि वह्नेरनुष्णत्वं द्रव्यत्वादनुमीयते ।
किञ्च हेतुर्विरुद्धोऽयं सहभावो द्वयोर्यतः ।
तवा हि नत् हि (तथाहि नहि ?) संवित्तिस्स्वात्मना सह भासते ।
[20]सहोपलंभनियमो न खल्वेकैकसंविदा ।
न चेदस्ति ससामान्यं सर्वं संवेदनास्पदम् ।

ledge (*vijñāna*) is not manifest neither the self nor the object is revealed. Therefore, the world-process is an illusory presentation of knowledge. To this we reply that distinctions, being established by perception which is of superior validity, cannot explain them away by your reasoning. To explain it fully.—In the cognition "I know this", each person realises in his own experience, clearly and distinctly that the three—the knower, the known and knowledge—shine forth separately and without being mixed up with one another. Inference cannot go against the evidence of perception. Surely, it is never inferred that fire does not burn, since it is a substance

Moreover, (in your argument that since thought and things always go together, they must be identical), the *hetu* (reason) is liable to be charged with the defect of *viruddha*. For 'going together' necessarily implies two objects. Surely knowledge cannot be said to be manifest along with itself; (it can only be manifest along with some object or other). Further, if (on your theory there is no universal (*sāmānya*) apart from the different particulars) what goes by the name of knowledge must be unaccompanied by what may be called knowledge in general, each item of knowledge must be said to be manifest in association with all objects; but it is not so.[20]

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20. Though this stanza is found earlier in the printed books and manuscripts, this appears to be the proper place.

नोलाद्युपप्लवापेतस्वच्छचिन्मात्रसन्ततिः ।
स्वापादौ भासते नैवमर्थस्संवेदनात्पृथक् ।
तेन संवेदनं सत्यं संवेद्योऽर्थस्त्वसन्निति ।
तदेतदपरामृष्टस्ववाग्बाधस्य जल्पितम् ।
सहोपलम्भनियमो येनैवं सति हीयते ।
यस्माद्दते यदाभाति भाति तस्माद्दतेऽपि तत् ।
घटाद्दतेऽपि निर्भातः पटादिव घटस्स्वयम् ।
.... ॥

॥ इतः परं संवित्सिद्धिर्नोपलभ्यते ॥

नमो नमो यामुनाय यामुनाय नमो नमः ।
नमो नमो यामुनाय यामुनाय नमो नमः ॥

श्रीरस्तु.

The opponent may argue that in the state of deep sleep, the stream of pure consciousness alone shines forth uncontaminated by objects such as the jar. Therefore, objects are not distinct from knowledge. Knowledge (*samvit*) alone is real; while objects are unreal.

To this we reply that it is the prattle of one who fails to realise the contradiction in one's own statement; for there could be no invariable presentation of thought and things together, if the two were really identical. Moreover, if consciousness could manifest itself without objects, the latter too must present themselves in the absence of consciousness; even as the jar may manifest itself without the presentation of the cloth, which, in its turn may present itself without the awareness of the jar.

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